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| October 7, 1999 |
| October 7, 1999 |
1. Getting Ready for the First 25 Years
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
Forget the next century, let alone the next millennium. If the Pentagon doesn't get serious about changing the way it prepares for war, the United States may find that other nations' militaries have beaten it in the transformation game. (Transformation is one of the latest buzzwords; it refers to the RMA or Revolution in Military Affairs, itself shorthand in the military for what civilians would call reinventing the wheel.)
Since release of the National Defense Panel (NDP) critique (Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century) of the Pentagon's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the chorus of government committees and nongovernmental groups urging reforms has been increasing.
The latest to join in is the prestigious Defense Science Board (DSB), a panel of outside experts that evaluates Pentagon programs and provides recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. In an August, 1999 report unofficially obtained by the trade publication "Defense News," the DSB noted that the Pentagon is talking the talk of significant change in force structure and warfighting doctrine and tactics but so far has not really walked the walk. Moreover, the DSB failed to detect "much sense of urgency" at the top levels of the Pentagon hierarchy.
Evidence supporting the DSB conclusion is ample.
-Even as it talks about being ready to fight along the littoral and needing ships that can get close to shorelines to operate in "brown water," the Navy is still buying nuclear powered aircraft carriers that are becoming increasingly vulnerable to stand-off land-based anti-ship cruise missiles.
-The Army last year rejected formation of a medium-weight Strike Force that, being more agile and requiring less sea and air lift than heavy armored divisions, would be able to get to potential trouble spots faster.
-The Air Force/Navy/Marines are still planning to buy some 3,700 new tactical aircraft costing $350 billion, but the Pentagon hasn't allocated enough money to pay for the three programs. One nonpartisan outside budget review estimates that the Pentagon would have to add at least $3 billion per year over the next quarter century to pay for its tactical aircraft procurement program.
-The Pentagon has just formed the Joint Readiness Command (formerly Atlantic Command). Its mission is to develop doctrine and methods for planning and implementing operations involving more than one service (which in the future, along with operations involving allies, will likely be the norm -- Kosovo notwithstanding). This means it must have a say in what weapons and supporting systems need to be developed so that the capabilities of the individual services mesh in battle. But equipment development remains a jealously guarded service prerogative because equipment helps defines the roles and missions of the services and the slice each gets of the Pentagon's budget. What is a Navy without aircraft carriers and submarines or an Army without tanks and artillery?
There are some small rays of hope that the Pentagon may be changing course. Under Secretary of Defense Jacques Gansler has told the services to put more emphasis on upgrading current weapons platforms and buying more precision guided munitions. He has also made cost a major consideration, along with performance and interoperability, for future weapons, and directed that the practice of "re-baselining" costs (starting over again) to hide long time delays and unacceptable price increases is to end. Given that many weapons systems such as the F-22 and the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter have been in development for so long (well over the already long average of 11-12 years to produce), it can be difficult for both the public and Congress to keep track of the real costs of weapons.
Within the services themselves things may be changing also. The Air Force is attempting to lighten its deployable battle management system so that it can be carried on one-tenth the number of aircraft currently required. The Army's new Chief of Staff is expected to announce next week that the service will reverse direction and create a mobile Strike Force. The Army is also expected to accelerate efforts to develop lighter tanks and artillery that will reduce its airlift requirements.
If these and similar measures are pursued, perhaps the Pentagon's "transformation" will happen. Such efforts in the past have faltered because of service parochialism and the lack of continuing strong leadership and pressure from senior Pentagon civilian leaders. The chief danger in this current drive is time: this Administration is about to enter its final full year in office, and those who are set and comfortable in the old ways may try to outlast the reforms. Should they succeed, the Pentagon will go into the next quarter century unreformed and -- perhaps -- unreformable.
Change for the sake of change gains nothing. But change is the only constant, and in the age of instant communications and transnational events only those who master the rapid pace of change will have the requisite ability to react and stay ahead of the competition. And that is what we expect of our military.
Albright Expands U.S. Small Arms Policy at United Nations
By Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
For the first time in the history of the United Nations, small arms were the topic of a UN Ministerial in the Security Council. Convened at the initiation of Dutch Foreign Minister Jozias Van Aartsen, the Council adopted a resolution detailing the Security Council's recommendations for action against the worldwide scourge of small arms.
Minister Van Aartsen said there were four reasons that small arms must be on the Security Council's agenda. First, small arms pose a challenge to disarmament, peace-building, crime prevention, and development. Second, the international community has now recognized the need to implement voluntary moratoriums on arms exports to regions of conflict and zones of tension. Third, because of the widespread devastation caused by small arms in post-conflict societies, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants must be included as key components of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Lastly, the Security Council must strengthen and enforce the implementation of arms embargoes.
The Netherlands, which holds the Security Council presidency, invited UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to address the Ministerial and explain how small arms affect all levels of security. Annan said, " The proliferation of small arms, ammunition, and explosives has also aggravated the violence associated with terrorism and organized crime. Even in societies not beset by civil war, the easy availability of small arms has in many cases contributed to violence and political instability."Annan stressed that stemming the easy availability of small arms is paramount for creating of successful peace-building processes and resolving conflicts.
While welcoming the recent efforts of governments to reduce small arms proliferation, Annan praised the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in fighting the devastating effects of small arms and in creating the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). (A press conference was held the day before the Ministerial, in which IANSA representatives, the Dutch Foreign Minister, and the UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs met to discuss the importance of placing small arms on the Security Council agenda.)
All fifteen members of the Security Council addressed the Ministerial. U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright's statement drew heavily on a previous speech at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in July and upon a recent State Department report on small arms in Africa. (For more information on both the NAACP speech and State Department Report, please see "Albright Speech and Report Link Arms and Conflict in Africa," By Rachel Stohl, Weekly Defense Monitor, July 22, 1999.)
Albright reiterated the rationale for the U.S. stance on small arms. "Although prices are low, the social cost of arms sales is high. Countries that are among the world's poorest spend hundreds of millions of dollars buying small arms and other weapons. Funds are diverted, crops are mortgaged, and relief supplies are stolen to finance these purchases. In each case, it is the people who are the losers." Albright pledged that "we commit ourselves to strengthening our coordination, promoting disarmament in peacekeeping operations, and improving the enforcement of small arms embargoes."
During her speech, Albright also announced an important shift in U.S. arms export policy. She said the United States "will refrain from selling arms to regions of conflict not already covered by arms embargoes." Previously, the United States had used UN arms embargoes and State Department definitions of rogue states in determining which states would be ineligible to receive U.S. weapons. By expanding the criteria to countries involved in conflict, the United States is taking a significant step in reducing its small arms trade.
Albright then reflected on the "economy of war" -- the sale of natural resources, such as diamonds, narcotics, and oil, that fund small arms purchases. "Too often the profits fund violence and mayhem -- as in Sierra Leone -- where illicit diamond profits allowed the RUF to transform itself from a band of 400 to a marauding army of thousands." Controlling the sale of these goods through legal and black markets could make the purchasing of weapons more difficult. Albright emphasized that the United States must carefully scrutinize its trade policies in such commodities to determine if U.S. action help finance civil wars. For example, many diamonds for the U.S. market come from UNITA controlled mines in Angola, and RUF controlled areas in Sierra Leone.
Both Albright and Annan stressed the need for regional and sub-regional efforts on small arms and praised current initiatives undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States, Southern African Development Council, and the European Union. Albright reflected that the small arms problem would not be eradicated overnight, but said that "governments have a responsibility to keep arms transactions transparent and make those involved accountable. As the world's number one arms exporter, the United States must enhance transparency of arms exports to allow civil society to scrutinize possible and negotiated sales at all levels.
Flirting With Disaster
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate, olurie@cdi.org
Congressional leaders insist that the Pentagon urgently develop and deploy a national missile defense (NMD) regardless of cost and the availability of mature, tested technology. The anxiety driving this demand ostensibly rests on the hypothesis that a rogue Russian, a crazed Chinese, a vengeful terrorist or unstable ruler of an unfriendly nation will launch a long range missile at the United States. But lurking beneath these unlikely possibilities is a more familiar Cold War scenario that has a resurgent Russia or a newly assertive Chine deliberately attacking the United States. But the missile defenses that are being advocated cannot hope to stop a massive and deliberate Russian assault and would probably spur the Chinese to expand and modernize their current intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force.
A different threat scenario is given in a recently published RAND Corporation Paper. (RAND is a research organization created for and financed by the Defense Department; its reports usually are well received in the Pentagon.) RAND says that neither Russia nor China would deliberately attack the United States because they are deterred by the old logic of Mutual Assured Destruction.
But RAND also points out that to counter even the type of missile attacks that NMD proponents say are more probable will require a far more elaborate defensive array than what is being proposed for the near future. RAND envisions a "system of systems" which would expand the single or dual-site basing scheme now being developed to cover the entire territory of the United States as well as our forces deployed overseas. This expansion would be achieved through a combination of forward positioned interceptors and U.S. territorial defenses linked by global detection and tracking satellites and battle management centers. With such a coordinated approach the United States would be able to employ interceptors to destroy enemy missiles in the boost, mid-course, or terminal phases. RAND also foresees eventual use of space-based directed energy interceptors in the defensive mix.
Incredibly, RAND sees the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty of 1972 as no barrier to their system of systems even though it admits that the expanded NMD will require nine changes to the Treaty. (Even the development and deployment of the limited system currently being tested will require two Treaty changes according to RAND.) Such a large number of alterations would leave the ABM Treaty a hollow shell.
What is more disturbing is the curious reversal in the RAND proposal of the traditional justification for NMD as a necessary defensive shield against the threat of a missile attack by a rogue. The RAND rationale holds that it is only "in the face of utter defeat by U.S. conventional forces [that] an enemy regime could threaten such attacks in order to deter the United States -- and conceivably carry out the threat if the United States were not deterred....The United States might be paralyzed if so threatened."
But like a Gulliver beset by Lilliputians, the United States can pursue its myriad interests by sweeping away the pretensions of those who would threaten us because "ballistic missile defense is not simply a shield but an enabler of U.S. action." Defense becomes offense, or at least the enabler of offense in the pursuit of any (as opposed to vital) interests.
This raises the specter of the United States as the world policeman, a role better left to international organizations like the United Nations. U.S. foreign policy ought to be premised on diffusing the perception of U.S. dominance and reducing exposure of our forces and our homeland to those who see all American influence as evil. The less exposed our forces are through unnecessary deployments the more likely we are to avoid the kind of vindictive or irrational reaction such deployments could spark. Such "preventive defense" is as real -- and less expensive -- than missile defense.
U.S.-China Relations Continue to Sour
Joseph P. Sottile, Research Assistant, jsottile@cdi.org
By virtually every measure, relations between Washington and Beijing have soured over the last 18 months. The Chinese campaign contributions scandal, the alleged Chinese nuclear weapons espionage affair, and the United States' blundered bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade strained already difficult negotiations between the two governments over China's admission to the WTO and complicated attempts by the Administration to halt Chinese sales of weapon technology abroad.
The tense situation was aggravated further when President Lee Tung-hui of Taiwan said in a July interview that the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) should engage in"state to state" relations. Beijing viewed this as a deliberate deviation from the long enunciated "One China" policy that has been the hallmark of cross-straits relations. Although the Clinton Administration has never strayed from the "One China" policy, publicly rejecting the idea of Taiwanese independence, Beijing asserts that continued U.S. sales of military hardware to Taiwan contravenes Beijing's sovereignty and incites the Taiwanese desire for independence.
Earlier this year, the House began consideration of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act which would expand the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. If passed it would commit the United States to assist the Taiwanese militarily should they suffer an unprovoked attack by the PRC. The House Republican leadership plans to bring the legislation to a vote sometime this session and its passage would most likely be interpreted by the PRC as a hostile act, thus making the Administration's efforts even more difficult.
At a September 16 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC) responded to a reported Chinese violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime by calling for the immediate imposition of sanctions on China and threatening to block the nomination of Robert Einhorn to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Affairs. According to a CIA report, confirmed at the hearing by CIA official Robert Walpole, the Chinese allegedly sold M-11 short-range ballistic missiles to Pakistan, the newest member of the nuclear club. In the wake of the May 1999 Cox Report, this latest revelation provides more ammunition to congressional critics, both Republican and Democratic, of the PRC and Administration policy.
While relations with the U.S. government seem to be in a free-fall, ties between Beijing and the U.S. business community couldn't be stronger. Last week President Jiang Zemin kicked off a week of celebrations marking 50th anniversary of the People's Republic of China by hosting a gala event in Shanghai attended by 300 leading businessmen from around the world. Speaking later that week at another party for foreign business leaders, Premier Zhu Rongji said that U.S. policies toward Taiwan had encouraged Taiwanese independence and that "sooner or later it would lead to an armed resolution of the [Taiwan] question."
China has used the increasingly close economic relationship with U.S. corporations as a key part of its diplomatic strategy. China, with U.S. business leaders lobbying on their behalf, has been able to keep its Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status in spite of increased criticism of its human rights and labor practices. Premier Zhu's statement may be a calculated move to put pressure on the Congress by appealing to American corporations who stand to lose the most should relations between the United States and China deteriorate further.
In addition to these recent developments, two other issues could frustrate future prospects for a renewed, productive dialogue between the United States and the PRC.
First, the United States is considering a request by the Taiwanese government to sell them a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. A final decision on deploying TMD to Taiwan will likely be postponed until next year, but the mere possibility has been enough to anger Beijing. The PRC is already concerned over Congress' vote earlier this year to revive the National Missile Defense (NMD). Although not a signatory of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Chinese, like the Russians, argue that NMD contradicts the terms of the treaty. Two weeks ago, the Chinese reacted angrily to the announcement that the United States plans to eventually deploy a National Missile Defense system in Alaska. Although U.S. officials claimed that this site will be able to pre-empt a strike by a rogue nation, such as North Korea, Beijing remains unconvinced that it is not targeted at them.
Second, negotiations over China's entry into the WTO have again faltered after a flurry of activity during President Clinton's meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in New Zealand earlier this month, a meeting intended to heal the ailing relationship and soothe Chinese anger over the embassy bombing. The initial progress made in New Zealand has given way to less-than-promising talks between low-ranking U.S. and Chinese representatives. On September 29, Chinese officials returned to Beijing after the first of two days of planned meetings without a deal on the key trade issues that have kept the United States from supporting China's entry into the WTO.
As the Cold War with the Soviets fades into history, a new regional Cold War with China would be a serious source of instability and could increase already excessive military budgets well into the next century. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration's poor handling of "engagement" has given proponents of containing China an opening and the opportunity to make political capital out of delicate foreign policy and security issues. In next year's elections, proponents of containment would like nothing more than to go back to their constituencies having voted in favor of blocking Beijing's "rise to power." While this may help some get re-elected, it also threatens to create an enemy where there is now only a competitor, perhaps locking the United States into an adversarial relationship that could last decades.
As has been observed many times previously, domestic political concerns usually do not form a sound basis for foreign policy. Expansion of the U.S. military commitment to Taiwan and the introduction of a TMD system would only play to Beijing's fears about U.S. attempts to dominate East Asia. The key is to make informed, long-term decisions that will contribute to regional stability while recognizing China's significant role in the region. The challenge is to do so in such a way that the PRC will not place a higher premium on military expansion or cause Beijing to view the United States as a strategic foe.
Second Chechen War Underway -- Russian forces occupied close to one-third of the territory of the break-away republic of Chechnya in what is becoming a repeat of the bloody 1994-96 war. Russia cut off all mediation with Chechen officials who it accuses of being responsible for a series of terrorist attacks in Russia. Moscow also announced it is revising its military doctrine to better prepare for low-level conventional operations against internal threats.
Changing of the Guards in Kosovo... -- German Gen. Klaus Reinhardt took over as commander of the 40,000 peacekeeping forces in Kosovo from British Gen. Michael Jackson. Kosovo represents the first time that Germany has deployed military forces abroad since World War II, and the first time since the Napoleonic wars that a German general is commanding British troops.
...And In Brussels -- NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stepped down on Wednesday, ahead of his scheduled retirement, to take up a new post as the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. This new post was created this year to make the 15-member EU more active and assertive in making foreign policy and military decisions separate from NATO and the United States. Solana's successor at NATO is the former British Defense Minister Lord George Robertson.
NMD Test Success? -- On Saturday the military conducted the first intercept test of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system. While the Pentagon declared the test a success, very little of the system that was tested will actually be part of a deployed NMD system. Only one part, in fact -- the actual kinetic energy "kill" warhead with its close-in sensors. All the other elements, the booster rocket, tracking radars, the interceptor guidance system, and the "battle management system," were either substitutes or simulated.
Kosovo Costs -- At a DoD briefing this week the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) released information on the size and cost of U.S. logistical support for Operation "Allied Force." During the build-up and air operations, EUCOM conducted 1,71 airlift missions at a cost of $99 million; operated 93 trains at $7 million; operated 75 ships at $18 million, completed engineering projects worth $63 million, built two refugee camps at a cost of $40 million; and consumed 1 billion liters of fuel.
President Signs DoD Funding Bill -- On October 5 the President signed the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The legislation authorizes $288.8 billion for the military, $8.3 billion more than was requested by the Administration. For details of what was included in the bill, see "Congress Authorizes More Money for the Pentagon," Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 3, Issue #31, August 12, 1999.
Another Navy Ship Experiencing Cost Overruns -- Not only is the Navy experiencing cost overruns with the latest of its largest ships, the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, its seeing major cost growth in one of its smaller vessels, the San Antonio-class amphibious transport ship. Designated the LPD-17, the first ship of this class may be, according to the Pentagon, as much as $245 million over original estimates. That's a 41% cost hike. Such cost growth is not, however, uncommon in the first ship of a new class.
South Africa Lists Arms Sales Online -- In an effort towards increased transparency, the government of South Africa has published a list of arms sales to 83 countries over the last three years on a website. The site does not disclose the specific weapons transferred, but instead provides a categorical description. The four categories are A) Sensitive major significant equipment, B) Sensitive significant equipment, C) Non-sensitive equipment, and D) Non-lethal equipment. In 1998, more than half of South Africa's sales fell into category A. See the list.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Light Weapons, Heavy
Casualties"
The vast majority of today's wars are started and fought with small arms and light weaponry. Cheap, portable, easy to use, and widely available, small arms are responsible for 90 percent of conflict-related deaths since World War II. Now there is a growing international movement to limit the spread of these weapons, even as the U.S. government gives assault rifles to nations with unstable governments.
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