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| September 9, 1999 |
| September 9, 1999 |
What Next for the "Army After Next?"
Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
As the end of the 20th century approaches each of the service branches are trying to find their niche as the U.S. military slowly remakes itself to face a changing international security environment. For the Army, the need to find relevance in the ongoing debate about roles and missions is particularly acute, given the common perception about the dominant role that air power played in military operations in Kosovo.
The current "ground troops versus air power" controversy is only the latest round in a debate that has ranged back and forth since the inception of strategic bombing during World War II. Yet it comes at a critical time as the Pentagon begins preparations for its next attempt at self-examination. The Defense Authorization Conference agreement for Fiscal Year 2000 currently before Congress includes a permanent requirement for conducting future Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) every four years, the next to be completed by September 30, 2001.
General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe who led Operation "Allied Force" against Yugoslavia, recently commented on the U.S. Army's role during combat operations. In discussing the contributions made by Task Force Hawk, the contingent of 24 AH-64 Apache helicopters and their support units which included eighteen MLRS missile launchers, General Clark stated that stationing these units in Albania "dramatically changed the security environment and the sense of confidence of the government of Albania and made a significant impact for the war."
While the presence of Task Force Hawk probably bolstered spirits in Tirana, particularly as a deterrent against large scale incursions by Yugoslav ground forces into Albania, it is hard to see how this small force, which did not engage in combat operations during Operation Allied Force, could have possibly "made a significant impact." More likely, General Clark, an Army officer, is as sensitive as his colleagues in the Army leadership to ongoing interservice rivalries.
Others have joined the fray. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee as well as the full committee, has stated that the Army needs a dedicated peacekeeping contingent. "I think that it's probably time that we put a portion of the Army into peacekeeping training, if this is going to be our national function." It appears likely that the Army leadership would accept such units, provided it meant an increase in their active duty end strength and did not, in their mind, undermine the service's ability to fulfill its traditional mission of conducting large force-on-force combat operations.
Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre has made the most pointed remarks about the Army's need to reconsider its strategic mission. In a speech last month he said, "if the Army holds onto nostalgic versions of its grand past, it is going to atrophy and die...[The Army] cannot simply be what it was, and think that it is going to be relevant for this new, complex world that is emerging."
Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki have assigned four task forces to review the service's strategic vision, modernization plans, manpower requirements, and reorganization of the Department of the Army's headquarters. Each task force is expected to report by this October.
What comes out of these task force reports may well chart the Army's course as the service prepares for the upcoming QDR. If so, it will be interesting to see if the Army embraces the idea of truly "outside the box" thinking about future roles and missions, or whether the services will undertake the next QDR with the same "salami-slicing" approach that have plagued similar reviews in the past.
Round Two Or a Whole New War?
By Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
The conflict in Dagestan, a republic in the south of the Russian Federation, has entered a new and potentially more dangerous stage. After beating back the initial invasion of Chechen and Dagestani fighters from Chechnya, Russian forces trained their sights on home-grown militants. Beginning in August 29, Russian artillery and attack aircraft have been pounding a number of villages in central Dagestan. Since 1998, when the population of the Buynaksk region (see map information below) openly denounced the republic's government, the villages have lived under the rule of Islamic Sharia law. By some estimates, over 60 such localities exist in the republic.
But only a few days after the Russians concentrated their forces on the rebellious villages, the invaders from Chechnya came back. Their latest attack, estimated at 2,000 strong and launched over the past weekend, took place in the Khasavyurt region, along a main road leading straight into the republic's capital, Makhachkala. The stated purpose of the latest offensive is to help the villages besieged by Russian forces last week. In truth, the goal seems to be to relieve the villages by threatening the city of Khasavyurt and possible Makhachkala itself and thus tying down Russian units, rather than linking up the two forces rebelling against the pro-Moscow government of Dagestan.
The new developments carry several potential dangers for the Russian forces. Their success in repelling the initial invasion in the beginning of August can be attributed to the opposition of the local population of Dagestan. The Russians helped arm and organize local self-defense units. Also, the invading troops did not receive crucial support from two potentially sympathetic groups in Dagestan -- the local ethnic Chechens and the Islamic radicals. Without local support the rebels could not sustain their invasion forces in the face of Russian attacks and pulled back.
But when Russian units subsequently attacked local villages controlled by Islamic fundamentalists, the nature of the conflict for the Dagestanis changed. It went from defending against outside forces (dominated by Chechens, who are widely disliked by other ethnic groups in Dagestan), to an internal conflict between the government supporters and opposition, between different ethnic groups and two forms of Islam (See "Demystifying The Role of Islam in The Former Soviet South," Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 3, Issue #33, August 26, 1999). The Russian forces are walking a dangerously thin line. If they begin to be perceived by Dagestan's larger ethnic groups as intruders, Russia may find itself fighting an insurgency armed and supported from within the republic, and therefore much harder to suppress than an invading force. In the 1994-96 Chechnya war, Russia lost to poorly-equipped guerillas who, however, routinely derived support from and found shelter among the local Chechens who were sympathetic to the guerillas' drive for independence.
Moscow may be about to commit the same mistake by alienating the ethnic Chechens in Dagestan, who have mostly stayed out of the fighting so far. Russian allies in the Dagestan government began warning against the "fifth column" the ethnic Chechens represent. Russian forces also bombed villages in Chechnya proper. For their part, some local Chechen leaders in Dagestan threw their support -- verbal, so far -- behind the rebel forces coming from Chechnya. Should the nature of the conflict change to "Russians vs. Chechens," large parts of Dagestan could sink into chaos and Moscow may find itself drawn into a second war with Chechnya.
The Chechen leadership has so far distanced itself from the fighters operating across the border with Dagestan -- the same Chechen troops attacking Dagestan also challenged President Aslan Maskhadov's government in Chechnya. But with Russian aircraft attacking Chechen villages, even Maskhadov's ministers threatened retaliation against Moscow. Uniting the Chechen factions in Chechnya and Dagestan against Moscow is a sure way to launch a new disastrous war in north Caucasus.
Click here for a map of the region.
The Benefits And Costs of U.S. Military Power
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate
Congressional conservatives generally block any activity whose benefits they consider to be less than its costs. But they make an exception for the military by designating some Pentagon spending "emergency" or "vital to the nation's welfare." Such designations exempt military programs from the normal cost-benefit reviews to which other programs that have more benefits for the same cost are subjected to in the appropriations process. Putting military spending on "automatic" deprives the public of the opportunity to join the debate on what government does in the people's name.
Any review of military spending ought to clearly present both the benefits of such spending and the "lost opportunities" of improving our non-military security. For example, defending the nation's territory is a cardinal obligation of the modern nation-state. Protecting our way of life is likewise a very high priority. But when military leaders and congressional boosters take advantage of public support for these goals to justify spending necessary if we are to be ready for military action far beyond our borders, they leave fewer dollars for rectifying domestic problems such as education, housing, and nutrition.
When a friendly country or people suffers external aggression or repression, Americans want to help. But sometimes our own policies make others vulnerable. After the Marshall Plan helped Europe recover from World War II, U.S. policies encouraged our allies to reduce their own military strength and depend on America's power. Recent events in Yugoslavia show the result: our European allies are now too weak to stop horrors such as Bosnia or Kosovo.
American presidents constantly stress that U.S. leadership of the free world is central to our military and foreign policy. But leadership can become domination; and some allied countries (e.g., France) regard NATO as a tool for maintaining America's influence in Europe. Our active military presence in the Middle East offends many Arabs and drives militants to attempt terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens, facilities, and even our own territory.
Many in Congress say that military spending is essential to national prosperity. But this is not so. Despite a 25% reduction in military spending since the Reagan peak, the U.S. has enjoyed over seven years of continuous economic growth now totaling about 24%. Employment has increased by 20 million. California, where the greatest volume of military work was concentrated, today has higher employment at higher compensation than it had 10 years ago. If motivations were really out in the open, many Members of Congress vote for military programs because of the jobs and profits such contracts bring to their constituents.
Even as our elected leaders rely more heavily on military solutions to international problems and support military spending that exceeds our true needs, they starve the structures that promote peaceful resolution of international conflicts. America's response to the 1998 terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam was a cruise missile attack against suspected bases in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan and a boost in money for the Pentagon. Despite a finding by a blue ribbon panel that most of our embassies and consulates are vulnerable, the Administration's original FY 2000 request for "worldwide Security upgrades" was two-thirds below the previous year's authorization. President Clinton amended the request by calling for an annual average of about $1.1 billion over 10 years to improve the safety of those who solve international problems by peaceful diplomacy.
In satisfying the urge to increase FY 2000 military spending by $18.9 billion over FY1999 spending without exceeding the legal caps on discretionary spending, Congress decreased non-military spending by $26.3 billion. The planned cuts impact many areas: job training for displaced workers and people leaving welfare rolls, housing, health, environmental protection, medical and high-tech research, and diplomacy and foreign aid. Regardless of the rhetoric, these cuts will cause real reductions in our nation's welfare, our international competitiveness, and ultimately in our national security. And these cuts are directly traceable to excessive military spending.
The Kosovo Liberation Army: Demilitarized or Transformed?
Denise Groves, Scoville Fellow, dgroves@cdi.org
Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) are due to disarm by September 19 according to terms laid out in UN Resolution 1244 and the June 20 agreement between NATO and the KLA. The dismantling of the army requires that soldiers cease wearing uniforms or any other KLA insignia and turn in their weapons to be stored under KFOR control. The agreement also envisions that the guerrilla army will transform itself into a political entity.
KFOR officials asserted two weeks ago that KLA compliance was right on schedule. Last week, as the political head of the KLA, Hashim Thaqi, toured several European capitals, he expressed certainty that the KLA was committed to the June agreement. The military commander of the KLA, Agim Ceku, also reassured Richard Holbrooke, the American ambassador to the United Nations, that his forces would comply with the agreement. Senator Joseph Biden, who accompanied Mr. Holbrooke on a recent trip to the Balkans, emphasized American expectations for complete demilitarization by warning that if the KLA did not comply with the September 19 deadline and if it failed to demonstrate democratic tendencies, support from the United States would evaporate overnight.
Almost on cue, failure of the demilitarization process is becoming graphically apparent as the deadline approaches. According to the June agreement, anti-tank weapons, grenades, mines and other explosives and some automatic weapons were to have been turned over to KFOR within 30 days after the KLA signed the agreement. Yet on September 2 KFOR troops seized a cache of over 500 weapons, including AK-47s and explosives. Additional reports indicate that the weapons in storage under KFOR control consist mostly of hunting rifles, antique carbines, and damaged AK-47s. Surrendering weapons of such quality indicates non-compliance with disarmament schemes and almost guarantees that better quality weapons remain in circulation, hidden for future use. The frequent occurrence of grenade and mortar attacks and the seemingly unending reports of shootings in Kosovo appear to confirm this suspicion.
Disparity between NATO expectations and KLA intentions regarding the question of transformation have also contributed to the general unraveling of the demilitarization plan. While the political arm of the KLA was pledging commitment to the June agreement, the military arm was drawing up plans for the future of the KLA. Agim Ceku bluntly stated that the KLA planned to "transform in several directions -- one part will become part of the police force, one part will become civil administration, one part will become the Army of Kosovo, as a defense force. And another part will form a political party." The U.S. State Department responded that a Kosovar defense force was clearly not allowed under the June 20 agreement. Senator Biden reiterated his threat that U.S. support for Kosovo would dry up if the agreement to disband the KLA was not honored.
At the end of last week, however, it became evident that NATO's commitment to the demilitarization plan was evaporating. As the September 19 deadline nears, a major concern has been growing about successfully reintegrating former soldiers into civilian society. Unemployed former soldiers, without viable alternatives, may turn to crime or form an underground army operating beyond the control of the UN and NATO missions. In addition, KLA members have demonstrated resistance to the demilitarization plan by failing to turn in prohibited weapons and by continuing to insist that a defense force in Kosovo is necessary. Fearing that a confrontation with the KLA over the issue could lead to the collapse of the peace agreement, NATO officials capitulated to the aspirations of KLA leaders.
Rather than disarming first and then transforming, NATO is now willing to accept a partial "transformation" short of full demilitarization. The change involves the creation of the "Kosovo Corps," a force that NATO claims would act as a sort of national guard or civilian emergency force to respond to natural disasters like forest fires or earthquakes. The 3,000 strong force will be built around the existing KLA structure and will include a helicopter unit, an honor guard, a security force and a rapid reaction unit. The corps will be given uniforms and allowed to carry weapons, although it is not clear how many or under what terms the weapons will be allowed. Less than a week after he threatened to cut off support to Kosovo, Senator Biden, along with Senator Mitch McConnell, welcomed the decision and even suggested that the United States should help train the new force.
Both NATO and the UN insist that the Corps is merely a civilian emergency force, but the KLA is heralding the institution as the new army of Kosovo. And while the United Nations must still approve the plan, it is not surprising that the Russians and the Serbs were quick to express their vehement opposition to it. Russia criticized the disarmament program under KFOR and accused it of failing to protect the security of minorities in Kosovo. Serbia flatly rejected the formation of the Kosovo Corps, claiming that the creation of an army in Kosovo impinges upon the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. Others fear that crimes committed against minorities in Kosovo will continue unabated if the basic structure of the KLA is retained. Human Rights Watch has accused the KLA of complicity in many of the attacks that have occurred in recent weeks.
Although the creation of a national guard was mentioned in the June agreement, the international community only agreed to "consider" its formation. Capitulating now to the establishment of the Kosovo Corps signals shortsightedness on the part of international officials charged with reconstructing the war-torn region. Rather than finding more productive alternatives for a province wracked by poverty and devising more pro-active disarmament programs, NATO and the UN are missing an opportunity to dislodge the weapons culture in which Kosovo is mired. Indeed, the formation of the Kosovo Corps violates the spirit of the June 20 agreement and simply preserves the Kosovo Liberation Army by another name.
Turkey Closer to EU Membership -- In a strange twist of politics, the earthquake that struck Turkey in August helped advance the country's bid for membership in the European Union (EU). In the aftermath of the disaster, Greece dropped a long-standing veto to Turkey's membership in the EU and EU aid to Turkey. The main Kurdish armed force, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) also announced last week that it is laying down arms. The Turkish military campaign against the PKK caused objections from a number of EU to Turkey's membership in the Union, which is now expected to weaken as the fighting dies down.
Polish Tanks Diverted to Sudan -- Poland admitted that 20 T-55 tanks it sold to Yemen earlier this year ended up being diverted to Sudan. The U.S. had warned Poland that the shipment, valued at an estimated $1.2 million, could be diverted. The U.S. is threatening to impose fines, withhold army officer assistance, or eliminate other military assistance to Poland for ignoring the warning and allowing the tanks' diversion.
U.S. Will Not Send Troops to East Timor -- Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced on September 8 that the United States will not send peacekeeping troops to East Timor. Cohen encouraged the Indonesian government to stop the widespread violence and chaos immediately.
DoD Study Calls for Splitting JSF Production -- A study by the Pentagon's Defense Science Board has called for the Joint Strike Fighter program to be restructured from its current "winner take all" format to one which permits competitive bidding on production lots of aircraft. Currently Lockheed Martin and Boeing are each developing aircraft designs, with a winning design to be selected in 2001 after a fly-off. The DSB cited concerns about the need for continued competition in the program as well as helping to maintain the industrial base as reasons for the proposed change.
Construction Begins on 1st New Attack Submarine -- The keel for the lead ship in the U.S. Navy's newest class of submarines, the USS Virginia (SSN 774), was laid at Electric Boat's Quonset Point Facility in North Kingstown, R.I. on September 2. The Virginia class is a nuclear-powered attack submarine armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles and conventional torpedoes. In all, the Navy plans to build 30 Virginia-class submarines, which will replace the much of the existing fleet of Los Angeles-class submarines, at a total cost of over $65 billion. Electric Boat will construct two of the first four vessels, with Newport News Shipbuilding constructing the other two. The first boat is scheduled to enter the fleet in 2004.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Water, Land, People, Conflict"
Today, the greatest threats facing any nation's security may not be military threats. Increasingly, they are complex issues related to the environment such as population growth, water scarcity, pollution, and economic stability. Does America have a strategy to defend itself from the collapse of the world's fisheries or global deforestation?
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