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| August 12, 1999 |
| August 12, 1999 |
Taking Care of the Troops
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.) Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
Among the myriad provisions in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Bill agreed to by Senate-House conferees and awaiting final congressional action is a pay raise for three and four star officers. The raise comes from an easing of the caps on the pay for these ranks. A four star will get a raise of 13.8 percent or $14,200 dollars annually while three stars will get an 8.3 percent increase to just over $119,800.
Whether the country's 144 four star and three star officers merit a raise is one issue, but not the main one.
It seems that some in Congress, notably Representative Steve Buyer (R-IN), are afraid that senior flag rank officers who are inclined to hang up their stars will wait until January 1, 2000 because that is the date the pay cap changes become effective (as does the 4.8 percent pay raise approved earlier for the entire military). Apparently wanting to avoid a stampede by an as yet unknown number of doddering old fogies on January 1, Senator Buyers inserted a provision in the Authorization legislation that makes the active duty pay raise retroactive to April 1, 1999 for purposes of computing the retired pay for these two flag ranks. Thus, although no increase in active duty pay occurs, a four star officer who retires between April 1, 1999 and December 31, 1999 will get a boost of $11,400 in retired pay to $94,425.
The whole premise behind Rep. Buyer's plan is ludicrous. Three and four star generals are more like warhorses than old fogies. They have been in the military so long they react to the sound of the latest trumpet and head off to the fray -- whether against a real enemy or one of the other services. By and large retirement is forced on them by limits on time in service or time in position.
Consider also the lament of the Army, Navy, and Air Force that they are woefully short of personnel. While the upper tier flag ranks may not be suffering shortages, it seems logical that the pressure for advancement from the lower ranks might not be as severe as in the past.
Finally on this subject, suggesting that three and four star officers are hanging on because they want to fatten their retirement checks implies that their career decisions are driven by mercenary considerations rather than professionalism. Officers who reach these ranks had better be professionals in the best sense of the term or the whole military establishment is in danger.
Congress in its wisdom has also done something for the lowest ranks -- although not quite as much.
For five years the Pentagon and the Department of Agriculture have been arguing about who will fund the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) for eligible military families stationed abroad. (Agriculture funds the program for eligible families within the U.S.) Both the Senate and House versions of the FY 2000 Defense Authorization Bill directed the Pentagon to pay the cost of the program for military families living overseas -- about $2 million. Where the two bills disagreed was in computing the cut-off for eligibility. The House bill includes the value of housing in determining family income -- the basis for determining eligibility -- whereas the Senate bill does not. Unfortunately, in conference the House provision was adopted. This means that only some 20 percent of those who would otherwise be eligible (based on income) in the U.S. will get vouchers for high nutrition foods.
Those who have been fighting for the extension of WIC to military families abroad say that this is a good albeit limited step. They vow to bring the issue back in the next budget cycle. When they do, they might suggest making the program retroactive to October 1, 1999, the start of FY 2000, or even April 1, 1999 -- like the three and four star retired pay.
It really asks so little.
For additional information about WIC benefits for military personnel and dependents stationed overseas, see ""Running Out of a Few Good Men and Women" -- Part II," CDI Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 3, Issue #8, February 25, 1999.
Going Nowhere Without the People
Lt.Colonel Piers Wood, USAR (Ret.), Senior Fellow, pwood@cdi.org
Things had been going so well. Nuclear weapons and the dangers they embodied were dwindling down toward a bare minimum. What happened?
Over the last few years many who follow the status of the nuclear powers have noted that the downward trend in the numbers of nuclear weapons has leveled off. It was much like being aboard a rail car that had been quietly detached from the engine in the night. The world drifted to a stop so silently in the dark that no one noticed.
From an historical perspective, it is unlikely that the process of whittling down will get underway again any time soon. Serious nuclear control initiatives have simply have not taken place unless there was a popular movement to push through the obstacles.
Since the inception of nuclear weapons; every nuclear arms treaty, each halt to nuclear testing, every brake on the spread of nuclear weapons -- indeed, every major nuclear policy change but one -- has been a response to a popular outcry. Only widespread protests at home and abroad -- such as the Ban-the-Bomb movement of the 1950's or the Nuclear Freeze campaign -- have sufficed to break the deadlocks between proponents and opponents of nuclear deterrence.
The irony is that many people, experts and leaders alike, acknowledge that the dangers of nuclear weapons persist in the post-Cold War era and claim to support a variety of measures to reduce those threats. Polls show that a healthy majority of Americans favor dramatic reductions in nuclear arms and bans on nuclear testing. Lately, the President reiterated his call for a comprehensive test ban. The Secretary of State now wants to "jump-start" the process of strategic arms reductions." Leading Senators have urged their colleagues to ratify the nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Even the U.S. Navy would like to reduce its nuclear submarine fleet from 18 to 14 boats.
However, the opponents of limitations on nuclear arms have managed to mire nuclear arms control in a maze of political ploys and technical complexities. The U.S. Senate cannot ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Russian Duma cannot ratify the START II treaty. The U.N. conference on disarmament is devoid of prospects. Military cooperation to shore up Russian early warning shortcomings has fallen victim to soured Russian-American relations in the Balkans. Removing nuclear weapons from hair trigger alert has received ample lip service but has only a few ardent supporters who advocate serious, pragmatic proposals.
It has not been helpful that the Pentagon has developed new nuclear weapons, that it has proposed deploying another missile defense system threatening the ABM compromise, that it published a new doctrine for tactical nuclear warfare, and that it pushed for expanding NATO. It is especially dismaying that the President signed a new strategic nuclear framework -- at the Pentagon's behest -- which makes nuclear weapons the "cornerstone" of U.S. national defense into the foreseeable future.
Clearly if history is any guide, these unhealthy trends will continue unless a popular outcry intervenes. In the past, only widespread citizen action has energized Congress to stand up to the Pentagon and to grant the Administration leeway to take calculated risks in U.S. foreign relations.
Effective broad-based protests of the past avoided entanglement in the numerous potential complexities of nuclear weapons dangers and concentrated on a single "hot button" issue. As a rule, pragmatically formulated, simple objectives were used to arouse public indignation. This, in turn, opened doors policy changes in other areas.
Furthermore, even the most productive movements have seldom achieved exactly what they sought at the outset. The record shows a series of mixed results in which protesters got more and less than they demanded, in unpredictable ways. And the results obtained were often stretched out over periods longer than the active life of a given movement.
The Ban the Bomb movement originally sought to eliminate nuclear weapons but soon focused on the more immediate issue of radioactive fallout from nuclear testing. The movement eventually settled for a ban on atmospheric tests alone, but it can be credited with making way for the Non-proliferation Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and a nuclear free zone in Latin America.
The late 1960s fight about anti-ballistic missiles [ABM] arose from the effort to slow the nuclear arms race by opposing a nationwide missile defense system. Although the struggle occurred almost exclusively within the U.S. Congress, it achieved great popular momentum by tapping into the opposition to the Vietnam war. In the final analysis, anti-ABM protests led to the implementation of the pivotal ABM treaty and pushed the prospect of a practical, deployed missile defense well beyond the then foreseeable future.
The Nuclear Freeze Campaign of the 1980s focused very tightly on a bilateral mandate to stop the nuclear arms race. It eventually narrowed to a congressional vote which lost. However, an aroused public caused limits to be place on nuclear weapons programs and policies in a number of other areas such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty. In addition, the Freeze can be credited with drastically curtailing the land mobile MX missile program, limiting the "Star Wars" missile defense system to a research project, and encouraging Soviet President Gorbachev to institute the first of the moratoriums on nuclear explosions for test purposes.
One is hard pressed to name a major arms control measure that was initiated strictly within a government free of popular pressure. Most government initiated measures have been minor changes or were long term outgrowths of previous protest movements. Even the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is the outgrowth of the anti-testing movements of the 1950s and 1980s. The one exception to governmental paralysis might be the mutually reciprocal initiatives of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in which the Soviets and the U.S. withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from land and sea deployments worldwide. However, in 1990-91 Gorbachev was hard pressed by the populations of the Soviet Union who were seeking to escape the political, social, and economic disintegration of the Soviet empire.
Popular protest is a problematic and unsure means of resolving deadlocks as the course of events and directions chosen are unpredictable at best. But if history is our guide, no progress toward further limiting nuclear dangers will occur until the public is re-engaged. And it is not likely that the public will be engaged until a single key issue, articulated in a simple, communicable manner, arouses the appropriate level of indignation.
Absent popular pressure, we may drift a bit closer to a nuclear catastrophe or an incremental measure away from the present threat. But we should not expect any government on its own initiative to get us back on the path of dwindling the nuclear peril.
Congress Authorizes More Money for the Pentagon
By Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
Last week members of the House and Senate Armed Services committees approved the conference agreement on the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The legislation authorizes $288.8 billion in Budget Authority, $8.3 billion more than was requested by the Clinton Administration, and $12.6 billion over what was authorized for FY'99. Taking in to account the effects of lower than expected inflation and other savings, this represents $21 billion in additional spending above the FY'99 levels.
While few of the funding provisions of the bill are considered controversial by members of Congress or the Administration, the possibility of a veto exists because of language in the legislation which would reorganize the Department of Energy. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson has said that he may recommend a veto of the legislation since it would place the nuclear weapons functions of DoE under a new organization only nominally controlled by the Secretary.
The full House and Senate are expected to act on the compromise legislation shortly after the end of the August recess.
Highlights of the legislation include:
Pay and Benefits: The legislation authorizes a 4.8 percent military pay raise, effective January 1, 2000. This is 0.4% more than was requested by the Pentagon.
Procurement: Includes $55.7 billion for purchase of new weapons in FY'00, $2.7 billion more than the Administration's request, and $6.7 billion above the FY'99 level.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Contains $3.7 billion for missile defense, $367.7 million above the Administration's request. This includes $867.2 million for the "Star Wars" National Missile Defense (NMD) program, $30.7 million more than requested. The Administration's $612 million request for the Army's Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system was cut by $84 million, while the Navy's Theater-Wide "Upper Tier" system included $419.8 million, $90 million more than requested. The Army's Patriot PAC-3 system got a $212 million boost, to $542 million, to cover continued cost overruns in the program.
Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Includes $6.6 billion, roughly the amount requested by the Administration, including $3.1 billion for continued development and procurement of the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, $3.1 billion for the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, and $506 million for the Joint Strike Fighter.
Air Force: $3.1 billion for continued development of the F-22 and procurement of six aircraft, as requested by the Administration, $252.6 million as requested for the purchase of 10 F-16 fighters, plus $249.5 million for upgrades for the Air National Guard's F-16 fleet, $70 million more than requested. Congress also fully funded the Administration's request of nearly $3.6 billion for procurement of 15 C-17 transport aircraft.
Navy/Marines: As requested, the legislation includes $3.1 billion for 36 F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet" fighter aircraft, $1.5 billion for two LPD-17 assault ships, $2.9 billion for three DDG-51 destroyers, $749 million for advanced procurement of the first of the new SSN-74 Virginia class attack submarines, and $751.5 million for advanced procurement of CVN-77, the tenth Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier. Also included was $375 million for advanced procurement of an LHD-8 amphibious ship not requested by the Pentagon. Congress added two aircraft to the Administration's request of 10 V-22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft, increasing the total authorization by $132 million to $1.2 billion.
Army: $483 million for development of the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, $56 million more than requested. The legislation includes $646 million for M1A1 tank upgrades, $426 million to purchase 2,179 Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV program), and $283 million for development of the Crusader Artillery System, each as requested. Congress increased the request for UH-60 helicopters from 8 to 17 aircraft, raising funding by $90 million to $176 million.
"Nunn-Lugar:" The legislation includes $475.1 million, fully funding the Administration's request, for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). Also known as the "Nunn-Lugar" program, CTR is intended to assist Russia and the former Soviet Republics safeguard and eliminate their stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and related technologies. However, Congress cut roughly $100 million from programs that support the elimination of chemical weapons in Russia, including the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility.
Other Provisions: The legislation retains the current requirement that the United States not reduce its nuclear forces below START I levels until Russia ratifies the START II treaty. It does, however, permit the Navy to retire four of its 18 Trident nuclear missile submarines provided that the President certifies that doing so will not undermine U.S. nuclear deterrence. The legislation also includes a permanent requirement for conducting future Quadrennial Defense Reviews every four years, the next to be completed by September 30, 2001. Finally, the legislation includes a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress by March 15, 2000 on the relative advantages and disadvantages of a two site ground-based national missile defense system, which would require either the renegotiation or the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile defense (ABM) treaty.
Developing World Remains Attractive Arms Market
By Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
The annual Congressional Research Service report, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1991-1998," was released earlier this month. The report documents that although arms transfer agreements made with the developing world have decreased over the past year they still totaled $13.2 billion, accounting for 57.3% of the total of worldwide arms transfer agreements. Total deliveries to developing nations were $23.2 billion, also a decrease from 1997. This represents 77.8% of worldwide arms deliveries.
The CRS report (also known as the Grimmett Report after its author, Richard Grimmett) defines developing nations as all countries except the United States, Russia, the European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The report examines fourteen categories of conventional weapons: tanks and self-propelled guns, artillery, armored personnel carriers and armored cars, major surface combatants, minor surface combatants, submarines, guided missile patrol boats, supersonic combat aircraft, subsonic combat aircraft, other aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, and anti-ship missiles.
The United States remains the world's largest exporter of arms to developing nations and leads all nations in both arms transfer agreements and arms deliveries for 1998. United States' arms transfer agreements with developing nations were $4.6 billion in 1998, up from the 1997 total of $2.6 billion. The United States' share of arms transfer agreements increased from 15.7% in 1997 to 34.7% in 1998.
France was second with regards to arms agreements, successfully negotiating $2.4 billion, and Germany was third with $2 billion. Russia fell to fourth place, with arms transfer agreements falling from $3.2 billion in 1997 to $1.4 billion in 1998 -- the percentage share falling from 18.9% in 1997 to 10.9% in 1998. Israel, China, Belarus, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Italy, and Ukraine negotiated the fifth through eleventh largest dollar amounts of arms transfer agreements.
In 1998, the United States delivered $7.8 billion in weapons to the developing world. France was second with $6.2 billion, the United Kingdom third at $4.8 billion. Russia, Germany, China, Ukraine, Israel, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and South Africa also delivered significant amounts of weapons to the developing world in 1998.
Although Near East economies have been hurt by the drop in crude oil prices, the economic crisis has damaged Asia's buying power, and falling copper prices have hurt Latin American economies, developing nations still negotiated significant arms transfer agreements for future deliveries. Saudi Arabia remains the leading recipient among developing nations in arms transfer agreements, negotiating $2.7 billion worth in 1998. The United Arab Emirates was second with $2.5 billion, and Malaysia was third with $2.1 billion. Other significant arms agreements were negotiated by Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Kuwait, Ethiopia, India, and South Korea. Deliveries of weapons to developing nations from prior agreements again saw Saudi Arabia in the lead with $8.7 billion. Taiwan and Singapore followed with $5 billion and $1.6 billion respectively. Other major deliveries went to South Korea, Israel, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and Kuwait.
These top ten arms recipients accounted for 99.1% of total arms deliveries to the developing world. Six of these top ten recipients are in the Near East, an extremely volatile area of the world.
The United States remains the largest arms exporter to the Near East region (defined as Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab, Emirates, and Yemen). U.S. transfers to the Near East were 35.1% of all arms sales to the region -- over $10 billion since 1995. Included among U.S. transfers to the Near East from 1995-1998 are 817 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,727 armored personnel carriers and armored cars, 126 supersonic combat aircraft, 90 helicopters, 1,284 surface-to-air missiles, and 287 anti-ship missiles. This total is almost surely going to increase significantly in the next few years as the result of pending deals the United States has with the United Arab Emirates worth -- almost $8 billion -- and with Israel for $2.5 billion.
Since the Gulf War the United States has sold a tremendous amount of conventional weaponry around the world. Considering the mayhem that such sales can create, any transfer of conventional weapons such be judged in light of U.S. national interests. The United States should not sell weapons to a country if that sale will significantly alter the balance of military power in the region. Further, the United States should ensure that the country has an excellent record of protecting human rights and participates in a free democracy before U.S. weapons are transferred. The U.S. must be careful who it sells sensitive military technology and equipment to -- we wouldn't want to see U.S. soldiers facing U.S. military equipment in a conflict down the road.
For more information, please see the CRS Report for Congress, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1991-1998," by Richard F. Grimmett, August 4, 1999 and "Developing World Receives $28.6 Billion in Conventional Arms in 1997," By Rachel Stohl, Weekly Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, August 28, 1998.
Azerbaijan Moves One Step Forward, Two Steps Back on Capitol Hill
Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
Despite forging new alliances in the U.S. Congress, Azerbaijan seems to have fallen out of favor with U.S. lawmakers. The proposed Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 2000 prohibits all assistance to Azerbaijan unless its government takes "demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh." The Senate thus reaffirmed an earlier provision of Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act penalizing Azerbaijan for closing its border with Armenia, its foe in the 1990-94 over Nagorno Karabakh region.
Azerbaijan fought a war from 1990 to 1994 against Armenian forces fighting for independence of Nagorno Karabakh region. The conflict ended with Nagorno Karabakh gaining de facto independence and conquering surrounding parts of Azerbaijan as well. The Azeri government responded by shutting down its borders with Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia. Section 907 is an effort by Congress to coerce Azerbaijan into relaxing its blockade.
However, relations with the Baku government have improved since 1994, mainly due to the hopes of U.S. companies of gaining access to Azerbaijan's oil reserves. The mood on Capitol Hill shifted as well. A series of exceptions gradually watered down Section 907's provisions as more and more U.S. assistance found its way to Azerbaijan. Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced a so-called Silk Road Strategy Act meant to reinvigorate trade among South Caucasus countries, strengthen democracy in the region and help lift the countries out of their current economic mess -- all to keep them from collapsing and being reabsorbed into the Russia's spere of influence.
Azeri influence in Congress was strengthened further when the country picked up support of Jewish groups, which rank among the most influential lobbies in Washington, DC. Their alliance mirrored the rapprochement in Israeli-Azeri relations. Israel, already a close ally of Azerbaijan's powerful friend in the region, Turkey, has also become one of the largest investors and contractors in Azeri oil developments.
But Section 907 has turned out to be a tough nut to crack. It endured and survived two repeal attempts in one year. Senator Brownback's efforts to circumvent Section 907 by granting the President a right to waive the law's provision in the interest of national security were struck down by fellow Senators. And the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations bill incorporated Section 907's language nearly verbatim. Although the Silk Road Strategy has also been passed by both the House and the Senate, without changes to Section 907 its practical impact on Azerbaijan will be minimal. "It will serve to provide additional guidance on U.S. policy in the region, " a staffer on the Asia and Pacific subcommittee told CDI.
To add insult to Azerbaijan's injury, the report accompanying the House version of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill also calls on the Administration to provide $20 million in humanitarian assistance to residents of Nagorno Karabakh. Although this province is effectively under self-rule, it has not been internationally recognized and Azerbaijan considers it part of its territory. The legislative setbacks in the U.S. Congress prompted the nationalist opposition parties in Azerbaijan to stage a protest in front of the U.S. embassy, which was broken up by the police.
Meanwhile, the resolution of the underlying source for Azeri-Armenian conflicts -- the question of the Nagorno Karabakh's status -- is far from over, although it may be moving forward. Presidents Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian of Armenia recently met in Geneva. They revealed nothing about the outcome of the talks but President Aliyev has since hinted at making concessions to finally settle the issue. Nationalist opposition newspapers in Azerbaijan claim that Baku is moving towards accepting an OSCE-sponsored plan for a "common state" of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. The plan, which was officially rejected by Azerbaijan last year, would preserve only a formal Azeri sovereignty over Nagorno Karabakh, while the province would give up Azeri territories it currently occupies in exchange for preserving a land-link with neighboring Armenia.
Changes in NATO Leadership -- British Defence Secretary George Robertson has been nominated to lead NATO after the current Secretary General, Javier Solana, leaves in the fall. Solana will take up the post of European Union's Secretary for Common Foreign and Security Policy. In another case of early departure, General Wesley Clark who presided over NATO's air war against Yugoslavia from his post as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe has been asked by President Clinton to retire in order to make room for current Air Force Chief of Staff, General Joseph Ralston. As is the tradition, General Ralston will execute his NATO duties in addition to leading the U.S. European Command.
New Commander for KFOR -- NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, KFOR, is also up for personnel changes. Current KFOR commander, Lieutenant General Mike Jackson (UK) will be succeeded in October by General Klaus Reinhardt (Germany), current commander of NATO's Allied Land Force Central Europe.
Y2K No Problem for U.S. Military Bases -- According to Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre, the "Y2K" problem will not result in computer failures at military bases in the United States. Overseas bases, however, may face difficulties if the host nation has not adequately addressed the problem.
Child Mortality Rate Skyrockets in Iraq -- A report released by UNICEF indicates that the mortality rate for Iraqi children under the age of five years has more than doubled from a decade ago in areas of the country controlled by the government. The rate has risen from 56 deaths per 1,000 live births during the period 1984 to 1989 to 131 per 1,000 from 1994 to 1999. In contrast, in the northern region of the country, which is an autonomous region where U.N. humanitarian assistance is widely available, the death rate has dropped 20 percent over the same period.
Chinooks Grounded -- On August 6 the Army grounded its entire fleet of 466 CH-47 "Chinook" transport helicopters after cracked transmission gears were found in one of the aircraft operated by the British Royal Air Force during a routine mechanical overhaul. Although no accidents related to the cracks have been reported, the fleet was grounded as a precautionary measure. In addition to the U.S. fleet, more than 300 Chinooks, which can carry up to 50 people, are in service in other countries as both military and civilian transports.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Why is Military Spending
Going Up?"
Americans need to remember that the estimated $6 billion cost of conducting war in Kosovo is on top of the Pentagon's annual $280 billion budget. U.S. military spending dwarfs that of any other nation. Yet the White House, the Pentagon, and the Congress are on the verge of increasing military spending by more than $110 billion over the next six years. Although the Cold War ended almost a decade ago, the United States is about to return to Cold War budgets.
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