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| June 17, 1999 |
| June 17, 1999 |
Disarming the KLA
By Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
As NATO peacekeepers enter Kosovo and the Serb withdrawal continues, a potential deal-breaker, in addition to the much publicized standoff with Russia, is the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Barely mentioned in the United Nations (UN) Resolution that outlines the peace agreement, the disarming of the KLA could be the key to lasting peace in Kosovo.
The UN Resolution was essentially an agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia. Because the KLA is not a state entity, not part of the UN, nor a participant in the negotiations that ended NATO's air campaign, it technically is not bound to observe the terms of the agreement. The KLA has agreed to do so as a gesture of good-faith.
Language in the Rambouillet agreement referring to disarming the KLA was downgraded in the UN Resolution to "demilitarize" -- a substantially vague term. The Resolution "demands that the KLA and other Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General."
The UN Resolution demonstrates a nominal determination to disband the KLA, seize its heavy weapons, and construct a Western-trained police force. But demilitarize does not mean disarm, and this distinction has already caused problems. The ambiguity of the agreement has the potential to lead to clashes with NATO peacekeepers if the KLA refuses to lay down its weapons. In a tense eight hour standoff, about 100 KLA soldiers refused to handover their AK-47s, mines, and rocket-propelled grenades to US Marines, doing so only after Apache and Cobra helicopters appeared. This standoff ended peacefully, but the potential for violence remains.
German troops have been much more lax about demanding KLA weapons, disarming them only when they have been in the way of German attempts to conduct operations. The German commanding officer, Brigadier General Fritz von Korff, said he had no orders to disarm or interfere with the KLA unless they "hindered his mission." Korff acknowledged the ambiguity: "There is a certain grey area here," he admitted. "There is no agreement that deals with the KLA."
Because the KLA fought its war with the Serbs primarily with small arms, its unclear position with respect to the UN Resolution seems to allow it to retain virtually all of its weapons. The Rambouillet agreement required the KLA to surrender machine guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and grenade launchers, allowing the KLA to keep the majority of its weapons, rifles and other small arms. (For more information about the KLA's weapons, see "Arming the KLA," By Rachel Stohl, Weekly Defense Monitor, March 25,1999) Recent reports reveal that KLA fighters have weapons ranging from Chinese-made Kalishnikovs to German high-tech SSG 3000 sniper rifles, grenades, landmines, and mortars.
Some KLA spokespersons have said that the KLA will not disarm in areas that are to be controlled by Russian peacekeepers. The KLA believe the Russians were on the side of the Serbs during the war and are therefore not friendly to the KLA cause. Furthermore, the KLA has said that it will only begin to give up some weapons when all Serbian military personnel have left the province.
The consequences of not disarming the KLA may not be as apparent in the short term as they will be in the long term. One need only look at places like Somalia to realize what can happen if weapons are not removed from a post-conflict society. Small arms are responsible for 90% of casualties in today's conflicts and were the only instruments of war in all but three of the 49 conflicts since 1990. Small arms are a serious threat to peace.
Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, has stressed the need for total disarmament in Kosovo. Drawing parallels to the situation in Northern Ireland, where the peace process has been hampered by a failure to disarm the various parties, Axworthy said, "If you leave the automatic weapons, we've learned enough about what's happened in other places, that that becomes a source of brigandry, criminality, intimidation, and so on."
While negotiations about Russia's role in Kosovo are crucial, these should not overshadow other, pressing issues. For any chance of lasting peace in Kosovo, there must be total disarmament of all groups. Armed political groups in Kosovo could be seen as a challenge to Milosevic and his government creating a situation for renewed depredations in Kosovo and clashes with NATO peacekeepers.
The Cox Report: Exaggeration Won't Improve Security
Lt. Colonel Piers Wood, USAR (Ret.), Senior Fellow, pwood@cdi.org
The report of the special House committee headed by Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA) that examined possible Chinese espionage will serve to improve future security throughout the U.S. government. But its exaggerations of the consequences of possible espionage may be counterproductive.
Clearly, corrective action is warranted for the apparent numerous losses of U.S. government secrets. Yet, the report contains distorted information, selectively emphasizes inconsequential data, and omits other data that would provide users important context -- all of which detract from the reports objectivity.
The Cox Report comes as a three volume, glossy, big print product complete with color pictures reminiscent of the picture book style of the DoD annual "magazine," Soviet Military Power. Chapter 4 of the Cox Report, "PRC Missile and Space Forces," is particularly egregious in its selective omissions and overindulgence in the obvious.
For example, a listing for the total number of each type of missile is curiously missing. For only one type of missile in the Chinese arsenal, the CSS-4 ICBM, does the report give the total (twenty). The CSS-4 happens to be the most lethal Chinese ICBM and has the range to strike the U.S. mainland. Oddly, this number is repeated three times, giving the impression that the Chinese pose a significant threat to the United States. If the Cox Report had provided quantities for the entire Chinese missile fleet, it would have become painfully obvious how small this force is in comparison to the U.S. missile forces. The U.S. arsenal of 7,300 nuclear warheads and the Russian arsenal of some 7,000 warheads make the total Chinese inventory of some 100-400 warheads seem paltry indeed.
In another instance, this time with pictorial depictions overpowering the words, the report ominously shows nine Chinese missiles against a background of the curvature of the Earth as would be viewed from space. The depiction clearly implies intercontinental capabilities even though forty-four percent of the missiles pictured have ranges of 1,100 miles or less. (One missile has a range of only 373 miles.) Additionally, three of the nine missiles portrayed are under development and do not exist as deployed weapons, a fact that cannot be ascertained from the picture, chart or caption accompanying the illustration. A fourth missile, the CSS-8, is abeled "ballistic" although it is derived from a Soviet anti-aircraft missile currently being used with no success by Serbian forces in Kosovo. It is "ballistic" in the same technical sense that U.S. Army artillery missiles travel in ballistic trajectories.
Elsewhere in the same chapter is an entire page devoted to a color chart listing eleven U.S. cities within range of the CSS-4 ICBM. This is theater at its best. Obviously, any missile that can hit the city farthest from China, Washington, DC, can also strike everything in between. There is a similar chart portraying the shorter range CSS-2 ballistic missile. Fifty percent of the targets listed are American. However, the threatened U.S. bases are remote outposts like Diego Garcia, in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Given the geographic spread of U.S. bases and installations around the world, it is hardly surprising that a number of American outposts are within range of nations that have or are acquiring ballistic missiles and might be considered potential adversaries.
Some might dismiss these shortcomings in the Cox Report as "justified" by the need to drive home the overall point that the U.S. has suffered security lapses. The point is not that security lapses should be minimized but that intellectual dishonesty in official reports corrodes the necessary trust in government that underpins successful democracy. For those who witnessed flagrant government deceit during the Vietnam War, this document makes it all too easy to suspect that deception it is still going on in some parts of government.
More Security At Lower Cost
Oscar Lurie, Research Analyst
Congress and the Administration believe that the security of our country can only be assured if we spend $350 billion to acquire 4,000 new hyper-tech tactical aircraft: the F-22, the F/A-18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter. These programs would use up almost half of the Pentagon's current annual budget for all weapon purchases, including, ships, tanks, rifles, etc. In particular, the F-22 would be the most expensive fighter aircraft in history.
But America's fighter aircraft already have unmatched superiority against any rivals in the world. For instance, no potential opponent can counter America's current air supremacy fighter, the F-15. The Pentagon could modernize the entire existing fleet of aircraft by purchasing new models of these proven aircraft at a much lower cost than replacing them with brand new planes without sacrificing U.S. air dominance. Such a change in weapons procurement strategy could be of critical assistance in solving our problems in the Persian Gulf.
For years the United States has been spending billions of dollars and risking hundreds of lives to protect the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. The 1990-91 war against Iraq was not just because one Arab dictatorship had invaded another The 650,000 soldiers deployed in the Gulf were there to regain the oil fields in Kuwait and to protect the much richer Saudi fields from seizure. Iraq was seen to be threatening the oil supply of the Western world.
The persistent bombing of Iraq since January 1999 is justified by the Clinton Administration as punishment for Saddam's refusal to give the U.N. inspectors free access to his chemical and biological weapons factories and storage sites. The Administration charges that Saddam threatens the peace of the world. But America does not attack other nations that have the ability to make and hide such weapons. Moreover, Russia, France, and even some pro-western Arab nations object to the American campaign. They evidently are not persuaded that Saddam's projects really threaten world peace.
The poorly concealed objective is really to assure the unimpeded movement of oil from the Gulf's rich fields. Use of American forces for this assurance is now costing the U.S. taxpayer about $ 1 billion per year.
An altogether more peaceful and less expensive way of assuring America's independence from Persian Gulf oil is available. If the U.S. took advantage of the present opportunity it could gain security and probably make a profit on a nonmilitary defense operation. Following the 1973 Arab oil embargo, when prices skyrocketed, the U.S. Congress authorized the purchase and storage of crude oil in a Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The storage sites -- a series of caverns created by pumping water into salt deposits, evacuating the salt, thereby leaving large areas in which oil can be stored -- consist of fluid pools of 10 to 12 million barrels to which more oil can be easily added. The oil is readily retrieved with little loss while it is being stored.
As of March 24, 1999 the U.S. Department of Energy reported that the SPR had a storage capacity of 700 million barrels with 561 million barrels actually stored.
In 1996, before the collapse of the Asian economies, American refiners were paying about $21 per barrel to import oil. Due to slack Asian demand, by 1998 the average price had fallen to $12.10. At that price it would cost just under $1.7 billion to fill the SPR to its present capacity, an amount equivalent to the cost of just twelve F-22s. Filling the SPR to capacity would give the U.S. the ability to live entirely independent from Persian Gulf oil for 334 days -- almost a full year.
Under a more ambitious strategy, additional energy independence could be purchased by creating and filling more storage sites. Most of the SPR capacity was created in the period 1978-'84. The federal budgets covering those years report a total cost of about $3,250 million for SPR "Land and Structures." Since the goal of these outlays was a storage capacity of 750 million barrels, the average cost was about $2,.400 per thousand barrels of capacity. Adjusting for progressive inflation in underground construction up to 1997, the current cost to create more storage would be about $4,300 per thousand barrels.
Thus to obtain an additional year of independence from Persian Gulf oil site creation would cost about $3.3 billion. The oil to fill this extra capacity would cost about $9.3 billion, bringing the total cost of this additional year of independence to about $12.6 billion. This cost is equivalent to 93 F 22s, which would still leave the Air Force 228 of these unneeded aircraft.
There is an additional, unusual feature in this approach to national security -- it potentially can turn a profit for U.S. taxpayers. In March, 1999 OPEC and a few other producers agreed to reduce their output by 2 million barrels per day. This caused an immediate price rise of $2 per barrel which was followed soon afterward by smaller increases. But this agreement, like many previous OPEC deals, can readily be broken by a few cheaters. If the cartel again falters, the price will quickly fall, going as low as $4 per barrel according to some oil marketing analysts. This could happen if the Saudis (the linchpin in OPEC) abandon production controls to maximize their oil revenue and thereby avoid having to make painful decisions about cutting back their generous domestic subsidies.
As Asian economies recover, their demand for oil will rebound. World oil prices will then rebound, probably to the 1996 range of $19-$21 per barrel. If the U.S. has on hand as much as two years supply in the SPR purchased as prices ranging from $8 to $14 per barrel, there would be a $5 to $10 billion increase in the value of this oil. Not a bad profit, especially when one adds in the $1 billion per year that could be saved by ending the bombing campaign against Iraq.
New Non-Proliferation Initiative Zeros in on Non-Nuclear Threat
Laura Beers, Research Assistant
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has been active in a number of bilateral and multilateral programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and WMD technology from Russia and the newly independent states (NIS). Though all of the programs have had the same ultimate goal, funding requests and implementation have been handled individually by the Departments of State, Defense and Energy. Now, under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETR), the three agencies are presenting a joint funding request to Congress for a total of $1 billion for FY'00. The $1 billion will go to fund the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program administered by the DoD, U.S. contributions to the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) in Russia and Belarus and the Science and Technology Center Ukraine (STCU) administered by the State Department, and the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the new Nuclear Cities program administered by DoE, as well as several other unilateral and multilateral initiatives.
Proposed ETR funding for FY'00 is just over $1 billion dollars. Of this, $486 million would go to DoD, $251 million to the State Department, and $265 million to DoE.
CTR, commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar program -- named after Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) who initiated the program in 1991 -- focuses on dismantling and neutralizing WMD and on increasing border security in the NIS to prevent the proliferation of WMD. The programs administered by State and DoE focus on the 'brain drain' problem - preventing the defection of former Soviet weapons scientists to rogue nations such as Iran. Among the newer initiatives funded under ETR are programs to increase security at former Soviet biological weapons facilities. The funding request for FY'00 represents a 40 percent increase over last year's funding levels for non-proliferation programs. This increase in funding is part of a eight year trend as Congress and the President gain a fuller understanding of the extent of the WMD proliferation threat.
The FY'00 funding request includes a considerable increase in funding for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs, from $129 million in FY'99 to $229 million in FY '00. As new intelligence on former Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs becomes available, the United States is realizing the full enormity of the CBW proliferation threat. Russia has admitted to possessing a 44,000 ton stockpile of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, Lewisite, and nerve agents -- the world's largest stockpile of such weapons (the U.S. stockpile, in comparison, is 32,000 tons). The full extent of Russia's biological weapons stockpile is unknown. In 1972, the Soviets signed the Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention which banned biological weapons research, and for the next twenty years, the Soviets denied conducting BW research. Their biological weapons research program, which according to former Soviet BW scientist Kenneth Alibek employed over 60,000 people in the late 1980's and early 1990's, was the Soviets' most closely guarded military secret.
The existence of these large CBW stockpiles in Russia and the NIS represents a dual threat. From an ecological viewpoint, toxins from these laboratories and storage facilities pose grave health threats to surrounding populations. From a security viewpoint, the possible proliferation of CBW weapons technology is a real threat to the United States and the international community. CBW are becoming the weapons of choice for rogue nations and terrorist groups as they are cheaper and easier to acquire or develop than nuclear weapons. A serious threat exists that former Soviet weapons scientists, many of whom are now unemployed, will auction their weapons expertise to the highest bidder.
To combat these threats, the United States is funding programs to aid in the destruction of Russian chemical weapons stockpiles; to begin dismantlement of former biological weapons facilities; to increase security at existing former biological weapons facilities, and to employ former CBW scientists in peaceful research.
A CW Destruction Analytical Laboratory in Saratov, near Moscow, is currently under renovation, and the site was just chosen as a new nerve gas destruction facility. In 1996, the United States delivered three mobile CW destruction analytical laboratories, one of which is now operational. Tackling the issue of Russia's biological weapons stockpiles is more difficult, as the Russians did not even admit to possessing a large BW arsenal until 1992. Nonetheless, over the past few years, funding has been made available for BW production facilities dismantlement in Russia and Kazakhstan and for increased security at biological weapons facilities which due to cuts in the Russian defense budget are often inadequately guarded. The State Department's ISTC program and DoE's IPP, both of which were originally designed to employ former nuclear weapons scientists, have expanded to include CBW scientists in increasingly large numbers.
These efforts must continue. Congress should approve the full appropriation request for the ETR initiative for FY'00. Funding for CBW non-proliferation programs, already nearly 1/3 of the ETR budget request, ought to be increased, as should funding for the other components of the program. Recent events, such as the 1995 release of sarin gas into the Tokyo subway by the Aum cult and the more recent UNSCOM investigations into potential chemical weapons stockpiles in Iraq indicate that the threat of CBW being used by terrorist groups and rogue states is all too real. The United States, along with the rest of the international community, must work with Russia and the NIS to prevent the proliferation of CBW and CBW technology outside of the former-Soviet borders.
"Y2K" Costs -- The Office of Management and Budget announced this week that the government's costs for fixing the "Y2K" computer problem will exceed $8 billion, $1.3 billion more than was predicted three months ago. The main reason for the increase was the Pentagon's use of just over $1 billion of the emergency funds set aside by Congress to fix the most important computers.
U.S. Responses in Korea -- Mounting tensions between North and South Korea over territorial disputes in the Yellow Sea exploded in to violence this week when naval vessels of the two countries exchanged fire. A North Korean gunboat was reported sunk. In response, the United States is sending warships in to the region. The guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes arrived in the Yellow Sea from Japan on Thursday, to be joined by a second guided missile cruiser, the USS Mobile Bay, on Friday.
PAC-3 Cost Overruns -- Projected budget overruns for the Patriot PAC-3 may reach $278 million for the engineering and manufacturing phase, well above the expected $60 million in cost growth. The overrun will be split between the government and the system's prime contractor, Lockheed-Martin, which says it considers the recent development to be "very serious." The Pentagon is expected to absorb 70% of the extra costs.
Navy Grounds Harriers -- The U.S. Navy grounded its fleet of 84 Marine Corps AV-8B Harriers equipped with Rolls-Royce engines after two planes were lost due to engine problems. The crashes occurred on June 4 and June 14, and both pilots were able to eject safely. The grounding effects 17 jets which are deployed with NATO forces in Kosovo.
"Rent-a-Jet?" -- U.S. Representative Pete Stark (D-CA) has introduced legislation which would require defense contractors to fully reimburse the U.S. government for the costs of displaying military material at overseas air shows. The "Restrictions of Foreign Air Shows Act" bans the direct participation of military personnel and equipment at air shows unless the contractor pays all the expenses incurred by DoD. Currently DoD permits loaning aircraft to contractors free of charge. See Congressman Stark's press release on this legislation.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Kosovo: NATO's Mid-life Crisis?"
The West's Cold War defense alliance has found itself on the offensive in the former Yugoslavia -- first in Bosnia and now Kosovo. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization refused to die with its old nemesis, the Warsaw Pact, and instead reinvented itself as a peacekeeping organization, the enforcer of western values, and the vehicle for political change in Eastern Europe. What does the future hold for the new NATO?
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