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| June 22, 1999 |
| June 22, 1999 |
Editor's note: On May 28, CDI experienced a failure of our "Weekly Defense Monitor" list server. The failure was the result of one of the list's recipients sending a response to our majordomo account. We delayed sending any e-mail through the list serve until we were able to locate and analyze the problem. We believe that we have taken the steps necessary to avoid a recurrence of the problem, and we regret any inconvenience that these events may have caused.
Kosovo Body Language: Backslapping or Head Scratching?
Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
In spite of celebrations in the White House and NATO headquarters, the real lessons of the Kosovo war give more reason for concern than jubilation.
The outcome can hardly be called a victory for anyone. NATO failed to prevent the Serbs from uprooting and forcing most of the Albanian Kosovar population from their country. In the end, NATO resorted to simply punishing Serbia for its deeds -- hence the bombing of industry and infrastructure unrelated to the horrible events in Kosovo. Only when Milosevic realized that the alliance would indeed bomb until the last factory had fallen did he agree to NATO's demands. By then, Kosovo was burned and emptied of its occupants and the Serbian economy destroyed. Victory? Hardly.
Contrary to the U.S. Air Force's self-congratulatory claims, the war was not decided through air power alone. If not for the KLA, NATO pilots would still be peering through their cameras in search of elusive Yugoslav army tanks and APCs. The Kosovo rebels' offensive forced the Yugoslav formations into the open where they were devastated by cluster bombs from B-52s and Gatling guns on AC-130 gunships that rained steel at 1,800 rounds a minute. Indeed, the Pentagon's June 10 press briefing substantiates that most of the damage inflicted on Serb forces began about the time the KLA offensive started at the end of May. From the beginning of the campaign through the beginning of the KLA offensive, NATO only destroyed about 40 tanks and APCs. In the two weeks after the offensive began, the tally went up to 454 artillery pieces, 222 APCs and 122 tanks. In short, NATO did use ground troops, but conveniently they were Albanian.
U.S. - Russia relations sank to their lowest state in years. The authority of the United Nations was undermined. And while most refugees will likely return to their homes under NATO protection, in some areas they will be returning to nearly complete devastation.
What, then, are the lessons that NATO should draw?
Unfortunately, different lessons will likely be drawn by the U.S. and most of the allies. Over the last few years, the United States has come to rely on military force instead of diplomacy in international affairs. The Rambouillet talks preceding the air war can hardly be considered true diplomacy since the U.S. proposed conditions that Serbia simply could not accept. The complete refusal by the U.S. to even negotiate on the terms offered effectively precluded any chance for peacefully settling the impasse. As the bombing went on, Congress seemed to be working in another world. It added $16 billion to the Pentagon's budget while cutting the State Department's funds by nearly one-third. Furthermore, the U.S. debt to the United Nations has hamstrung that organization's ability to monitor conflicts and prevent wars.
In NATO's new Strategic Concept, the Clinton Administration has a new tool to employ in Kosovo-style military operations. The Strategic Concept specifically gives NATO the right of "deterring and defending" against threats in the vaguely defined "Euroatlantic area" which is not necessarily identical with the territory of NATO allies. Under this formulation, Washington can claim that it is acting through NATO rather than unilaterally, thereby permitting the Administration to ignore criticism about imposing Pax Americana on the rest of the world. Acting under the guise of the new Strategic Concept, the U.S. can declare future cruise missile and bombing raids are expressions of the will of the "democratic community of nations" even though traditional diplomatic negotiations undoubtedly would be the first choice of our allies.
There is no shortage of potential conflicts lurking right over the horizon. Some could easily dwarf Kosovo in their complexity; others could potentially bring the United States into a direct conflict with Russia.
Right next door to Kosovo is Montenegro, where police loyal to President Djukanovic face 20,000 Yugoslav troops under Belgrade's control in a tense stand-off. Redeployment to Montenegro of troops withdrawing from Kosovo will only add fuel to the fire. Further southeast lie the Caucasus and Central Asia, where a number of ethnic conflicts and secessionist attempts have flared since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The United States and NATO countries are building economic and military ties with oil-rich states in these regions, much to the displeasure of Iran and Russia, the latter of which still has military bases in the area. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, among others, said they would seek U.S. and NATO help should they get into conflict with their neighbors or experience domestic unrest.
European NATO countries seem much less eager to give NATO doctrine supremacy over the current international system that rests on the United Nations Charter. While the Europeans followed the U.S. lead in Kosovo, they also have been intensifying efforts to create a truly European defense organization. The dormant Western European Union is being abolished to allow the 15-member European Union (EU) to add foreign policy and security tasks to its existing agenda. Last week in Cologne, EU members named their first representative for common foreign and security policy. The lesson the Europeans seem to be taking from Kosovo is the need to build their own defense organization to be used when they disagree with the U.S. or when the U.S. opts out of dispute resolution.
For more information on the U.S. role in international affairs, see "America's Future: Confrontation or Cooperation?" in CDI's "Defense Monitor." Pentagon data on the role of the KLA at the end of the bombing campaign can be found at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/990610-J-0000K-007.jpg
Kosovo: Assessing the Damage
Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
With the signing this week by Yugoslav military leaders of the agreement for withdrawing Serbian forces from Kosovo, NATO's focus has switched from conducting military operations to introducing peacekeeping forces. Work has also begun on devising a plan for the safe return of Kosovar refugees to their homes, as have discussions about reconstruction efforts in the region.
While a comprehensive assessment of the situation on the ground will be necessary to determine the true extent of the damage caused by NATO bombings and Yugoslav and KLA military operations, certain facilities will clearly be given immediate priority. These consist of those elements of infrastructure that are necessary for the peacekeeping force to fulfill its mission, particularly the transportation system. Roads, bridges and airfields will need to be rapidly repaired so that peacekeepers can swiftly enter the region in large numbers and move easily about Kosovo as they conduct their operations. Clearing landmines to permit free movement of the peacekeeping forces and later protect returning refugees will also be of the highest priority.
Next in order of priority will be those items essential to the support of the returning refugees. These include water, electrical power and communications, as well as a temporary network to help feed and house civilians. A national administrative system will have to be developed. Finally, the focus will likely shift to the reconstruction or replacement of public buildings, businesses and permanent homes, and the redevelopment of the regional and local economies.
While solutions to the most pressing problems are fairly straightforward, many questions remain about how to safely return 800,000 civilians to Kosovo. Who oversees and coordinates the reconstruction effort and how to fund it are critical issues. Also yet to be determined is the extent to which the international community is willing to assist Yugoslavia's efforts to recover from the effects of seventy-eight days of bombings.
While the United States provided the lion's share of military equipment for NATO's air campaign, the Clinton Administration views reconstruction of Kosovo to be primarily Europe's responsibility. In his Memorial Day speech, the President stated, "...when peacekeeping force goes in there, the overwhelming majority of people will be European; and that when the reconstruction begins, the overwhelming amount of investment will be European." This stance mirrors events in Bosnia, where the United States provided the bulk of military personnel, material and support, while our European allies conducted the majority of follow-on operations.
Congress appears to share the President's view, at least for the short term. While last month Congress approved an emergency spending package to fund military operations and humanitarian assistance for Kosovo, earlier this week the Senate adopted an amendment to the Pentagon's annual spending bill prohibiting the use of any of those funds for reconstruction in the region. A second amendment adopted by the Senate bars any U.S. funds being spent on reconstruction efforts in Yugoslavia as long as Slobodan Milosevic remains as president. Both amendments were adopted by voice vote, and the House of Representatives is expected to take similar actions in the near future.
Without a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Kosovo, it is impossible to estimate the extent of the damage. Yet clearly other factors will effect the cost of reconstruction, including the scope of the effort and whether it will include all of Yugoslavia. Who will pay for it? Will it be funded by direct cash contributions from other nations, or a series of loan programs, or, as is most likely, some mix of the two? Ultimately, the bill for reconstruction may be determined not by what the actual cost is, but rather by how much the United States and the rest of the international community are willing to spend.
Central Europe Finds No Other Option But to Support NATO
The NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia generated the opposition of a
large number of people in both the three new members and the aspiring NATO
members in Central Europe and the Balkans. In the words of a Bulgarian
political analyst, "the region was psychologically divided." There are
several reasons for this psychological division: 1) the close cultural and
historical ties with Yugoslavia; 2) the close geographical proximity of
the war; and 3) (relevant mostly to left-wing party supporters) Yugoslavia
is a former ally.
Yet the opposition to NATO bombing and the losses from the war, especially
in the countries adjacent to Yugoslavia, did not drastically diminish the
support for NATO. Most sociological surveys about the Kosovo crisis show
that an equal percentage of the population disapproves of both the NATO
bombing and Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing. The people in
Bulgaria and Hungary are particularly concerned about their respective
ethnic brethren in Yugoslavia, who were subjected to both the bombing and
Milosevic's treatment. Ultimately, the governments of the Central and
Eastern European countries bit their tongues and remained supportive of
NATO because to do otherwise would be to side with a losing side and a
barbaric cause.
For Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary it was a test of their loyalty
to NATO, which ended with mixed results. In Hungary, the parliamentary
parties showed a striking unity in support of NATO's actions and prevented
the Kosovo crisis from becoming a part of an ongoing domestic political
struggle. Hungary hosted a NATO base in Taszar but domestic political
concerns led Budapest to initially oppose strikes at Hungarian-populated
northern Yugoslavia and to resist combat missions bing flown from
Hungarian territory. As the NATO bombing accelerated, the Polish
government proclaimed its country to be the most firm U.S. supporter in
the region. The Czech Republic took the most skeptical stance on the
Yugoslav war. The Prague government sided with NATO ally Greece (which
refused to participate in the conflict altogether) in calling for a pause
in NATO bombing. On the whole, NATO's actions helped the leftist parties
stay together (as it was the case with the Polish SLD) or gain new
supporters (the Czech KSCM). The governments of the new member states
remained supportive of the Alliance's actions without jeopardizing their
political credibility.
The aspiring NATO members in the region interpreted the conflict in Kosovo
as yet another reason for gaining admittance into the Alliance. The
Romanians, disappointed after being "rejected" both in Madrid and in
Washington, declared that Kosovo has made it clear that only a full
membership in the Alliance can guarantee Romania's security. Macedonian
President Kiro Gligorov claimed that given that no other country in the
region has done more for the Kosovars than Macedonia, his country's rating
during the Washington summit (last on the list of candidates) was
"inappropriate." Despite the tremendous economic losses, NATO's missile
incidents, and the strengthened voice of the political opposition (the
Socialist coalition), the Bulgarian government stayed firmly behind NATO's
actions in Yugoslavia. Albania, too, found it hard to refuse anything to
the West when it realized it is at the bottom of the list of prospective
new NATO and EU members. At the end of May, the Baltic republics also
confirmed their eagerness to join NATO despite the drastic deterioration
of the relations between the Alliance and their former "big brother"
Russia.
To the Central European countries the conflict in Kosovo represented a
classic "civilizational choice" -- to become a part of the West which, for
better or worse, NATO has come to represent, or to choose a neutral path.
This choice, for countries like Albania and Macedonia, required sacrifices
at a time of already fragile economic and political conditions. For the
aspiring NATO members to choose the opposite meant to jeopardize their
chances for NATO membership. Therefore, they supported NATO even if it
meant condoning an action whose legality they called into question.
Commerce of Small Arms Banned in Rio
In the wake of the Columbine school shooting, the dialogue about guns in
America has reached new levels. But while action in the United States is
mired in partisan politics, some countries are taking active steps to
prevent continued armed violence in their countries. Brazil, which is
plagued with 27,000 deaths per year by small arms -- 10 to 13% of all
gun-related deaths in the world -- is beginning such action.
In an historic move, the Assembly of Deputies in the state of Rio de
Janeiro approved a law banning the commerce of small arms in the state of
Rio by a vote of 41-10 on June 1. As a result of the vote, only the armed
forces, police, and private security firms will be permitted to buy guns.
The City Hall of Rio de Janeiro city approved a similar law unanimously
the week before.
Complementing the steps taken by Rio de Janeiro state, Brazil's President,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso sent a proposed law to the Brazilian National
Congress that would ban the commerce of small arms in Brazil, with the
exception of the armed forces, police, and private security firms. In
addition, citizens in possession of such weapons would be required to turn
them in to the state for reimbursement.
The Brazilian and Rio de Janeiro State governments have worked closely
with civil society to develop these programs. Viva Rio, a
non-governmental organization, helped develop the initiative and gathered
popular support for the legislation. In a campaign translated as "Rio,
Put That Gun Down" over 200,000 signatures have been collected on a
petition to prohibit the sale of guns in Brazil.
The need for such legislation in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro are easily
apparent. According to government statistics, almost 95% of violent
deaths in Rio de Janeiro are due to firearms. Small arms are easily
accessible on the streets of Brazil. In the capitals of Sao Paolo and
Rio de Janeiro, the cities with the highest level of violent crime and
most weapons, a 32 caliber revolver can be found for $40 on the black
market. Brazilian police say that 80% of the weapons recovered from
offenders younger than 20 are such weapons.
The proposed legislation will be implemented in a kind of weapons
collection program. The Brazilian government says there are approximately
three million legally registered guns, and estimates at least six million
illegal guns (some put the total near eight million) in circulation in
Brazil. Weapon owners will receive 150 reales ($88) when the weapons are
turned in to the proper authorities.
Part of the reason this kind of program can work in Brazil is the nature
of the Brazilian arms industry and trade. Brazil is home to five large
small arms manufactures, which combined exported 265,000 weapons and sold
87,000 domestically last year. Although some have argued that the
civilian ownership ban will hurt Brazilian industry and cause
unemployment, because two-thirds of production goes to exports the
government argues that the large majority of jobs will not be effected.
However, some weapons manufacturers and gun retailers (those who will be
hurt by the measure) have protested the proposed legislation. Irrespective
of industry dissent, President Cardoso remains committed to the idea
because of the number of students murdered in schools in Brazil and the
statistics showing the high level of crime committed with small arms
annually in Brazil.
The measures in Brazil are symbolic of the current trend for national and
regional measures aimed at addressing the proliferation and misuse of
small arms around the world. In passing the legislation, Brazil joins
Australia and the United Kingdom in the group of countries that bans small
arm sales. Brazil's legislation is also a type of moratorium, reminiscent
of the West African Moratorium agreed upon last year (please see
"West African Small Arms Moratorium Adopted" by Rachel Stohl, November 12, 1998,
for more information).
These national and regional initiatives are essential for ensuring that
the proliferation of small arms does not become destabilizing and lead
to violent conflict. Such measures should be supported and applauded.
CDI's "Briefing Room"
Kosovo peacekeeping -- Turning the tables on the Western allies, Russia
took a page from NATO's book, moving first and negotiating later -- 500
troops from the Russian contingent in Bosnia entered Yugoslavia on their
way to Kosovo, despite the lack of agreement with NATO on where and under
whose command they will serve.
THAAD Success -- After six failed attempts to demonstrate a "hit-to-kill"
capability, the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system
intercepted an incoming Hera target missile at White Sands, New Mexico, on
June 10.
Shipyard Merger -- Litton Industries, the parent company of Ingalls
Shipbuilding, agreed on June 3 to purchase Avondale Industries, Inc. for
$529 million in cash, topping an earlier bid by Newport News Shipbuilding
of $470 million in stock. This move came in the wake of Litton's decision
not to pursue its plan to acquire Newport News after the U.S. Navy's
announcement that it would recommend that the government oppose the
proposed merger. See "Litton Moves to Acquire Newport News, Avondale,"
Weekly Defense Monitor, May 14, 1999.
Landmines -- The $48.3 million funding request for the development of the
RADM mixed-landmine system was struck from the Senate Defense
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000. However, funding for the program
remains in the House Defense Appropriations bill, and therefore, the
inclusion of RADM funding will have to be negotiated when House and Senate
members go to conference to iron out the differences in the two versions
of the legislation.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "The Thinning Threat"
Russia -- America's once-feared military adversary -- now spends less than
$10 billion per year on the military, compared to nearly $300 billion in
annual spending by the United States. None of our other potential
adversaries China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Cuba, and Sudan
can mount a credible threat to the United States or its allies. In light
of the disappearance of the conventional military threat to the U.S., how
might the United States better organize its national defense?
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Maggie Vencill, Research Assistant
By Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
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