
| May 27, 1999 |
Just War -- Or Just A War
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague today (May 27) formally indicted the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and some of his inner circle of civilian and military associates for war crimes in connection with the ethnic cleansing and mass killings of Albanian Kosovars.
In the United States, a CNN/USA TODAY conducted at the beginning of the week pegged public support for NATO's military action against Yugoslavia at 49 percent, the first time since the bombing began that a major poll has recorded less than 50 percent support. Just as significant, the same poll shows Americans are equally divided over the question of whether the allied forces are doing everything possible to avoid casualties among civilians, whether in Kosovo or the rest of Yugoslavia.
These two incidents go to the heart of international tolerance, if not acceptance, of war as a remedy for large-scale injustices. The classic formulation of this issue has two elements: whether a war is "just" and whether the means of waging war are "just."
Complicating the first element is the centuries old presumption that a nation-state is absolutely sovereign, that it should be immune from outside interference in its internal affairs, and has the absolute right of self-defense. These principles are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and are often cited by a government that objects to even rhetorical assaults about conditions inside its borders.
However, this principle is not ironclad. One of the major exceptions is that involving instances when a government sets out to destroy, systematically terrorize, or enslave a part of its own population that is unable to effectively defend itself. In such cases, it seems a fair conclusion that the continued existence of political community, the basis of the nation-state, no longer applies, and those responsible for initiating such actions open themselves to intervention by outside powers. Such intervention is more acceptable if it is carried out by a multinational force whose members do not inherently stand to gain (especially territorially) from the intervention.
In the same context, the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights comes into play. This Declaration holds in its Article 1 that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." When a government blatantly and deliberately violates the values enshrined in this Declaration such that its actions constitute "crimes against humanity," intervention on humanitarian grounds is permissible. (Note that this formulation implies offenses against the conscience of humankind, not merely the opinions or consciences of government leaders.)
The second element, just conduct of the war, addresses the way force is applied in the effort to stop or reverse the "crimes against humanity." Such conditions as proportionality between the level and means of violence and the ends to be achieved, the probability that fighting will accomplish the intended goal, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants (and, in the modern nation, the infrastructure supporting noncombatants), humane treatment of prisoners, and the necessity to exhaust (and even re-exhaust) every possible means of resolving a conflict without violence, come into play.
So too, in an unintended way, does the Declaration of Human Rights, and it is the latter that seems to lie at the root of public unease about the war that the polls are beginning to show.
One of the major objectives of the Pentagon and the other NATO countries has been to conduct the war in such a manner that the allied nations have no battlefield casualties. The experience of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War and the one-afternoon firefight in the streets of Mogadishu convinced U.S. political and military leaders that the public has minimal tolerance for American casualties. What seems to be happening in Yugoslavia is a manifestation of minimal tolerance for casualties among noncombatants, whether these are among fleeing Kosovar Albanians or Serbs living in other parts of the Federal Republic.
This unease is compounded by the fact that until very recently allied pilots were restricted from going below 12,000 feet (reportedly 15,000 feet in the early days of the air campaign) when making their attacks. While no American wants to see other Americans killed, the question that is immediately raised by these tactics is whether the life of an oppressed Kosovar Albanian is equal in worth to the life of an American warrior. According to the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, which must be taken as the basis for determining that this is a "just war," the life of every human is of equal value.
No nation can or should try or should be expected to save the world and everyone in it. But to conduct even a "humanitarian" war in such a way that it unduly jeopardizes and punishes those ostensibly being protected by the intervention denigrates the moral basis on which the intervention is based.
In this context, the CNN/USA TODAY poll is revealing in other ways. While 71 percent of those polled opposed leaving the Kosovars to try to deal with their plight, 82 percent favored a bombing pause to allow a better climate for negotiations.
As we move into the new century, perhaps the American people are moving ahead of our political and military officials in recognizing the emergence of a new consensus about when it is both necessary and permissible to resort to violence. The outlines of this consensus might be summed in three propositions. Wars kill. Americans hate wars. Nonetheless we are willing to oppose, even by war and after all other means are exhausted, those who would systematically and ruthlessly crush the rights of ethnic and religious minorities unable to defend themselves.
Would we not, in their situation, want the same?
Deadly Steps in Kosovo
By Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
As the crisis in Kosovo continues, fleeing refugees and displaced civilians are facing new dangers. Not only must they be aware of hostile ground troops and of inaccurate missile and bomb attacks, these innocent victims of war must also face the indiscriminate use of landmines in and around Kosovo. The Yugoslav military and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) are all known users of landmines in this current conflict. Now, the U.S. has made clear that they are reserving the right to use landmines in their campaign in Kosovo. Now more than ever, each step for all parties involved in this devastating war could be a deadly one.
The international community took a stand against the use of landmines with the 1997 Ottawa Convention banning the production, use, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. There is evidence of only four of the 135 signatories to the treaty being in violation of its terms. (For more information about the success of the first year of the Ottawa Convention, please see "First Meeting of States Parties to Landmine Treaty Meet in Maputo," by Rachel Stohl, Weekly Defense Monitor, May 6, 1999.)
In fact, all NATO nations except the United States and Turkey have signed the Ottawa Landmines Treaty. But even though there is a clear majority of Ottawa Treaty signers among the NATO countries, the dissident U.S. voice is currently the loudest in terms of possible landmine use in Kosovo. According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), U.S. mines are stored in Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom, and there is the possibility the U.S. will transport these mines through signatory states for use in Kosovo, which could be a violation of the treaty. As a result, the ICBL has called upon NATO to adopt a no use policy for anti-personnel mines in their operations. Also of concern to the ICBL and other interested groups is that the U.S., to this point, has reserved its right to use anti-personnel mines in the conflict.
According to Steve Goose, Program Director of the Human Rights Watch Arms Division, two senior U.S. government officials have told him "that the U.S. maintains anti-personnel landmines as an arrow in their quiver for use in Yugoslavia if necessary." Further evidence that the U.S. is considering use of landmines in Kosovo is that the U.S. has upgraded the B-1 bombers to deliver Gator anti-tank weapons - a combination of both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Many familiar with the issue also widely believe that the U.S. plans to upgrade the Gator system in 2005 with a "wind-corrected munitions dispenser," allowing mines to be dispersed more accurately. Although the Pentagon has denied such a program in place, the idea has many activists concerned.
According to UN officials, "Landmines are one of the increasing dangers facing refugees heading for Macedonia and Albania." The Los Angeles Times, quoting interviews with UN officials reported, "With Yugoslavia's border guards periodically restricting departures of refugees and its soldiers burying mines in anticipation of a ground invasion, UN officials fear that more refugees may trigger the weapons as they flee Kosovo through illegal, unmarked border crossings."
The UN, humanitarian workers, and involved civilians have a right to be concerned. The Yugoslav government, not a signatory of the Ottawa Treaty, continues to use landmines in and around Kosovo. The ICBL publication "Landmine Monitor" provides a glimpse of the Yugoslav position on landmines. In a 1996 interview Yugoslav Colonel Duzan Stanizan, said, "Considering the fact that Yugoslav military doctrine is primarily defensive, anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines have a very important place in our defensive system." Today the Yugoslav army is laying mines to prevent refugees from returning to Yugoslavia and to their homes. There is evidence of the Yugoslav military mining the borders with Albania and Macedonia. Even before NATO involvement the use of landmines in Kosovo was significant. Between August 1998 and February 1999 55 incidents of landmine usage were uncovered by the Kosovo Verification Mission, Mine Action and Information Center.
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) for their part is also rumored to be laying mines in Kosovo and the surrounding areas. Although there is no concrete evidence, it is believed that the KLA has the capacity to produce explosive ordnance, is importing and smuggling landmines from Albania, and has control over mine stockpiles. However, it is also believed that anti-tank mines are used more frequently in Kosovo than anti-personnel mines.
Regardless of the type of mine, landmines of all types are deadly. In April five refugees were killed when their automobile was destroyed by a anti-tank mine place at the Albanian border. Although members of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) were monitoring the border and mines were known to be present, there is little observers can do to stop the lethality of a landmine.
Landmines not only impede the movements of civilians, but can also prevent effective military action. One of the greatest dangers ground troops often experience is the presence of landmines. If NATO is going to ignore the humanitarian implications of landmine use, then a no use policy on landmines must be adopted by NATO to protect soldiers involved in a possible ground campaign. Further, mine awareness programs and victim assistance actions are required for those in Kosovo and border refugee camps. As refugees continue to flee and landmine use continues, the dangers for accidents dramatically increases. Each step the Kosovars take -- toward freedom or to escape the dangers of war -- could be a deadly one.
Congress Kills Base Closures -- Again
Chris Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
This week, as the full Senate began its work on the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, an amendment was offered by Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Carl Levin (D-MI) calling for an additional round of military base closures in 2001. The amendment was defeated 60 to 40, with Democrats and Republicans split on both sides. The defeat of this amendment effectively ends efforts this year to close additional bases.
Last year, at the urging of the Pentagon, the Administration requested authority for two additional rounds of base closures, one in 2001, and the second in 2005. Congress not only rejected the proposal, but included language in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 that made it more difficult to close existing facilities. Similar closure efforts where also defeated the year before.
The Pentagon estimates that it is carrying 23% surplus infrastructure, and that closing additional unneeded bases could save $3 billion annually. Opponents of further base closures generally agree that additional closures are necessary, but argue that the Clinton Administration cannot be trusted not to play politics with the closure process. As proof, they point to a decision by the Administration to keep open two bases, one in Texas and the other in California, that had been slated for closure in 1995.
On March 22, at a CATO forum on the economic effects of military base closures, Bill Johnson, Legislative Director for Representative Jim Hansen (R-UT), a member of the House Armed Services Committee and an opponent of the Administration's base closure proposal, laid out some ideas on how any future base closures should be handled:
While it is clear that Administration tampering with the 1995 closure list repoliticized the base closure process, arguing that base closures are necessary but that the current Administration cannot be trusted to conduct them fairly is a spurious argument, given that the proposed closure process would not begin until 2001 at the earliest, after the Clinton Administration leaves office. Opponents of base closures have merely seized on a convenient political argument to protect their districts' interests. Ultimately, however, Congress will have to consider seriously the costs associated with keeping open unneeded facilities.
For background on the Base Closure issue, see "Pentagon, Congress Prepare to Go Another Round over Base Closures," CDI's Weekly Defense Monitor for January 14, 1999.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Talking with Cuba"
Despite official hostility between the U.S. and Cuba, many Americans are making contact with their Cuban counterparts. We took our cameras to Cuba to document this growing dialogue on military, political and academic issues.
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