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| May 6, 1999 |
| May 6, 1999 |
Good-bye Air Campaign, Hello Ground Offensive
Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
Weeks of speculation about a ground invasion of Kosovo reached a new stage with the Wall Street Journal's publication of an alleged official NATO plan for a "semi-permissive" entry into the Yugoslav province. According to the newspaper, the plan envisions a force of 60,000 entering Kosovo via helicopters and by land from Macedonia, Albania and possibly Bulgaria. First elements would be airlanded behind the Yugoslav line of defense along the borders with Albania and Macedonia while tanks and other heavy equipment attack Yugoslav army positions on the border. A deployment of troops in Hungary and Bulgaria would be used to tie down Yugoslav army divisions on these borders.
Although the plan has not been confirmed officially, a brief analysis is warranted because the debate about possible ground action is mounting.
As outlined in the Wall Street Journal, the plan would face seriou political obstacles. First, three of the four countries mentioned as possible jumping-off points or troop staging areas currently oppose the use of their territory for a NATO ground campaign. Hungary, a NATO member, and Bulgaria -- an applicant -- only allow the use of their airspace for the Yugoslav war. Macedonia does host around 10,000 NATO troops. These units, however, were to form a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The Skopje government opposes their use for an offensive strike against Yugoslavia.
More significantly, the plan does not address firm Russian opposition to the use of ground combat forces. Numerous Russian leaders publicly promised military assistance to Serbia in case of a ground invasion, although all stopped short of threatening to send Russian troops. The specter of Russian arms and possibly advisors fighting against a NATO force would have tremendous symbolic value -- it would essentially mark the failure of a decade-long effort to turn NATO's former nemesis into even a reluctant partner. Militarily, Russian support would be equally dangerous. Supplies of surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-10 could challenge NATO dominance of Yugoslav airspace.
The categorization of the NATO plan as a "semi-permissive entry" may be intended to lessen Russian opposition by somehow distinguishing this plan from an outright invasion. But there is nothing "permissive" about a plan that calls for Yugoslav border defenses to be attacked from both inside and outside Yugoslavia.
The envisioned seizure of Kosovo promises much less military opposition than an outright invasion of all of Serbia. The entry -- across the mountains from Macedonia and Albania -- would be extremely difficult. If, however, Yugoslav troops are left the opportunity to simply withdraw from Kosovo into Serbia and Montenegro, NATO troops would encounter much less resistance than if they fought an army pinned between a two-prong attack from the north and the south.
Clearly, the initial part of the operation would be the most dangerous. Unless airlanded units are reinforced quickly by ground armored units moving from Macedonia and Albania, they could sustain heavy casualties. A successful and timely crossing of the mined and well-defended mountains separating Kosovo from neighboring states would not be easy and cannot be guaranteed.
As outlined, the plan conceals serious long-term complications. The border between Kosovo and the rest of Serbia would become a zone of incessant confrontation. NATO troops in Kosovo would likely come under attack from Yugoslavian army units in Serbia. Although Serbia would have suffered a tactical defeat in Kosovo, Belgrade could exploit the limited mandate of NATO troops by lashing out against its independence-minded junior partner, Montenegro.
Ultimately, any ground campaign would substantially increase casualties and deepen the already substantial rift between the United States and Russia. Fortunately, recent diplomatic initiatives raise the possibility that a negotiated settlement can be found. Every effort should be made to achieve the international community's goals -- withdrawal of Serbian troops, an international armed presence in Kosovo, and the return of refugees -- without increasing the war's intensity. Concerted negotiations now might avoid the inevitable loss of additional lives that a ground campaign would cause.
First Meeting of States Parties to Landmines Treaty Meet in Maputo
By Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
In accordance with the provisions of the Ottawa Landmine Treaty, the countries who have signed the Ottawa Convention, which outlaws the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines met in Maputo, Mozambique this week to discuss how the international community can continue to fight the scourge of landmines around the world. Approximately 1000 people attended the opening ceremony of the meeting, which is appropriately being held in a county that has seen the devastating effects of landmines firsthand. Mozambique remains one of the world's most heavily mined countries, and the need for demining and victim assistance is as real a need here as in any other country in the world. The conference's aim was to develop strategies for dealing with the continued use and effects of landmines around the world. Participants took part in workshops on various aspects of the landmine problem including immediate health care needs for victims as well as long term strategies for reintegrating them into society.
In conjunction with the meeting of the States Parties, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has also released the "Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World." The report provides a country-by-country analysis of mine use, production, trade, stockpiling, humanitarian demining, and mine survivor assistance.
According to the "Landmine Monitor," since the signing of the Ottawa Convention, production of landmines has lessened dramatically and there is no evidence that mines are being exported by any country in the world. Further, the report found that of the 135 governments that had signed the Treaty by April 23, 1999, only three -- Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal -- have used mines since signing the Treaty.
Unfortunately, the report also reveals that landmines are currently being used in 13 conflicts around the world including Yugoslavia, Turkey, Burma, Israel, and Sri Lanka. Further, Africa remains the most heavily affected landmine continent, but only eight African countries have not yet signed the Treaty -- the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, and Morocco.
In addition to urging the remaining countries to sign the Treaty, the ICBL also highlighted the need to address the more than 250 million landmines held in stockpiles in at least 108 countries around the world. The report supplies the most accurate and comprehensive information on landmine stockpiles currently available. It reveals staggering statistics the number of stockpiled landmines -- China has approximately 110 million landmines, Russia 60-70 million, and Belarus in the tens of millions. On a more positive note, however, more than 30 countries have already destroyed over 12 million landmines.
According to the ICBL, getting the United States, China, and Russia to sign the Ottawa Treaty is still a necessary long-term policy objective. However, getting these countries to destroy their surplus stocks of landmines and to actively encourage other countries to also do so is vitally important. The United States continues to fund demining and victim assistance programs around the world. These programs should be continued and receive renewed funding. The world has made huge strides with the Ottawa Treaty, but there is still much work to be done.
Three Free, One Million Still To Go -- One View on Resolving Kosovo
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
This past Sunday the Reverend Jesse Jackson obtained the release of the three American soldiers taken prisoner by Serb forces in late March as they patrolled the Macedonian-Yugoslavian border. In a statement announcing Slobodan Milosevic's agreement to free the three soldiers, Reverend Jackson called for NATO and the United States to "show appreciation" for the Yugoslav president's gesture by halting the air raids for at least one night.
This was not to be, and rightly so, in my view, but not for the reason given by some -- that the three soldiers abducted from Macedonia were part of the prospective NATO peacekeeping force envisioned by the Rambouillet Accords and were not associated with the NATO bombing campaign.
An equivalent reciprocal gesture by NATO is warranted, however. The most obvious move is to release immediately to the International Red Cross the two Yugoslavian soldiers who are in NATO's custody for repatriation to their homeland.
Separately, NATO should seriously consider two other steps that, in advancing the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations and the Russians, might hasten the end of this conflict and reverse the humanitarian disaster created by Slobodan Milosevic.
First, the bombing of what are clearly elements of the civilian infrastructure -- e.g., the electric power grid -- should be suspended. NATO has consistently stated that it is not at war with the Yugoslav people, yet this attack, more than any other to date, represents an expansion from military and "dual use" targets that have been the objects of previous air strikes. NATO has demonstrated, with its specialized weaponry, that it can black out the Yugoslavian power grid at will, seriously disrupting civilian functions. But in so doing the alliance may have stepped over a line that will reinforce world support for the Yugoslav people and by extension, for Milosevic. As it is, U.S. public support for the air campaign had fallen from 61% in mid-April to 56% at the end of the month (as measured in a Gallup Poll), an indication that the Administration is likely to face increasing opposition at home if it insists on expanding targets to those that are manifestly civilian in nature.
The other diplomatic initiative that could test the seriousness of Milosevic's stance for ending the conflict is to invite him to meet with NATO, not just with President Clinton, in some neutral European capital. Again, although the United States wields unparallel influence in NATO, the war has been undertaken by the alliance as a body (even if not all nineteen member states are actively engaged in the fighting). The basis for such a meeting should be neither the Yugoslavian position nor the Rambouillet demands of NATO but the plan suggested by Sergei Rogov, the respected Director of the Institute of USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in an editorial in the May 1 Washington Post.
Mr. Rogov proposes a five step program: Kosovo would be an autonomous province within Yugoslavia; all military action (and presumably para-military action by both Yugoslavian units and the Kosovo Liberation Army) should cease immediately; all Yugoslavian forces except border guards would withdraw from Kosovo; the U.N. would initiate peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, which demand a well-armed force; and all refugees would be allowed to return to their homes. In terms of the international peace enforcement operation, the most contentious point dividing NATO and Milosevic, Mr. Rogov suggests that three "zones" be established. Kosovo itself would be patrolled by military units from Russia, the Ukraine, the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union, plus NATO members who have not participated in the bombing of Yugoslavia. The Albanian and Macedonian border areas would be manned by the ground forces from NATO already present. This would also allow continuation of current arrangements for humanitarian aid from the west into these two countries until the refugees return to their homes.
This plan incorporates key elements of both the Yugoslavian and NATO positions. The Yugoslavs, in calling for a political settlement, insist that all ethnic groups in Kosovo receive equal and fair treatment; assent to free and unimpeded access to the International Red Cross and the UN High Commission for Refugees; agree to "adjust" the level and disposition of their forces in Kosovo as NATO pulls back it forces from the Macedonian and Albania borders with Yugoslavia; commit to talks about the composition of an international peacekeeping mission under the control of the United Nations and agree to the presence of international representatives as observers (not arbitrators) at discussions involving all Yugoslav/Serb/ethnic Albanian parties; and insist on outside help in reconstructing the whole region, as promised by NATO.
At the end of its April 23-25 summit in Washington, NATO issued a seventeen point statement that called for a "peaceful, multiethnic democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis." While insisting that Yugoslavian military, police, and paramilitary forces be withdrawn from Kosovo, NATO said it would suspend its bombing when these Yugoslav forces began -- not completed, as in previous demands -- their withdrawal in accordance with a fixed timetable. NATO also said it would seek a United Nations resolution authorizing a multinational military force, including unspecified NATO countries, to safeguard the returning refugees and creating an autonomous provincial government "within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
There are still obvious points of separation between Milosevic and NATO, but they are not as wide as in mid-April. Milosevic and NATO are both looking to Russia to solve the impasse into which they have fallen; Mr. Rogov's proposals are an opportunity to test the resolve of both sides to end this war.
Reciprocal gestures are welcome, but they will not bring back to life those who have been killed. They cannot bridge the differences that exist about the fundamental conditions for ending the bombing and safely repatriating those who have been uprooted. Albanian Kosovars may be pleased that the three Americans have been released. But few if any would "appreciate" a halt in the bombing while one million remain dispossessed of their homes, their livelihoods, and their futures.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Test Anxiety -- Should
America Ratify the CTBT?"
The achievement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty outlawing nuclear weapons test explosions has long been a cornerstone of U.S. arms control efforts. Americans, by a wide margin, favor the ratification of the treaty, as do a majority in Congress. However, a powerful minority in Congress are stalling the ratification process. Do the new security challenges of the post-Soviet era change America's arms control equation or is the test ban still a good idea?
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