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| March 25, 1999 |
| March 25, 1999 |
NATO Attacks Targets in Yugoslavia
Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
On Wednesday night NATO forces began their long promised pounding of Yugoslavia with bombs and missiles. The first wave of the attack included Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from four U.S. ships and two US submarines as well as a UK submarine in the Adriatic Sea. The attack also involved bombs dropped by F-117 "stealth" fighters flying out of Aviano, Italy and B-2 bombers flying from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. It was the first combat use of this $2 billion bomber. A second round of bombing, which Pentagon called "just as severe and substantive as the first wave," began Thursday at about the same time as before (2:00 PM EST).
Among the roughly 40 targets reportedly hit on the first night of strikes were ammunition depots, air bases, aircraft plants, radars, power grids, army barracks and communication centers. However, the primary targets were the Yugoslav air defense system. This was done in order to lessen the dangers to NATO pilots. But because many Yugoslav air defense assets (see enclosed fact sheet) are mobile, they are difficult to target.
The Pentagon says only about 20 percent of the targets attacked on the first day were directly related to the fighting in Kosovo. If the air strikes continue, further rounds are expected to focus on the infrastructure and equipment used by the Yugoslav army and police in Kosovo, as well as the units themselves. President Clinton stated that damaging Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future is one of the primary objectives of the NATO effort.
Original NATO plans called for a symbolic round of bombing to send a warning to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Earlier this week, however, the Yugoslav police and military forces launched an offensive in Kosovo, sweeping from the west-northwest of the province towards the capital of Pristina. In response, NATO planners expanded the campaign to hit a wide range of military targets in Kosovo as well as in the rest of Serbia and the smaller of the Yugoslav republics, Montenegro. The strikes on Wednesday hit facilities as far north as Novi Sad near the border with Hungary and Croatia down to Montenegro on the Adriatic coast. A number of bombs fell in the vicinity of Yugoslavia's capital, Belgrade.
One surprising aspect of the strikes was the weak response from Yugoslav surface-to-air missiles. The missiles, especially medium-range SA-6s, are part of an integrated air-defense system which also includes shoulder-launched systems and anti-aircraft artillery (see enclosed fact sheet on Serbian forces).
Possible reasons why the Yugoslav army elected not to use surface-to-air missiles in a substantial way include:
-the systems linking the missiles to radars and command centers may have been damaged by NATO bombing.
-there were few targets to hit. The first wave of air attacks was carried out by cruise missiles and bombs dropped by "stealth" aircraft, both of which are impossible or nearly impossible to hit by the missiles in the Serb arsenal.
-NATO F-16 fighters, which also flew on Wednesday, usually carry radar-seeking HARM missiles. Had the Serbs turned on their missile's radars, F-16s would likely have attacked and destroyed them.
If NATO begins targeting tanks and other mobile targets in later stages of the operation, it will have to switch to slower- and lower-flying A-10s and F-16s. Such ground-attack missions would bring aircraft closer to the surface-to-air missiles and radars, thus increasing the risk to NATO pilots.
Yugoslavia has 15 relatively modern Mig-29 fighters of Russian origin, although a number of these planes are likely inoperable. When Mig-29s engaged NATO pilots over Yugoslavia on Wednesday, three Yugoslav fighters reportedly were shot down. No NATO aircraft were lost in the first day of operations, although a U.S. Air Force F-15, on an unrelated mission over Bosnia, was forced to make an emergency landing due to engine problems.
The operation is expected to continue for at least a few more days. The Theodore Roosevelt carrier group leaves the United States on Friday to relieve the USS Enterprise, currently in the Persian Gulf. Part of the original USS Enterprise group remained in the Adriatic to take part in the air strikes. It is unclear whether any of the ships in the Theodore Roosevelt carrier group will relieve ships currently involved in the Kosovo operation.
Arming the KLA
Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
rstohl@cdi.org
As NATO air power pounds Yugoslavia, protecting Kosovo Albanians seems to be the predominate reason for NATO's action. But this conflict is not new. The fighting between Kosovars, and more specifically the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian forces, started some three years ago. That few seemed to have paid much attention until recently may be due to the fact that the civil war in this province of almost 2 million people (1.8 million Albanians and 180,000 Serbs) has been waged by the KLA not with heavy weapons but primarily with small arms and light weapons.
The KLA managed to arm themselves to fight against their better armed Serbian counterparts through the smuggling of cheap weapons from abroad. Although UN Security Council resolution 1160 prohibited all deliveries of arms to warring parties in Yugoslavia, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that "international agencies have failed to make good on promises to monitor the arms embargo against Kosovo." Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov added that "the Western partners failed to effectively suppress attempts at illegal supplies of weapons to the Kosovo Albanians." Without a doubt, the embargo was more effectively enforced on the Serbs.
Most experts believe that Macedonia has now become the main route for arms supplies into Kosovo as Serbia has mined its border with Albania and increased fighting has made passage difficult. Weapons are usually transported by mule or by foot. Macedonian police officials acknowledge that they have lost control of the border between Albania and Macedonia. They say an increasingly number of Albanian youths -- thousands in the past few months -- posing as tourists are moving through the Macedonian mountain border on their way to join the KLA.
The majority of KLA arms are Albanian in origin. In 1997, Albania's democratically elected government was toppled by a population frustrated and ruined by fraudulent pyramid schemes which cost the majority of people their life savings. As protesters took to the streets, Albanian civilians raided and looted military bases, bunkers, arms depots, and police stations. When the damage was totaled, over a million weapons and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition had disappeared from military and police control. Astoundingly, estimates of the total weapons taken ranged as high as 80% of the total weapons' holdings -- that is, somewhere between 750,000 and one million light weapons. More specifically, 2,500 rocket-propelled grenades, 200,000 AK-47s, 800 mortars (mostly 60 mm), 1.5 million rounds of 7.62 ammunition, 3.5 million hand grenades, and 1.4 million anti-personnel mines were stolen from government arsenals by civilians. Larger conventional weapons, such as small cannon, armored personnel carriers and tanks were also taken but were later recovered.
To attempt to collect these weapons, the Albanian government, assisted by the United Nations, has begun a series of weapons collection programs. (See "Weapons Collection Program to Begin In Albania with UN Support," Weekly Defense Monitor, January 21, 1999). However, Albania remains awash in weapons. Towns, especially those bordering the Serbian province of Kosovo, have become literal arms bazaars. According to visiting journalists, all types of small arms are available, from AK-47s to machine guns to mortars -- all weapons from the looted arsenals and police depots. Experts believe that former Albanian President Sali Berisha is responsible for much of the arms trade between Albania and Kosovo. Some hypothesize that Berisha is using Kosovo as a staging ground for a political comeback. One of Berisha's top officials was arrested in June, 1998 for arms smuggling in Italy. Perhaps even more disturbing, NATO officials worried in July, 1998 that aid provided for humanitarian relief was actually being used to fund weapons purchases in Kosovo.
Although the KLA still relies on small arms to fight its guerrilla style war with Serbia, they have been able to finance the purchase of some light weapons including anti-tank weapons. As air strikes continue, it may be possible for the KLA to regroup and rearm -- preparing for a continued armed struggle with the weakened Serbs. The international community should therefore enforce all arms embargoes to Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, and aim to solve this current conflict diplomatically.
Links to CDI's Kosovo Web Resources
Position Brief: With Great Reluctance...And After the Bombing?
Fact Sheet: U.S. Forces in the Kosovo Theater
Fact Sheet: Yugoslav Military Forces