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| March 18, 1999 |
| March 18, 1999 |
Northern Ireland Faces Disarmament Challenge
Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
rstohl@cdi.org
As the anniversary of Northern Ireland's Good Friday peace agreement nears, the troubled region still faces many unsettled issues. The one which most threatens the tenuous peace accord is the disarming -- or as it is called locally, decommissioning -- of the factions throughout the six counties in the north as well as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) support structure in the Republic.
Disarming combatants is always a crucial aspect of any peace agreement. When the Good Friday accord was first negotiated, all sides agreed that disarming the various factions was essential for a peaceful resolution of the "Troubles." However, details about how and when disarmament would take place could not be agreed. Therefore the final text of the Good Friday accord says only that "all participants in the talks will use any influence they may have to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years." Because the agreement does not specify what those steps must be, the decommissioning of former combatants has yielded few results.
According to the Independent Commission on Decommissioning and figures from the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Garda Siochana (the Irish Republic's FBI equivalent), the IRA and Unionist groups still possess significant quantities of surface to air missiles (SAM), rocket propelled grenade launchers, rockets, machine guns, submachine guns, assault rifles, hand grenades, Semtex explosive, and handguns and revolvers. As an example, the Garda Siochana recently discovered a cache containing two anti-aircraft guns, a machine gun, and a few thousand rounds of ammunition capable of piercing armored helicopters. Overall, current estimates place IRA weapons and explosives holdings at about 100 tons.
Although all parties involved in the peace agreement have repeatedly acknowledged that disarming is necessary to ensure the success of the peace agreement, the factions are retaining their weapons to see if the process succeeds. Political leaders associated with the armed factions have been criticized for not pushing harder for decommissioning, but their rejoinder is that the militant wings will not disarm until they are sure that there will not be a resurgence in fighting.
Obviously, this has produced a "Catch-22" situation that will only be broken when one or two large factions on each side of the political divide have the courage to step forward and take a chance for peace. The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) has destroyed firearms, grenades and detonators from their illegal holdings, but many believe this is just a token demonstration. For its part, the IRA has said that it will not disarm until the peace agreement is fully enacted in the spring of 2000.
As a contingent of Northern Irish political figures meets in Washington, DC this week, the question of decommissioning and the success of the original agreement is receiving more publicity. But a temporary increase in press interest is not enough. Regardless of the political costs, only a real commitment to a sustained process of mutual decommissioning will produce the much anticipated but still elusive enduring peace for Northern Ireland.
Kosovo Conundrum
Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
The second round of Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet, France, came to a halt with only one signature -- the Kosovo Albanians -- on the document and the threat of NATO air strikes against the Serbs hanging in the air. The current stalemate pits 30,000 Serb troops in and around Kosovo against a NATO fleet of over 400 planes and 12,000 personnel in Macedonia. NATO has repeatedly warned that it will bomb Serbian positions if Yugoslav President Milosevic does not agree to the proposals on Kosovo put forth by the United States, the European Union, and Russia.
There are several possible outcomes to the current stalemate, some with very troubling consequences for the allies.
Milosevic Capitulates: The Yugoslav president has been known to make threats as a negotiating tool and then settle at the last moment. In October 1998, NATO aircraft were ready for take-off when Milosevic accepted an agreement on reducing Yugoslav troops in Kosovo. Similarly, NATO threats in January 1999 led to the Rambouillet negotiations. But this time may be different. The constant crisis and turmoil in Yugoslavia enables Milosevic to maintain the near-dictatorial powers that keep him in office. After compromising or capitulating in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, the Yugoslav strongman is running out of potential trouble spots. Moreover, the current agreement calls for a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Western troop in Serbia proper is anathema to Milosevic. They would expose his Kosovo policy as a failure and could embolden reformers in Montenegro and Serbia itself, such as the Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic.
Civil Revolt in Serbia: As the head of the Yugoslav Army General Ojdanic tells his troops to prepare for martyrdom, there are signs of unrest within the Yugoslav armed forces. The parliament of the smaller of the two Yugoslav republics, Montenegro, passed a resolution questioning Milosevic's Kosovo policy and calling for protection of Montenegrins serving in the Yugoslav army. Observers on the ground report a fierce propaganda struggle which could lead to a crackdown on independent voices throughout Serbia and civil unrest even outside Kosovo. The deterrent effect of NATO forces on Yugoslav conscripts should not be underestimated even though Milosevic managed to solidify his power over the military by purging from senior positions all but the most loyal supporters.
Air Strikes Lead to Widespread Fighting in Kosovo: When NATO strikes, the Yugoslav army can be expected to attack positions of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in an attempt to eliminate it once and for all. Over 30,000 Yugoslav army and police troops are poised for action in and just outside Kosovo. Scattered fighting and shelling is already under way, but the offensive would significantly raise the level of violence. Undoubtedly, entire villages would be wiped out with the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians. NATO's options from the air will be very limited. U.S., French, and British aircraft can attack Serb garrisons and inflict many casualties, but stopping the Serb offensive would require a NATO ground force, something that the Alliance has already ruled out. If Serb plans have already been laid out and distributed to units in the region, NATO attacks on command centers will only hamper, not stop, Serb operations.
The Alliance argues that its credibility is at stake in Kosovo; having made countless "serious" warnings to strike it cannot afford to back down. But NATO aircraft circling overhead while Serb force massacre Kosovo civilians would be an eerie reminder of the spectacle of U.N. troops observing massacres of Bosnian men in the supposed "safe haven" in Srebrenica. Such an image could cause a much more serious credibility problem than putting ir strikes on hold.
On the other hand, if Serb forces are poised to fight one way or another, NATO's inaction may embolden the Yugoslav president to act. Judging Serbian intentions properly will be crucial in making a decision on which course to follow. If, however, President Milosevic is determined to crack down in Kosovo, the Alliance can do little to stop him without the use of ground troops.
There are no good options in Kosovo. An old adage in the diplomatic world says that one should never get into a situation in which the only two options are either war or capitulation. A dead end is precisely where NATO finds itself today in Kosovo, with potentially devastating consequences to the Kosovar population and the Alliance itself.
If It Flies, Costs Will Soar
Colonel Daniel M. Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, Center for
Defense Information
dsmith@cdi.org
Three Pentagon aerospace programs received failing grades on keeping costs under control.
The General Accounting Office officially released it long awaited (and widely forecast) report on the Air Force's premier airplane development, the F-22 Raptor. As expected, the GAO cited Air Force and contractor Lockheed Martin projections that the F-22 will exceed the current congressional cap of $18.9 billion (inflation adjusted) for engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). Lockheed has identified $240 million in potential costs overruns while the Air Force has found an additional $242 million. Furthermore, compared to its Fiscal Year 1999 projection, the Air Force's actual funding request for Fiscal Year 2000 went up $312 million.
Ominously, GAO noted that this nearly $800 million increase in cost projections for EMD did not include two elements that could easily break the bank: integrating the avionics package into the airframe and increased allocation of management overhead to the F-22 program. (The latter will occur if production rates for the C-130J transport aircraft, which is being built at the same location as the F-22, continue to sag.)
On the missile front, the Pentagon is forecasting that the cost of the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High, a crucial component for both the national and theater missile defense systems, will jump from the current $2.3 billion to $3.3 billion. A major factor contributing to the cost growth is a delay in launching the first of five geostationary satellites from 2002 to 2004. Pentagon estimates are that the delay will cost as much as $550 million while the contractor, Lockheed Martin (again), estimates a price tag of $650 million. Additional cost growth (up to $350 million) is the result of unidentified increasing contractor costs and an Air Force requirement to have the SBIRS satellites "be compatible with" two new rockets.
Finally, the drive to promote a sea-based national missile defense received an unpleasant jolt when LtGen Lester Lyles, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, told Congress that the cost of such a system would be close to $16 - 19 billion dollars. Some estimates had suggested that the system could be deployed for as little as $2 billion, a figure dismissed out of hand by General Lyles in the original draft of his late February testimony before Congress.
What's the bottom line? One need go no further than another portion of the draft testimony of the BMDO Director. Having noted that "some groups outside" DoD were advocating the sea-based national missile defense as "quick, cheap, and easy," General Lyles wrote: "Over twenty years of defense acquisition experience tells me that when someone advertises a system as 'quick, cheap, and easy' it seldom is."
*NEW* This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Russia's Nuclear Crisis"
Show #1228
Relations between the U.S. and Russia have dangerously worsened in the last five years. Russian economic woes and military deterioration have increased the risk of loss of control over nuclear weapons, while NATO expansion has fostered fear and distrust among the Russian people. If the U.S. fails to take steps to address these issues, we risk a new Cold War.
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