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| March 11, 1999 |
| March 11, 1999 |
Code of Conduct Returns to House Floor
Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
rstohl@cdi.org
In an effort to establish a U.S. Code of Conduct for international arm sales, the House of Representatives has begun consideration of House Resolution (HR) 973 pertaining to the Security Assistance Act of 1999, Sections 401 - 403 -- known as the International Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act of 1999.
The current Resolution is based upon the original U.S. Code of Conduct on Arm Sales, sponsored by Reps. McKinney and Dana Rohrbacher (R-CA), and a subsequent International Arm Sales Code of Conduct introduced by Rep. Sam Gedjenson (D-CT). (See,"Stopping Weapons Sales to Dictators: An Update on the US Code of Conduct," Weekly Defense Monitor, May 7, 1998, and "Code of Conduct Receives Increased Attention," Weekly Defense Monitor, August 6, 1998.)
The 1999 Resolution is based on a number of important conclusions from an analysis of world arm sales and conflicts. First, the proliferation of conventional arms and conflicts is a multilateral problem; only through a multinational "arms sale code of conduct" is there hope of preventing rogue governments from acquiring conventional weapons. Second, approximately 40,000,000 people, over 75 percent of whom were civilians, died as a result of civil and international wars fought with conventional weapons during the 45 years of the Cold War. This clearly puts conventional weapons in the category of "weapons of mass destruction." Third, U.S. national security and economic interests are best served by reducing dramatically the $840,000,000,000 that countries spend on armed forces every year -- especially the $191,000,000,000 spent by developing countries, an amount equivalent to four times the total bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance such countries receive every year.
Fortunately, the compromise on HR 973 includes, from the original U.S. Code of Conduct proposal, the four criteria for determining to whom the U.S. can sell arms. The bill ties these criteria -- countries must promote democracy, respect human rights, not engage in armed aggression, and fully participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms -- to any negotiations for a multilateral agreement restricting arms sales. HR 973 also requires that the State Department consider these criteria when it draws up its annual evaluation of the human rights records of nations.
Finally, HR 973 designates the "Wassenaar Arrangement," a body that establishes export controls for conventional arms and dual-use technology, as the preferred forum for international negotiations on arms sales as the leading arms suppliers are all members. It also requires the President to report to the appropriate Congressional committees on progress made on the negotiations undertaken with the Wassenaar countries.
Speaking at the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) mark-up of HR 973, Representative McKinney complimented the work of Gedjenson on the International Code. Rep. McKinney spoke of plans to reintroduce the original code later this year.
Although both Reps. McKinney and Rohrbacher were disappointed that there are no domestically binding requirements affecting U.S. arm sales in HR 973, McKinney's speech to the HIRC reflected the importance of securing passage of the Resolution: "With it, we will enshrine into law clear, unambiguous standards for weapons transfers and put us on an equal footing with the 15 nations of the European Union that passed a similar Code of Conduct last year. With it, we can join the efforts lead by Oscar Arias and 16 of his fellow Nobel Peace laureates to promote an International Code of Conduct in an uncompromised position Indeed, this legislation will establish the United States in its rightful role as a leader in this international effort."
Rep. McKinney also reiterated the obligation of the United States to have a Code of Conduct. "We also have a responsibility to our troops. We know that weapons sold to the Shah or Iran became the arsenal of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and we know that in recent mobilizations of U.S. forces -- in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and in Haiti -- U.S. soldiers were killed and wounded by weapons and/or weapons technology exported from the United States. Finally, we have a moral responsibility to deny our direct, or indirect, support to those who do not share our values of democracy and respect for human rights."
The HIRC vote on HR 973 was unanimous in favor. As a result, the bill now goes to the House floor under what is known as a suspension of the rules. This means that a bill is found "non-controversial" and no amendments are permitted. Votes can only be cast in favor or against. If the bill passes, which it is expected to do, future annual human rights reports will be have to take into consideration the above four criteria.
Although the International Code of Conduct is a good first step in acknowledging the evil caused from arming undemocratic and abusive regimes, it may not reduce U.S. arm sales. Under the terms of HR 973, countries are not cut off from receiving U.S. weapons. Further, there is no requirement that an administration make a list of countries complying (or not complying) with the four criteria. Thus U.S. can continue to arm some of the world's worst governments.
For a full text of HR 973, please contact rstohl@cdi.org
Fiscal Year 2000 Pentagon Budget: "Talk" or "Walk?"
Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
chellman@cdi.org
In his prepared remarks for the House and Senate Armed Services committees in early February, Defense Secretary William Cohen emphasized that the proposed FY'00 budget "puts people first with the largest military pay raise in a generation and increases in military retirement benefits [and] protects readiness priorities with increased funding for operations, training, repair parts, and maintenance." Yet a close examination of the actual numbers shows that the budget proposal continues to focus on what has been the Pentagon's -- and Congress' -- highest priority in recent years: buying weapons.
The FY'00 request for personnel, which includes pay and benefits, is $73.7 billion, an increase of $2.8 billion over the FY'99 level. Funding for Operations & Maintenance, (O&M) a major component of troop readiness, is $103.5 billion, up $5.4 billion from current levels. These represent increases of 3.9% and 5.5% respectively. The request includes $53 billion for procurement, most of which goes for the purchase of new weapons. This is an increase of $4 billion from the current level, or a jump of 8.2%. In fact, procurement gets the largest percentage spending increase of any DoD account, as the Pentagon continues to invest billions on Cold War weapons systems.
This basic trend continues for the duration of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) which covers the period FY'00 through FY'05, inclusive. Funding for personnel in FY'03 is 14.1% higher than current levels, and O&M will have increased by 9.9%. Procurement, however, will have gone up 35.9%. By FY'05, personnel accounts will have grown 22.3% and O&M by 16.6%, while procurement will have increased a whopping 53.3%.
Most disturbing, perhaps, are the proposed changes in the military housing accounts. Housing represents a key component of recruitment and retention, particularly of younger service personnel with families. In prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 3, 1999, General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conceded that 66% of the Pentagon's family housing units "are substandard," 25% of barracks spaces "do not meet current standards," and "there is a shortfall of 42,000 additional [barracks] spaces." Yet funding for military housing actually decreases by $500 million in FY'00, from $3.6 billion to $3.1 billion, a decline of 13.9%. While funding for housing does increase over the FYDP, by 2.8% in FY'03, and 8.3% in FY'05, it's difficult to look at these numbers and feel that housing is a priority.
Ironically, under the spending plan proposed by the Pentagon last year, housing accounts faired significantly better, rising 11.4% in FY'00 and by 20% by FY'03, the last year covered by the FY'99 budget proposal.
To be fair, personnel spending per person does go up in FY'00 budget request, from $31,192.26 in FY'99 to 32,755.56 in FY'00. But an overall examination of the spending plan leads one to ask, "you talk the talk, but do you walk the walk?"
To see a full analysis of the FY'00 budget request by account, and a comparison to the FY'99 spending plan, see CDI's factsheet, "Comparison of the FY'99 and FY'00 Defense Budget Requests"
Hollow Warriors
Colonel Dan Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.), Chief of Research, Center for Defense
Information
dsmith@cdi.org
Last week a Marine court-martial board found Marine aviator Captain Richard Ashby not guilty of 20 counts of manslaughter and lesser included offenses. The charges stemmed from February 3, 1998 accident in Italy in which the plane Ashby was piloting sliced a cable car lift, sending 20 people in a gondola to their deaths.
Although the court found that Captain Ashby was not criminally negligent, Europeans continue to insist that responsibility must be determined. At a March 5th news conference with Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema, President Clinton said that the United States was "fully responsible" and that it was "our objective...to determine responsibility and accountability in an open and fair process."
In one sense, the United States "is responsible" because the tragedy was caused by a U.S. Marine Corps officer flying a Marine Corps jet on a training mission. But the responsibility to which the President refers is abstract; it is far removed from the actual event and what contributed to the accident. In the end, this "responsibility" will take the form of compensation paid to the families of the victims -- seventy-five percent from the U.S. and twenty-five percent from the governments of those killed.
In talking of responsibility, it is important to distinguish responsibility from blame. To blame is to find fault; it is always pejorative. To be responsible, conversely, is to be answerable as the primary cause or agent of an event or a result; this result may be positive or negative. Properly speaking, inanimate objects can be blamed -- e.g., a wire whose insulation wears out can be blamed for causing an electrical short that starts a fire. But responsibility connotes the lodging of accountability which, in turn, requires the presence of an actor to whom is assigned a moral or legal standard against which acts or omissions are weighed. And it is through this weighing process that individuals move beyond themselves, mature, and develop "substance."
Thus systems are not "responsible" or "accountable," people are. Systems are devised by and function through the actions that individuals take or fail to take. In this case, many people seem to have failed in their responsibilities:
-The cable lift was not shown on the maps produced by individuals in the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) even though one series of Italian maps (at a scale of 1:500,000) clearly show it. Map makers at NIMA were using Italian maps with a scale of 1:250,000. A pending question is whether there is satellite photography of the area that map makers could have checked to verify the completeness of their work.
-U.S. Air Force units at the Italian airbase from which the Marine squadron flew had Italian maps showing the lift, but the Marines reportedly did not know the map was there. At the very least, someone in the Air Force unit should have known about the map. Furthermore, considering the Marines rotated into the Italian base, one might reasonably expect that an Air Force operations or intelligence officer would brief the newly arrived pilots on hazards. An analogy for ground forces is a unit relief in place; the old commander and his operations and intelligence staff are obliged to brief the new commander and his staff on "hazards" such as enemy locations and capabilities, terrain and avenues of approach to friendly positions, the presence of noncombatants, etc.
-Evidence from the trial suggests that Marine aviators had not reviewed safety notices such as restrictions on speed and altitude even though this information was available to the Marines.
-Other evidence pointed to a faulty altimeter in the plane that Captain Ashby was flying. It had been checked for malfunctions a dozen times in the preceding five months. Why was it not replaced?
Only two U.S. military personnel have been disciplined in any manner: the Marine squadron commander has been relieved of his command and another person received a letter of reprimand. There is a tradition that a commander is responsible for whatever his unit does or fails to do. In this case this tradition seems to have been invoked with reference to the squadron commander. But there is also a tradition that a commander's direct influence extends at least two echelons down the chain of command. (In the Army, for example, a division commander directly influences both brigade and battalion commanders.) Thus the level of professionalism, the emphasis on preparation, on solid training, on safety -- the whole "tone" of a unit -- is set at least two echelons above the operating level.
Unfortunately, there also seems to be another, newer tradition: responsibility stops at the very lowest possible rung in the chain of command. Hence the paucity of disciplinary action in this case (as in others such as the shooting down of two Blackhawk helicopters over Northern Iraq in 1994 by two U.S. Air Force planes).
The court-martial failed to assign blame. Fair enough. But the Marines -- and the Air Force -- might do well to carefully determine responsibility. Failure to do so can only signal that a lack of "substance," a hollowness of character, is acceptable.
*NEW* this week on America's Defense Monitor: "Welfare for Weapons
Dealers"
Show #1227
The United States is by far the world's leading exporter of weapons and military equipment, but in the international arms trade, America pays a high price for being #1. Government programs and activities that subsidize weapons exports cost American taxpayers more than $7 billion per year, but that's just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the price we pay for the arms trade.
Featured Interviewees:
William Hartung, Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute
Joel Johnson, Vice President-International at the Aerospace Industries
Association
Tamar Gabelnick, Acting Director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project,
Federation of American Scientists
Gregory Suchan, Director of the Office of Export Controls, US Department
of State
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