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| February 18, 1999 |
| February 18, 1999 |
What Next for the Joint Strike Fighter?
Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
chellman@cdi.org
New concerns are being raised about problems that Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, the two defense contractors competing for the multi-billion dollar Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, are having as they develop design concepts for the aircraft. These concerns in turn are raising questions about the development schedule and ultimately the total cost of the JSF.
The Joint Strike Fighter is under joint development for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The services currently plan to buy a total of 3,000 aircraft between 2005 and 2030; two-thirds for the Air Force, 640 for the Marines, and 300 for the Navy. The JSF is to replace a variety of aircraft, including the Air Force's F-16 multi-role fighter, the Navy's A-6 long-range attack aircraft, and the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier jump jet.
The JSF is one of three fighter aircraft currently under development by the military. Together with the Navy's F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet" and the Air Force's F-22 "Raptor," the three programs are expected to cost in excess of $350 billion. The services believe that the average cost of the JSF will be roughly $35 million apiece when finally enter full scale production. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), however, estimates that the total cost of the JSF program alone will be $219 billion, making it the most expensive weapons program ever. Based on the CBO estimate, the average cost per aircraft is $73 million, more than double the Pentagon's estimate.
Recently, Pentagon officials announced that Lockheed-Martin had experienced problems in controlling costs of its JSF development program and had amassed $150 million in cost overruns. It is unclear whether DoD will help assume some of the costs or whether Lockheed-Martin will have to absorb the full amount. Either option will ultimately drive up the cost of JSF.
Meanwhile Boeing announced that it had reconfigured its prototype. Boeing officials stated that the refinements had nothing to do with technological problems but rather incorporated changes which would improve the aircraft's performance and lower costs. Yet with the "winner take all" fly-off between the two designs scheduled for late next year, the announcement has raised some eyebrows.
DoD is apparently considering delaying the program, although it is not clear how seriously, in order to allow the two contractors to get their houses in order and work out some of the technological problems before final design selection, currently planned for March, 2001. Yet such delays are likely to contribute to increases in the program's cost.
Concerns have also been raised at the Pentagon and in the U.S. aerospace industry about the fate of whichever contractor fails to win the JSF program. McDonnell-Douglas, for instance, was bought by Boeing after it was knocked out of the JSF design competition in 1996. It has been suggested that DoD consider splitting the production portion of the program. Critics of the proposal point out, however, that while doing so might help ensure the survival in the defense market of the losing bidder, dividing JSF production would result in the loss of economies of scale, adding additional cost to the program.
With each year increasing the likelihood that both the F/A-18E/F and the F-22 program will survive the budgetary axe, any delays or significant cost overruns in the JSF program make it increasingly vulnerable. The Air Force's willingness to continue to buy F-16s for its ground attack mission -- there are 30 included in the Pentagon's new multi-year budget spending plan -- must also raise concerns among JSF supporters.
Running out of "a few good men -- and women"?
Colonel Daniel M. Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.), Chief of Research, Center for
Defense Information
dsmith@cdi.org
The latest crisis in the Pentagon is people. Among the services only the Marines are not having trouble getting enough recruits to fill spaces in units and on ships. The first response by the Pentagon has been to push across-the-board and targeted pay increases, job training and college education benefits, and to call for Congress to reverse the 1986 changes in the retirement system. At first blush these seem logical responses, particularly in light of the irresistible mantra that "nothing is too good for the troops."
The armed forces merit adequate compensation in the form of pay and benefits and deserve a good quality of life. But some of the personnel programs being pushed by the Pentagon are actually counter-productive.
For example, advertisements stress college education which is a major draw. But contributing toward a service member's college education is an inducement to leave the service after one or, at most, two tours of duty. If the option existed to use this program either for the service member's own education or that of his/her children, this could work to the military's advantage. It would work to keep good people who, as noncommissioned officers, are not only the backbone of the military but also serve as very positive role models for recruits.
The military is not a business; it cannot hire people to fill mid-level management positions. It must train them from the bottom up, but it must go beyond job training -- another big drawing card. Well trained people are attractive to the civilian world, and there is no way that the military can compete on the basis of money with civilian firms. That's why simply throwing money at the problem is not an adequate solution.
The Pentagon's second response is to remove the restrictions on the percentage of new recruits without a high school diploma that it will accept. There has developed a general view that high school graduates make better troops. This view rests on the assumption that habits formed in civilian life are brought into service life. If individuals have slogged through 12 years of education the assumption has been that they will be more likely to complete an enlistment obligation whereas if they drop out of school and community, they are likely to drop out in the military also when the going gets too tough. Unfortunately, the statistics on this don't necessarily track with the assumptions; the non-completion rate for first term Army enlistees currently is 40 percent.
As important as quality of life and pay are -- to which retirement must be added as time in service lengthens -- the fundamental problem may lie elsewhere. One possibility is that the emphasis on money has undermined the sense of professionalism, the idea that military service (or national service even) is more than just a job. Regardless of how long one serves, even if only three years, it is important for the institution to impart a sense of the value of service both to the nation and to the individual who inevitably will return to civilian society at some point. Yet the recruiting advertisements consistently push the monetary aspects of military service, the equipment, and not the intangible aspects that have always underpinned successful militaries, whether volunteer or conscripted.
In a word, this is a problem of leadership. Good leaders emphasize accomplishment, professionalism, and self-fulfillment. They inspire confidence that comes from working together to meet and overcome challenges. This is why changing the recruiting standard doesn't automatically mean that the services will have increased droves of recruits dropping out. They won't -- if there is good leadership all the way up the chain of command.
If good leadership can't turn around the recruiting shortfalls in the short run (leaders have to have time to develop and to be recognized), there are options. First, the Pentagon's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review mandated end strength reductions that have still not been met. Current projections indicate that active duty military personnel will still number 1,385,000 at the end of Fiscal Year 2000. The QDR target is 1,363,000, an additional drop of 22,000. (The reserve components are also slated to be reduced further.) To avoid "hollowing" units, the Secretary of Defense should re-examine the force structure to see where additional units can be cut. (This would also be an opportunity to reconfigure units so that the Pentagon has available more of the types of forces most often called upon to deploy.)
Second, the Pentagon could modify the "up-or-out" policy that says if a service member is not promoted he/she must leave the military. This policy prematurely forces good people out and deprives younger troops of the valuable and steadying influence of experienced mentors.
Not every American can be president; not every enlistee can be the sergeant major or every officer the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But with a little imagination and strong leadership, the military can make most any American a competent member of one of the services -- not to mention a good citizen.
Bombing the Gordian Knot?
by Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
For the third time in five months, NATO is threatening air strikes against Serbian forces in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. On Thursday, the Pentagon ordered 51 additional aircraft moved to Europe for use in a possible Kosovo operation, designated "Noble Anvil." They will form a part of the 260-strong U.S. aircraft fleet ready to attack Serbian air defense and other military installations.
Air strikes were narrowly averted in October 1998, when the Serb and Kosovar authorities signed a cease-fire agreement. In January 1999, threats of force by NATO helped bring the two warring parties to France for peace talks on Kosovo.
The latest round of threatened air strikes were prompted by the refusal of the Serb authorities to allow international troops to monitor the Kosovo peace accord. The roughly 30,000 strong, NATO-led peacekeeping force is the cornerstone of the proposed peace agreement for Kosovo. The document is being negotiated at the international supervised Serb-Kosovar talks in Rambouillet, France.
Unofficial reports from Belgrade say that Serbia may agree to the force, which was given the working acronym KFOR, as long as it does not include U.S. troops. This proposal is likely to be rejected by NATO, which plans to use the 2,200 U.S. Marines currently on board of the ships anchored in the Adriatic, for the initial wave of the deployment. They expected to be replaced later by 4,000 mostly Army troops, which would patrol a sector of Kosovo close to the Albanian border.
If no progress is reached by the Saturday deadline, NATO has threatened to attack Serb positions from the air. U.S. and other NATO officials hope that, as in Bosnia in 1995, force will help compel the Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic to drop his opposition. In 1995, NATO forces attacked Serb positions in Bosnia. Shortly thereafter, president Milosevic agreed to negotiations that led to the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995. Force, U.S. Secretary of State Albright concluded, is the only language Milosevic understands.
But Kosovo is different from Bosnia. In 1995, in the Bosnian war, the Serbian forces were also losing on the ground. The Croatian army was on a full offensive both in Bosnia and the remaining Serb-controlled parts of Croatia. If Milosevic had not agreed to start the peace talks, the Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia would have shrunk further.
The guerillas in Kosovo are only a few thousand strong, armed mostly with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Since last October, when the United States brokered a cease-fire, the guerillas have trained and rearmed their troops. Nevertheless, they remained outmatched by the far more numerous Yugoslav troops equipped with tanks, fighter jets, and helicopters. The Kosovo guerilla force -- the KLA -- have the ability to inflict continuous damage on the Serbs but not to win the conflict outright. Milosevic therefore, has fewer incentives to settle.
Moreover, the internal political situation in Serbia has changed dramatically. Since the Dayton agreement, in the wake of the 1996-97 demonstrations in Belgrade, Milosevic dropped the last semblance of democracy. He purged the government of all but the most loyal bureaucrats and shut down a number of independent media outlets. There is little hope that U.S. air strikes will put any public pressure on Milosevic from within Yugoslavia; the Serb public appears too repressed and demoralized.
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), also present at the Rambouillet talks, opposes clauses in the agreement which call for KLA's disarmament. NATO has few military option of forcing the KLA into an agreement. The U.S. Department of Defense promised to "withdraw support" for the Kosovars should they not agree to the proposals. But U.S. support for the Kosovars is purely diplomatic and its withdrawal will end up hurting the more moderate factions in Kosovo rather than the KLA.
NATO may attempt to cut KLA's supplies of arms and provisions, which enter Kosovo mostly through neighboring Albania. NATO forces could theoretically be deployed in Albania to safeguard this country's border with Kosovo and stop rampant arms smuggling. Albania itself, however, opposes such deployment. In a response to a question by CDI, the Albanian Prime Minister Majko Pandeli dismissed such plans as dangerous and unrealistic.
There is little doubt that absent a peace agreement from Rambouillet, war in Kosovo will resume with full force. The best means of pressuring the Kosovo side is to stress that the Rambouillet talks may be the last chance to prevent horrendous casualties in Kosovo, and the province's descent into violence.
Safeguarding Civil Liberties at Home -- An Opinion
Oscar Lurie, Associate Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
We Americans are horrified at the lack of civil liberties in China. Yet we close our minds to the danger of erosion of our own liberties at home. How does this danger come about? And what should we do about it?
If terrorists from overseas strike an American city with a huge bomb or chemical or biological weapon, the resulting deaths will mobilize all levels of our government to prevent follow on attacks. The result will be snooping into our individual lives -- reading, speech, assembly, and movement -- to an extent far exceeding what we suffered during the McCarthy era. Our government authorities will consider such scrutiny necessary to ferret out the few terrorists from the overwhelming multitude of law abiding Americans.
Terrorists have already told us why they would sneak into our country to annihilate our citizens. They perceive the United States to be a hegemonic superpower that often intrudes in the affairs of other nations -- particularly those which we contemptuously call "third world." We send our troops wherever television coverage tempts us -- Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Korea -- and issue threatening statements against other countries like Iran and Libya. Reacting to these images and the perceptions they create, people in these and other countries come to hate America. They know they cannot prevail over American armed forces in conventional battle, but they can use bombs or poisonous weapons to kill American civilians at home.
We can prevent erosion of our own liberties by stopping the intrusion of our military forces on the liberties of others. In some cases we have intervened in response to requests of pro-democracy elements. In most cases however, we intervene because we dislike the way the others manage their affairs, even if their conduct has no effect on the quality of our own lives. We need not become isolationist to take our military out of roles which result in risks to the domestic liberties we hold so dear.
*NEW* This Week on America's Defense Monitor -- "Why is Military
Spending Going Up?"
Show #1222
Airs in Washington DC, Sunday February 21 at 10:30 a.m.
Airs in New York on Friday, February 27 on Channel 25 at 8:30 p.m., and
on Saturday at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Length: 30 minutes
For air dates in other cities, check your local listings.
Synopsis:
U.S. military spending dwarfs that of any other nation. Yet the White
House, the Pentagon, and the Congress are on the verge of increasing
military spending by more than a third. U.S. military spending dwarfs
that of any other nation. Yet the White House, the Pentagon, and the
Congress are on the verge of increasing military spending by more than a
third.
Pentagon leaders say they need the money to modernize American forces. Critics say the only war we're financing is the one between the White House and Congress.
With charts, graphics, beautiful footage and some of the best minds in the field on hand for commentary, America's Defense Monitor probes the underbelly of today's pork politics.
Key Interviewees:
Ralph DeGennaro, Executive Director of Taxpayers for Common Sense
Barney Frank, Congressman from Massachusetts
Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the CATO institute
Cost: $29
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