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| October 22, 1998 |
| October 22, 1998 |
Congress Boosts BMD funding $1 billion
This week Congress adopted legislation which provides the military with $9.2 billion in emergency funding for Fiscal Year 1999, which began on October 1. Of this, $1 billion is "for the enhanced testing, accelerated development, construction, and integration and infrastructure efforts in support of ballistic missile defense systems."
This $1 billion is in addition to the $3.5 billion for ballistic missile defense (BMD) included in the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Act adopted by Congress during the week of October 1. Of this $3.5 billion, $951 million was for National Missile Defense (NMD), the amount requested by the Pentagon. Other allocations were $310 million for the Navy Theater Wide system, a $120 million increase over the budget request; $267 million for the Air Force Airborne Laser system, $25 million less than requested; and $445 million for the Army Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system, a $376 million cut which reflects the growing concerns about the troubled program.
Unlike the Appropriations Act, the $1 billion supplemental does not state to which programs the additional funds should be allocated. Instead, the legislation says that the Secretary of Defense shall notify Congress of spending on any specific programs 30 days before the funds are released.
The Pentagon has not sought additional BMD funds, and program officials have stated that the various missile defense systems are adequately funded for the near term. Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, sees no problems with missile defense programs during the current Future Years' Defense Plan (FYDP) which runs through Fiscal Year 2003. Both he and Defense Secretary Cohen have testified to Congress in recent weeks that additional funds will not speed up development of an NMD system. In fact, in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. Lyles commented that "there is very little we can do" with additional NMD money. Meanwhile, the General Accounting Office, in a draft of its analysis of the military's Fiscal Year 1999 budget, recommended reducing funding for various theater missile defense (TMD) systems by $225.9 million, stating that the money is not needed at this time.
This is of particular interest, given that the $1 billion has been declared "emergency spending" in order to comply with current law. Supplementals are generally funded by making cuts, referred to as offsets, in other areas of the federal budget. Thus, supplementals normally represent a reallocation of assets and not new federal obligations. If, however, a supplemental is deemed by Congress and the Administration to be an emergency, then offsets are not necessary and the cost of the supplemental can be added to the federal budget without violating the existing spending caps.
Basically, Congress has said to BMDO, "here's a billion dollars. Just take it." It is difficult to reconcile how Congress can throw $1 billion at a program which is generally considered to be adequately funded, fail to identify where in the budget the funding shortfalls exist, and do so by declaring the funding need to be an emergency.
Highlights of the Supplemental -- In addition to funding for BMD, the Supplemental included the following items: $1.9 billion for ongoing U.S. military operations in Bosnia, $1.1 billion to improve the readiness of U.S. forces, $1.1 billion to attempt to fix the Pentagon's "Y2K" computer problem, $235 million to repair flood damage at U.S. military facilities in South Korea, $385 million for improved security at U.S. embassies, and $2 billion for intelligence.
Other spending included $690 million to halt the flow of narcotics into the U.S., $140 million to repair damage from hurricane Georges, $210 million for the Coast Guard, an additional $200 million to support health programs for the military's 8 million eligible recipients, and $50 million for countering weapons of mass destruction.
-- Senior Analyst Chris Hellman, chellman@cdi.org
Governments and NGOs Discuss Small Arms in Belgium
From October 12-13 approximately 600 representatives from government and non-governmental organizations met in Brussels to discuss the proliferation and misuse of small arms at the International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development. The conference was convened by Dr. Réginald Moreels, Belgian Secretary of State for Development Cooperation, and Dr. Oscar Arias, Nobel Peace Prize Winner and former President of Costa Rica.
The intent of the conference was "to strengthen the momentum for a more global programme of action on controlling the proliferation of light weapons and on promoting human security as a prerequisite for sustainable development. It seeks to build on the experiences and actions of the past and to explore future steps to be taken by a number of actors both North and South, governmental and nongovernmental, regional and international."
At the conclusion of the first two days, a Call for Action was issued and endorsed by the 98 government and NGO representatives present. The Call for Action recognizes that there is an "increasing international awareness of the need to tackle the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (defined as those weapons designed for personal use, and those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew), since these have become more prominent as major instruments in violent conflicts." The declaration also notes that the "widespread availability [of small arms and light weapons] erodes negotiated peace settlements, prolongs conflicts and hampers conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction...perpetuates insecurity and instability, thereby undermining the basis for sustainable development."
The Call for Action suggested an International Programme of Action on Practical Disarmament and Peacebuilding to tackle the problems caused by misuse of small arms. Among the myriad measures suggested were strengthening national controls over possession, use and transfer of small arms and light weapons; renewed efforts to restrain international arms transfers; ensuring that weapons stocks used by security forces do not exceed requirements for legitimate defence; destroying or otherwise responsibly disposing of surplus weapons stocks to prevent diversion; increasing transparency and information exchanges among countries in regions of conflict; and halting the abduction, recruitment and involvement of children in armed forces and militias.
Although comprehensive, the Programme of Action does not fully address legal transfers, which is a significant element in the proliferation and misuse of small arms. Additionally, the Call for Action is a non-binding document that allows governments to pick and choose measures they want to implement. Even so, the Call for Action is a welcome step forward, especially since the small arms issue is relatively new on the international agenda. However, pressure must continue to be applied on governments to implement effective policies that will address the proliferation and misuse of small arms on a global level.
Civil society also has a major role in advocating policies that address small arms. As Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has said, "civil society activism is the major factor in ensuring that governments actually take up the responsibilities that they have acknowledged are theirs."
In this light, following the government/NGO conference over 200 representatives of non-governmental organizations met to develop an International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). This meeting continued the work begun by 33 NGOS from 18 countries who met in Canada in August to take the first steps in organizing IANSA.
The keynote speech for the NGO meeting was delivered by Olara Otunnu, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict. Otunnu said that "small arms ...are the weapon of choice in modern war where the majority of casualties are civilians, many of them women and children....The development of an International Action Network on Small Arms is an important initiative towards tackling one of the greatest humanitarian challenges of our times.
Participants in the NGO meeting developed a number of policy prescriptions. Increased cooperation between North and South was seen as one of the keys to addressing the negative effects caused by small arms and light weapons.
The continued development of IANSA, which is more of a network than a campaign, has been left to a committee of individuals present at both the Canadian and Belgian meetings. The Committee will formalize a document from the meetings and develop a timetable and work plan for the continued work of IANSA.
-- Research Analyst Rachel Stohl, rstohl@cdi.org
Targeting Pipelines: Caucasus Insurgencies (Part I.)
This week's brief mutiny of about 300 troops in the western part of the Republic of Georgia highlighted the risks of building and maintaining a pipeline system in the volatile Caucasus region. The soldiers in Georgia seized tanks and APCs and marched on the town of Kutaisi before being dispersed by government troops a day later. Four people died and the leaders of the revolt are said to be on the run. The insurgency forced a temporary suspension of the construction of a pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to the nearby Black Sea port of Supsa.
Some observers suggested that halt in the construction may have been the main goal of the insurgents. It is more likely, however, that the revolt was politically motivated -- the leader of the rebel troops is a supporter of the former president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who waged an unsuccessful war against the current government of Eduard Shevarnadze in 1993. Simple quality of life for the soldiers may also have played a role: some units have not been paid for months.
Pipelines are not always the root of the conflict, but they are a very visible target because of their economic and political importance. They are a major source of revenue for the central governments of the Caucasus. Many of the secessionist movements thrive on their respective governments’ inability to impose authority over all of their territory. Oil cash would enable the governments to solidify their control by building up police and military forces. Newly created jobs, trade opportunities, and social programs would also link the peripheries closer to the center. Where pipelines cross the insurgent territories directly, local authorities may benefit from extracting transit fees. Otherwise, it is in the interest of the leaders of the rebellious provinces in Georgia, the Russian Federation, and elsewhere that the pipeline construction be delayed or stopped altogether.
For the consortium of Western and local oil companies financing the construction of the export pipelines for the Caspian oil, the Caucasus region’s instabilities pose a logistical nightmare. No matter which way they go, pipelines out of Baku face an uncertain security environment.
The pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to Supsa, Georgia, passes just south of the disputed South Ossetia territory, the site of the 1990-92 war for independence. The port of Supsa lies on the roughly 30 mile portion of the Black Sea over which the Tbilisi government retained control. The rest is controlled by Abhkazia, a de facto independent state since the end of its war for independence in 1994. To the south of Supsa lies Ajaria, an autonomous region with dubious loyalty to Tbilisi. To make matters worse, all of the western part of Georgia is considered a stronghold of the supporters of the deposed president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, as were the troops that mutinied earlier this week.
The proposed pipeline route from Baku to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey, faces some of the same problems because it also crosses Georgia in its initial phase. It would make a southward turn to Turkey, passing by Ajaria or the Javakheti region -- an ethnically Armenian territory which also houses a Russian military base. As it traverses Turkey from north to south, the pipeline would cross Kurdish territories that have been the site of a longstanding conflict between various Kurdish groups and the Turkish government.
The northern pipeline route from Baku to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk follows Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea shore northward into Dagestan, a mountainous and ethnically diverse region of the Russian Federation, which has been the site of several insurgencies in 1998 (see table at the end of this article). The pipeline exits Dagestan into Chechnya, which, since its 1994-96 war, is only nominally a part of the Russian Federation. The Chechen government this year has threatened to stop the flow of oil on numerous occasions.
Most of the conflicts in the Caucasus seem intractable. Only tenuous ceasefire agreements and, in some parts, Russian peacekeeping troops keep the fighting from flaring again. As long as the region remains divided into semiindependent regions operating outside the control of the central governments, the construction and maintenance of the oil and gas pipelines will remain a risky business. This week’s suspension of the Baku-Supsa pipeline construction may not be the last such occurrence.
Next week: How the governments involved cope with the problem of providing security to the pipelines.
SOME OF 1998 ARMED INCIDENTS IN THE CAUCASUS REGION:
PLACE: near Kutaisi, Georgia
DATE: October 19-21
EVENT: About 300 soldiers, led by Akaki Eliava, a supporter of Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, mutinied. The troops seized tanks and APCs and marched on
the town of Kutaisi before being dispersed by Georgian armed forces.
PLACE: Gali district, Georgia
DATE: May 19-25
EVENT: Georgian militia clashed with Abhkaz units in the formally
demilitarized district of Gali. About one hundred people die and 30,000
fled the area before a ceasefire agreement is signed.
PLACE: Makhachkala, Dagestan (Russian Federation)
DATE: May 21
EVENT: An armed crowd of 150 fighters led by Magomed Khachilaev seized the
building housing the State Council with the support of hundreds of local
traders. They demanded that the incumbent authorities step down.
PLACE: Buinak District, Dagestan (Russian Federation)
DATE: August 17
EVENT: Three villages in Buinak Raion declare an independent Islamic
territory. The villagers have clashed with the police on numerous occasions
since June 1997.
PLACE: Grozny, Chechnya (Russian Federation)
DATE: June 21
EVENT: Chechen Security Minister Lechi Khultygov was shot dead during a
confrontation in central Grozny with supporters of maverick field commander
Salman Raduev; the mob was intent on storming the local television
headquarters.
-- Research Analyst Tomas Valasek, tvalasek@cdi.org