
| September 17, 1998 |
The United Nations In Session
Center for Defense Information
Director of Research Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.)
dsmith@cdi.org
September 21 is the first day of the general debate of the 53rd annual United Nations General Assembly meeting. It may well be the most fateful session for the United States in the UN's history.
Considering that the United Nations was created in large measure because of U.S. leadership, one can only be appalled when contemplating the current state of U.S. - UN relations. The President, who is scheduled to speak to the General Assembly on its opening day, comes before world representatives who see the most powerful nation in the world seemingly bent on destroying the UN's ability to operate effectively on a broad array of issues.
The most pressing issue for the President and the UN is U.S. arrears. As of the end of July 1998, the U.S. owes the UN approximately $1.5 billion for unpaid assessments for regular UN operations and UN peacekeeping missions. Negotiations to reduce the U.S. share of regular assessments from 25 percent to 22 percent have ended with no action because the U.S. owes so much money and is insisting on "reforms" to the UN structure and operations. Similarly, the UN does not accept the validity of the unilateral action by the U.S. Congress to reduce the U.S. peacekeeping assessment from 30 percent to 25 percent.
The President submitted a supplemental budget request of just over $1.02 billion for the current fiscal year (which ends September 30) to pay off at least some of the arrears to the UN and other international organizations. (This does not include the requested $18 billion in standby authority for the International Monetary Fund.) Of this amount, $54 million was earmarked for regular assessment arrears, $658 million for peacekeeping arrears, and $254 million for three special UN agencies (World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and International Labor Organization). This request has been stalled by those in Congress who do not believe that the reforms implemented by the UN Secretary General are enough.
Regular Fiscal Year 1999 funding for the UN has fared no better. Funds for the current year's assessments are part of the State Department's Appropriation, one of 13 funding bills still tied up in the Congress. For FY 1999 the President requested $322.1 million for the UN, $335.4 million for UN affiliated organizations, and $231 million for 16 UN peacekeeping missions/activities. Just on the latter item, the House version of the State Department's funding cuts $11 million from the President's request and the Senate version $20 million.
The congressional action cutting peacekeeping funds is perhaps the most short-sighted of all. The UN's peacekeeping missions relieve the U.S. of the need to deploy large numbers of troops to help sustain cease-fires and oversee implementation of peace accords in sixteen locations around the globe -- and do so at a bargain price. Of the 14,453 peacekeepers currently deployed around the world, only 529 are Americans. That's a personnel savings equivalent to a U.S. ground combat division, on top of which are savings in equipment, training, and operations and maintenance costs that do not have to be paid because a division's worth of U.S. troops have not been deployed.
Our failure to fully pay our share of UN operations costs will soon become an issue that goes beyond mere money. Article 19 of the UN Charter says that a nation's right to vote in the General Assembly can be denied if its arrears "equal or exceed the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years." The United States, the world's richest nation, will be at this point in 1999, and the General Assembly will be fully within its rights to enforce Article 19. Not to do so would set a deplorable precedent and damage the UN far more than the enforcing the provision -- even against the world's only remaining superpower.
What is perhaps most frustrating about this whole situation is that Congress is ignoring the wishes of the American public. Polls show that Americans understand the importance of the UN and support it and its work. While there can be tension in representative government between the views of the public and deep-seated, moral principles of conscience held by elected officials, no one has yet explained how opposing peace and humanitarian operations of the UN can be based on such principles.
Continued failure to appropriate money for current UN operations and to pay our nation's arrears is inexcusable and undercuts the valuable work of the UN. Congress in this case should heed, not obstruct, the American public.
South Asia, Public Opinion, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Center for Defense Information
Senior Research Analyst Andrew Koch
akoch@cdi.org
As the U.S. Congress debates whether to give President Clinton the power to waive economic sanctions against India and Pakistan, these South Asian countries are maneuvering to meet a key American demand -- signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government in India and Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif have recently hinted their willingness to sign the CTBT, contingent on further negotiations. While the exact modalities are still incomplete, an unforeseen obstacle has entered the picture -- overcoming strong domestic public opposition. Ironically, the ruling political parties in New Delhi and Islamabad -- the BJP and Muslim League -- played a large role in creating the pubic opposition they now must overcome.
Prime Minister Sharif has repeatedly hinted that his government is ready to sign the CTBT in exchange for the lifting economic sanctions, although those two outcomes would not be officially linked. But Sharif's freedom of action to actually sign the CTBT has been complicated by internal Pakistani politics. Sharif’s administration had submitted a draft resolution calling on the parliament to "authorize the government to take a decision on the CTBT in the best national interest." Sharif had hoped to gain approval during a rare joint session of parliament before a planned September 20 trip to New York, but opposition parties took the opportunity to score political points by playing on public attitudes against signing the treaty. As a result, the draft resolution was withdrawn.
Sharif has argued that Pakistan must secure the lifting of sanctions in order to right Pakistan’s sinking economic ship. Islamabad subsequently announced that the executive branch will decide Pakistan’s stance on the CTBT, hinting that a decision to sign the document has already been made.
In return for signing the CTBT, Pakistan hopes to secure IMF assistance in avoiding an expected $4.5 billion balance of payments shortfall. Restarting IMF and World Bank loans, or at least a memorandum of understanding that loans will restart, could be the key deal-maker. Although an actual signature date has not been set, Sharif could announce Pakistan’s support for the CTBT as early as next week when he joins world leaders in New York to start the new session of the United Nations General Assembly.
While it appears Pakistan is ready to sign the CTBT sooner rather than later, a decision by India to due so is less certain. Indian Prime Minster Vajpayee is expected to give a key speech at the UN gathering, but is unlikely to announce any significant breakthrough on the nuclear front without parliamentary approval. In recent weeks, Vajpayee has hinted an increased willingness to sign the CTBT, although New Delhi appears to be waiting for a deal-sweetener such as the lifting of export restrictions on high-technology goods by the United States.
But as in Pakistan, this momentum is in jeopardy due to domestic political opposition to the CTBT, opposition that can be traced back to pre-election political rhetoric of the BJP which created a public ground swell against the treaty. Before New Delhi can complete any deal with the U.S., it must overcome that ground swell and the prospect that the opposition Congress party will seek to bring down the BJP government if it signs the CTBT without parliament’s acquiescence.
Pressure Growing to Boost Pentagon Spending
Center For Defense Information
Senior Research Analyst Chris Hellman
chellman@cdi.org
With the end of the fiscal year (September 30) fast approaching, members of Congress are anxious to return to their districts for some last minute election year campaigning. But they still have not passed most funding measures for Fiscal Year 1999 (FY'99), including the Pentagon's budget, which many members -- amid increasingly vocal concerns about the readiness of U.S. combat forces, the need to find $1.9 billion to fund the continued U.S. presence in Bosnia, and a desire on the part of Congress to find funds to address the government's "Year 2000" computer problem -- are seeking to increase.
Of political concern is whether the need to increase the Pentagon's FY'99 funding can be justified in light of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. The BBA sets funding caps for both overall federal spending and specific accounts. Under the BBA, the Pentagon is permitted $266 billion in outlays -- dollars actually spent -- in FY'99. Spending in excess of this amount would violate the BBA and would require special legislative action.
Both the Clinton Administration and Congress have spent considerable time taking credit for balancing the federal budget, pointing to the fact that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has projected a $39 billion surplus this fiscal year, the first budget surplus in nearly thirty years. Neither the Administration nor the majority of members of Congress seem inclined during an election year to be labeled as the side that violated the agreement which produced this surplus. Thus, certain members of Congress have begun looking for ways to increase Pentagon spending without violating the letter, if not the actual intent, of the BBA.
Because unexpected federal expenditures often do arise, the federal budget process allows for the enactment of special supplemental appropriations which are used to pay for unanticipated federal initiatives such as disaster relief. Supplementals are generally funded by making cuts -- referred to as offsets -- in other areas of the federal budget. Thus, supplementals normally represent a reallocation of assets and not new federal obligations. If, however, a supplemental is deemed by Congress and the Administration to be an emergency, then offsets are not necessary and the cost of the supplemental can be added to the federal budget without violating the existing spending caps.
According to congressional sources, Representative Bill Young (R-FL), Chairman of the House National Security Appropriations Subcommittee, and Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, are working on a supplemental bill for the Pentagon totaling roughly $5 billion. The supplemental would be treated as an emergency, and thus would not apply towards existing spending caps.
The supplemental would provide $1.9 billion for Bosnia, $1.6 billion for DoD's "Year 2000" computer problem, $250 million for emergency construction in South Korea due to flooding, and $100 million for improved security at U.S. embassies. It would also provide $1 billion for spare parts, training and quality of life initiatives which are currently funded through the normal Defense Appropriations bill. If approved, the supplemental thus would free up funds within the actual DoD budget for improving readiness without violating the limits set by the BBA.
Without arguing the relative merits of a continued U.S. presence in Bosnia or the need to address the "Year 2000" problem, it is clear that both initiatives, if they are worthy of funding, belong in the federal budget. They do not constitute the type of urgent funding request for which emergency supplementals are intended. Likewise, shifting funds for training and spare parts to an emergency spending bill is more a matter of budgetary slight of hand than an urgent necessity. Yet Congress may add more than $4 billion to the FY'99 Pentagon budget, with little or no debate, while circumventing the BBA in the process.
Does the American taxpayer really need to pay for this kind of back door increase?