Brought to you by the Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036
(202)332-0600 * Fax (202)462-4559 * http://www.cdi.org
| August 28,1998 |
| August 28,1998 |
Terrorism in 1986 and 1998
Center for Defense Information
Director of Research Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)
dsmith@cdi.org
"The vast moral gulf which once separated us from the terrorists was narrowed yesterday....Take another look at those bleeding children before you delight over the precision of the rockets, my colleagues. Tell them you are not sure the policy will work, but it sure did feel good."
These words were spoken by then Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) on the floor of the Senate on April 16, 1986, one day after U.S. jets struck targets in Libya. Reports placed the dead at 41, the wounded at 93. Among the dead were Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's adopted child. Two American pilots also died when their F-111 went down.
Flash ahead to August 1998. Instead of F-111's and A-6 aircraft, the United States struck reputed terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan with Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from ships in the Arabian and Red Seas. Combined casualties this time were reported as 21 dead and over 60 wounded. No Americans had been placed "in harm's way."
There is the adage, of course, that one should fight fire with fire. Generally that's good advice in the wilderness where undergrowth can intensify forest fires. But even there the technique of deliberately setting backfires to consume potential fuel ahead of a raging fire can, on occasion, literally backfire.
By analogy, international relations is like a forest. From a distance, the trees of the forest seem to live harmoniously side by side in a larger, albeit competitive, environment. But a closer look usually reveals a less placid picture: sick, dead and decaying trees and shrubs that await a lightening strike, a careless camper, an arsonist. Terrorists are the arsonists in the forest that is international relations.
Many experts once believed that the way to stop most forest fires was to systematically remove dead wood and clean out brush. Fires that did start had to be attacked directly and quenched rapidly. We now know that Nature has a cycle of its own with respect to cleansing and renewing forests -- Yellowstone Park is a clear example of the power of Nature in this regard.
In some ways, terrorists resemble the forces of fire. While terrorists may have specific targets, they usually are indifferent about the lives and welfare of those who just happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Something, or someone, triggers their rage, a rage that, like choking undergrowth, is based on real or perceived wrongs.
But unlike the forest set ablaze by lightening, terror -- defined by the State Department as "the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups...when such actions are intended to influence a target group wider than the immediate victim or victims" -- is not the only or the inevitable approach to resolving disputes between nations or between nations and subnational groups. Terror becomes the instrument of choice for those who are disempowered politically, economically, socially, culturally, when all other possible remedial avenues seem blocked. In their desperation, terrorists believe that violence can make the world -- at least their part of the world -- conform to their vision of righteousness and justice. What they often fail to realize is that violence is an all-consuming fire, one that sears the conscience of its user as much as it consumes its often innocent victims. I believe it is this searing of conscience to which Senator Hatfield was referring in his April 1986 speech.
In the years since 1986, terrorists have added to their array of methods and weapons. In turn, the United States and other countries have increased defensive security measures. More stress has been put on international cooperation to find and bring to justice terrorists. This is a slow and often painstaking process, but it works in this milieu of increasing international interdependence. Indeed, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger noted earlier this week that the U.S. has successfully brought to justice some 40 individuals accused of terrorism, and it appears that the two Libyans accused of the Pan Am 103 bombing over Scotland will now stand trial in the Netherlands before a Scottish court.
The conundrum for us in 1998 remains the one of 1986: is the United States (or any government) ever justified in using military force, no matter how "precise," to punish identified or suspected terrorist either before or after they have acted? The key is "justified," for this very word connotes the rule of law and, in our system, the separation of accuser, judge, and -- if necessary -- executioner. Terrorists do not separate these three functions of justice and, as a consequence, inflict indiscriminate carnage on the innocent as well as on those whom they deem "guilty."
Military action, like backfires, can disrupt or stem the course of terror. But should it become the frequent "remedy" that is implied in the Administration's rhetoric that we are in a protracted war with terrorism, it is just as likely to create new fires in new areas of the world.
To stay on the right side of Senator Hatfield's moral gulf, the United States must be willing to put as much effort into confronting the root causes of terrorism -- poverty, ill health, lack of education, the dearth of opportunity and the prevalence of despair among millions -- as in planning and mounting military strikes.
We certainly can kill terrorists from time to time, but terrorism will live on until we deal with its causes.
Developing World Receives $28.6 billion in Conventional Arms in 1997
Center for Defense Information
Research Analyst Rachel Stohl
rstohl@cdi.org
The United States remains the world's number one arms exporter.
A new government report, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1990-1997," released by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) last month, lists U.S. arms exports in 1997 at $15.2 billion, 44% of the global arms market. However, the report also finds that U.S. dominance of the world's arms sales is shrinking, at least in regard to sales to developing nations.
Although in 1997 the United States ranked first in terms of arms deliveries to developing nations ($11.7 billion or 40.9% of all deliveries to developing nations), the U.S. was third in terms of new arms transfer agreements in 1997 ($2.3 billion or 13.3% of all new agreements with developing countries).
The CRS Report (also known as the Grimmett report after its author, Richard Grimmett) finds that arms transfers to developing nations during the period 1990-97 were 68.6% of the total value of all international arms transfers. The report states that in 1997, the developing world increased its share of global arms transfer agreements to 71% ($17.2 billion) of the world total. Similarly, the developing countries showed an increase in the value of arms deliveries in 1997, rising from $20.6 billion in 1996 to $28.6 billion in 1997.
Although the total value of 1997 arms transfer agreements to developing nations increased from the previous year, the CRS notes that "the total value of U.S. arms transfer agreement with developing nations in 1997 was the lowest value, in real terms, of United States arms transfer agreements with developing nations since 1990." France was the global leader in terms of new arms transfer agreements to developing nations with $4.6 billion (26.8% of the total agreements with developing countries) and Russia was second with $3.3 billion (19.2%). However, since 1990, the U.S. has sold $53.4 billion worth of weapons to the developing world, by far the highest of any arms exporting country.
In terms of the value of actual deliveries to the developing world, the Grimmett CRS report provides data from which the percent share of the value of the market over 1990-97 can be determined for major arms suppliers. These percentages are:
United States 29.12% United Kingdom 20.83% Russia 18.33% France 10.18% China 4.89% Germany 2.33% Italy 0.58%
Completing the picture are two general categories: "All other European" which collectively delivered 7.16% of arms to the developing world, and "all Others" whose share was 6.58%
Turning to recipient nations in the developing world, the CRS report reveals that the value of new agreements during 1997, in real terms, was the lowest since 1990. Although Saudi Arabia, ranked first among all developing nations from 1994-97 with $14.1 billion worth of arms sales agreements, the United Arab Emirates concluded the largest dollar value of arms transfer agreements in 1997 with $3.5 billion. Saudi Arabia was second and India was third with $2.9 billion and $1.8 billion in agreements respectively. Saudi Arabia did maintain its rank as the recipient of the most arms deliveries, receiving $11 billion worth of arms in 1997. Taiwan was second with $9.3 billion and Egypt was third with $1.1 billion.
What the U.S. government calls the Near East (18 North African and Persian Gulf states) is still named by the CRS report as "the largest purchasing region in the developing world." In 1997 the top ten developing nations received $25.8 billion or 90.3% of all arms sales to the developing world. Six of these top ten arms recipients were in the Near East.
The United States remains in the forefront as an arms exporter to this region. According to the Grimmett report, the United States transferred the following quantities of weapons to Near East countries in the 1994-97 period:
As Russia and France vie for larger shares of the global arms market, it seems that the old adage, "if we don't sell arms, someone else will," is gaining greater acceptance in the Clinton Administration. France often seems to act indiscriminately in pursuit of arms sales while Russia, as the CRS report notes, is anxious to obtain hard currency to bolster its failing economy.
In turn, the United States government now seems more willing to speed the arms sale review process for major conventional weapons so as to protect from foreign encroachment as many of the "traditional" American markets as possible. In 1995, the Clinton Administration released its policy on weapons sales, Presidential Decision Directive 34, which says that arms sales are "a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy." However, according to the New York Times, "no international arms deal has been rejected under the directive, which evaluates sales case by case."
For more information, please see the CRS Report for Congress, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1990-97," by Richard F. Grimmett, July 31, 1998.
Cruise Missiles: The Preferred Face of Warfare?
Center for Defense Information
Senior Research Analyst Chris Hellman
chellman@cdi.org
Last week's strikes by the United States against targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan are but the latest instance in a growing list of U.S. military actions that have employed cruise missiles. Originally intended as a delivery system for nuclear warheads, cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads are rapidly becoming the weapons of choice for Pentagon planners.
The development of cruise missile technology dates back to as early as the 1960s. The Air Force's AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile was first deployed as a strategic system in 1982. A similar system was then deployed with the U.S. Navy for use on submarines, and a ground-launched system, capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union, was deployed with NATO. In 1986 the Air Force developed the AGM-86C equipped with a conventional High Explosive (HE) warhead.
Both Air Force and Navy cruise missiles were used during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the first time they were used in combat. The 288 missiles launched during Desert Storm attacked high priority targets particularly in areas considered to be well-defended against attack from helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft. Since then, cruise missiles have been used on five separate occasions, including in Bosnia in 1995 and to enforce the "no-fly" zone in Iraq in 1996.
The version currently in the Navy's arsenal is the Tomahawk Block III, manufactured by Hughes Missile Systems Company. The Tomahawk, also known as "TLAM" for Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, has a range of 1,000 miles and travels at roughly 550 miles per hour. It carries a 1,000 pound HE warhead or a conventional submunitions dispenser. Its navigational system uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) network as well as a terrain contour matching (TERCOM) guidance system which compares stored map references with the actual terrain to determine the missile's position.
While the Pentagon has confirmed neither the type or number of weapons used in last week's strikes, it is widely believed that between 75 and 100 Tomahawks were launched. The estimated 12 to 24 reported launched against the suspected chemical weapons facility in the Sudan carried 1,000 HE warheads. The strikes against the six suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan used at least some Tomahawks carrying submunition dispensers.
The positive reasons for using cruise missiles are obvious. Their range is sufficient to strike numerous targets even when launched from vessels operating outside a nation's territorial waters. They are highly accurate and their low radar cross section make them difficult to detect. They eliminate the need to put a pilot in harm's way and avoid the political problems associated with having a pilot captured.
While the stealth technologies in the U.S.'s F-117 "Nighthawk" fighter and the B-2 bomber make these aircraft difficult to track and reduce the risks to their pilots, they are not invisible and are subject to mechanical failures. The loss of one of these aircraft in combat or due to an accident potentially could result in revealing classified elements of critical stealth technology. While the loss of a cruise missile might also result in a potential enemy gaining valuable intelligence information, it would not be nearly as damaging.
Although the Pakistani Government has lodged official protests about violations of its airspace, one wonders if in the future other nations might be more willing to allow U.S. cruise missiles to overfly their territories than they would be to permit large scale operations by conventional strike aircraft and their escorts. At the very least, it would be easier for a nation to claim to not have been aware that cruise missiles had been used than if actual air operations had occurred.
Clearly, there are certain situations for which cruise missiles are not well suited and others for which only strike aircraft will do. Both the Navy and Marines are in the process of improving their strike capabilities with the F/A-18E/F, an upgraded version of the current Hornet fighter. And together with the Air Force, the Navy and Marine Corps plan to buy more than 2,800 of the next generation Joint Strike Fighter. Given the high cost of these aircraft, it might be well for the services to consider further investments in cruise missile technology.
Ironically, as the Tomahawk increasingly becomes one of the premier strike weapons in the U.S. inventory, the program is facing funding shortfalls. Navy officials are planning on cutting the support and maintenance budgets for the Tomahawk program in both Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. For example, the service is apparently considering eliminating funding for engineering support in each year. Total savings would be $53.6 million, less than the cost of one F/A-18E/F, whose per unit cost is nearly $80 million.
MiGs Will Have to Do -- For Now
Center for Defense Information
Research Analyst Tomas Valasek
tvalasek@cdi.org
Hungary and Poland will not buy new Western fighter planes in the near future, according to representatives of the two governments. "It's not because we do not want to. But, let's face it, we simply cannot afford [the aircraft]," said the new Czech defense minister, Vladimir Vetchy on August 11. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban had a similar surprise in store for major aircraft makers taking part in an air show in Kecskemet, Hungary. Addressing those gathered at the show on August 22, Orban said the state of Hungary's economy made it impossible to purchase new fighter jets in the next few years. His Chief of Staff, General Ferenc Vegh, specified that the tender is postponed until 2003.
Both decisions were virtually preordained by the state of both countries' economies and militaries. All three prospective NATO members made commitments to increase their defense budgets, but money remains tight.
Instead of spending to buy new aircraft, the Hungarian air force may have to cut staff to save funds, said General Vegh.
The losers in the latest turn of events are large manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Sweden's Gripen, which for years courted the three countries invited to join NATO -- Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic -- in the expectation of selling as many as 150 aircraft.
Conversely, local manufacturers and companies specializing in upgrading Soviet era military equipment emerge as major winners. The military aircraft fleets in Hungary and the Czech Republic are aging quickly. The Czech military says only 50% of its planes are operational and the country will be without usable aircraft shortly after the year 2000. To keep their air forces from collapsing completely, all of the Central and Eastern European nations have begun upgrading their existing fleets with outside help. For example, Israel's Elbit Defense Systems has teamed up with a Romanian company, Aerostar, to install advanced electronic equipment on the country's fleet of MiG21 fighters. A consortium consisting of the Russian jet manufacturer MiGMAPO and Germany's Daimler Benz Aerospace is bidding to upgrade the more modern MiG29 jets in several former Warsaw Pact countries. The Central and Eastern Europeans also meet their aviation needs with local help. The Czechs plan to buy 72 L159 light aircraft from Aero Vodochody, a domestic jetmaker with a long tradition of producing trainer aircraft. The L159 will lack many of the capabilities that new Western planes would offer but it comes at a much lower price. "Our air force will get what we can afford," said Minister Vetchy. The deal will also rescue Aero, which for years has been on the verge of bankruptcy.
The planned L159 purchase also illustrates the Western fighter makers' new strategy. A consortium of Boeing and the Czech Airline, CSA, bought about a 35% share of Aero Vodochody. Aero's director, Adam Strana, said he expects Boeing to start making parts for its F/A18 fighters in the Czech plant. But Boeing's investment also positions the company well for a new fighter order, which is still expected when the Czech economy can afford it.