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| June 25,1998 |
| June 25,1998 |
Reunification vs. Cooperation: Armenia’s Dilemma
by Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
The Southern Caucasus witnessed a diplomatic version of a summer thunderstorm storm this past week. The immediate cause of the turmoil is Nagorno Karabakh, a territory populated mostly by ethnic Armenians. It had been part of the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan until it broke away in a bloody civil war that ended in 1994.
The latest rumblings were touched off by the Armenian Foreign Minister, Vartan Oskanyan, who suggested that if negotiations over the status of the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region do not make progress soon, Armenia might simply "reunify" with the breakaway province.*
The minister’s statement triggered an avalanche of critical responses, not only from traditional foes such as Azerbaijan and Turkey but even from nations friendly to the Yerevan government, such as Russia and the U.S. Some diplomats professed surprise at the turn of events. Oskanyan, however, was merely reiterating Armenia’s new policy towards its neighbors, which has been in place since President Kocharian’s ascent to power in February of this year.
The Nagorno Karabakh issue is really no closer to resolution than it was at the end of fighting in 1994. The OSCE-sponsored Minsk Group negotiations failed because Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh have rejected the Azerbaijani offer of autonomy. Azerbaijan for its part continues to insist that the territory remain, at least nominally, under the Baku government. In the short term, this impasse rewards the Nagorno Karabakh independence fighters who profit by controlling not only the province’s territory but also surrounding swaths of Azerbaijan.
It is doubtful that the status-quo can be sustainable in the longer term. Azerbaijan sits on significant oil reserves which it is beginning to export to the West. As the amount of oil - and corresponding income - increases, Armenia fears the proceeds could be used to rebuild the Azerbaijani army which would then try to retake Nagorno Karabakh by force. Minister Oskanyan used precisely this scenario to justify his reunification statement: "Armenia cannot wait for concessions from Azerbaijan for a decade knowing that Azerbaijan has great possibilities to strengthen its army with petrodollars and opt for a military solution."
The previous Armenian president, Ter-Petrossian, believed Armenia needed to negotiate an end to the crisis and start cooperating with neighboring Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey on oil and other economic developments. But he failed to convince his compatriots. Domestic pressures then forced him out of the office. Armenia has since suffered the consequences. All planned pipeline developments will bypass Armenian territory. Without some income from the exploitation of petroleum reserves, Armenia may quickly be left behind economically while the rest of the region benefits from oil money.
In the past, Armenia could count on support from Russia. But last week’s events revealed the depth of the country’s isolation. Even Russia dismissed Oskanyan’s statement as "political blackmail" damaging to the negotiations.
The current dispute, while vocal and emotional, is not as significant as the lack of a viable long-term strategy in Yerevan. The Kocharian government seems to believe that the territorial gains by Nagorno Karabakh are irreversible. But without a political settlement, this position rests exclusively on a precarious regional balance-of-power that currently favors Armenia.
This balance may be changing already. Even as the economic indicators are beginning to shift in favor of Armenia’s neighbors, Russia’s support is no longer unequivocal. United States support is also waning. In 1997 Armenia received six times more foreign aid than did Azerbaijan. The Clinton Administration and a powerful congressional group plan legislative changes that would erase the current tilt.
In diplomatic terms, Foreign Minister Oskanyan's comments may have been a trial balloon to test the extent of international support for Armenia’s position. If so, the reaction seems akin to Ben Franklin's kite experiment involving lightning: the results were a little shocking to the Yerevan government.
Non-Proliferation Leadership Needed: Will The U.K. Fill The Void
by Andrew Koch, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
akoch@cdi.org
The United States political leaders have been slow to realize that the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan signal the need for the nuclear powers to abide by their disarmament obligations if the non-proliferation regime will survive in an effective form. Fortunately, Britain appears poised to fill that leadership void.
Next month, British Defense Secretary George Robertson is expected to announce deep reductions in the U.K. nuclear arsenal as part of a Strategic Defence Review [the U.K. version of America’s QDR]. The new configuration, first reported by The Guardian newspaper and confirmed by a British government official, will eventually consist of four Trident strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) carrying no more than 48 warheads each- a cut from the current configuration of no more than 96 warheads per boat. When the last of the four Trident SSBNs is commissioned in early 1999, the British nuclear arsenal will consist of 192 warheads [48 warheads x 4 SSBNs], a reduction of one third from the current arsenal of 288 [96 warheads x 3 SSBNs]. The British arsenal will be held far below its full potential of 768, as the subs could hold 16 Trident II D-5 submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) each capable of carrying 12 independently maneuvering warheads [192 warheads per sub x 4 subs].
The cuts are part of a restructuring of the British nuclear arsenal that has been ongoing for several years. This March, the U.K. withdrew the last of its 75-100 atomic gravity bombs and depth charges, leaving the Trident as the country’s lone nuclear delivery system. These cuts were possible because British security thinkers have embraced the idea of minimal deterrence, under which the U.K. seeks to have the capability to inflict sufficient damage to deter an aggressor, but no more. The D-5's increased accuracy and reliability vis-a-vis its predecessor provides a greater capability to fulfill both a strategic and tactical role, allowing for a reduced and re-configured arsenal.
Also to be announced as part of the Labor government’s ethical approach to foreign policy, Robertson is expected disclose the number of Britain’s warheads and missiles in addition to their explosive yield. That information is a welcome transparency measure and would be the first time a nuclear power provided details of its atomic stockpile.
By cutting its nuclear arsenal and providing greater transparency of those weapons, the U.K. has taken a significant first step to abide by its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a step the other nuclear powers would be wise to emulate if NPT is to survive over the long term.
The Future of U.S. Forces in Panama
by Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
chellman@cdi.org
The U.S. military presence in Panama, which dates back to 1903, is scheduled to end on December 31, 1999. The United States has been responsible for the security of the Panama Canal since before it opened in 1914. Under the terms of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1997 and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (1979), primary U.S. responsibility for the waterway's safety ends at at the end of 1999. While U.S. military personnel may be permitted to stay, all U.S. military facilities are to close.
Over the past two decades the United States and Panama have gradually transferred control of canal operations to local authorities. Civilian authority has shifted, in planned phases, to Panama, as have employees and operators of the canal. While a physical U.S. military presence in Panama will end, the Treaties preserve U.S. rights to defend the Canal in the event of a crisis.
U.S. military presence in Panama reached its peak during World War II, when nearly 70,000 troops were stationed there. Since 1975 roughly 10,000 U.S. personnel have been stationed in Panama. This number has dwindled over time to about 4,000 currently. The headquarters of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was relocated from Panama City to Miami last September. Southern Command estimates that the U.S. presence in Panama adds $370 million a year to the economy, about 8 percent of that country's gross domestic product.
At times relations between the United States and Panama have been strained. Panamanian nationalists have long resented having U.S. military bases on their soil. In 1964 anti-American riots claimed the lives of two dozen Panamanians. The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, in which several hundred civilians were killed, heightened tensions. Opponents to proposals which might allow a U.S. presence beyond 1999 remain vocal. Yet a poll conducted in March, 1997 by the daily newspaper "La Prensa" indicated that 72% of Panamanians support a continued U.S. presence.
Panamanian and U.S. representatives have been negotiating for two years on maintaining U.S. forces in the region. The negotiations have focused on utilizing an existing facility as a base for hemisphere-wide counter- narcotics operations. Two thousand or more U.S. service personnel would be stationed at the base. In return, Panama has asked that the U.S. government become a tenant at the facility when it reverts to local control, paying rent at what is now a U.S. facility.
Both sides think they would gain from a new arrangement keeping U.S. forces in Panama. The U.S. military would retain its forward bases for the "war on drugs." From Panama's perspective, a continued U.S. presence means a continued, albeit reduced, boon to the economy. Further, it would reassure potential foreign investors about the country's stability.
However, U.S. military leaders quietly grumble about paying for what they already own, particularly in an era of tight fiscal constraints at the Pentagon. Panamanian officials have balked at U.S. proposals to use the facility not only for cooperative multi-national anti-drug operations, but also for unilateral U.S. operations in the region, including humanitarian relief and training exercises. U.S. officials say that they cannot operate the facility cost-effectively without these activities.
Some Panamanian officials also fear that the continued presence of U.S. forces in Panama is merely a disguise for continued U.S. influence in Panama's affairs. Given the size of the proposed U.S. contingent, which greatly exceeds the personnel necessary for counter-narcotic activities, this is not an unreasonable assumption. It certainly appears that the Pentagon is intent on retaining a significant force in the region, treaties notwithstanding.
Interestingly, the security of the Canal itself has played little role in the debate. For Panama, the issues are clearly economic. But this concern is clearly offset by the worry that a continued presence of a large U.S. military contingent will invite political trouble and possibly reignite the political conflict that necessitated the treaties two decades ago.