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| June 11,1998 |
| June 11,1998 |
The U.S. Must Lead By Example
by Andrew Koch, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
akoch@cdi.org
Now that the dust has settled on the nuclear testing sites in India and Pakistan, it is time that the United States end its hypocritical nuclear posture. Changing U.S. nuclear policy away from the current "do as we say, not as we do" posture is vitally important if further proliferation is to be halted.
The interlocking framework of treaties and agreements that have been cobbled together, generally referred to as the non-proliferation regime, is at a crossroads. On the one hand are states that, over the long term, could emulate South Asia’s direct challenge to the non-proliferation regime. The recent tests will undoubtably strengthen the hand of hardliners in states such as North Korea and Iran who may wish to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the United States has an opportunity to demonstrate that India and Pakistan made a serious miscalculation by pursuing expensive weapon systems which detract rather than enhance their security. Fortunately, there is still time to act because the emergence of another new nuclear power is not likely over the short term.
As the chief non-proliferation advocate, the United States has a significant interest in stopping proliferation. Yet, perversely, the United States continues to pursue a hypocritical nuclear policy that encourages others to proliferate. One of several rationales for the Indian tests was to challenge the non-proliferation regime, which New Delhi views as discriminatory. What particularly peeked India’s ire was the fact that the nuclear powers have not adequately fulfilled their obligation to move toward nuclear disarmament as promised under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Policymakers in New Delhi wonder why Washington, Beijing and Moscow should be allowed to retain enormous nuclear arsenals when India, the world’s largest democracy, is denied that right.
In an attempt to discourage other states from seeking the bomb, the Clinton Administration has argued that nuclear weapons are no longer an important determinant of international power or prestige. However, the U.S. has not been willing to support its rhetoric with actions. Now that India and Pakistani have called our bluff, Washington must demonstrate its leadership and take real steps to reduce America’s nuclear stockpile.
The Clinton Administration should move to unilaterally take a portion of our most threatening nuclear weapons, such as MX missiles, off alert status. De-alerting the MX, which is scheduled to be scrapped under the START II treaty in any event, would be a welcome sign to Russia that the U.S. no longer threatens its security. Such a move should be followed by encouraging Russia to de-alert part or all of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the Clinton Administration should take advantage - and sooner rather than later - of Moscow’s willingness to negotiate deep reductions in both side’s nuclear forces. This would greatly enhance America’s security by eliminating thousands of nuclear weapons that could strike the U.S. heartland. Concurrently, it would also send a loud signal that the U.S. is serious about fulfilling its NPT obligations and strengthening the non-proliferation regime.
The entire onus is not on the Clinton Administration, however. The U.S. Senate must also show its wisdom and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Without accession to that treaty, the U.S. is left in a position of criticizing other states for conducting nuclear tests without forswearing that option ourselves.
If the events in South Asia have taught us one lesson, it is that maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert has adversely effected America’s security by encouraging others to seek the bomb, while ironically providing little power to prevent that outcome.
A Farewell to Arms? Not Quite Yet
by Colonel Daniel M. Smith, Director for Operations,
Center for Defense Information
dsmith@cdi.org
Yesterday in Sweden the highly respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released its 1998 Yearbook. Unlike in previous years, however, media interest seemed to be slight; only Reuters, CNN, and the Associated Press mentioned the event on their Internet sites.
Buried in the wire stories are some interesting but not too surprising statistics. Using the "standard" definition of armed conflict as one in which at least 1,000 people were killed during the year, SIPRI determined that in 1997 there were 25 conflicts in the world, a drop of two from 1996. Asia had the most with 9 while Africa was a close second with 8. The 25 conflicts are the lowest number in over a decade and accords closely with a December 1997 count by the Center for Defense Information which listed 21 conflicts.
SIPRI also estimated that world military expenditures continued to drop (albeit slightly), reaching an estimated $740 billion in 1997 - down some one-third from the high water mark of the late 1980s when nations spent over $1.1 trillion, according to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
If that's the "good news" statistically for 1997, so far in 1998 it has largely been downhill again. Consider:
On the positive side, negotiations in Northern Ireland finally produced a breakthrough to a referendum, elections, and a new attempt at power sharing within the province and across the Irish-Northern Ireland border. (However, just how to implement "decommissioning" of weaponry is still an open issue.) On the other side of the world North and South Korea have resumed talks about moving beyond the 45 year old armistice that stopped the fighting on the peninsula.
So where does that leave the world?
It leaves us still spending too much money on military forces in a world where millions still struggle simply to survive. The U.S. alone is spending almost $270 billion, over 36 percent of the world total, and yet 1 in 5 American children lived in poverty in 1996, according to the Children's Defense Fund.
It leaves us still buying and selling, giving away, or recycling too many weapons. New arms sales agreements by the U.S. government in 1997 totaled $8.8 billion with another $11 billion in approved commercial licenses. Actual deliveries from the U.S. to other countries in 1997 came to $19.3 billion, according to the Defense Security Assistance Agency.
It leaves us in a world with over 35,000 nuclear weapons, including those that India and Pakistan may have, with START II still unratified by the Russian Duma, and with ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate in doubt.
It leaves us still very much on the cusp of continued conventional conflict between and within states, continued large scale humanitarian disasters created by war, and more decades living in the long shadow of a nuclear exchange.
Since the world seems incapable of saying "A Farewell to Arms," inevitably it must constantly ask "For Whom the Bell Tolls" - and hope it doesn't toll for us all.
European Union Passes Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers
by Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
rstohl@cdi.org
On May 25th, the European Union (EU) agreed on a Code of Conduct for arms transfers. Spearheaded by the United Kingdom, which currently holds the rotating EU presidency, the Code is a significant step toward restricting future arms trafficking.
Under the Code, EU member states are to consider the eight criteria listed below when determining whether or not to proceed with an arms transfer.
The EU Code of Conduct is not a perfect model and not without problems. Some have criticized the final product for not having strong enough language and settling for the lowest common denominator. They point out that the Code is not a legally binding instrument, merely a declaration of the intentions of EU member countries. A third criticism is that the Code does not provide a common list of arms that will be controlled. Member States will be left to make individual decisions about what arms they regard as falling within the purview of the Code. Additionally, there are no end-use monitoring mechanisms and only limited transparency arrangements for the items that are transferred.
Intended to prevent the most egregious of human rights abusers from getting their hands on deadly weapons, the Code's language seems to many to fall short in forcefully describing human rights criteria. Furthermore, an exporting state contemplating an arms transfer when the prospective recipient had previously been refused similar equipment must only hold bilateral consultations rather than consult with all EU states. This omission could eventually undermine the spirit of transparency and cooperation that the Code seeks to encourage.
Irrespective of these concerns, all parties agree that the Code is a necessary and welcome first step. It is anticipated that future versions of the European Code will strengthen the provisions that many find too imprecise.
Supporters of the Code hope their success with the EU, which has three of the top five arms trading countries, will impart the necessary impetus for world-wide standards for arms transfers.
The ball is now in the court of the United States where the U.S. Code of Conduct again faces an uncertain legislative fate. As the world’s largest arms exporter, the U.S. cannot afford to fall further behind in the international effort to increase transparency and act more responsibly in the sale of arms to other nations.
For further information regarding the EU Code of Conduct, contact The British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Saferworld, Amnesty International, Christian Aid, Oxfam, or the World Development Movement.
Balkan Domino Theory II - Albania
by Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
NATO is accelerating its preparations for possible military action around Kosovo. This Yugoslav province is mired in an increasingly bloody guerilla war. The recent rush in diplomatic activity was prompted by a Serb offensive in which police and military units destroyed entire villages and forced tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians to flee. But as NATO countries in Brussels pondered their options, another compelling reason for urgent action emerged: the Kosovo malaise is spreading to neighboring countries. And the one affected most directly is Albania.
For the most part, Albania has maintained neutrality in the Kosovo conflict, emphasizing the need for a peaceful solution. More recently, however, the government of Prime Minister Fatos Nano has warned that it may switch its support from Kosovar President Ibrahim Rugova, who also favors a peaceful approach to the crisis, to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which leads the guerilla war in the mountains and valleys of Kosovo. In Nano’s words, the existence of "self-defense groups" can no longer be ignored.
There are two primary reasons for this change in position. The fighting in Kosovo is moving ever closer to the Albanian border and threatens to spill over into Albania. There are reports that the northern part of this country is already being used as a training and staging ground for KLA operations.
Serb units have moved to the border in an attempt to stop the flow of arms and men to Kosovo. The Balkan Institute, a non-profit research group in Washington, DC, speculates that Serbia may be preparing to partition Kosovo, an action that would include expelling Albanians from key border regions and roads. Whatever the reason for Serb actions, the Albanian government is becoming nervous. The New York Times quotes Prime Minister Nano as saying, "the Serbs have been manufacturing so-called evidence to say that Albanian territory is being used to launch terrorist attacks...the next step is to enlarge [the Serb buffer zone] under fire, an enlargement that would push the conflict into Albania."
The other reason for the hardening in Albania's stance is domestic politics. Nano has come under increasing pressure from political opponents within Albania to support the KLA. Former president Sali Berisha, leader of the opposition Democratic Party, organized demonstrations in support of the Kosovo Albanians, calling the KLA "a vital necessity." Berisha, who was ousted last year in the chaos following the collapse of large financial pyramid schemes in Albania, has strong support in the north of Albania near the Kosovo border. He is now trying to capitalize on the perceived government failure to support the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovar refugees who fled to Albania. Among other measures, Berisha reportedly has turned over his house to the KLA for use as a military base. Moreover, his supporters are enriching themselves from the sale of arms to Kosovo fighters, thus further strengthening the Berisha camp.
The Albanian diaspora, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, supports the KLA with money and manpower. The Albanian daily Koha Ditore published an appeal from the government of Kosovo in exile calling on all Albanians to contribute to the effort to stave off Serbian aggression. Without specifying how the money is to be spent, and without reference to the Kosovo Liberation Army, the statement asks for contributions ranging from 200 Deutsche Marks (DM) to 1,000 DM, depending on the country of residence. (The KLA conducts its own fundraising and recruitment drives abroad.)
Prime Minister Nano knows that his military is too weak to stop Serb excursions into Albanian territory. Such an action could easily set off a chain of events in Albania that may be outside Nano’s control. A proposed NATO force on the Kosovo border would go far toward stabilizing Albania, but the KLA guerillas in northern Albania oppose such intervention as it would cut the supply lines running from Albania to Kosovo. But the risk of drawing Albania into the war is great and must be dealt with immediately.