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| May 21,1998 |
| May 21,1998 |
India: Building the Bomb
by Andrew Koch, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
akoch@cdi.org
On 11 May 1998, India joined the nuclear club when it simultaneously conducted three nuclear tests at Pokharan in the Rajasthan desert. Code named Operation Shakti1, they were part of a series of five tests held as a joint project of India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
According to the Indian government, the five tests involved: a 12 kiloton (kT) fission device, a 43 kT "thermonuclear [fusion] device," a lowyield device, and two subkiloton devices.
Although U.S. intelligence analysts speculated that the largest test was of a boosted nuclear weapon, the head of India's Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Rajagopal Chidambaram, insisted that New Delhi had tested a thermonuclear bomb. He noted that the yield was deliberately kept low to minimize damage to the surrounding area but that India has the ability to make much larger hydrogen bombs.
That New Delhi can indigenously design and produce the full range of nuclear weapons, from tactical bombs for battlefield use to citybusting thermonuclear warheads, should come as no surprise to the international community. India tested its first nuclear device in 1974 and has developed an enormous nuclear infrastructure since. While India may have relied on foreign technology in the early stages of its weapons program, it now has an "inhouse" capability to design and produce all the components necessary for making nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles which can carry them.
The devices used in the recent tests were designed and developed by personnel from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), where most of the work was carried out. Located near Bombay, BARC is the nervecenter of India's nuclear weapons program. The Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics in Calcutta assisted in the design effort, providing expertise on fusion (thermonuclear) technology and tritium production. The weapons were designed using powerful supercomputers, which India is capable of producing indigenously at the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing in Pune.
The plutonium for the five tests was produced at BARC's 100 megawatt Dhruva research reactor, which began operations in 1985. Dhruva provides the majority of the plutoniumbearing spent fuel for New Delhi's nuclear weapons program, producing up to 1626 kilograms of weaponsgrade plutonium every year. The spent fuel is sent to reprocessing plants at BARC and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research in Kalpakkam to separate out the plutonium. BARC personnel have also developed uranium enrichment technology using ultracentrifuges, and have built two enrichment facilities: an experimentalscale laboratory at BARC that can produce 2 kg of weaponsgrade uranium per year and a larger plant at Rattehalli that can produce 28 kg per year. India has stockpiled enough fissile material to build 80100 nuclear weapons and has the capability to produce much more.
Once the fissile material [plutonium or highly enriched uranium] is extracted, it is converted into metallic form at BARC. BARC has also developed the capability to produce the nonnuclear special materials needed to build advanced atomic bombs, including tritium and beryllium. The Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad has assisted in this effort and can provide some materials and specialized equipment, while the Centre for Advanced Studies in Indore has developed nuclear triggers.
DRDO facilities including the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory and the Defence Research and Development Laboratory in Hyderabad helped fabricate the devices and weaponize them. DRDO personnel provided systems engineering, in addition to producing the detonators, highvolt triggers, and safety locks for command and control. Other DRDO labs provided technology and expertise on aerodynamics, arming, and fusing.
This briefing is derived from a forthcoming Center for Defense Information study on India's nuclear infrastructure. Visit http://www.cdi.org/issues/testing/inbombfct.html for complete text and map.
Time For the B-3?
by Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
chellman@cdi.org
After failing to add funds for procurement of additional B-2 bombers during last year's budget cycle, supporters of the program received what appeared to be the final set-back in efforts to revive the program. On March 20, the congressionally-mandated Long Range Air Power Review Panel concluded its work. The panel, chaired by former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch, was charged with evaluating current planning for U.S. long-range air power and the possible continued production of the B-2. The panel recommended that B-2 funding be focused on improving the performance of the currently planned fleet.
Faced with the negative recommendations from the panel they helped create, congressional supporters of the B-2 finally admitted defeat in their long battle to protect this controversial aircraft.
Or did they?
Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), Chairman of the House National Security military procurement subcommittee and a B-2 supporter, is already pushing a successor aircraft to be fielded in 15 years. Seizing on another recommendation of the Welch panel, which called for the Pentagon to develop a plan to replace the existing force over time, Rep. Hunter has included in this year's Defense Authorization bill language requiring the Air Force to develop a timeline for acquiring a follow-on bomber. The Air Force report, which will also include a list of planned upgrades to the current bomber fleet and their costs, is due March 1, 1999.
According to several accounts, Rep. Hunter's proposal aroused little opposition during the Committee's closed session in which they marked-up the legislation. This was certainly due in part to the departure of Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA), the Committee's highest ranking Democrat and one of the B-2's most severe critics, who retired from the House this past February. The new Ranking Democrat, Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO),is a long-time B-2 supporter the bombers are based in his state as are the majority of his colleagues on the committee.
Similarly, little opposition has been heard from traditional B-2 opponents in the intervening days since the markup was completed. This is surprising, given the possibility that Rep. Hunter's plan is to revive the B-2 in some form while distancing the new program from the intense controversy which surrounded its predecessor. Similar initiatives have led to the F-22 fighter, the New Attack Submarine, and the Joint Strike Fighter, each of which has arisen from the ashes of an earlier program which had run into political trouble due to technical or cost problems.
One would expect that the loudest questions would be coming from the Air Force. Like the other services, the Air Force already has more demands on its future procurement budgets than it has funding. This was the root cause of the service's opposition to purchasing additional B-2s, which Air Force officials feared would squeeze out higher priority programs in the competition for scarce Pentagon dollars. The service should realize that their funding mismatch will only get worse as big-ticket items like the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter go into production over the next decade. The last thing the Air Force needs is another bomber to further aggravate their approaching budgetary shortfall.
For last year's congressional action on the B-2, see http://www.cdi.org/weekly/1997/Issue11-#3 or visit http://www.house.gov/nsc/4-01-98welch.htm to see a publicly released version of the Long Range Air Power Review Panel's recommendations.
GUAM’s Potential Outside of the CIS
by Jared Feinberg, Scoville Fellow, Center for Defense Information
jfeinber@cdi.org
As the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) continues to stagnate, member states have been coalescing into smaller groupings. For example, there is the Russian-Belarus Union as well as the CIS Customs Union which groups these two states with Kyrgyzstan and Kazazkstan. Over the past year, however, it is the foursome of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) which has begun to attract the greatest interest of observers in the region.
GUAM is neither a formal nor an informal regional organization as of yet. The four governments refer to GUAM as a grouping of "common interests," albeit very real military and strategic ones: Caspian oil and internal conflicts. In fact, GUAM appears to be the first sub-CIS group whose participants have genuine shared interests that can be the foundation for an effective regional organization in the future.
All four states perceive a common threat from Russian involvement in their own internal conflicts. In Georgia, Russia fomented Abkhaz separatism, and Russian troops are now stationed on Georgian soil. Ukraine is under constant pressure from Russia over the Crimea. Azerbaijan holds Russia responsible for supporting Armenia with over $1 billion in military supplies and arms during the conflict with Nargorno-Karabakh. Moldova also holds Russia responsible for the conflict in Transdniester which involved the Russian 14th Army.
Caspian oil may be the issue that makes or breaks GUAM as an organization. Azerbaijan is prepared to transport its oil west via Ukraine and possibly Moldova as well. Moldova also has a large need for the crude oil and petroleum products that Azerbaijan can provide. The final location of energy transportation corridors to the West will greatly affect whether these states perceive their interests as common.
In October 1997, at the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg, the presidents of the four states signed a communique creating GUAM. They also outlined GUAM's priorities: fighting separatism and regional conflicts; development of Eurasian and Transcaucasus corridors; and integration into Euro-Atlantic and Atlantic structures. A second meeting in Baku in late November ended with the Deputy Foreign Minsters of the four states signing numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements on energy, transport and communication corridors. Azerbaijan's Foreign Minster Hasan Hasanov also raised the potential for closer military cooperation among the four states and with NATO through a "16+4" principle". "Holding quadripartite consultations will make a great contribution to strengthening security and cooperation in Europe, and in the region in particular," Hasanov stated.
Russian reaction to the GUAM group has been mixed. The Chairman of the Russia State Duma Committee on International Affairs, Vladimir Lukin, appeared displeased by the initiative and its potential for economic gains in the future. He stated that GUAM is an artificially created organization whose goal is to upset Russia. Federation Council Chairman Fedor Stroev, however, stated that GUAM represents no threat to Russia’s interests or those of the CIS.
Due to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia finds itself outside of GUAM. Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesman Arsen Gasparyan stressed that Armenia had normal relations with the other three states and did not perceive GUAM to be oriented against any one state. Still, if GUAM were to begin cooperative security or peacekeeping activities, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia could have strategic implications for the Southern Caucasus. One potential scenario is that a reignited Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would lead to a Russia-Armenian bloc opposed to the GUAM group. (Russia and Armenia signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in August 1997.)
In fact, on May 7, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that the presidents of the four GUAM states had decided to form a joint peace-making battalion in response to an initiative of the United Nations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Kuzmuk stated that a composite battalion of 400-450 troops could be created with each national component domestically based and funded. GUAM is meeting this week to discuss this idea and others further.
On the economic front, several of the agreements signed in Baku could have been undertaken within the domain of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) forum to which all four GUAM states and Russia belong. That GUAM exists at all clearly illustrates how important it is to these states to bypass Russia in their policy-making process, specifically in the area of energy. GUAM is also the first regional organization of former Soviet states from which Russia has been excluded. The continued apprehension about Russian motives in the region, along with the ineptness of the CIS, raises the real possibility that more regional groups like GUAM may emerge and change the geopolitical landscape of the former-Soviet states.
Beyond India’s Nuclear Tests: Stopping Small Arms Proliferation
by Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
rstohl@cdi.org
The world was shocked and outraged this week by India’s decision to conduct five nuclear tests. Foreign policy experts took to the airwaves to address the damage to the non-proliferation regime and the renewal of a global nuclear threat. The diplomatic protests by many governments, while welcome, generally were not backed up by more stringent measures except the sanctions mandated by U.S. law. Although governments have known that India had nuclear capabilities, it was most unexpected that they would choose to prove it so dramatically and with apparent disregard for world opinion.
On the subcontinent itself, Indo-Pakistani relations, strained for decades, had been showing signs of improving before the recent Indian election. Now the relationship has reverted to a more ominous and uncertain status even though the chances of nuclear weapons actually being used in the region still remains quite low.
But the new conditions raised by India's nuclear test should not mask the presence and the effects of another deadly killer: small arms and light weapons. In the decades of fighting that has raged between India and Pakistan, not one death or injury has been the result of nuclear weapons. Rather, deaths from the communal and regional violence that plagues India and Pakistan are from the "conventional" weapons that have been allowed to flow unimpeded throughout the region, exacerbating the violence. And while the U.S. has been one of the nations supplying these weapons, the real "grim reaper" in these conflicts has been the AK-47.
Assault rifles like the AK-47 are used in every conflict around the world. Because these weapons are relatively inexpensive, lightweight, easy to smuggle, and are recycled from one conflict to another, their destructive effects are multiplied. Experts estimate that since 1990, 84% of the deaths associated with wars were civilians. The vast majority of fatalities have been caused by light weapons and small arms which, overall, are responsible for 90% of all casualties. In just the Kashmiri flashpoint between India and Pakistan, over 20, 000 people have been killed in the past two decades, most by light weapons (again, chiefly AK-47s) that Cold War international politics funneled into South Asia.
India’s nuclear tests are newsworthy, significant, and cannot be ignored. Their effects will continue to reverberate for some time to come. However, the international community should not concentrate its attention on the nuclear issues to the extent that it forgets about the flow of small arms and light weapons to South Asia. Since the successful conclusion of the landmines campaign, momentum towards the development of a campaign to control the proliferation and unlawful use of small arms and light weapons has intensified. This work must continue to receive the support of international organizations and of nations. The thousands killed annually, after all, are a persuasive argument that small arms themselves are weapons of mass destruction. The only difference is it takes longer to wreak their havoc.
Yugoslavia: A House on Fire
by Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
Ethnic Albanian fighters in Kosovo received unexpected help in their guerilla war against the Yugoslav army and police, courtesy of the smaller of the two Yugoslav republics, Montenegro.
At the outset, one thing must be clear: Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic has not decided to join the Kosovars, no matter what the Serbian propaganda machine claims. But Djukanovic’s showdown with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has escalated to the point of a fullblown political conflict which threatens to destroy the Yugoslav Federation (as predicted in CDI Weekly, April 23). Milosevic now has two crises on his hands - Kosovo and Montenegro - and, on the top of that, the future of his presidential seat is uncertain.
The latest round of tensions began on May 18 when the Yugoslav federal parliament ousted Prime Minister Radoje Kontic in a noconfidence vote. The lawmakers named another Montenegrin, Momir Bulatovic, in his place. (Under the Yugoslav constitution, the offices of the President and the Prime Minister are split between the two republics. The President, Milosevic, is a Serb). Bulatovic is a familiar face in Yugoslav politics - he was the proMilosevic candidate who lost to Djukanovic in the October 1997 presidential elections. In getting the Yugoslav parliament to name Bulatovic as prime minister, Milosevic seems to be trying to boost the chances of his supporters in Montenegro less than two weeks before parliamentary elections there.
This week’s "coup" could mark the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. The fault lines are forming - the republican parliament in Montenegro refused to recognize Kontic’s ouster on constitutional grounds. It claims that mandates of the Montenegrin proMilosevic deputies who voted for Bulatovic had been withdrawn prior to the ouster and, therefore, their votes were invalid. Djukanovic called the federal parliament’s move "an act of breaking up Yugoslavia."
Montenegro has the potential to become a more serious problem for Milosevic than Kosovo. While Kosovo represents a secessionist attempt far from Belgrade, Djukanovic is directly challenging the president’s hold on power. If Djukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) wins the Montenegrin elections, he will be in a position to attack or block Milosevic’s policies in the federal parliament. In fact, Svetozar Marovic, speaker of the Montenegrin parliament, promised to oust Milosevic if DPS wins enough votes. If Bulatovic, from his new post of Yugoslav Prime Minister, tries to sabotage either the voting or implementation of the election results, Montenegro may secede and thus destroy the Yugoslav Federation. Milosevic’s post as federal president would thus become superfluous.
One must wonder at the timing of Milosevic’s decision to force a showdown with Montenegro. Media reports speculated that Milosevic may have counted on Kosovo to occupy the world’s attention. In reality, Kosovo may be turn out to be a critical obstacle to rather than a catalyst for solving the Montenegro problem. Thousands of troops of the Yugoslav army are tied down in Kosovo, where the guerilla war shows every sign of intensifying. By some estimates, the radical Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) now controls 40 percent of the territory of Kosovo. The Yugoslav troops are bogged down in what promises to be a lengthy conflict. This removes Milosevic’s flexibility to use troops in Montenegro. It is doubtful that the Yugoslav force of roughly 140,000 army and police troops can handle two conflicts simultaneously.
While Montenegro temporarily took Milosevic’s attention away from Kosovo, recent events could have mixed results for the rebelling Albanians. With Belgrade's attention temporarily on Montenegro, further escalation of the Kosovo conflict is quite possible. Future separation or partition seems inevitable as the positions of Serbs and Kosovo Albanians appear irreconcilable. The KLA, financed by Albanian diaspora in Europe and in America, has grown into a large enough force to make a permanent Serb presence unbearable and unaffordable. Milosevic may therefore opt for a quick solution to the Kosovo conflict, launching a destructive offensive before withdrawing most troops for potential use in Montenegro - if time permits. The elections in Montenegro are a mere 10 days away.