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| May 14,1998 |
| May 14,1998 |
Beyond Nuclear Non-proliferation: Considering Illicit Weapons Trafficking at the G8 Summit
by Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
rstohl@cdi.org
The G8 Summit, being held in Birmingham, UK on May 15-17, has several peace and security items on its agenda. With India conducting five nuclear tests this week, talks on nuclear non-proliferation are sure to dominate the arms control agenda.
However, for the first time, a G-8 Summit will also address the illicit trade in light weapons as part of its transnational organized crime agenda. The decision to include illicit weapons trafficking is crucial for small arms control because of the participation in the summit of the leading arms producer and supplier nations - those responsible for almost 90% of the world’s arms exports.
The Summit discussion comes on the heels of a UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting held in Vienna earlier in the month. At the Vienna meeting, the G8 states strongly supported the creation of an international body to address the illegal trade in firearms.
The G8 states seek to adopt a legally binding global convention to combat weapons trafficking by tracking and controlling firearms imports, exports, and transfers. Recognizing that it is primarily small arms and light weapons which contribute to increasing crime and global conflict, and that approximately 90% of all casualties in global conflicts are caused by small arms and light weapons, the G8 has made a new commitment to light weapons control.
Small arms control has been gaining momentum in recent months. In addition to the ECOSOC meeting, the G8 states are expected to also draw upon recent initiatives concerning the proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons. The Organization of American States (OAS) agreed on a Convention on Illicit Firearms Trafficking in November 1997. The Convention seeks to "prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms." The proposed global action will undoubtedly focus on the language and principles of the OAS Convention.
Legal arms sales should also be discussed when addressing the illicit traffic of light weapons. Including proposed Codes of Conduct (in the United States, the European Union, and amongst the international community) in the debate surrounding illicit trafficking is essential to providing a well-rounded view of the global arms trade. In terms of the importance to global peace and security, the world dare not underestimate the negative consequences of various legal arms sales nor understate the responsibility of the international community to control this flow of weapons.
The global convention supported at the Summit will primarily address criminal activities and uses of light weapons. Ironically, even with trials before International Courts for crimes such as ethnic cleansing and genocide, warfare still is not considered "criminal" activity and will not be a topic in these discussions. Yet because illicit light weapons fuel so much "non-criminal" conflict, it is essential that the G8 states at least consider applying the principles for controlling light weapons trafficking as they relate to crime to weapons flows that create or sustain "general" conflict situations.
Build-ups of light weapons in areas with, at best, only tenuous "peace" can have catastrophic destabilizing effects. Without transparency of light weapons and other arms transfers, the probability of conflict and violence increases substantially.
Fork in the Road for Franjo Tudjman
by Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
On May 4 Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak died of cancer. Susak, who spent 22 years in exile in Canada before returning to build and lead the Croatian defense forces, was eulogized by top U.S. officials.
Known for his no-nonsense approach, Susak was the U.S. government’s "contact" in Croatia. The former Yugoslav republic relied on assistance from a team of U.S. specialists in rebuilding its military in the aftermath of the disastrous war of secession in 1991. In 1995, Croatia reconquered most of the territory it lost to Serbs in a swift attack, one carried out allegedly with advice from the U.S.
Susak proved extremely useful to American efforts to strengthen Croatia’s independence and thus serve as a counterbalance to Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. But Croatia, more specifically the Herzeg-Bosnian faction in Zagreb which Susak headed, proved to be an equally frustrating partner in implementing the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia.
Under the agreement, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats joined forces in a federation whose purpose was to deter the territorial aspirations of Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity in Bosnia. But the commitment of the Bosnian Croats to the federation proved doubtful at best. The Croat and Muslim forces fought each other on numerous occasions during the war. As Bosnia began rapidly disintegrating under the onslaught of Serbian forces, Croats also attempted to carve out as much territory as possible for themselves. Although they were later compelled to join the Bosnian Federation government, the Bosnian Croats apparently never relinquished the dream of a separate Herzeg-Bosnia Republic or possible unification with Croatia proper. This past week the Western representative in Bosnia, Carlos Westendorp, had to remind the Croats to stop the activities of the Herzeg-Bosnia "government," which should have disbanded under a 1996 agreement.
The Bosnian Croats’ secessionist efforts receive support from the government of Croatia proper. Herzegovinians - Croats from the territory of Bosnia - occupy powerful and prominent positions in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. Gojko Susak, himself a native of Herzegovina, helped bring President Tudjman to power and was a powerful influence on the authoritarian president. Davor Gjenero, a Balkan political analyst, said in an interview with Reuters that "the Herzegovinians have become uncontrollable - there is no one to stop them."
The efforts of the Croat secessionists in Bosnia did produce results. President Tudjman began hinting that Croatia should be "restored" to its historic borders: i.e., take over Croat territories in Bosnia.. During a speech at a conference of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) on March 21, Tudjman said, "[previous governments] agreed to border changes which were detrimental to Croatia. They...gave up the idea that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be part of Croatia..." And in a reference to Croatia’s historic borders (encompassing today’s Bosnia), Tudjman proclaimed, "...we are returning to where King Tomislav came from."
The speech immediately drew fire from the West. The reaction from the United States, which engineered the Dayton Agreement, was understandably strong. U.S. Special Representative in the Balkans Robert Gelbard said that Tudjman used "dangerous expressions that show obvious hegemonic intentions for Bosnia." HDZ representatives shot back, saying of Gelbard that "a civilian servant, albeit of the United States, has no right in slapping the wrists of a president of a sovereign nation in that manner."
The European Union (EU) also weighed in. Membership in the EU is officially one of the highest foreign policy priorities for Croatia, which gives Brussels some leverage over Zagreb’s actions. The EU responded by threatening to put Croatia’s integration on hold. "Croatia’s performance [in upholding the Dayton agreement] will be a key factor in the development of closer relations between Croatia and the European Union," read a statement from Brussels.
Tudjman has to make hard decisions about whether to cater to the nationalist radicals in Croatia or seriously pursue integration into the European Union and NATO. The list of complaints about his government is long, from persecution of political opponents and attempts to control the media to inciting nationalism. There is little doubt that Susak’s faction in the Zagreb government has led Croatia astray from its international obligations and aspirations. Gojko Susak himself was described as a "voice of moderation" in the faction, the force who was able to reign in the radicals when necessary. (Diplomats say that Susak was also instrumental in turning in alleged Croat war crimes perpetrators to the tribunal in the Hague.)
His death may have a paradoxical effect on the Croat government. While his disappearance from the scene may allow increased radicalization of the Herzegovinian faction, his death may well reduce the faction's influence by reducing its access to the highest ruling circles in Zagreb. This, in turn, could reduce the importance of the whole Herzeg-Bosnia issue.
Perhaps Tudjman will realize he has an opportunity to seize the higher diplomatic ground and bring his policies in line with the obligations he has made to the international community.
Security Hinders Cooperation in Central Asia: the Economic Cooperation Organization
by Jared Feinberg, Scoville Fellow, Center for Defense Information
jfeinber@cdi.org
At the end of their two day summit, the leaders of the 10 Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) member states issued the Almaty declaration outlining new cooperative measures among their countries.
A memorandum of understanding on customs will aid the states in combating narcotics trafficking and other contraband trade across their borders. A transport agreement is intended to facilitate rail and road travel among the states. One specific provision calls for easing visa procedures for businessman. An ECO educational institute for the region was outlined in a third document. All of the member states signed the agreements except Uzbekistan.
This summit was the fifth ECO summit since 1992, when the five Soviet Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan - along with Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, began to join the existing ECO. ECO, initiated in 1985, began as a cooperative forum of the non-Arab Muslim states of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. (In 1964, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey had formed the Regional Cooperation for Development that later became ECO.) ECO now includes 10 states with a population of 300 million situated over 7 million square kilometers.
While ECO strives to be a regional forum enhancing economic cooperation, the current political debate over oil and gas transport routes has interrupted this integration. The Central Asian states are currently deciding on which transport routes from the Caspian Sea to select for their gas and oil destined for Western markets. United States business investment is necessary to develop these transport routes, one of which - through Iran - appears to be the most economical. The United States' Iran Lybia Sanctions Act (ILSA), however, prohibits U.S. firms from investing in Iran. The Central Asian states therefore face the dilemma of having to choose between needed U.S. investment or the potentially more profitable transit routes through Iran. Seeking to offset U.S. pressure, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami has stressed the member states’ common cultural heritage: "Our political and economic decisions should conform to the same cultural identity."
As long as the United States maintains ILSA, efficient economic integration within ECO will be severely hampered as the member states wrestle with the unavoidable melange of politics and economics the law unleashes.
In terms of regional integration, and hence stability and security, ECO has a potentially large role to play in improving the transit infrastructure among its member states. Currently, overland routes such as rail and highways are limited. This situation significantly limits the potential for economic trade and transit across the ECO states' territories. New rail and road projects hold the promise of increased flow of goods and better communications across borders, thereby facilitating integration of the entire area. Other aspects of ECO that could facilitate integration include the establishment of a secretariat, a framework for a trade and development bank, and a reinsurance company.
However, the continuing civil war in Afghanistan (Afghanistan was represented at the summit by ousted President Burhanuddin Rabbani), the instability of Tajikistan, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan work against ECO’s ability to take concrete steps towards integration. Agreements from past summits have rarely been implemented, reducing ECO to little more than a consultative forum. The Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, has stated that none of these agreements can be implemented until peace and stability have been attained in the region.
The interplay between stability and further economic cooperation was most clearly enunciated by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawas Sharif: "The link between peace and growth is undeniable. Our efforts at socio-economic development of our region will be self-defeating in the absence of peace and security."
ECO, once lauded by the Central Asian states, now appears to be stagnant, unable to overcome political differences and conflict. Nonetheless, while seemingly incapable of actually implementing many of the initiatives discussed and signed, ECO does play a constructive role. As Turkish President Suleyman Demirel observed, "ECO summits give us the opportunity to hold bilateral meetings with the leaders of friendly countries." The value of such exchanges was recently illustrated by a series of briefings by Pakistani officials on Pakistan’s relationship with India as well as its peace efforts in Afghanistan.
The next summit is scheduled for 2000 in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. Whether it will achieve better results than the preceding five may well depend as much on the state of U.S.-Iranian relations in 2000 as on the ability of the 10 ECO member states to resolve individually and collectively the turmoil that currently afflicts the region.