
| August 6,1998 |
The United States is Isolating Itself by Rejecting International Treaties
Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.), Deputy Director,
Center for Defense Information
ecarroll@cdi.org
Once again the United States has worked vigorously, and with considerable success, to shape the terms of an international treaty, only to reject the final product because we did not get our way on every issue.
This time our negotiations were on the provisions for an International Criminal Court (ICC). In the early phases of this initiative the United States was a leading proponent of a permanent international tribunal which would have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In effect, we were working to create a permanent successor to the Nuremberg Tribunal and obviate the need for ad hoc arrangements for special bodies such as the one now sitting in the Hague to consider crimes committed during the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.
Unfortunately, our efforts were directed toward creating a Tribunal which would remain firmly under the control of the U.N. Security Council where we could exercise a U.S. veto if the ICC moved to act in a way we considered inimical to U.S. interests. During increasingly acrimonious deliberations in Rome in June and July, U.S. insistence on retaining a means for the United States to deny jurisdiction to the ICC created a storm of criticism of the U.S. position by even our closest friends and allies. The final vote in Rome last month on a charter for the ICC was 1207 against the U.S. position. Even worse than the crushing defeat is that we found America voting with nations such as Iraq, Libya and Yemen, radical states little noted for their devotion to human rights and the rule of law.
Now it appears certain that the overwhelming majority of the world’s democracies will become participating members of an effort initiated by the United States to expand the rule of law within the world community. It is sadly ironic that the world’s leading democracy has chosen to exclude itself from this initiative. It is even more disheartening that this is far from the only effort to establish more just and peaceful international norms to which the United States refuses to accede.
The starkest example of U.S. isolation is the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty. This extremely valuable convention came into being with powerful, effective U.S. leadership and meets every significant U.S. security requirement. One hundred twenty four nations have acceded to the Treaty and it will come into force on November 22 this year whether or not America ratifies it. If Senator Helms continues to refuse to permit the Senate to advise and consent to ratification before that date, the United States will be denied its rightful role in implementing the terms of the Treaty. We will be excluded from the bodies which will administer application of its provisions. This can only have adverse effects on our legitimate economic and security interests in the future.
Other international agreements which the United States has yet to ratify are the Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Ottawa AntiPersonnel Land Mine Treaty. The first of these three is absolutely critical to efforts to control future proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is strong public support in America for the Test Ban Treaty and it seems Senate approval is certain if the members are permitted to vote. Regrettably, Senator Helms has refused for 10 months to hold hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Treaty in order to prevent a vote by all Senators.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 has been signed by 191 nations. Only Somalia and the United States have not. This basic and humane declaration that the children of the world have certain inalienable rights sets forth standards which are American to the core. Nevertheless, there seems to be an instinctive U.S. rejection on the grounds that other nations have no right to prescribe the rights of our children. Another sticking point is the current effort by signatories to raise the minimum age for military service from 15 to 18, to which the Pentagon is adamantly opposed.
The Ottawa convention outlawing antipersonnel land mines is also strongly opposed by the Pentagon. President Clinton has conceded that at some date in the future we will consider adhering to the Treaty but first we must find military alternatives to these indiscriminate killers of soldiers and innocent civilians alike. Meanwhile, we ignore the fact that more than 120 nations are already committed to the ban while we stand in opposition with such nations as China, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Congo and Cuba.
The single theme which drives the United States to reject multilateral efforts to make the world a safer place to live under the rule of law is the claim that each agreement represents a threat to our national sovereignty. Our leaders seem to believe that as the world’s most powerful nation we alone are empowered to proclaim and enforce American standards and judgments anywhere in the world. Treaty opponents, most notably Senator Jesse Helms, argue that efforts to create and apply rules by global consensus will infringe upon or limit the freedom of the United States to act independently to promote U.S. interests politically, economically or militarily.
This chauvinistic reliance on American power in the face of the growing willingness of a large majority of nations to adopt global norms is isolating the United States. It may seem today that we are willing and able to pay the price to stand alone and reject world opinion, but the vote in Rome of 1207 against the United States is one more ominous harbinger of dangers ahead. The day will come when our security and wellbeing as a nation will best be served by participating constructively in a cooperative world community under the rule of law. The option of standing alone as the world’s only superpower will, sooner or later, no longer be affordable or possible.
Code of Conduct Receives Increased Attention
By Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
rstohl@cdi.org
The Code of Conduct debate has taken an interesting turn in this year’s congressional session. Traditionally, support for the Code of Conduct has been led by Representatives Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) (see Weekly Defense Monitor issue #18). However, this session, Representative Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) has introduced the International Arms Sales Code of Conduct, which some see as undermining the McKinney- Rohrabacher effort.
Although both bills attempt to prevent arms transfers to undemocratic and abusive countries, unlike the McKinney-Rohrabacher Code, the Gejdenson version attempts only to regulate arms transfers on an international level within the Wassenaar Arrangement countries. Instead of the four criteria in the McKinney-Rohrabacher version, which addresses a domestic Code of Conduct, the Gejdenson legislation attempts to put the Code framework into the international arena. Gejdenson’s International Code would have three provisions - arms sales would be prohibited to countries that 1) do not respect democratic processes and the rule of law, 2) do not adhere to internationally recognized norms on human rights, and 3) are engaged in acts of armed aggression. Furthermore, the Gejdenson Code would direct the President to work on negotiating an international agreement on arms transfers.
Simply stated, the Gejdenson Code uses the Wassenaar Arrangement as the point of reference for the Code, not U.S. domestic policy decisions. Senator John Kerry (D-MA), sponsor of the original version of the Code in the Senate and Representative McKinney were quoted as saying, "As Members of Congress...we believe it is important that our own government act responsibly, and apply the standards of the Code of Conduct on its own activities, no matter what other countries may do." The Gejdenson version would only regulate arm sales on an international level and would not force changes in U.S. domestic and foreign policy, an approach that concerns many supporters of the McKinney-Rohrabacher Code.
Critics of the Gejdenson Code argue that introducing this new legislation weakens the McKinney-Rohrabacher version. The McKinney-Rohrabacher Code has been seen as the only mechanism which could lead to reforms in current U.S. arms trade policy and could lead to genuine progress toward international arms export control norms. Believing that U.S. unilateral action on restraining the arms trade is essential to create any international momentum and that the Gejdenson Code’s enforcement mechanism is too narrow (through the Wassenaar Arrangement), concerned non- governmental organizations sent a letter to members of congress last week appealing for unified support for the McKinney-Rohrabacher Code.
While the U.S. remains uncommitted to a Code of Conduct, Europe continues to move forward. Members of the European Union successfully negotiated a Code of Conduct earlier this year, and according to news reports thirteen non-EU countries have also "aligned themselves to the criteria and principles contained in the Code, which will guide them in their national export and control policies." The announcement of the thirteen countries, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, eleven of which are attempting to gain EU membership, was welcomed by the EU members.
The participation of these non-EU member states is a dramatic step for the code process. One of the biggest arguments against a U.S. Code of Conduct, "if we don’t sell the weapons, someone else will," has become increasingly untrue and irrelevant. More and more countries are joining the list of those committed to preventing a free flowing marketplace of deadly weapons, yet he U.S. continues to lag behind the rest of the world in pushing forward the idea of a Code of Conduct. Progress in establishing a Code of Conduct binding to the United States is a necessary next step. If the United States is unable to take the lead now, the country will remain a step behind the rest of the world in protecting innocent civilians from heavily armed dictatorial regimes.
Cyprus: Countdown to Crisis
by Andrew Koch, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
akoch@cdi.org
The likelihood that a "hot" conflict could erupt over the disputed island of Cyprus has increased over the past year, due in part to the intransigent postures of the Greek and Turkish governments. The island has been divided between the heavy armed Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides since 1974. While the United States and the European Union are involved in a full-scale effort to negotiate a settlement to that long-standing dispute, a provision in the annual Pentagon spending legislation threatens to reward Athens and Ankara for their bad behavior. At issue is a section of the Fiscal year 1999 Defense Appropriations Act that would authorize the U.S. Secretary of the Navy to transfer abroad 48 Navy ships classified as "surplus," including 14 vessels to Turkey and 11 to Greece.
What makes the proposed transfers especially troublesome is the offensive power projection capabilities of these ships, which include Knox- and Perry-class frigates and Adams- and KIDD-class guided missile destroyers. Both Greece and Turkey have a history of conflict over issues such as maritime boundaries in the Aegean Sea, mineral rights, and Cyprus. With tensions between the two NATO allies already rising, providing sophisticated military equipment that can help both sides project power into controversial areas appears a dangerous proposition.
The most immediate catalyst for causing further trouble is the Greek Cypriot government’s controversial purchase of a sophisticated S-300 air defense system from Russia. Turkey has said that it will use "any means available, including military power" to prevent Moscow from delivering the S-300s to the island. The missiles are scheduled to be delivered by the Russian Navy’s Atlantic Squadron in October or November of this year.
Although prospects for a quick settlement look bleak, the U.S. had started the year hoping that progress could be made on resolving the Cyprus conflict. The American strategy was to work with the European Union to offer the possibility of membership as an incentive for both Nicosia and Ankara to compromise. Turkish relations with the E.U. have steadily deteriorated, however, following the E.U. summit in Cardiff. At that summit E.U. member states failed to recognize Turkey as an official candidate for eventual membership.
Last week, Turkish-E.U. relations sank lower yet when Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz’s quipped that the E.U. had been "deliberately misleading" Turkey "for years" about its membership chances. Ankara is particularly incensed that its membership chances are fading while membership negotiations between the E.U. and the Greek Cypriot government have proceeded apace. In response, Turkish officials have threatened to integrate into Turkey proper the territory of North Cyprus currently under their military control.
Given the apparent stalemate in negotiations, why would the U.S. supply addition fuel to the already tense regional situation in the Aegean? Congressional supporters of the bill noted that the sales would raise over $600 million in revenue, revenue which would be added to what they view as an underfunded U.S. military budget. The central question, however, is whether exacerbating the unsteady military relationship between two NATO allies is worth $600 million.
United States Signs New Agreements to Reduce the Nuclear Danger
Laura Payne, Research Intern, Center for Defense Information
lpayne@cdi.org
Last week the United States, Russia, and former Soviet republics of Kazakstan and the Ukraine signed several preliminary agreements which will help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and aid these countries in fulfilling their obligations under the Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty and other arms control agreements.
Vice President Al Gore and Russia’s new Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko on July 24 signed two preliminary agreements which are designed to safeguard Russia’s plutonium stockpile and find new jobs for scientists working in the defense industry.
The first agreement, the Management of Used Plutonium Agreement, provides $1 billion in the upcoming five to six years to convert 50 tons of plutonium from nuclear weapons in both countries into fuel for civilian nuclear power plants. According to U.S. officials, the plutonium involved in this initiative would be enough to manufacture 10,000 warheads.
In the second agreement, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, the United States pledges an initial $3.1 million to Russia to help scientists in its closed nuclear research cities to transit to civilian jobs. Today these scientists earn approximately only $175 a month and pay is sporadic. On July 23 at the closed city of Sarov, formerly called Arzamas-16, where most of this initiative’s efforts will be directed, there was a three hour strike by workers over wage arrears. There are approximately 125,000 Russians working in nuclear research and atomic power plants. Without regular pay, it is feared some these scientists may seek employment elsewhere, possibly defecting to countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, which are seeking to develop their own nuclear capabilities.
Another set of agreements announced on July 28 amend the Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Agreements with Russia, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. CTR, also called the Nunn-Lugar program, was created in 1991 and has evolved to encompass several goals: the destruction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the former Soviet Union; the safe transportation of these weapons from deployment sites to areas where they will be dismantled; and the creation of safeguards against proliferation and the spread of the scientific knowledge which built the Soviet nuclear arsenal.
Under the latest CTR agreements the United States has earmarked an additional $127.9 million for Russia, $76.7 million for Ukraine, and $300,000 for Kazakstan. The aid to Russia will be used to dispose of a variety of nuclear weapons delivery systems, to modify plutonium-producing reactors, and to procure fissile material containers. New funding to Ukraine will be used to eliminate SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs. Aid to Kazakstan will cover logistical support for communications-related facilities.
Thanks in large part to the CTR program, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan are no longer nuclear powers. The program’s highest profile achievement is "Project Sapphire." During this 1994 operation, the United States airlifted 1,300 pounds of poorly guarded weapons-grade uranium out of Kazakstan. Other high profile achievements include the US purchase of Moldova’s twenty-one MiG-29 aircraft and 500 Soviet-made air-to-air missiles in November of 1997 and the April 1998 "Operation Auburn Endeavor" which removed five kilograms of uranium, enough for one nuclear weapon, from Georgia to the United Kingdom for permanent storage.
Initially the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and similar initiatives were heavily criticized in Congress, by members who traditionally oppose U.S. foreign aid programs, or others who felt that it was an inappropriate use of taxpayer dollars to assist our former enemies. Over time, however, the successes of these programs in reducing the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, promoting international stability, and preserving U.S. national security have made such initiatives an important part of U.S. policy.