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| July 2,1998 |
| July 2,1998 |
House and Senate Move Pentagon Spending Bills
by Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
chellman@cdi.org
Last week both the House and Senate continued work on the Pentagon's annual funding legislation. On June 25 the Senate adopted the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 by a vote of 88 to 4. The House, which passed its authorization bill on May 21, adopted the Defense Appropriations Act on June 24 on a 358 to 61 vote.
The Senate bill authorizes $271 billion, virtually the same amount as requested by the Clinton Administration and authorized by the House.
Bosnia and base closures were two of the central issues in the Senate debate. The Senate adopted an amendment by Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, expressing the Senate's view that U.S. troops not be committed to Bosnia indefinitely and urging the Administration to consult with our NATO allies so that U.S. troops can be withdrawn in a "reasonable" time. The Senate defeated an amendment by Senator Bob Smith (R-NH) that would have required a withdrawal of U.S. troops by March 31, 1999 unless Congress specifically authorized a further deployment.
Like the House, the Senate refused to include language sought by the Administration authorizing two additional rounds of base closures. In fact, the Senate made it more difficult for the Pentagon to close unwanted facilities. Senators adopted an amendment offered by Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) expressing congressional opposition to the proposed additional closures. It also lowered the threshold for bases which the Pentagon can close without Congressional approval from those which employ more than 300 civilian employees to those with more than 225 civilians. The amendment also imposes a four-year moratorium on closing any base that has been "realigned," that is, had its mission changed.
Administration officials have already indicated that President Clinton is considering vetoing the legislation if any language that restricts base closures is included when Congress sends the final bill to the White House.
Other highlights of the Senate's action:
Meanwhile the House adopted legislation appropriating $250.3 billion for the Defense Department. This legislation, combined with separate appropriations for military construction and military activities of the Department of Energy, will provide roughly $266 billion in Pentagon spending during FY'99.
Bosnia was again a central issue as the House failed to fund the Administration's $1.9 billion request for operations there during FY'99. When the federal budget was released in February the Administration indicated that it would seek to have funding for Bosnia classified as an emergency so that it would not count towards the Pentagon's annual spending cap. Following the Administration's lead the House, many of whose members are alarmed by the effect Bosnia funding is having on overall military spending, opted to delay a decision on how fund continued operations. Congressional leaders of both parties agree, however, that funding will have to be found sometime in the next few months.
The House also adopted language that would restrict the President's power to conduct military operations. The amendment, offered by Representative David Skaggs (D-CO), would prohibit the use of any appropriated funds for offensive military operations without specific congressional approval. Administration officials are also expected to recommend a Presidential veto of this legislation if it contains such language.
As usual, it was what was added to the bill that raised the most eyebrows.
The legislation, as adopted, included $431 million in unrequested funds for the purchase of 6 C-130J cargo aircraft, which are manufactured in House Speaker Newt Gingrich's home district in Georgia. An additional $50 million was included for long-lead procurement of a $1.5 billion LHD-8 landing assault ship which will be constructed in Mississippi, home state of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott.
For highlights of the House National Security Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, see http//www.cdi.org/weekly/issue21.html#2
Nuclear "Nuts"
by Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Center for Defense Information
dsmith@cdi.org
The numbers are so staggering that it's crazy.
That observation doesn't refer to the 680 pages of "Atomic Audit: The Cost and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940." Edited by Stephen Schwartz, this just released book from Brookings Institution details for the first time the financial costs of the U.S. nuclear weapons program from its inception.
According to "Atomic Audit," between 1940-1996 the U.S. spent $5.5 trillion (that's $5,500,000,000,000) on its nuclear program. This includes research and development, production of weapons, delivery systems, training, security and C3I = command, control, communications, and intelligence. The weapons alone cost only some seven percent of this total.
Fortunately, the book breaks down this $5.5 trillion into more digestible though still enormous numbers as it details the nuclear path the U.S. took.
There are many more facts and figures in this volume. They range from the human toll - those tens of thousands whose lives were affected by atmospheric tests conducted by the nuclear powers - to the rationale for presidential decisions on fighting protracted nuclear war.
"Atomic Audit" is important to read for two other reasons. First, it demonstrates the problem of excessive secrecy in a democratic system. Until now, neither the public nor the Congress knew how much nuclear preparations have cost the nation. And without knowledge there can be no oversight and there is no accountability. Second, the authors find no hard evidence to support the popular claim that the Reagan build-up broke the economic back of the Soviet Union and led to its collapse. This lack of evidence leads to the conclusion that at both ends of the Cold War, just as we are doing today, the U.S. was in an arms race with itself.
Without an enemy to threaten us, why we are still spending $35 billion annually to maintain a nuclear warfighting structure seems a fair question.
It's just crazy.
And that, perhaps, is the most telling indictment of all to come out of this book.
In Beye’s Memory: Continuing the Angolan Peace Process
by Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
rstohl@cdi.org
Alioune Blondin Beye, the UN special envoy for the Angolan peace process, died this week in a plane crash near Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Beye, the UN special envoy to Angola since 1993, and was instrumental in the peace agreement between the government and UNITA in November 1994. The UN has appointed Kofi Obeng, the current military leader of the UN Observer Mission in Angola, as temporary chairman of the Joint Commission on the Peace Process. However, Obeng’s appointment might be too late to mute the growing tensions in Angola. Beye himself had recently expressed concerns about UNITA’s and the government’s commitment to peace, and had threatened to resign unless advances in the peace process were made.
At the time of his death, Beye, along with five other UN officials, was on a mission to several African countries to gain support for measures to avert a return to full-scale war in Angola. UNITA forces have resumed surprise attacks, including ones against UN personnel and civilians. Beye had reported that at least 60 policemen and a significant number of civilians had been murdered since January.
The United Nations has been active in pursuing Angolan Peace since 1989 with the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I). Since then two other UNAVEM missions have come and gone. Currently the United Nations has an Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA); it began in July 1997.
To facilitate the November 1994 peace agreement, the UN established an large-scale demobilization process to disarm the thousands of troops on both the rebel and government sides. According to a New York Times report, UNITA has sent 71,000 soldiers to the quartering camps in the last 18 months. Although the UN planned to collect the weapons from all soldiers, only 34,000 weapons were collected. Scheduled to last only a few months, the demobilization has now lasted over a year, and approximately 26,000 troops left the camps without leaving a record for UN personnel. The UN had planned to demobilize 30,000 government troops after the UNITA soldiers had been reintegrated into Angola society. However, a lack of funds for the UN mission could end or stall the process. The UN claims it needs an additional $20 million to continue the demobilization efforts.
UNITA troops who have not turned in their weapons are finding a lucrative trade with neighboring Namibians. (Illegal trade in weapons from South Africa has also been reported.) The Western Caprivi Headman’s Council, a group that works to eliminate the circulation of illegal weapons, has reported that the "trade in AK-47s was booming again." Their reports show that AK-47 assault rifles are being traded for radios, mealie meal, cooking oil, and other food products. Understandably, non-governmental organizations in the area are concerned about the resumed illegal trafficking in arms.
The failure of UNITA to completely disarm has provided justification for the Angolan government to resume attacks on UNITA strongholds. As a result, UNITA rebels have begun to rearm and prepare to engage the government forces. The UN has evidence that UNITA has resumed its complex networks for illegal arms smuggling, indicating they still have "military ambitions."
Recent reports indicate that both UNITA and the Angolan government are beginning to forcibly recruit soldiers. Aid workers have recorded a significant number of Angolan civilians fleeing the country into Namibia to avoid a probable resumption of fighting. This continued exodus - as many as 40,000 in one month - damages chances for civil society to be strengthened and perpetuates insecurity throughout the country.
Upon hearing of Beye’s death, the United States, Portugal, Russia, and the United Nations quickly approached both the Angolan government and UNITA, encouraging them to honor Beye by continuing the peace process that Beye was trying to complete. One can only hope that these appeals will not fall on deaf ears and that there is still time to turn the tide of war in Angola.
The Georgian Military: Nowhere to Go but Up
by Jared Feinberg, Scoville Fellow, Center for Defense Information
jfeinber@cdi.org
When the Abkhaz militia entered the Gali region at the end of May, it succeeded in driving over 35,0000 internally displaced Georgians from their recently reclaimed homes. Georgian partisans, the White Legion and the Forest Brothers, defended the escaping civilians. Throughout the "six-day war," an appellation now popular in Georgia to describe this phase of the conflict, Georgian Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces never engaged the Abkhaz forces. This failure highlights policy failures, the decrepit state of the armed forces, and an unclear, bloated senior command structure.
Ever since Georgian independence in 1991, the Georgian armed forces have struggled with maintaining proper command and control between the civilian and military leadership. Between 1991 and 1993, the core of the Georgian ground forces consisted of the National Guard under the command of Tengiz Kitovani and the Mkhedrioni under the command of Dzhaba Ioseliani. Though these forces and other semi-official militias fought against the Abkhaz, they also were involved in illegal activities as well as an assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze (Mkhedrioni in 1995). These and other units, which nominally served the central Georgian government, were loyal to their commanders but to no one else. Ultimately, the National Guard was absorbed into the Ministry of Defense and the Mkhedrioni were disbanded (though former Mkhedrioni are rumored to be active in the White Legion/ Forest Brother groups).
In 1994, Shevardnadze appointed Vardiko Nadibaidze as Defense Minister in the hope that Nadibaidze’s close relationship with the Russian armed forces would aid in rebuilding the Georgian military. Nadibaidze had been the Deputy Commander of the Group of Russian Forces in Transcaucasia. His appointment was seen as a vital step forward in the consolidation of the Georgian armed forces under a professional officer. Shevardnadze especially hoped that Nadibaidze’s relationship with then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachov, Nadibaidze’s godson, would aid Georgia in reclaiming more of its CFE allotment from Russia.
But after four years Nadibaidze’s close ties with Russian forces had provided no substantial benefit to Georgia. With Shevardnadze looking westward, and with some unexplained "lapses" concerning Shevardnadze’s security detail, Shevardnadze removed Nadibaidze as Defense Minister. On April 28th, 1998 David Tezvadze was appointed the new Defense Minister.
Whereas Nadibaidze supported closer cooperation with Russia, Tezvadze is clearly looking to the West. He attended a U.S. military college and had only become a soldier after the collapse of the USSR. His Western orientation places the new Defense Minister more in tune with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee. He is the antithesis of Nadibaidze, and for that reason may be capable of strengthening the Georgian armed forces and civilian control of the military.
One of the first positive signs of improvement under Tezvadze is the consolidation of the 12 deputy defense ministries within the Ministry of Defense to four. One of these four, the new Chief of the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, General Johnny Pitrskhalaishvili, appears to complement Tezvadze's Western orientation. General Pitrskhalaishvili also has studied at a NATO military college, the George Marshall Center for Strategic Studies and Defense Economy in Germany. Another Deputy Defense Ministers is General Grigol Katamadze, a career diplomat. Including a civilian at the top level of the MOD reflects the transformation that the Georgian armed forces must undergo if effective civilian control is to be established.
As Georgia and its new military leadership reorient themselves westward, cooperation with Western armed forces will be crucial to the continued development of the Georgian armed forces. The officer corps is the weakest part of the armed forces, yet also the most crucial. At the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, of the 300 Georgian officers in the Soviet armed forces, 80 percent served in the rear. In fact, not one Georgian had graduated from a Soviet military college since 1985. To make matters worse, in February 1994, when the armed forces were being purged of militia members, over 50 percent of the National Guard who had fought from 1990-1993 were removed. Their accumulated military experience was completely lost. Today, Georgia is trying to recoup through widespread bilateral training programs with Germany, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia and within NATO’s Partnership for Peace.
Meager and low quality supplies of food and clothing have contributed to a high desertion rate, depressed morale and low readiness in the Georgian armed forces. In an effort to remedy these deplorable conditions, Tezvadze dismissed Valery Buchukuri, head of the MOD logistics department, as well as Temur Karmazanashvili, head of the Division for Agricultural Support within the logistics department.
Another promising event for Georgia’s armed forces is the transfer of border control from Russian forces to Georgian border guards that officially began on July 1. The first phase will have Georgian border guards taking over the Black Sea coast line, primarily the Batumi and Poti sectors. In April 1998, the United States delivered one coast guard boat to bolster Georgia’s small navy. One more U.S. boat and a German boat are scheduled to be delivered this summer. Over the next two years, Georgian forces will replace Russian guards along the Turkish border as well.
Only two years ago it was widely believed that the Russians exercised ultimate authority over all Georgian security decisions, such as ministerial appointments. Nadibaidze actually began every morning with a visit to the Russian forces headquarters in Tbilisi. The recent appointment of Tezvadze, the reorganization of the Ministry of Defense, and continued Western military assistance are early but substantive signs that Georgia’s armed forces are free of direct Russian influence and will become an effective defensive force.
Still, the inability of the Georgian government to intervene militarily in Abkhazia in late May exemplifies how far the Georgian armed forces have to improve to be able to effectively protect their country’s security interests. The Georgian civilian leaders, however, must also provide their military commanders with a clear military and security doctrine, something lacking so far.