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| May 7,1998 |
| May 7,1998 |
Stopping Weapons Sales to Dictators: An Update on the U.S. Code of Conduct
by Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information,
rstohl@cdi.org
The global community recently has undertaken several measures to decrease the negative consequences of international arms transfers. The UN Register for Conventional Arms and the Wassenaar Arrangement to limit exports of dual-use goods are initiatives that hope to curb the traffic of weapons to regions of conflict and prevent weapons from being used against civilian populations. Revelations that U.S. weapons have been used by some of the most infamous dictators against their people -- not to mention the use of these weapons against U.S. troops -- ought to alert U.S. policy makers to the urgent need for meaningful domestic action to prohibit the arming of undemocratic regimes with U.S. weapons.
Both the House of Representatives and Senate are addressing the need for a Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers. The Senate effort is led by John Kerry (D-MA) who is currently seeking co-sponsors for the Senate Code. In the House, Representatives Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) have reconciled the language in the House Code to match the Senate version. McKinney and Rohrabacher helped push the passage of the Code as part of the fiscal year 1998 State Department Authorization Act in June 1997.
Unfortunately, the Code was removed by House and Senate Republican leaders during conference committee negotiations in March 1998. Undeterred, McKinney and Rohrabacher have renewed their resolve to advance the Code of Conduct on the House agenda in 1998. They have turned to the 1999 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, attaching language incorporating the Code in a bid to make it law. In the next few weeks, the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee (of the House Appropriations Committee) will be considering the Code for inclusion in the bill. Non-governmental and grass roots organizations are working to gain support among the members of the subcommittee and gain publicity for the Code of Conduct in the public arena.
The U.S. Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers would prohibit U.S. arms exports to governments that are undemocratic, abusive of citizens’ human rights, are engaged in acts of armed aggression, and do not participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms.
The Code would permit the government and U.S. contractors to continue to export arms to countries that meet the Code’s criteria. Furthermore, the President would be able to submit a "national security" waiver allowing continued exports to countries which don’t fulfill the Code’s obligations.
The U.S. is not alone in this initiative to prevent the arming of aggressive parties. On the international front, 15 former Nobel Peace Prize winners came together in May, 1997 and established a campaign supporting the implementation of an International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers. The European Union is currently debating a joint French-British proposal which would increase transparency by announcing proposed arms transfers and requiring multilateral consultations before any country fills an arms order that was previously refused by another.
Support for the U.S. Code of Conduct is crucial to the promotion of democracy, the preservation of human rights, and the move towards increased transparency in armaments. As the largest supplier of arms in the world, the U.S. has a responsibility to carefully scrutinize those countries receiving U.S. weapons to ensure adherence to basic human rights and norms. The U.S. is already behind Europe in supporting a Code. It's time to make up the lost ground and make the Code of Conduct an integral part of our foreign policy.
Burning Real Money
by Colonel Daniel M. Smith, USA (Ret.), Associate Director,
Center for Defense Information
dsmith@cdi.org
Senator Everett Dirksen's alleged lament about spending taxpayer dollars, "A billion here, a billion there; soon you're talking about real money," once again comes to mind because of an appropriately timed (April 15 - income tax day) article about congressional junketing on Pentagon airplanes.
"The Hill," a newspaper dedicated to reporting what goes on in Washington, detailed congressional trips in which Pentagon "civilian" aircraft were used to ferry congressional delegations (some with spouses) to various parts of the globe in 1997. Gathering available information from widely dispersed offices in the Pentagon, the paper's intrepid Mr. Jock Friedly described trips costing over $3.8 million in 1997 to Asia Central America, the Middle East, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and "Eurasia."
DoD has a directive that "governs" when its C-12s (costing $4,600 per hour to operate), C-9s ($7,243 per hour), and C-137s ($14,000 per hour) can be used: when the reason for travel is "of primary interest to, and bears a substantial relationship to, programs or activities" of the Defense Department. The only exception contained in Directive 4515.12 is for offical though non-DoD travel that is reimbursed by "members and employees of the Congress."
Fair enough - if the bills were ever presented and paid, which they never seem to be. And with a fleet of 14 airplanes and 19 helicopters in the 89th Military Airlift Wing stationed at Andrews Air Force Base just outside Washington, the bills soon add up to "real money."
As with most legislation, Congress is either exempt or it has found other ways to avoid restrictions it places on the rest of Americans. In this case, subject only to "regulations" promulgated by standing committees of each chamber, Senators and Representatives are allowed to make "field investigations" associated with any (not just DoD-related) appropriations requests from the Executive branch.
Between 1986-1990 I dealt with foreign dignitaries visiting the U.S. as guests of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Army Chief of Staff. In planning where these visitors would go (if they traveled outside Washington, DC), my office had to justify on a cost and itinerary basis the use of military planes in lieu of scheduled civilian carriers. When the dignitary was accompanied by a large entourage (typically from Asian nations), it was normally more cost effective to use military aircraft in the continental U.S. - and of course this travel was directly related to Pentagon programs.
With this experience, and knowing from the newspaper article a few locations by name that were visited by congressional delegations, I did an on-line search of commercial airfares to the same destinations. Nine members went to Nicaragua for $74,000 round trip via military air. A round trip ticket on a regular commercial carrier is $624; multiplied by 9 people brings the cost of air travel to $5,616. Granted, this was not first class airfare, but even that would not come close to the cost of military airlift.
Another group went to Puerto Rico on military air at a cost of $55,000; the round trip fare for an unrestricted ticket on a commercial carrier is $327. At this rate, over one third of the entire House of Representatives could have gone to this Atlantic paradise.
Finally, a trip to New Zealand ran up a cost of $200,000 for use of a military airplane. Round trip from Washington to Wellington and back on commercial carriers came in at $4,200 per person. Again, for this cost almost half the Senate could have gone.
In the grand scheme of DoD budgets, this use of military aircraft, like so many other "small things," might be dismissed as an insignificant example of Dirksenian "real money." After all, $3.8 million is one thousandth of one percent (.001%) of the DoD FY1999 budget. But these are merely the figures that Mr. Friedly found and reported and only in this one area.
At a time when the services all say their men and women are overstretched, any commitment of resources for non-military missions ought to be scrupulously avoided.
Balkan Domino Theory: The Case of Macedonia
by Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
As the Yugoslav army moved into position on the Albanian border the last week, the conflict in Kosovo reached a new stage. Small-scale guerilla warfare has broken out and casualties are being reported daily. If all-out fighting does erupt, most experts predict that other Balkan countries will join in, possibly even NATO members Greece and Turkey.
The country often cited as most vulnerable to an outbreak of violence is Macedonia (formally called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). This is not the first time that this small Balkan country has been forecast to be on the brink of war. Macedonia, however, defied expectations when it became the only part of the former Yugoslav federation to secede peacefully.
On the surface, the demographic situation in Macedonia resembles that of Kosovo. Albanians amount to roughly 25 percent of the population of Macedonia. Less than in Kosovo (90 percent), they nevertheless represent a sizable minority. As in neighboring Yugoslavia, the largely Muslim Albanian minority is surrounded by a majority Orthodox Christian Slavic people, the Macedonians.
But the similarities end here. The Kosovar Albanians boycott the Yugoslav government, which they regard as an occupying force. In contrast, the Macedonian Albanians have been present in every government in their country since 1991. The ethnic Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) sent 22 deputies to the 120-member parliament. Five government ministers represent Albanian interests in the executive branch. The Macedonian constitution guarantees education in the native language of ethnic minorities from kindergarten to 12th grade. [After Yugoslav authorities shut down Albanian university in Kosovo, its faculty help set up another one in Macedonia. It is not recognized by the Macedonian government.] There are Albanian newspapers, TV and radio stations in Macedonia. In fact, President Gligorov of Macedonia felt so proud of his policies toward minorities that he proposed to other governments in the region to undertake a comparative study of minority policies in each nation. (They all refused.)
Despite efforts by both sides, relations between Albanians and Macedonians are far from idyllic. In July 1997, Albanians rioted in the town of Gostivar, just across the border from Kosovo. Three people died in the violence after police took down an Albanian flag hoisted by the mayor of the town in contravention of Macedonian law. While cases of violence are rare, angry nationalistic rhetoric is more common. Radical Albanian leaders are demanding autonomy for their ethnic group. After holding consultations with most political parties, President Gligorov proclaimed: "Where inter- ethnic relations are concerned the ethnic positions...[indicate] that we will be continuing [with] this problem for a long time." Yet considering the tense Balkan conditions, ethnic relations in Macedonian must be rated generally harmonious.
If this is so, why should others be concerned about violence spilling over to Macedonia?
Events in Kosovo have direct influence on the Macedonian Albanians. The armed Kosovo Liberation Army staged attacks into Macedonia in an attempt to draw the country into a conflict. After Yugoslav police raids killed scores of Kosovar villagers, the Macedonian Albanians held demonstrations in support of their ethnic brethren. "Brethren" is more then an oratory tool in this case the border region is full of families with relatives on both sides of the line who would almost certainly intervene if killing began in Kosovo. The Albanians in Macedonia also help arm their Kosovar counterparts, using in part the arsenals from military depots looted during the recent uprising in Albania. (In Skopje, Macedonia's capital, an AK-47 reportedly sells for $35.)
The Ambassador of Macedonia to Washington, Ljubica Acevska, recently told CDI: "We are not afraid of a breakdown in inter-ethnic relations, but there are radicals on both sides. If things are chaotic in Kosovo, radical Albanians could go to Kosovo. That could prompt Serbs to get involved to try to help the Macedonians against the Albanians."
The Bulgarians also might be tempted to intervene. They believe that Macedonian Bulgars are denied their rights, and there are elements within Macedonia calling for a union with Bulgaria. Turks, the second largest minority in Macedonia, could pull their "mother country" into a conflict. Given the tense Turkish - Greek relations and Greek historical aspirations in the region, Greece would hardly acquiesce.
During the war in Bosnia, Macedonia steered clear of violence thanks largely to the presence of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). The impact of UNPREDEP is largely psychological - the troops don’t have the mandate or the means to stop illegal border crossings or to prevent invasion. If the lightly armed UNPREDEP soldiers see smuggling or violence, their orders are to monitor and to report but not to intervene. But to the people of Macedonia, the United Nations troops affirm that the international community cares. To a would-be aggressor, UNPREDEP forces signal that the West will not stand by idly.
UNPREDEP’s mandate was recently renewed, albeit only for limited time. Because of the violence in Kosovo, Western powers began discussing a larger follow-on force. British and other European officials privately have indicated their interest in contributing troops to UNPREDEP, which currently consists of some seven hundred fifty U.S. and Scandinavian peacekeepers. Reinforcement may be necessary if the UN force is to be seen by the various contending parties and states as a credible deterrent. Otherwise it may suffer the fate of the early United Nations troops in Bosnia who were in no position to stop the violence and came under attack themselves.
Macedonia is at a crossroads; it can stand as an example of successful inter-ethnic relations or it can succumb to the violence raging on the other side of its borders. Attempts to diffuse the Kosovo crisis by mediation have failed so far, and the conflict becomes more violent with every passing day. Should the Kosovo crisis erupt into full-scale fighting, the international community - and Macedonia’s - only hope is to contain it and prevent spillover.