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| March 12,1998 |
| March 12,1998 |
One More Nail in the Coffin--A Commentary
by Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Associate Director, Center for Defense Information
dsmith@cdi.org
The prestigious Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), a Washington-based research organization funded by the Pentagon, has drafted a report for DoD whose conclusions in large measure agree with those reached earlier by many independent observers (including the Center for Defense Information): the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review was a bust!
Perhaps the language used by IDA will not be quite that blunt, but however much the words may be finessed, their meaning will not change. The eight month-long study was a waste of talent, time, and taxpayer dollars.
As one who followed the QDR from its inception, I do not find this conclusion at all surprising, After all, one of the QDR's principal recommendations--two more rounds of base closings to cut infrastructure--was greeted by Senator Joel Hefley (R-CO) with the comment, "Over my dead body."
But the real problem with the QDR goes deeper. Like the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the entire effort was done in-house. This was the first and biggest error, for as Max Weber pointed out long ago, no bureaucracy reforms itself, and the larger the organization the less chance that even minor reform will succeed. (In this regard, one is reminded of the impossible charge, "Physician, heal thyself.")
Reading the very earliest drafts of the QDR Report, I was impressed with the authors' recognition of the need to reform and reshape the military away from the ponderous formations and weapons platforms that dominated 20th Century warfare and toward the lighter, mobile, more agile, and information-based structures that are better suited to meet the anticipated 21st Century threats. Alas, by the time the bureaucracy and the senior officers were through with this forward-looking vision, there was little left. Committees, which had multiplied like Topsy (some 25 of them), worked at cross purposes. According to the IDA draft, the two senior committees, whose duties were to integrate and steer the others, failed to perform either function. And the study pinpoints the reason: interservice rivalry and the bickering that was all too apparent all too often.
The National Defense Panel, the independent nine-person group established by the origianl QDR legislation to critique the QDR and make recommendations about strategy and forces beyond 2015, made a brave stab at cutting through the QDR's shortfalls. But to date its reports and recommendations to Congress have fallen on deaf ears. Secretary of Defense Cohen did not like the NDP's call for more rapid progress on force transformation, and uniformed senior officers (most recently the Commander of the Air Force's Tactical Command) are voicing opposition. Congress still opposes base closings. Acquisition reform has been embraced by the Pentagon's civilian leadership and some in Congress, but it is proving difficult to implement. Military contractors are afraid of losing business and members of Congress up for reelection this year don't want to lose jobs in their districts and states.
The final IDA report, expected sometime this Autumn, will produce recommendations about how the Pentagon should organize for the next QDR, currently scheduled for 2000. Unfortunately, given the Pentagon's track record, the study is liable to go on a shelf and, like John Brown's body, simply molder. Given that there will be a new team in the White House and the Pentagon by then, this outcome is all the more likely.
GAO: Army has a long way to go in efforts to reduce support personnel
by Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
chellman@cdi.org
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has found that the Army is having difficulty streamlining a significant portion of its "institutional"support network. In part this is because the service has not been able to effectively measure workload to determine where surplus personnel are located.
Institutional personnel are nondeployable military and civilian employees who support the service's infrastructure activities such as training, doctrine development, base operations, supply and maintenance. According to the GAO report, these personnel constitute 27% of the total active Army, all of its civilian workforce, and costs the service $18 billion annually.
The Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act requires the GAO to report annually on the Army's efforts to streamline its infrastructure activities and reduce surplus personnel. The Army's institutional functions have been under close scrutiny recently because of the service's inability to justify manpower requirements based on workload and ensure that these functions are being performed in the most efficient manner possible.
The Army began efforts to reform its institutional processes and redesign their organization in January 1995. The effort, referred to as Force XXI Institutional Redesign, is due to be completed by March 2000. In all, the Army expects to reduce 33,700 civilian personnel in addition to an undetermined number of active duty positions. Under current plans, any savings from these reductions will be applied to operational forces.
But in analyzing personnel trends from 1992 through 2003, the GAO found no reduction in the ratio of institutional personnel to operating forces in the active Army. It also noted that the service does not use "workload" as the basis for assigning personnel and ensuring that priority functions are funded first. As a result, the GAO notes that "the Army's lack of progress in identifying efficiencies means that some active Army personnel are not available to fill shortages among operational forces, including deployable support forces...."
In effect, the Army's inability to assess "institutional" inefficiencies is not only wasting funds needed to support operational forces but is aggravating problems arising from the increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of deployed support personnel needed for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions such as Bosnia. Given that the frequency of these types of operations is more likely to increase than decrease, it becomes more important that the Army quickly sorts out its support personnel situation.
Both the Quadrennial Defense Review and last November's Defense Reform Initiative recognize the need to streamline the Pentagon's bureaucracy and infrastructure. Both initiatives identified such efforts as a significant source of savings to be transferred to fund future weapons purchases. But the Army's experience in attempting to reduce its institutional functions demonstrates how difficult an undertaking this will be and suggests that the Pentagon and Congress should carefully reexamine the affordability of the military's future procurement programs.
For additional information see GAO report "Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results," NSIAD-98-65, February 26, 1998 at: http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY98/abstracts/ns98065.htm
Will Diplomacy Succeed in Kosovo?
by Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
The ongoing crisis in Kosovo has stirred fears of a repetition of a Bosnia-style war with its indiscriminate, brutal killing, ethnic cleansing, and the feeling of helplessness that that conflict engendered in the West. So far the United States has chosen only to urge both sides to negotiate, but even this minimal effort has been short-circuited by the deep-seated differences and emotions aroused by the recent bloodshed. Does the U.S. approach have a chance to succeed?
After his forces pummeled the Kosovo rebels' stronghold with heavy arms fire for days, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to "negotiate." Milosevic's views on Kosovo's future, however, are worlds apart from those of his potential negotiating partner, the head of Kosovo's shadow government, Ibrahim Rugova. Milosevic insists that Kosovo is an integral part of Yugoslavia while Rugova demands nothing less than complete independence. A return to autonomy, which Kosovo enjoyed between 1974 and 1989, would be a logical compromise but both men may find it extremely hard to change their negotiating positions.
The population of Kosovo seems unwilling to settle for autonomy, which can be revoked at Milosevic's discretion, as happened in 1989. Two years after this revocation, Kosovo declared its independence, but Belgrade refused to recognize the claim. In 1992 Rugova was given a mandate to lead an independent Kosovo, not an autonomous province of Yugoslavia. Rugova now faces pressure from home-grown radicals--the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), which thrives on the perceived failure of Rugova's moderate policies. This pressure on the Kosovar leader serves to toughen his negotiating stance rather than promote compromise.
As is often the case, Milosevic's decision to use force in Kosovo was driven by domestic politics. And the reaction in Yugoslavia so far seems to confirm Milosevic's approach. The Kosovo issue has divided and weakened the opposition by driving a wedge between the democratic and nationalist opposition parties. The general Yugoslav public seems ambivalent at best, even giving tacit approval to Milosevic's treatment of Kosovans. The government-controlled media's hyped-up charges of "Albanian terrorism" also helped Milosevic while the few dissenting dailies found themselves targets of criminal prosecution (as reported by the New York Times). Thus there is virtually no significant internal source of pressure on Milosevic to compromise.
The chances for an agreement on autonomy for Kosovo are slim but worth pursuing in the absence of a sensible alternative. What the international community does or does not do will be important in the days and weeks ahead. Both sides (Kosovars more than Milosevic) actively seek to manipulate the Western public in their favor and scrutinize the statements emanating from various capitals for clues about future responses. U.S. officials in Washington and in the Balkans have so far limited themselves to condemning the violence on both sides and called for negotiations. It remains to be seen whether we have enough leverage and skills to bridge the abyss dividing the two sides in this latest Balkan crisis.
The Pentagon's Newest Nuclear Weapon
by Andrew Koch, Senior Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information
akoch@cdi.org
On March 11, 1998, the U.S. Air Force conducted the last of a series of tests needed to certify its newest nuclear weapon. The Air Force dropped two B61-11 bombs, which had their fissile cores replaced with depleted uranium for simulation purposes, at a test range at Fort Wainwright near Fairbanks, Alaska. The B61-11 is an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon specifically designed to destroy hardened underground targets impervious to conventional munitions.
Prior to final certification, a number of the new bombs were delivered to the Air Force by Sandia National Laboratory. The B61-11, which will replace the B53 bomb in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, can be carried by either the troubled B-2 bomber or by an F-16 fighter-bomber.
The Pentagon claims this bomb is a modification of the existing B61-7 design, noting that the weapon's fissile core remains the same and that only the non-nuclear package has been modified. Despite these semantic niceties, the B61-11 has substantially enhanced capabilities. Thus other states are likely to see it as a new weapon.
The B61 is not the only device being altered. Nuclear weapon scientists at Sandia are working on "modifications" to other nuclear weapon designs as well. While continuing scientific and technical improvements to our nuclear arsenal seem to be a rational course of action, such activities are a clear violation of the spirit if not letter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Ironically, the United States was a leading proponent of the CTBT, correctly noting that the treaty enhances our security by helping to control the spread and development of advanced nuclear weapons technology.
Under the CTBT, the U.S. promised to end all nuclear tests as a way to halt the development of new nuclear weapon designs. Continuing work on weapons such as the B61-11, however, validates the concerns of CTBT opponents who claim that the U.S. is continuing to develop new weapons for its nuclear arsenal using technology not available to other states.
Deployment of the B61-11 also reaffirms fears that President Clinton's new targeting guidelines for U.S. nuclear weapons could violate American obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Called PDD 60 and approved in November 1997, the new guidelines suggest that the U.S. might respond to a chemical or biological weapon attack with nuclear weapons even if the aggressor is a non-nuclear weapon state. If true, such a policy violates U.S. commitments under the NPT not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
News reports that the U.S. was contemplating deploying the B61-11 for possible use against Saddam Hussein's underground chemical or biological weapon facilities illustrates this fear. Statements by various Pentagon officials that the U.S. has the capability to successfully attack buried weapons of mass destruction in "rogue" states such as North Korea, Libya, and Iran are also troubling. Although Washington should be concerned about these states' proliferation activities, the U.S. needs to meet its international arms control obligations if it is going to successfully convince other countries not to acquire weapons that will threaten our security.
China's Growing Blue-water Navy
by Andy Sywak, Research Intern, Center for Defense Information
In recent years the Navy component of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLAN) has revamped their mostly coastal fleet into a formidable, modern, blue-water force composed of destroyers, frigates and submarines capable of long-distance operations.
Currently, the PLAN is oriented around provincial patrol and coastal combatant ships. According to the 1997/98 issue of The International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance, the PLAN has 830 of these ships compared to a mere 18 destroyers and 36 frigates in its "blue- water" force. Thus without significant qualitative and quantitative improvements, China would be unable to project power beyond its territorial waters.
To address this deficiency in force projection, China has spent a considerable fortune in recent years constructing modern destroyers, frigates and submarines. During its first-ever visit to Pearl Harbor and San Diego in March of last year, the PLAN showcased two of its largest and most modern destroyers, the Luhu (Number 112) and a Luda III destroyer (Number 166). It was the first time the West had seen the Luhu "up close." The Chinese, keen to prove they had nothing to hide, even opened the ships for inspection by American naval intelligence officials.
Such transparency suggests that the PLAN does not consider a conflict with the U.S. to be likely. Quite possibly, the Chinese believe that openness may strengthen trust between the PRC and the U.S. and encourage America to share more of its advanced technology. As the overwhelming American victory in the Gulf War made strikingly clear, it is the formidable cache of American military technology that separates it from the rest of the world's militaries.
Two Luhu-class destroyers have been built and two more are planned or already under construction. A general-purpose warship, the Luhu contains a guided-missile system and two French Dauphin helicopters but is considered deficient in long-range air defense. Last year the Chinese acquired two Sovremenny-class destroyers from the Russians for $800 million dollars. Though these ships won't be deployed for another two years, their acquisition significantly bolsters the PLAN's long-range offensive capabilities. Complementing the PLAN's destroyers are four recently completed Jiangwei-class frigates whose guided-missile systems and more sophisticated radars and sonars will counter an existing weakness in anti-submarine warfare.
Submarines, it turns out, are the fledgling blue-water navy's strong point. China has 61 submarines although about half of these are aged and lack advanced technology. Still, the recent acquisition of three (and possibly four) Kilo-class submarines from Russia has given the PLAN an impressive diesel attack submarine to complement its five nuclear-powered Han-class and the indigenously manufactured Song, the latest addition to the submarine fleet that the PLAN hopes will become its standard. The PLAN also has one Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine.
Given this force, where might it be used?
Nicholas Kristof, former New York Times Beijing bureau chief, predicted in a recent article that China's most probable conflicts will occur in the South China Sea. This expansive area includes the Paracel and Spratley Island groups, sporadic shoals and rocks that are being hotly contested because of their strategic position astride key shipping lanes and reported reserves of oil and gas. Parts of these islands are claimed by no fewer than six countries: Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. China insists these islands have belonged to them for two thousand years and, in the last year, has established communication stations on islands claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines. An effective blue-water navy could give the Chinese a decisive advantage over the weaker navies (with the notable exception of Taiwan) of their rivals in dominating these island groups.
A second reason to develop a blue-water navy is a possible conflict with Taiwan. Opposed to the increasingly independent and internationally assertive behavior of its tiny neighbor, China fired missiles near the Taiwanese coast in 1996 as a "warning" to the latter to rein in its activities. Fears that the PRC would invade Taiwan seem unfounded as the PLAN lacks sufficient amphibious lift for a large force. It is better suited to attempt a blockade of the island with its new destroyers and submarines.
China is not trying to counter the American navy but to assert itself more forcefully in the East Asia region. As the 1996 Taiwan Straits incident demonstrated, the PLAN is vastly inferior to a rapid deployment by a major military power. China has no aircraft carrier and is not predicted to have one before 2010 (although a helicopter carrier may be constructed to meet the PLAN's millennium goal of having one "carrier").
The build-up and modernization of China's blue-water navy is being done as quickly and purposefully as possible. However, with a limited indigenous technology base, the PLAN must rely on the outside world (especially Russia) for many of its improvements. This dependency, together with the general inexperience of the PLAN in "blue-water" operations, will continue to hamper the PLAN as it strives to become an important military force in a region with more than its share of territorial disputes.
CORRECTION:
Last week's article, "GAO: Moving More B-1 Bombers to
Reserves Could Result in Significant Savings," stated that the General
Accounting Office's first option for assigning additional B-1s bombers to
the reserves--converting one active squadron (12 aircraft) to a reserve
unit--would result in a B-1 mission-coded fleet that was 21% reserve-based
and save $87.1 million. While this option would generate $87.1 million in
savings, the B-1 fleet would be 36% reserve-based.
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