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| February 5, 1998 |
| February 5, 1998 |
The Fiscal Year 1999 Pentagon Budget Request
by Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
On Monday the Clinton Administration released its Fiscal Year 1999 budget request. It asks for $270.6 billion in new Budget Authority for the Pentagon and $265.5 billion in outlays. The $270.6 billion is $3 billion more than for FY'98, which represents an approximately 1% drop in spending, taking into account the effects of inflation. The request for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which covers Fiscal Years 1999-2003, is $1.4 trillion dollars. When considered on a "per year" basis, the Pentagon's annual expenditures remain roughly stable over the entire period when adjusted for projected inflation.
For ease in comparing the current year (FY'98) budget with the FY'99 submission, the following is keyed to the breakdown used in last week's on-line Weekly Monitor.
Budget Authority by major spending categories requested for FY'99:
This totals $257.3 billion for the Pentagon's portion of the military budget (known as the "051 Account"). An additional $13.3 billion was requested for defense related programs in the Department of Energy, bringing the total request (the "050 Account") to $270.6 billion.
End Strengths: For active duty personnel, the Pentagon requested an end strength of 1.396 million, and for Guard and Reserve 877,000.
Army Programs: The request includes $692 million for M1 tank upgrades, $634 million for Apache Longbow Helicopter upgrades, and $368 for continued development of the Comanche Helicopter.
Fixed Wing Aircraft: The Pentagon requested $3.3 billion for the F/A-18E/F program, including the purchase of 30 aircraft; $2.4 billion for development of the F-22 fighter and the purchase of 2 aircraft; and $920 million for continued development of the Joint Strike Fighter. It also requested $3.2 billion for 13 C-17 transport aircraft.
Navy Programs: The request includes $2.9 billion for 3 DDG-51 destroyers, $2.3 billion for one New Attack Submarine, and $639 million for one LHD-17 landing craft. It also includes $1.1 billion for 7 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.
Missile Defense: The Pentagon requested $4 billion for missile defense, including nearly $1 billion for National Missile Defense. It also requested $190 for the Navy Theater Wide system, $822 for the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program, and $292 million for the Air Force's Airborne Laser Program.
Other Highlights:
The budget request would allow the Pentagon to keep $21 billion in projected savings from lower-than-expected inflation over FY'99-'03.
Base Closures: Asks for two additional rounds of base closures, in FY'01 and FY'05. Projected annual savings: $3 billion.
Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: Requests $462 million for cooperative Threat Reduction (the "Nunn-Lugar" program) in FY'99 and $3.6 billion for defense against Chemical and Biological Weapons from FY'99-'03.
B-2 Bomber: Includes no funds for additional bombers beyond the 21 currently planned.
Procurement: Requests $48.7 billion in FY'99. Reaches $60 billion annual procurement goal in FY'01 ($61.3 billion).
Bosnia: Assumes supplemental funding to cover additional costs of Bosnia mission in FY'98 and FY'99.
NOTE: The Senate Budget Committee believes that a review by the Congressional Budget Office will show the FY1999 Defense Budget is $2-$4 billion short even without the supplemental for Bosnia.
For additional materials and an analysis of the Fiscal Year 1999 budget, go to: http://www.cdi.org/issues/budget/fy99
Going "All the Way"
by Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) Associate Director, dsmith@cdi.org
"If we're going to do this, let's go all the way."
In context, that statement has nothing to do with the President's domestic difficulties. But these words by Trent Lott, the Senate Majority Leader, have everything to do with the severe war fever that is gripping an Administration and a Congress that appear to have forgotten that frustration, no matter how intense, is not and never has been a reason for war.
As every American must know by now, not since the 1991 war against Iraq has there been such an array of military might in one place as is now in the Persian Gulf area. In that we find ourselves in the same place seven years after the Gulf War and a few subsequent air attacks to boot ought to induce second thoughts about the futility of force in the continuing stand-off with Saddam Hussein.
Force, whether on the battlefield or in the physics lab (remember the laws of inertia), causes an effect only when it meets resistance. Saddam Hussein's 1991 invasion of Kuwait, by violating international norms, was the force that forged 35 nations into a coalition that, after 5 months preparation, destroyed a large part of the Iraqi army and Iraq's infrastructure in 30 days and 100 hours. UN sanctioned force overwhelmed rogue force, and a follow-on inspection regime was initiated to find and destroy Iraqi stockpiles and capabilities to make weapons of mass destruction and the missile systems capable of carrying such weapons to hit Iraq's neighbors.
In the current confrontation, which first came to a boil last November, the U.S. has so far been able to muster more than words only from Great Britain. As much as our 1991 coalition partners in the region--Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan--may distrust and even fear Saddam Hussein, this time there is no plausible Iraqi "force" for them (or us) to resist and attack. No Iraqi troops have crossed a border. No UN inspectors have been harmed. No U.S. U-2 spy planes flying in support of the UN inspection teams have been attacked. In fact, the only "force" that is being applied at the moment is from the U.S. in the form of Secretary of State Albright's just completed tour, Secretary of Defense Cohen's visit scheduled for next week, and the mounting chorus of "attack, attack, attack" from Congress..
In spite of her brave announcements after every visit to rally support, Secretary Albright has not received backing for military action at this time from any nation except Britain. Everyone agrees that Iraq is the cause of the current impasse; everyone agrees that under the terms of the 1991 cease fire the UN inspection teams have a right to "unfettered access"; everyone agrees that "all options are open." But no one agrees that military force is the only option--or even the next one.
Because the Administration has made the confrontation a U.S.-Iraqi one rather than letting it remain a UN-Iraqi one, it and now the Congress have let frustration with the Iraqi regime overcome objectivity and cool thinking. But military force will meet--what? There is virtually nothing to oppose it. Two-thirds of Iraqi airspace is already a no-fly zone. Saddam Hussein will disperse his Republican Guards, making any strike on them less successful. He will flood the "palaces" and other sites from which inspectors have been barred with women and children even if they contain no weapons.
In short, it is this very inversion of the 1991 situation that acts as a powerful restraint on our partners in that coalition as we seek endorsement (but not, as Secretary Albright made clear, their approval) for the use of military force.
What ought to remain the number one priority in dealing with Iraq is to keep the UN inspection teams in the country and going about their duties so that Saddam Hussein cannot steal another march as he did last November. Simultaneously, other non-military actions can be approved by the Security Council. For example, now that Ramadan is over, the UN might extend the no-fly zone over all of Iraq. Approval for Iraq to sell more oil to raise revenue for food and medicine, as proposed by the UN Secretary General, can be made contingent on more UN personnel to oversee the transportation and distribution of the supplies within Iraq.
Instead of going "all the way" militarily, we should be going "all the way" with diplomacy to shift the frustration from our side to Saddam. Rather than let him set the course, we ought to turn the tables: tone down our rhetoric about massive military force and deny him any pretext to rally international support for his position. Secretary Cohen has said that bombs, rockets, and missiles provide no guarantee that Iraq's remaining weapons and production capabilities will be destroyed or that he will open any more sites to the UN inspectors. Lashing out might make us "feel better" afterwards, but like a force that meets no resistance, it accomplishes nothing.
Anthrax: Deadlier than Ever?
by Emily E. Skor, Research Intern, intern@mail.cdi.org
Earlier this week, scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory discovered at least four different strains of anthrax in tissue taken from the victims of the 1979 accident at Sverdlovsk, a Soviet military base. Dr. Paul Jackson's findings, published in The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences on February 3, have spurred a debate within the U.S. government about the effectiveness of anthrax vaccines.
Anthrax, a disease primarily found among cattle and sheep, has become the prototypical biological warfare agent. Fatal even in small doses nearly 100 percent of the time, anthrax spores are stable, making them well suited to deliver by missile or bomb. As a naturally occurring substance, anthrax can survive in soil and water for approximately twenty years.
Growing general concern over the threat of biological weapons and specific evidence that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has produced anthrax prompted Pentagon officials to announce last December a program to immunize all U.S. military personnel. The Pentagon will begin the arduous process by inoculating 100,000 troops in "high threat" areas this summer. The FDA approved vaccine to be given has been in use since 1970 and was administered to 150,000 Gulf War troops in 1990 and 1991. Up to six years and $130 million will be needed to innoculate all military men and women.
Dr. Jackson's recent discovery raises questions regarding the American response to possible future use of anthrax and, indeed, to the entire effort to protect U.S. forces from the effects of germ warfare. Colonel Arthur Friedlander, the chief bacteriology expert at the U.S. Army's Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland, says that the anthrax vaccine to be used is based on a single protein found in all strains of the bacteria. But the newly discovered multiple strains of anthrax appear to be genetically mutated, a fact that could significantly reduce the protection offered by a single vaccine. And on the broader front, scientists generally agree that it is possible to genetically alter biological agents expressly to render vaccines and antibiotics less effective.
The Los Alamos evidence that multiple strains have been produced has tremendous implications for the possible future use of biological warfare and the ability to offer military forces adequate protection. The genii is out and to recork the bottle is futile at this point. To know whether the Soviet incident happened while their researchers were working toward a vaccine or a deadly weapon might be helpful in strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention. Yet, as with all weapons, restrictions are only as good as the verification regimes associated with them. We need to work on this front as well as developing vaccines and common-sense policies for their use for our forces.
New Year's TMD Troubles
by Andrew Koch, Senior Research Analyst, akoch@cdi.org
With a full schedule of tests scheduled for 1998, U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) efforts to develop theater missiles defenses (TMD) have begun the new year on decidedly unsure footing. Several key systems, including the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Airborne Laser (ABL) are experiencing technical difficulties or have serious design questions.
The U.S. Army's THAAD system, which is zero for seven in attempts to intercept a ballistic missile, had another test scheduled for this spring. This test, however, has been delayed yet again due to continuing technical problems. The schedule for deploying THAAD has also been set back--from 2004 to 2006--although a limited version could be available in 2000. If THAAD again fails its intercept mission during the upcoming test, the program could be delayed even further.
The Arrow TMD program, a joint Israeli-U.S. effort, has also been delayed by up to a year due to internal Israeli squabbles over who will pay for damages caused by a fire at the Israel Aircraft Industries' plant that produces the missile. Despite Israeli government claims that Arrow will become operational by 1999, these administrative delays suggest the system might not be ready for deployment at that time.
The U.S. Air Force's airborne laser is also facing serious problems. An internal Pentagon report largely confirmed previous GAO concerns that the ABL will have questionable operational effectiveness. At issue is whether the laser is underpowered due to the amount of turbulence it encounters in the atmosphere, which would diffuse the laser beam and result in insufficient destructive energy reaching the target. If the ABL's power is degraded, the system would have to be moved closer to the battlefield, making it much more vulnerable to enemy air defenses. The study further notes that "the enemy can hit key targets in most scenarios by moving launch sites outside ABL range."
Even the PAC-3, long considered the most technically mature TMD system, is experiencing problems. The upcoming PAC-3 intercept test, initially scheduled for late February, has been postponed until later in the spring due to pre-flight software problems. Furthermore, development of PAC-3 is expected to amass $43 million in cost overruns above its Fiscal Year 1999 allocation of $343 million for procurement and $137 million for research and development.
The above underscores the lack of maturity of theater missile defense technology. However, there is no need to rush deployment of these systems because threats that were expected to develop over the past few years are not materializing as quickly as previously expected. Iran, currently touted as the primary threat du jour, was said by Israeli intelligence to be as close as six months away from deploying a medium-range missile capable of striking Tel Aviv. Even these most alarmist estimates have now been reassessed.