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| ISSUE #17 | November 6,1997 |
| ISSUE #17 | November 6,1997 |
Iraq Against The World -- Take 50+
By David Isenberg, Senior Research Analyst, disenber@cdi.org
As this is written, the United Nations and Iraq are engaged in last minute discussions aimed at avoiding a military confrontation over Iraq's refusal to allow U.S. members of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) to participate in inspections in Iraq.
While many observers and pundits are casting the crisis as a matter of principle insofar as Iraq has no right to dictate the composition of the inspection team, there is, in fact, an even deeper issue. This is Iraq's continuing efforts to obstruct, evade, and hinder the efforts of UNSCOM, established by Security Council Resolution 687 in 1991, to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (biological and chemical), associated manufacturing facilities, and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 kilometers.
What adds fuel to this latest crisis is the fact that the international community has been here before. Over the years since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has demonstrated a consistent pattern of lies and deception in its dealings with UNSCOM. This pattern is fully documented in UNSCOM's most recent report, S/1997/774, dated October 6.
According to the newly appointed Executive Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission, Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia, proscribed materials and documents remain in Iraq. Furthermore, Iraqi officials have undertaken highly coordinated actions to mislead the Commission as to the existence and whereabouts of these materials and documents.
Butler said that Iraq has increasingly reneged on its agreement to allow Commission members complete and unimpeded access to any relevant site or person. For example, on four occasions in June of this year, Iraqi personnel aboard UNSCOM helicopters took actions that obstructed the Commission's inspections and endangered both the security of the helicopters and the safety of persons on board. Also in June Iraq denied access to UNSCOM teams to three sites designated for inspection, with two of the refusals coming on the same day (June 12).
More was to come. During a September 13 inspection connected with investigations into Iraq's chemical and biological programs, one UNSCOM team member was manhandled while aboard a Commission helicopter as he attempted to take photographs of the unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site designated for inspection. Iraq has also refused to provide access to individuals the Commission wanted to interview. Of 18 people the Commission requested to see, Iraq provided access to only one.
UNSCOM's most recent report notes the area of biological weapons is "unredeemed by progress or any approximation of the known facts of Iraq's programme." The report expresses the Commission's complete bafflement about Iraq's persistent refusal to reveal facts about its biological weapons program and its insistence on blocking the Commission's efforts to check and verify those facts. To date, Iraq has submitted six "full, final, and complete disclosure" (FFCD) statements on the extent of its biological weapons program. The first five were found to be incomplete and unverifiable. In fact, until July 1995 Iraq totally denied it had any offensive biological warfare program.
In short, the current crisis is not merely a matter of who is on the inspection team. Rather, it is about Iraq's consistent refusal to comply with the terms of an agreement to which it acceded in the aftermath of its defeat in 1991.
It's All in How You Ask the Question
by Colonel Daniel M. Smith, USA (Ret.) Associate Director, dsmith@cdi.org
As has been noted in earlier articles, U.S. intelligence professionals say the United States has no current or foreseeable military competitor with the power to threaten our "vital" interests. Only one nation, Russia, has the capability of delivering a major blow to the U.S. in the form of nuclear weapons, but President Yeltsin has said Russian missiles are no longer targeted against the United States. All the major industrial nations in the world are our allies, and this situation seems likely to remain so until (or if) China emerges technologically or Russia reemerges from its current slump.
When this relatively benign situation is put in the context of nondefense concerns of many Americans, there seems to be significant cross-currents about the direction in which the public thinks the country should move.
For example, according to an August 1995 report from the Americans Talk Issues Foundation (ATIF), since 1986 a plurality of Americans (42 to 49 percent) have said we are "spending too much" on defense. (Remember, this was before the end of the Cold War and the demise of the "evil empire.") The same polls registered a range between 36 and 41 percent who said the nation was "spending about the right amount," with the high water mark for that opinion coming in 1991, the year of the Gulf War against Iraq. One must go back to 1981, the initial year of the first Reagan Administration, to find more than 19 percent of interviewees (based on the averages of numerous polls) who said the U.S. was "spending too little."
However, data released in October 1997 by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, which included comparative results back to 1974, showed a higher percentage-- generally between 52 and 57 percent of those polled--who felt defense spending should be kept the same. This is a significant difference from the ATIF findings but one which results from a subtle yet important distinction in the phrasing of the questions asked.
For the Pew surveys, the question was either, "Should we expand our spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or cut it back?" or "Do you think that we should increase our spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or cut it back?" In the surveys by the Americans Talk Issues Foundation, the question had a more explicit emphasis: "In terms of the amount of money the government in Washington spends for national defense, do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount."
Another October 1997 report, this one from the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, brought a third slant--and a third set of numbers--to questions about military spending. It found that Americans "substantially underestimate how much is being spent on defense," particularly in relation to potential adversaries including Russia, China, and the "rogue states." When informed that the U.S. was spending about twice as much for defense as all these countries combined, over 70 percent responded that they felt "this was too much" while 22 percent felt it was "about right."
Perhaps more revealing was the response to this statement in the Maryland poll: "Now that the Cold War is over the U.S. should put less emphasis on building new weapons and more emphasis on things like arms control, global environmental concerns, trade, and early prevention of conflicts. Therefore some money should be shifted from the Defense Department to other agencies such as the State Department." Over 42 per cent "agreed strongly" and other 22 percent "agreed somewhat" while 11 and 20 percent "disagreed somewhat" and "disagreed strongly," respectively.
Two things seem clear from all this. First, Americans do not want to disengage from the world, but they want engagement to have a different emphasis than in the past. Second, Americans apparently don't mind defense spending as much if others--such as our allies in the Gulf War who contributed some $60 billion--are paying all the bills or at least "their fair share."
GAO sees reductions in Pentagon mispayments
by Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
For several years, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has examined many problem areas in the Pentagon's financial management system. In the aggregate these problems, which the Pentagon admits exist, could potentially result in billions of dollars in unnecessary costs to the American taxpayer.
As part of its ongoing effort to rectify these shortcomings, the GAO has closely examined Department of Defense (DoD) reports of overpayments to contractors. Although contract payments represent only a portion of the Pentagon's financial transactions, it is a substantial portion. How substantial--and how substantial the problem is--is illustrated by two statistics. GAO figures for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 show that DoD contract activities represented about $110 billion of the Pentagon's budget for that year. DoD itself reported that, as of May 1996, its problem disbursements--payments about which significant accounting questions exist--totaled about $18 billion. The GAO feels this estimate is substantially understated.
A 1994 GAO study provides some details. The GAO found that $751 million in checks had been returned over a six-month period to the Pentagon's Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Center in Columbus, Ohio. These checks represented "problem disbursements" identified not by government auditors but by contractors. The GAO examined $392 million of the $751 million so disclosed and discovered that $305 million (or 78 percent) represented overpayments by the government. Three-quarters of these overpayments resulted either from the failure of DFAS to recover "progress payments" (basically installment payments to the contractors made at specific milestones in a contract) before it paid the total value of the contract or from duplicate payments by DFAS.
The Columbus DFAS center is the largest of DoD's contract payment centers, handling 389,000 contracts and making payments of about $7 billion a month on 100,000 invoices. Recently, the GAO reported that during Fiscal Years 1994-96, the Columbus Center received returned checks from defense contractors totaling about $1 billion a year. Together with returned checks during the first seven months of FY 1997, which came to about $559 million, the GAO found that the total returned by contractors to the Columbus DFAS came to $5.1 billion since FY 1993.
In addition to the good news that many contractors are honest, there was also a pat on the back for Columbus. Of this $5.1 billion, GAO reported that $3.7 billion was returned as a result of factors outside of DFAS's control (e.g., price decreases). Only $1.4 billion in overpayments were due to payment errors at the Columbus Center. The report also showed that the value of payment errors by DFAS has steadily decreased, going from $592 million in FY 1993 to $283 million in FY 1994, $252 million in FY 1995, and $191 million in FY 1996. The figure shrank further to $67 million for the beginning of FY 1997.
Clearly this positive trend represents an important step forward in the Pentagon's efforts to put its financial house in order. However, several Pentagon initiatives which will likely increase the number and value of contracts make continued improvements in DoD's financial system essential. Of particular concern are Pentagon plans to increase weapons procurement funding by 25% by 2002. While DoD's contracting activities are related to the size of the overall military budget, they are more specifically tied to trends in Pentagon procurement.
Further, the Pentagon plans to increase privatization of functions currently performed by the military as a way to free up additional procurement funds. This, together with ongoing efforts to reduce the number of DoD civilian personnel, probably means that there will be fewer auditors and contract authorities to oversee Pentagon contracting activities. Hence, GAO and the Pentagon may find they will have to redouble their efforts to avoid a reversal of the positive trend of the last few years.
For additional information, see "DoD Procurement: Funds Returned by Defense Contractors," (GAO/NSIAD-98-46R), and "DoD: Procurement: Millions in Overpayments Returned by DoD Contractors" (GAO/NSIAD-94-106).
Weldon's Folly
by Andrew Koch, Senior Research Analyst, akoch@cdi.org
Congressional Republicans have taken a "throw money at the problem" approach to addressing the world-wide spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa) introduced a bill on October 31, 1997, that would add $325 million to the already overinflated ballistic missile defense budget.
Called the Iran Missile Protection Act (IMPACT), the bill seeks to bolster theater missile defense (TMD) research and development budgets, including the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Navy's theater-wide system. Weldon, who chairs the House National Security Military Research and Development subcommittee, is trying to reappropriate money that became available after President Clinton vetoed $431 million in 1998 defense spending.
The $325 million addition is being proposed despite statements by Ballistic Missile Defense Organization head, Lt.General Lester Lyles, that the money could not be used wisely at this time. General Lyles notes that the Pentagon is experiencing technical difficulties with missile defense systems, adding that both THAAD and the Navy's theater-wide entry have tried and failed to intercept missiles during nine separate tests. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has also added his voice, telling Mr. Weldon in a letter, "I do not encourage additional resources for TMD at this time."
Despite General Lyles' advice not to overestimate Iran's missile capabilities, Mr. Weldon believes Tehran could have the capability to field medium-range ballistic missiles within the next 18 months. He points out that such missiles, if fielded, could strike Israel or U.S. troops stationed in the Persian Gulf since there will be no U.S. missile defense system in place at that time.
The dispute underscores the question of how best to address proliferation threats, a debate which currently centers on finding technical "fixes" to the problem. Congressional proponents of ballistic missile defenses want to accelerate deployment of TMD systems regardless of costs while the Clinton Administration and the Pentagon prefer to wait until the technology is proven effective. Lost in this debate are better, long-term options such as reducing the demand for WMD technology among would-be proliferators. After all, while missile defense systems can provide some protection from high-tech threats such as ballistic missiles, they won't protect the United States from more likely threats such as terrorists using small, portable chemical or biological devices or weapons.
The Many and Varied Uses of "Instability"
by Lt. Colonel Piers M. Wood, USAR (Ret.), Chief of Staff, pwood@cdi.org
"Stability" and its antonym, "instability," are used to great advantage by the U.S. military. The ominous sounding dangers of "instability" are cited incessantly by the Pentagon to justify everything from military intervention to major national policies like NATO expansion. The problem is that no one is sure precisely what either term actually means.
In the pivotal 30-page "National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997," the words "instability" (as in "Ethnic, economic, social and environmental strains continue to cause instability and the potential for violence.") and "stability"(as in "Such military operations can have important strategic value when they promote the overall stability the U.S. seeks.") are used 18 times. The document employs these two words, on average, on every other page. One would think that such a significant term would be carefully explained. It is not.
The Pentagon's official dictionary, JCS Pub-1 (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994), has no entry for "stability" or "instability." This is peculiar because that dictionary does define many nontechnical and non-military words and phrases such as "hospital," "economic action," and "national policy." The omission is also curious because JCS Pub-1 includes broad, general terms, some of whose meanings verge on the existential: "standard," "deception," "deceased." So it's not as if the words don't belong in a dictionary of military terms. They do.
Perhaps we should all be concerned that these undefined terms are just a bit too flexible. After all, it's easy to understand "instability" in the recent context of Liberia or Bosnia. But it's more difficult to understand why the term is almost never used to describe circumstances in Northern Ireland. Similarly, why is there enough "stability" in Turkey--which is fighting a guerrilla war with the Kurds--for the U.S. to support that NATO ally but too much "instability" in the Central Asian areas of the former Soviet Union?
Was the largest state in the U.S. "unstable" during the riots in Los Angeles that followed the Rodney King verdict? Few (if any) would say so, but that begs the question of how far the term can be pushed. Might not "instability" refer simply to those things we don't like? Conversely, could "stability" mean things we, or the President, or the Pentagon condone--no matter how appalling they might be? If so, what does that tell us about how U.S. officials conduct our affairs overseas?
It's also troubling that such vagueness seems to come into play when the Pentagon or a member of the Administration or Congress tries to justify military spending. A reliable rule of thumb is: the greater the threat, the greater the need for spending on the military. If the Pentagon could ever create a "threat" out of thin air by listing menacing "instabilities" as matters of grave military concern to the U.S., that would be worrisome indeed for the national treasury.
There are a multitude of English words to describe American concerns overseas: civil wars, rebellions, anarchy, civil disturbances, insurrections, chaos, bedlam, riots, internecine conflicts, and humanitarian crises--just to name a few. Why create new terminology to cause even more confusion about such truly complex phenomena?
Perhaps the public should insist that our military use only reliable, verifiable English words, especially when the Pentagon seems unwilling to explicitly define the terms it does use.
Media Advisory
For Immediate Release
Contact: Francyne Harrigan
November 4, 1997
(202) 862-0700
U.S. DELEGATION TO ANNOUNCE RESULTS OF CUBA VISIT Senior Experts Report on Findings at Cuba Nuclear Power Plant
The visually orientated press conference will include footage of the visit to the nuclear power plant, Jaragua, Cuba. B-roll of the trip will also be available.