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| ISSUE #11 | September 25,1997 |
| ISSUE #11 | September 25,1997 |
Loose Nukes in the former Soviet Union: What's the Danger?
by Andrew Koch, Research Analyst, akoch@cdi.org
Are there nuclear weapons in Russia that have disappeared since the fall of the Soviet Union? That is the nexus of a recent controversy caused by General Alexander Lebed, the former head of Russia's Security Council. Lebed told 60 Minutes that 100 nuclear weapons, small enough to fit in a suitcase, are missing from the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. He also said he could not be certain that all the devices were removed from the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union and some may be unaccounted for.
Ironically, the movie Peacemaker, scheduled to be released tomorrow, plays on this fear and takes it to a new level. In the movie, the characters portrayed by Nicole Kidman and George Cloony chase terrorists who plan to detonate one of these "loose nukes" in New York City.
Fortunately, Lebed's statements are based more on domestic Russian politics than reality. The Russian government stated that the Soviet Union did possess small nuclear devices called atomic demolition munitions, but insisted that Lebed's statements are misinformed speculation. He made the claims before his "investigation" into the matter was complete (if it was ever conducted at all), and stands to benefit politically by rising security fears.
The coincidence of the issues posed by Lebed's allegations (albeit factually inaccurate) and the film do raise the important question of whether fissile materials in Russia are adequately secured. There are hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium housed at potentially vulnerable Russian facilities. The U.S. and Russian governments have addressed such concerns under a cooperative project called Nunn-Lugar and have made great strides towards reducing nuclear dangers.
Despite this progress and the need for more work to be done, Congress is threatening to cut funding for Nunn-Lugar due to Russia's participation in an Iranian nuclear power project. Ending funding for a program that fosters rare U.S.-Russian strategic cooperation would be another blow to getting START II ratified in the Russian Duma, an action already in doubt because of the controversy about NATO expansion. Canceling Nunn-Lugar would also reduce the likelihood that START III negotiations could begin anytime in the near future. Such an outcome would be a far greater long-term danger than Lebed's alleged "loose nukes."
The Stinger that keeps on Stinging
by David Isenberg, Senior Research Analyst, disenber@cdi.org
It looks as if the godless Commies aren't the only ones to have been stung by Stinger missiles and other weapons the United States shipped to the Afghan mujahedin when they were fighting the Soviet occupation.
The Voice of America reported earlier this week that the Swiss Supreme Court ruled the Swiss government can help the United States in its investigation of a weapons-bribery case involving a member of Congress and his partner. The U.S. case, which involves allegations that the Congressman received kickbacks from companies delivering arms to Afghan rebels, dates back to 1983 when the Congress approved $40 million in aid to purchase weapons for the rebels. Most of that went to purchase anti-aircraft guns provided by a company recommended by the Congressman. The U.S. government accuses the two men of having received some four million dollars in bribes for providing weapons to the mujahedin.
Although the identities of the two suspects are being kept secret, the Swiss tribunal says that the U.S. representative's family name begins with "W." That is a dead giveaway to those with long memories who remember those rollback days of the Reagan Doctrine. The unidentified legislator conceivably could be former Rep. Charles Wilson, a Republican from Texas. During the Reagan years he was a high profile supporter of increased military aid to the mujahedin, at one point making a secret trip into Afghanistan in 1987.
In this regard, a passage from a 1992 book, "The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story," by Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, is revealing. Yousaf, as head of the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Afghan Bureau from 1983-1997 controlled the flow of arms to the mujahedin, recounts details of Wilson's visit. He notes the congressman "enjoyed himself, being photographed on a white pony dressed as a Mujahideen with a bandolier of bullets across his chest. He was most excited when he came under spasmodic shellfire, although nothing landed closer than 200 metres. Because we had several Stingers with us we tried to tempt a helicopter to come within range, as the Mujahideen wanted to show off their skill and Wilson was equally enthusiastic to see one brought down....I mention this now because Wilson epitomized the attitude of many American officials that I met that Afghanistan must be made into a Soviet Vietnam."
In retrospect, if Mr. Wilson turns out to be the suspect and the U.S. government makes its case, it looks as if the Reagan doctrine of rolling back communism may have bankrolled more than arms traders and foreign officials.
(For the original VOA story go to gopher://gopher.voa.gov:70/00/newswire/tue/SWISS_-_U-S_INVESTIGATION)
Congress near agreement on Pentagon Spending; B-2 "all but dead."
by Chris Hellman, Senior Research Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
Congress is in the process of putting the finishing touches on the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Appropriations bill which, at $247.5 billion, is $3.6 billion above the Administration's request. House and Senate Conferees met last week to iron out the differences between their respective versions of the legislation, and final congressional action is expected in the next few days.
The $247.5 billion figure does not include spending for military construction or that portion of the Pentagon's budget funded through the Department of Energy for nuclear programs. (Congress addresses each of these spending bills separately.) Combined, these two items add about $18 billion to the total Pentagon budget, bringing the total to $265.5 billion.
By far the most contentious issue for conferees was the B-2 bomber which suffered a well- deserved fate. The House had budgeted $505 million for the program, including $331 million for advanced funding of nine new aircraft. The Air Force, the Administration, and the Senate all opposed funding additional planes. After lengthy and heated debate, the Conferees included a total of $331 million for the B-2 program--$157 million above the Pentagon's request--and left the decision on how to spend it up to the Administration, effectively killing the drive for new bomber purchases.
Conferees fully funded the Pentagon's requests for the Air Force's F-22 fighter ($2.2 billion), the Joint Strike Fighter ($931 million), and the Navy's F/A-18E/F fighter ($2.5 billion). The agreement restored the House's $114 million cut for the F/A-18E/F and the Senate's $291 million cut for the F-22. Conferees also upped the purchase of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, increasing the $542 million procurement request by nearly $170 million, and the number of aircraft from five to seven.
The Conference cut the Senate's $345 million request for advanced funding of the next aircraft carrier (CVN-77) to $50 million. The House had opposed the advanced funding, which was supposed to reduce the total cost of the carrier by $600 million. Senate conferees, confident that the program will be fully funded in future years, accepted the cut. Conferees also agreed to fund an additional DDG-51 destroyer for $720 million, increasing the number of ships bought to four and total funding to $3.4 billion.
Funding for ballistic missile defense ended roughly $700 million above the Administration's request of $3 billion. Of this, $978 million was for National Missile Defense, a $474 million increase. However, funds for the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program were cut by $150 million to $406 million due to congressional concerns about program delays and several testing failures. The Navy's Theater Wide ("Upper Tier") program got a substantial boost. Conferees increased the original $195 million request to $410 million, $35 million less then the House level.
The Definitive Threat
by Lt. Colonel Piers M. Wood, USAR (Ret.), Chief of Staff, pwood@cdi.org
The word is out. The National Defense Panel [NDP]--an independent commission appointed to review the Pentagon's decision on the composition of US forces-- will focus on the "threat." Instead of suggesting such things as size, cost and equipment, the NDP reportedly will determine what principal military dangers the U.S. will face and recommend capabilities we should develop to confront those threats.
The NDP has the opportunity to do what the Pentagon should have done in the first place--openly identify "worst case" scenarios. That is what military professionals are supposed to do--prepare the country for the most dangerous likelihood, not conjure unwarranted concern about "regional conflicts" from military midgets like Iraq or North Korea. These minor threats, which might damage our national interests, clearly cannot be ignored. However, the very real prospect of the emergence of some remilitarized great power a decade or more in the future on the scale of World War II is truly the "worst case." This is what should be addressed directly, not hedged against by exaggerating the lesser regional cases.
Being the "sole remaining superpower" is not a secure perch. Frequently in the past, innovative, aggressive challengers have risen from relative vulnerability to threaten the very survival of first rank powers. France, for instance, rose from military disarray in the French Revolution to displace Great Britain, the eighteenth century's superpower, with Napoleon's conquest of mainland Europe.
Even Rome suffered a completely unexpected strategic reversal in its early days. Hannibal came from under the Roman thumb to rout three Roman armies and terrorize the boot of Italy for more than a dozen years. These were not "Pearl Harbor" kinds of surprise attacks. In each case the superpower saw the conflict coming for some time but underestimated how dramatically its enemy's capabilities had increased. The fact that both Britain an Rome ultimately prevailed is testimony to how deeply prepared they actually were for the long run.
The unforeseeable but plausible threat to our nation's survival sometime after 2010 is where to NDP should concentrate its attention in the coming months to insure we do, in fact, build a force in-depth that can carry us through any worst case.
The Coming Sure Thing in Bosnia
by Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Associate Director dsmith@cdi.org
From time to time many phrases from sports have gained currency in ordinary speech. One such phrase from baseball is "Tinker to Evers to Chance," describing three turn-of-the-century Chicago Cubs players (shortstop, 2nd and 1st basemen) who invariably produced double plays against their opponents. So proficient was this dreaded trio that their linked names became synonymous with a "sure bet."
Those looking for a late 20th century "sure thing" could do worse than bet on a continued U.S. military presence in Bosnia after June 1998, the withdrawal date for the current stage of U.S.- NATO involvement.
When the Dayton Accords were finally accepted in late 1995, NATO forces organized as a 60,000 strong Implementation Force (IFOR) entered Bosnia to ensure separation of the warring parties, to establish controls over major weapons, and to provide security for nonmilitary personnel charged with helping to rebuild political institutions and the social fabric.
Although insisting that IFOR (Tinker) and the U.S. ground presence would last only 12 months, President Clinton in late 1996 changed course and endorsed a 31,000 Stabilization Force (SFOR) (Evers) which, with approximately 8,500 U.S. troops, would remain in Bosnia another 12 months. Continued delays in implementing provisions of the Dayton Accord, such as elections and training police, soon led to an extension of the SFOR mission until June 1998. This was to be a "date certain" for withdrawal of U.S. forces.
What many overlooked was a Pentagon briefing in which SFOR, within the over 18 months of its anticipated existence, was to slowly transform itself into a "Deterrence Force" of 13,500, including 5,000 U.S. troops. But SFOR has not been able to start reducing; in fact, for the recent elections, some 3,000 new American troops were brought in to help ensure public safety. Furthermore, "private police" (really small armies) still exist, suspected and indicted war criminals still defy the International Court, and refugees trying to reclaim villages and homes are not able to live in safety.
The continued need for over 30,000 troops, together with overt resistance by European NATO members to remaining in Bosnia if the U.S. leaves, points to a transformation of SFOR to ?FOR (Chance). For a number of weeks, the Administration has been signaling this position. This week, the President's National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, observed in a speech at Georgetown University that "peace is beginning to take root" but "gains are not irreversible" and there remain "many real challenges that will require patience and sustained effort."
For its part, Congress has thrown its own ball toward a ?FOR in the 1998 Defense Appropriations Bill. It has voted to cut off funding for U.S. military involvement in Bosnia effective June 1998. But because it also said that the President could certify that national interests required continued U.S. presence and request supplemental funds, Congress is inviting a substantial U.S. presence on the ground after June 1998.
Walking out completely in June 1998 could well unravel the apparent progress made under Dayton. If the end game is a more stable Bosnia, and if a continued U.S. presence is the only way this can happen, then the President and the Congress should come clean about continued U.S. involvement.
Vietnam taught that the military must have the public's support. Unlike Tinker to Evers to Chance, such support is never a sure thing. Rallying that support is the job of the President and the Congress. If they aren't willing to do that, then they should never have started the game in the first place.
NOTE: Russia and NATO are expected to discuss an exit strategy for NATO troops in Bosnia and ground rules for any future peacekeeping operations at the Permanent Joint Council meeting in New York on September 26. CDI will attend the Permanent Joint Council meeting in New York. For more information on the proceedings and outcomes, send an e-mail to tvalasek@cdi.org
America's Defense Monitor: "Marketing Tomorrow's Weapons."
American weapons manufacturers--a shrinking pool of giant industrial conglomerates--have apparently maintained a seller's market for their products, in spite of plummeting worldwide demand: $350 Billion for a new generation of tactical fighter aircraft. $65 Billion for a new fleet of nuclear attack submarines. Untold Billions for "Star Wars."
How can the United States justify such expenditures? The message from the defense industry, that we simply have no choice, has penetrated the highest levels of government and the consciousness of the American people.
This episode of America's Defense Monitor looks at how the defense industry manipulates Congress, the media, and the public's inclination toward peace and security, into market its most lethal wares in the US and abroad.
A transcript of this episode will be available soon at: http://www.cdi.org/adm/transcripts/1103.html VHS copies are also available for sale; Weekly Defense Monitor subscribers receive a 20% discount.
In the Washington, DC area, America's Defense Monitor is broadcast on WHMM Channel 32 at 12:30 PM on Sundays. Outside the DC area, check local listings for America's Defense Monitor or go to http://www.cdi.org/adm/station/