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First appeared in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, (Diplomatic courier) 2002, Oct. 21, 2002.
Once again, we can't see the forest for the trees. Wars in Chechnya and Yugoslavia, terrorist acts in the United States, and the conflict around Iraq are just some of the more prominent links in a chain of factors that suggest a deep crisis in the present system of international relations and the philosophy that underpins it.
Searching for a Place to Fit
The Cold War cultivated a sense of the world's predictability and a primitive approach to foreign relations. The world was unprepared for this era's demise. The United States needed more than 10 years after the U.S.S.R.'s collapse to conceptualize a new framework for its national security and to begin defining its new responsibilities. Europe has been able to formulate neither its "European idea" nor its foreign policy, and for now chooses to dwell within its own imagined realities. The Arab world has lost all traces of tolerance and, seemingly, all sense of historical reality. It's difficult to even hypothesize how many years it will take for Russia to find its place in this new age.
An understanding of this new arrangement is sorely lacking in capital cities and presidential cabinets across the world. Everyone criticizes the United States for hegemonism, but no one wants to accept the role of a global leader. Everyone wants to fight international terrorism, but no one really knows what it is, or how to defeat it. Countries like Russia and the United States, who attempt their own methods of combating terrorism, are vilified and criticized nearly as much as the terrorists themselves.
Today, Russian-American relations are much better than Euro-Russian or Euro-American relations. Russia no longer proselytizes the Communist dream, while the United States becomes ever more skeptical about its own dream of world democracy. Foreign policy is less often an extension of domestic policy — on the contrary, it nowadays affects domestic policy to a greater extent, as in the United States.
Friendly Neighbors, Friendlier Strangers
The concept of international blocs and alliances has also undergone many changes. It has taken on an ephemeral quality, because no one wants to delve into long-term commitments and dependencies. The global scene, meanwhile, is shifting so quickly that national elites are frequently unable to comprehend the true meaning of events that surround them. Allies unite to solve a narrow, concrete problem, and dissolve quickly like partners in a marriage of convenience. Next time they may meet as foes.
The meanings of concepts like war, victory, security, and military strength have undergone tremendous changes. Wars are waged at long range, or by suicidal patriots. They no longer focus on defeating the army, but on destroying the enemy's communication systems and inducing panic in his populace. The goal is no longer just a military victory, but also a regime change and its political implications. That is what the United States demands of Iraq. There's nothing unique about it — in the 1990s, regime changes occurred in Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R., and later Russia.
No matter how one feels about Stalin's foreign policy, it has to be admitted that in the post-war period the Soviet Union took up an active and distinct position, which guaranteed its influence in all major international structures. This has allowed the country to play a key role in the second half of the 20th century. Today the situation repeats itself, in part. Russia, of course, does not have all the advantages that were at U.S.S.R.'s disposal, but now she is in the same camp as the United States.
The alliance with Washington is crucial for Moscow in many respects. The newly ratified plan for expanding the European Union by 12 new members from East and South Europe will be the last such expansion for the next few decades. The same can be said for NATO's upcoming enlargement. Russia's place in Europe, at least for the next half century, has not been defined by the Europeans.
Virtual Foes
Many political actors have appeared on the world scene that are not formalized as governments and obey no sovereign authority — al Qaeda is one such actor. They cannot sign treaties or exchange ambassadors, they cannot be sanctioned or embargoed. They cannot be attacked, occupied territorially, or dislodged in a coup d'etat. They are simultaneously nowhere and everywhere.
The influence of such structures upon global development is rapidly increasing. They can be in several countries but obey none of the laws. They cannot be defeated with traditional methods. They don't even fall under the jurisdiction of international law, since the latter applies only to sovereign states. The Geneva Convention, for example, does not mention terrorism. These structures are like a bad flashback to the global Communist movement, through which the Kremlin attempted to create "the fifth column" in capitalist countries. But at least that movement had legal representatives, and an identifiable command structure.
The proposed war with Iraq will undoubtedly be a war of the old type, a type both politicians and military leaders are comfortable with. A victory will give America a boost of confidence, which has been waning after 9/11/01, but it will not bring the more important problem closer to resolution.
That problem, in my view, is the inevitable stand-off between sovereign states and international organizations that bear no mark of a state and reject the very notion of national sovereignty.
One could, of course, demand that Arafat cease all terrorist activity against Israel, or even sign an agreement formalizing such demands, but it is clear that the Palestinian leader does not hold a monopoly on controlling his territory. For a long time he has existed under a condition of limited sovereignty. Russian President Vladimir Putin is right in his own way by refusing to negotiate with [Chechen leader] Maskhadov, who is to a large extent a "virtual" president. But on the other hand, nor is Putin in full control of all the agents and structures operating in Russia.
The Early Bird Gets the Worm
Limited sovereignty is the new reality of an interconnected world. If before, in case of an outside threat, border security could be tightened and armies could be readied, then now such precautions become meaningless. The world has become so transparent, complex and interdependent that not one defense system can guarantee absolute safety. This argument is actively used by opponents of the U.S. missile shield program. Paradoxically, it is also this argument that led the White House to adapt preemption as the new way of ensuring national security.
It would be wrong to say that such a doctrine displaces the policy of containment. Rather, it takes containment to the next logical step. If previously the aggressor could expect retaliation in case of an attack, then now Washington declares that a preemptive strike may be carried out when a potential aggressor refuses to disarm. The White House reasons that the world cannot wait for an attack in order to eliminate a potential threat. In other words, offense is the best defense. That is the logic behind American military plans against Iraq. If the al Qaeda camps had been hit preemptively, while they were swarming with terrorists, the tragic events in New York and Washington probably would not have occurred. Moreover, since al Qaeda is not a state, no one's sovereignty would be impinged upon in such an attack.
Of course, such a conception is highly debatable and dangerous, fraught with unpredictable consequences. But its appearance does not betray imperialistic proclivities within the Bush administration. Rather, it signals the acknowledgement that a post-Cold War policy of containment is unable to prevent conflict, and has disarmed the West in the face of a new invisible enemy. It is an acknowledgement of the fact that modern nation-states, even the most powerful ones, continue to lose their traditional functions, unable to ensure safety for themselves or their allies as their borders turn porous and their defense systems become less reliable. To prevent "the doctrine of preemptive strikes" from becoming the major tool of international relations in the new century, it is not enough to merely criticize it or to accuse America of hegemonism. A new conceptual framework is needed, something that can effectively replace "the doctrine of prevention" which is fading into the past. For Russia, due to a number of reasons, this question is more urgent than for many other countries.
Over 15 years ago, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke frequently about the need for a new approach to international relations. Yet in that quest Gorbachev was bound by old conceptions. In the past decade and a half, a revolution has taken place within the global arena. And like every revolution, it has swept away old laws, rules and norms. Revolutions, after all, are unlawful and unconstitutional by definition. If preservation of the status quo were the driving force of evolution in the international community, we might still be living by laws of Egyptian pharaohs and the Code of Hammurabi, and the norms of Alexander the Great's or Darius' era would dictate global relations.
The Earth does not stand still. New practices will inevitably replace old ones. The first person to break the agreed-upon conventions will be seen as a criminal in the eyes of the majority. But time passes, and those who stubbornly cling to the past are bound to end in failure. Let not the dead hold back the living. One would hope that Russia, which has suffered from this reactionary mentality many times before, should understand the historic decrepitude of such notions.
Translation by Seva Gunitskiy, CDI
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