Securing U.S. Water Supplies

Earlier this week the FBI issued the latest in a series of warnings regarding possible terrorist attacks against American targets.  This time the nation's water utilities were told to prepare to defend themselves against possible attacks on pumping stations and pipes that serve its cities and suburbs.  The effort comes after the discovery of documents in Afghanistan, which indicate that al Qaeda terrorists have been investigating ways to disrupt the U.S. water supply on a massive scale.

This is not the first time concerns have been voiced over the water supply.  In January, the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center issued a bulletin indicating it believed members of al Qaeda were trying to gain remote control of U.S. water supplies and wastewater treatment plants.

Unlike some warnings in the past that were actually fairly improbable, like attacks by scuba divers, the most recent one points to a real vulnerability.

For years government officials have been pointing to the ease with which American infrastructure can be attacked.  Infrastructure means physical and cyber-based systems so fundamental that a break in operation would debilitate the United States.  Electrical power, gas and oil networks, telecommunications, banking and finance, transport, vital government operations, emergency services, and water supply systems are examples.  Protecting U.S. infrastructure was the goal of Presidential Decision Directive 63 released by former President Bill Clinton.    

In the case of water supplies, we can look to recent history for examples of the danger of water contamination.  In spring 1993, Milwaukee was staggered by the nation’s largest outbreak of waterborne disease.  Cryptosporidium, a protozoan, passed undetected through two water treatment plants and, once it reached customers’ taps, caused more than 400,000 illnesses (mostly diarrhea) and between 50 and 100 deaths out of some 800,000 customers who drank the water.  Cryptosporidium often is present in mammal feces, and so might have come from a nearby sewage plant; authorities never figured out what happened.  But a principle was established: p athogens in water supplies can kill.

When it comes to water system sabotage, two types, vandalism and terrorism, need to be considered.  Vandalism would interrupt the supply of water and reduces its quantity.  Terrorism would contaminate the water and reduces its quality.

As drinking water is essential to human life, denying it for any period could cause panic and disrupt society.  Supply interruptions include the destruction of, or interference with, reservoir dams, water towers or storage facilities, pumping stations, intakes, valves, treatment plants, the distribution system, or fire hydrants, denying the population drinking water or firefighting protection.  Supply interruptions can be caused by any number of acts, including physical destruction, interruption of the supervisory control and data acquisition system, or acts that could reduce the water pressure in a system.  Supply interruptions can also occur as an indirect result of contamination. 

There are about 168,000 public water systems in the United States, some serving 8 million people and some serving 25.  To thwart a repeat of the Milwaukee poisoning, security has been stepped up around the country’s water supplies.  Since Sept. 11, the local Coast Guard has been patrolling the area of Lake Michigan where Chicago’s water intake is located.  New York City has increased the number of daily samples it takes at 900 sites from 2,060 to nearly 2,500, blocked off some roads that traverse reservoirs and stationed armed guards at "critical sites.” 

Much of the public concern is focused on the safety of water reservoirs and treatment plants.  But in terms of vulnerabilities, the real danger may be the pipes that carry the water, not facilities that store or purify it.Most reservoirs hold between 3 million and 30 million gallons of water, which would significantly dilute any poison to the point that terrorists would have to release enormous quantities to do serious damage.  And most poison would be destroyed when the water is purified at a treatment plant.  Chlorination, used in most every municipal system, kills or inactivates viruses as well as bacteria like E. coli and salmonella.  Some plants also treat water with ozone, which is more effective in killing protozoa like crypto.  In most facilities the water is also filtered.  Removing particles larger than 1 micron in size will eliminate threats from anthrax and botulinum spores.

By contrast, water utility officials across the country are taking steps to prevent terrorists from reversing the flow of water into a home or business – which can be accomplished with a vacuum cleaner or bicycle pump – and using the resulting “backflow” to push poisons into a local water distribution system.  Such an attack would use utility pipes for the opposite of their intended purpose: instead of carrying water out of a tap, the pipes would spread toxins to nearby homes or businesses.

Also likely is a truck bomb or another explosive device set off beneath a pumping station, according to Tom Curtis, an executive of the American Water Works Association, whose member utilities supply water to 80 percent of the U.S. population.  "For instance," said Curtis, "one city has six giant pumps, and they're all in one building.  If you crashed an airplane into that building or blew it up, it would cause half a million people to lose their water supply almost instantly.  Pumps of this size must be custom-built and can take as long as 18 months to replace.”

While some of the scenarios being sketched these days are undoubtedly plain old fear-mongering by utilities seeking a greater part of the homeland security budget pie, the danger is real.

Fortunately, there are some things that can be done to address the threat.  The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection division of the new Department of Homeland Security should require all facilities to comply with the following standards:

	All facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, reservoir dams, water storage facilities and towers, pumping stations, water intake facilities, chlorine booster stations, and meter and valve boxes) should be fenced, be well lighted, and have a perimeter that is monitored by surveillance cameras and motion detectors.
	To prevent hacking, supervisory control and data acquisition systems for monitoring and controlling water parameters should not be connected to the Internet.  Remaining cyber security should be enhanced, and passwords should be changed regularly.
	The EPA should give grants to cities to ensure fire hydrants and other entry points to the distribution system are tamperproof.  Surveillance cameras should be located on-site at key points, such as at the chlorine storage facilities, chlorine injection areas, filter beds, hazardous chemical and fuel storage areas, and finished water storage areas.

 

By David Isenberg Independent Consultant sento@earthlink.net

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