Kabul, Kapisa and Logar

Kabul and its immediate environs are ostensibly under the control of the Afghan interim authority led by Hamid Karzai. For now, Karzai's star appears to be in the ascendant. The interim authority leader stormed Washington recently, part of a public relations 'blitzkrieg' that ranged from Kabul to the U.S. capitol via Mecca, Tokyo, and Beijing - all in two weeks. His campaign moved to New York next and then London.

Back in Afghanistan, the various warlords who control the country's outlying provinces are proving harder to woo. For outside of Kabul, and the adjacent provinces of Kapisa and Logar, many of the old guard still harbor designs over their traditional fiefdoms, with some not taking kindly to attempts by the infant Afghan administration to impose a new post-Taliban order upon them. That some of this old guard are also members of the interim authority makes the emerging political map of Afghanistan even more complex. The country has become increasingly unstable, with at least three outbreaks of factional fighting in recent weeks in the provinces of Kunduz, Balkh, and Paktya.

Meanwhile, Karzai has repeatedly called for more troops to be deployed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). He also wants their mandate to be extended to allow them to operate outside of Kabul and beyond the six-month time limit currently envisioned for the mission, as well as requesting that America actively participate in any peacekeeping force.¹ These requests have been rebuffed by the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, (currently the chief contributor to and leader of the ISAF).

Karzai's calls for ISAF's expansion have gained resonance since the death, at Kabul airport on Feb. 14, of Abdul Rahman, the interim authority's aviation and tourism minister. Initially, Rahman was reported to have been killed by Muslim pilgrims, angry at delayed flights to Saudi Arabia, although Karzai has since alleged that senior aides from the Northern Alliance faction in the Afghan administration were responsible. However, some have expressed doubts over this allegation, with anonymous sources within both the U.S. State Department and the interim authority itself claiming that Rahman was the victim of an angry mob rather than a conspiracy.² Whatever the truth of the matter, it further highlights the inherent instability of Afghanistan's caretaker government, and will doubtless lead to increased calls for a bigger peacekeeping presence in the country.

Indeed, even before Rahman's death, support for such expansion was growing, with the United Nation's envoy to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, saying he is "fairly confident" that such a move will occur.³ Speaking of the recent factional fighting in Afghanistan, the interim authority chairman asserted: "This is one more reason why we should finish warlordism in this country."⁴ Karzai's fears are well-founded, for current unrest may spread as the country's warlords jostle to consolidate their power bases and expand their influence, even as the Loya Jirga (or Grand Council) convenes to establish a transitional government for Afghanistan.

 
North: Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Sari Pul, Samangan, Bamiyan, and Parwan
Abdul Rashid Dostum's power base in the north is centered around Mazar-e Sharif and the outlying provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Sari Pul, Samangan, as well as Parwan, which lies closer to Kabul. Originally excluded from the interim authority, Dostum was named as the deputy defense minister. Until his appointment, Dostum was critical of the political arrangements in the Bonn Agreement of Dec. 6, 2001. Such a change of heart is not unusual in Afghan politics, and Dostum himself has switched allegiances several times in his career. However, that his support was deemed worthy of such a senior post belies how damaging his opposition to the Afghan interim authority might prove.

Furthermore, Dostum, who has not been seen in Kabul since his appointment and plays no active role in the authority, may yet prove cause problems for it. Indeed, the Uzbek warlord is alleged by some elements in the administration to be receiving arms and money from Iran in an attempt by Tehran to establish a sphere of influence in Afghanistan.⁵ While this could represent a serious challenge to Kabul if true, others in the interim authority have denied the allegation, saying there is no evidence to support it.⁶

Such claims of Iranian interference are further colored, and possibly partly motivated by, the friction between Dostum and many of his Tajik allies within the Northern Alliance. Fighting occurred between his forces and Tajiks in Kunduz province on Jan. 21 and 22, with further clashes erupting around Mazar-e Sharif itself on Feb. 2 and 3 - this time between Dostum's forces and those of Ustad Mohammed Atta. Dostum and Atta were formerly allies, but relations between them have deteriorated considerably since their combined forces captured Mazar-e Sharif from the Taliban, with each seeking to assert his dominance over the region.

A U.N.-mediated conference between Dostum's Junbish-i-Mellie grouping and Atta's Jamiat-i-Islami, along with a third faction also active in the area - the Hazara group, Hezb-i-Wahdat - helped produce a cease-fire and an agreement to establish a new security council to control Mazar-e Sharif. The Hezb-i-Wahdat, founded by Iran in the 1980s, is led by Karim Khalili, who holds sway in centrally located province of Bamiyan (once site of Afghanistan's famed, but now destroyed, Buddha statues) whose capital he seized from the Taliban. Karim claims to support the interim authority, although he has expressed reservations about its composition.⁷

Under the agreement negotiated at Mazar-e-Sharif, each faction contributed some 200 fighters to a new police force for the city. However the situation there remains volatile, and clashes have since broken out elsewhere in the region, including the towns of Sholgara, Dawlatabad, and Chimtal.⁸ Although Dostum has played down the significance of the fighting, it demonstrates the growing difficulties the interim authority is facing in exerting countrywide control over Afghanistan.⁹

 
Northeast: Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan

Kunduz, like Afghanistan's other northeastern provinces of Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan, is controlled by Mohammed Daoud, a supporter of former president Burhannuddin Rabbani, or by other Tajik warlords affiliated with Mohammed Daoud Fahim, the interim authority's defence minister. The Jan. 21 and 22 clashes involved Dostum and Fahim loyalists and took place in the Quala Zaal region. This area, some 40 miles west of Kunduz, controls access to the Tajikistan border. The dispute died down when the Dostum faction withdrew to Balkh province. However, these forces are said to be planning their return and fighting may flare up again.¹⁰ Moreover, if Tajiks affiliated with Burhannuddin become involved in any clashes the episode could prove more ominous yet. Burhannuddin remains a powerful player in Afghan politics, despite being left out of the new administration in Kabul, and is rumored to be distributing cash among various regional commanders in an attempt to buy their support.¹¹ As such threats indicate, the Kabul administration faces challenges from both within and without.

 
East: Nuristan, Laghman, Kunar, and Nangarhar

U.N. security updates classify the eastern provinces of Nuristan, Laghman, Kunar, and Nangarhar as being mainly free of tribal control, and the region is reported by Afghans crossing into Pakistan as being mostly calm.¹² However, local commanders are still imposing a toll at Sarobi, astride the road between Kabul and Jalalabad, which, in recent weeks, has been a virtual 'no-go' area following the murder of four journalists last November.¹³ Abdul Qadir, who walked out of the Bonn talks last November because he felt his ethnic group's was under-represented in the interim authority, controls the strategic city of Jalalabad, as governor of Nangarhar.¹⁴ Qadir claims to be powerless to secure the main route to the Afghan capital. The Asia Times reports that the situation in the area remains "unclear", adding that, "as a matter of tradition," unrest elsewhere in the country has tended to quickly spread to Jalalabad.¹⁵ Certainly, the mix of warlords in eastern Afghanistan is as volatile as that in other regions. Other important players in the area include:

	Haji Gardezi: Leader of the Southern Council of Afghanistan, which proclaimed itself the government of Jalalabad after the city was liberated from the Taliban last November.
	Zaman Ghun Shareef: Leader of the Eastern Shura - the council of elders which succeeded the Southern Council of Afghanistan in proclaiming itself the government of Jalalabad.
	Yunis Khalis (aka Mawlawi Mohammed): One of the most senior mujahidin commanders during the war against the Soviets, allied with the Taliban until the fall of Kabul when he defected, seizing the strategic Torkham checkpoint on the Pakistani border. Khalis was affiliated with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Herb-e-Islami faction (although the current relationship between the two is unclear), and reportedly attempted to install himself in Jalalabad and declare the city independent of both Taliban and Northern Alliance rule.
	Haji Mohammed Zaman: A field commander prominent in the Jalalabad region.
	Hasrat Ali: Affiliated with Abdul Qadir, Ali took over Kundar province after the Taliban withdrew.

In another development, according to an anonymous U.N. security officer quoted by the London Times, rival warlords vying for control of Kabul's outlying provinces have been arming men in large numbers in the refugee camps around Jalalabad.¹⁶

 
Southeast: Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, Paktika, Paktya, and Khost

Afghanistan's southeast provinces of Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, Paktika, Paktya, and Khost are also witnessing an unfolding struggle between the various parties seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the Taliban's departure. Here, as in the north, open warfare has erupted in Gardez, the provincial capital of Paktya, situated only 60 miles south of Kabul. The fighting pits the forces of Bacha Khan (aka Padsha Khan Zadran) against Haji Saifullah. Khan, whose followers are mainly from the Zadran tribe, was appointed by the interim authority in Kabul to the governorship of Paktya. However, he proved an unpopular choice with the local people, who are mostly Ahmadzais. They convened a shura (or council) that elected Saifullah governor. Saifullah claims to support the Kabul administration and acknowledges its right to select a governor. However, he also says he will never accept Khan's appointment to the post.¹⁷ Khan, whose brother Amanullah Zadran is minister for border and tribal affairs in the interim authority, has also been involved in a growing power struggle in neighboring Khost province (where another of his brothers, Kamal, is acting governor) with a faction affiliated with the Northern Alliance, a group he has been openly criticized, and which also has close ties with the Gardez council.

Over 60 people were reported killed in the fighting that broke out when Kabul's appointee arrived to take up office in the Paktya capital. Both sides became involved in a standoff, with Saifullah holding out in Gardez and Khan moving artillery onto the high ground surrounding the city. The interim authority dispatched a team of civilian mediators. U.N. officials and U.S. military representatives were also involved in negotiations between the opposing groups, who both claimed to want a peaceful solution to the fighting but also said that they were prepared to escalate operations if need be. Kabul responded by appointing a new governor to the province - Taj Mohammed Wardag - and ordering Khan to stand down. Initially, Khan refused to do so and his brother threatened to resign his post in the Kabul administration.¹⁸ Khan's forces have since been said to have left the area,¹⁹ however, the episode raises the specter of fresh clashes in the region, something that not only risks destabilizing the interim authority but also puts U.S. troops in the area in danger of being caught in any crossfire.

Meanwhile, in Ghazni, where Qari Baba has been reinstalled as governor, the country's surviving Taliban leaders and surviving al Qaeda are reported by local senior civilian and military officials to have taken to the hills in the south of the province. Fugitives are also said to be present throughout neighboring Zabul province, with local Pashtun tribesmen and military commanders reluctant to hunt them down amid fears that they themselves will be subsequently abandoned by the United States. The ages-old Afghan tradition of granting asylum for crimes committed in other provinces is also a factor in the reluctance of the authorities in Ghazni to actively pursue any Taliban or al Qaeda fighters still in the region. Some commanders have complained that, had their earlier intelligence reports been acted upon more promptly by the U.S. military, these men would not have escaped in the first place. In addition, local tribesmen are wary of referring to any such fugitives lest they incur U.S. air strikes and any attendant collateral damage.²⁰

 
South: Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Hilmand

Gul Agha Sherza, who has been reinstalled as governor of Kandahar, ostensibly controls Afghanistan's southern provinces. But, Sherza, who supports the former Afghan King, Zahir Shah, may have a less secure power base in Uruzgan, Kandahar, and Hilmand than he would like. What currently serves the region as an 'army' reportedly includes a high percentage of former Taliban fighters, and is effectively controlled by Khan Mohammed and Mullah Naqibullah - warlords unhappy with Sherza's appointment as governor.²¹ Mohammed actively opposed the Taliban while Naqibullah is closely linked to them.

However, both men are from the same tribe and have united in common cause as rivals to Sherza. Naqibullah has been quoted as saying: "Wait until the Americans have gone ... Gul Agha will not last five minutes. America has backed the wrong horse."²² Such factors bode ill for any prospects of long-term stability in the region.

Nor are the Kandahar governor's troubles confined to his own fiefdom. He has, in recent weeks, been petitioned by many Pashtuns protesting abuse by the predominantly Tajik soldiers of Ismail Khan, resident warlord in neighboring Herat province. Moreover, some U.S. officials fear that the support Khan is allegedly receiving from Iran may encourage him to move against Sherza in an attempt to expand his territory. There is little love lost between the two warlords, who have accused each other of harboring al Qaeda fugitives.²³ Meanwhile, the road west from Kandahar to Herat remains insecure. The Asia Times reports unspecified sources as claiming that senior Taliban leaders, Mullah Omar among them, have been moving between Uruzgan, and Hilmand provinces.²⁴

 
West: Badghis, Herat, Ghor, Farah, and Nimroz

The prominent warlord in the western Afghan provinces of Badghis, Herat, Ghor, Farah, and Nimroz is Ismail Khan. Khan the former governor of Herat, reclaimed his old post soon after Kabul fell to Northern Alliance forces. However, as is the case elsewhere in the country, the dominance (or lack thereof) of one warlord has heightened regional insecurities. Such insecurities are further fueled by the reintroduction of the old communist-era system under which security responsibility is allocated among five of the country's thirty-odd provincial governors.²⁵ As a result, Khan sees himself as controlling neighboring Farah, a view not shared by Abdul Hai Neamati, the provincial governor there. Neamati's call for peacekeepers to be deployed to the area belies the seriousness with which he views the threat posed by his powerful neighbor, who, it has been claimed, is being armed by Iran.²⁶

The Iranians deny these charges, insisting that only humanitarian aid is being dispatched to Afghanistan. Moreover, Tehran has pledged $560 million to help with Afghanistan's reconstruction and threatened to expel Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former Afghan mujahidin commander living in Iran who recently called for an uprising against foreign troops stationed in his homeland.²⁷ At the same time, conflicting statements have emerged from sources linked to the interim authority in Kabul, both confirming and denying that Iran is assisting Khan or Abdul Rashid Dostum, the northern Afghan warlord who some say is also being armed and financed by Tehran.²⁸ Khan, like Dostum, has disputed these claims.

Meanwhile, on Feb. 7, Hamid Karzai flew to Herat to talk with his governor. It is probable that the subject of Iranian interference in Afghanistan featured on the meeting's agenda. The issue certainly warranted discussion. For if the interim authority over which Karzai presides is to stand any chance of bringing stability to Afghanistan it must first overcome the internal and external challenges facing it. Whether it will need outside help to do this remains to be seen.

End Notes:

¹   See, for example, Two Visions Of Afghanistan, Washington Post, January 20, 2002. Also, Karzai To Seek Continuing U.S. Role, Washington Times, January 28, 2002

²   Afghan Aide Assasinated, Leader Says, Washington Post, Questions Persist as Afghans Bury MinisterWashington Post, February 16, 2002

³   Quoted in, U.N. May Broaden Peace Mission, Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2002

⁴   Quoted in U.N. 'Averts War In Mazar', BBC News Online, February 4, 2002

⁵   Warlord Gets Money, Arms From Iraq, Afghan Aides Say, Washington Post, February 7, 2002

⁶   Iran's No Problem, Says Kabul, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 14, 2002

⁷   Leading Pashtun Quits Afghan Talks, BBC News Online, November 30, 2001

⁸   Alliance that Drove Out Taliban Unraveling, Boston Globe, February 3, 2002

⁹   Afghan Fighting Raises Fears For The Future, The Times (U.K.), February 4, 2002

¹⁰  Alliance that Drove Out Taliban Unraveling, Boston Globe, February 3, 2002

¹¹  Warlords Threaten Afghan Stability, BBC News Online, January 28, 2002

¹²  Afghanistan U.N. Security Update, February 4, 2002. Also, Afghanistan: Focus On Concerns Over Security Grows, IRIN News, February 5, 2002

¹³   Ibid.

¹⁴   Leading Pashtun Quits Afghan Talks, BBC News Online, November 30, 2001

¹⁵   Afghanistan Proceeds To Tear Itself Apart, Online Asia Times, February 5, 2002

¹⁶   Taleban Army Rises Again To Face U.S., The Times, (U.K.), January 25, 2002

¹⁷   Quoted in Strife Tests Afghan Leader, Washington Post, February 4, 2002

¹⁸   Karzai's Toughest Test: A Defiant Warlord Threatens to Sink the New Afghan Leader, Newsweek, February 13, 2002

¹⁹   Afghans Cheer a Homecoming: Governor's Appointment Tests Kabul's Ability to End Strife, Washington Post, February 15, 2002

²⁰   Lying Low In 'Taliban Country', Christian Science Monitor, February 5, 2002

²¹   Mullah Omar's Troops Enlist In Afghan Army, The Times, (U.K.), January 17, 2002

²²   Ibid.

²³   Iran, U.S. Jockey For Influence In A Post-Taliban Afghanistan, Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2002

²⁴   Afghanistan Proceeds To Tear Itself Apart, Online Asia Times, February 5, 2002

²⁵   Rival Flags Stir Afghan Fear, New York Times, February 4, 2002

²⁶   Warlord Gets Money, Arms From Iraq, Afghan Aides Say, Washington Post, February 7, 2002. Also, Iran 'Is Arming Afghan Warlord', The Times, (U.K.), January 25, 2002

²⁷   Ibid.

²⁸   Compare Warlord Gets Money, Arms From Iraq, Afghan Aides Say, Washington Post, February 7, 2002, with, Iran's No Problem, Says Kabul, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 14, 2002

By Mark Burgess CDI Research Assistant mburgess@cdi.org

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