America’s armed forces are being slowly reshaped by ‘transformational’ initiatives that will increase their ability to fight the wide range of diverse conflicts the 21st Century will bring.   But many times the United States either cannot or should not act alone. Allies are of vital importance, and the United Kingdom could well be seen as the closest and most reliable.   But is British military transformation, arguably only begun in 1998, adequate to redesign Britain’s forces for the challenges the War on Terror, and other conflicts, will hold?

The British government’s response to the changes in the international security environment caused by the end of the Cold War started to become apparent in July 1990 when the ‘Options for Change’ force reduction plan was first outlined.  Over the next six years, armed forces strength dropped from 306,000 to 226,000 and some forces were re-orientated toward a more mobile reaction role, principally within the Army, which took on the leadership of NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps.¹  However, the orientation of the Armed Forces remained primarily NATO and European operations.  There were continuing small-scale reviews, mostly focused on force cutbacks, during the early 1990s.  However, a more fundamental examination of the armed forces’ future was promised during the Labour Party’s election campaign in 1997.  This emerged as the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) in July 1998.

The priorities set out in the SDR meant the retention, at a lower level, of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, aboard four Trident missile-equipped submarines.  However, the submarine maintained on constant patrol will carry only 48 warheads compared to a possible 192.  The reduced threat environment has also meant the Trident missiles have taken over the battlefield nuclear role formerly performed by the WE 177 aircraft-delivered nuclear bomb.²

The SDR changed the basis upon which Britain structured its conventional forces away from the NATO contribution to the need to conduct expeditionary operations.³The Ministry of Defense decided that the United Kingdom’s forces now needed to be capable of conducting two concurrent small-scale operations or one full-scale operation.  After a long series of small cuts, the SDR left the U.K. armed forces with two similar deployable heavy mechanized divisions and an air assault brigade, three aircraft carriers, ‘32 to 35’ frigates and destroyers, 12 submarines, 11 fighter/attack squadrons, and five fighter interceptor squadrons.⁴Two RAF squadrons were disbanded as a result of the review.

The conventional force structure changes were intended to give the forces a greater capability to sustain the one major or two minor operations goal, in addition to the continuing anti-terrorist operations in Northern Ireland.  Thus the re-roling of two brigades, to produce an extra mechanized brigade and to merge the previous airborne and airmobile brigades into the new 16th Air Assault Brigade, made more heavy forces available to sustain a robust training schedule while having sufficient ground forces ready for either war-fighting or a peace keeping commitment.  The new Air Assault Brigade retained a battalion-level parachute forced entry capability alongside the newly introduced AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, which the Army started to receive in May 2000.  The new environment, defense planners felt, did not require the retention of a full airborne brigade.

However the most visible force change in the SDR was naval.  The Royal Navy had since the late 1970s operated a three small carrier force whose original role had been to stop Soviet long-range aircraft interfering with anti-submarine efforts in the Atlantic during a potential future East-West conflict.  Following the end of the Cold War, the carriers’ roles had been stretched further and further to try to respond to the increasingly expeditionary needs of the post cold war era.  The SDR recognized that the replacement carriers should be larger and more versatile, though only two are projected.  The carriers’ will operate mixed air groups from ‘Joint Force Harrier’ made up of both Navy and Air Force Harriers.  After 2010, the Harriers will be replaced by a ‘Future Joint Combat Aircraft’, expected to be named as the U.S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

The SDR also strengthened transport forces, in response to new and existing mobility requirements.  After some delay, including the cancellation of the original requirement, four Boeing C-17 heavy transport aircraft entered service in September 2001 with No.99 Squadron at RAF Brize Norton to fulfill the strategic airlift requirement.  Britain has also bought 25 new Lockheed C-130Js, and wants 25 European A400M transport aircraft.  Six new roll-on roll-off transport ships are also to be procured to fill the sealift requirement.  These ships are to enter service from 2002, and will eventually replace the two civilian transport ships converted and temporarily leased to fill the requirement.

Lessons and Remedies from Kosovo

Operation Allied Force over Kosovo exposed a number of deficiencies in U.K. military capabilities, despite the implementation of the SDR.  These included strategic lift, both British and European, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), a lack of all-weather precision bombing capability, insecure and obsolete U.K. tactical communications, worse on land than in the air, intelligence and reconnaissance capability, and incompatible information systems across NATO.⁵  Both Parliamentary and Defense Ministry reports stressed U.K. and European deficiencies, reflecting the wide disparity which emerged between U.S. and allied capabilities during the campaign.

The strategic lift requirement had been identified during the SDR Review before the Kosovo campaign.  It will be one of the most heavily used capabilities in the future, both as part of long-range overseas deployments as part of the war on terror and other continuing global commitments.  Whether the European A400M aircraft will actually enter service however is uncertain.  A lack of parliamentary consensus within the ruling German parliamentary coalition may derail the anticipated 73-aircraft German buy, which would effectively end the program, as otherwise it will be uneconomical for Airbus, the manufacturers, to build the reduced number of aircraft.  In that case, Britain could take up the option to buy it holds for the four C-17s, and it might well buy further C-130Js.⁶

Britain and France both lack adequate SEAD capabilities.  While Britain has introduced the Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) was used in Kosovo, it lacks the tactical electronic warfare and other capabilities that allow U.S. forces to destroy enemy air defense networks effectively.  The British Defense Ministry’s response to Parliament’s lessons of Kosovo investigation admitted the deficiency but said that it was unlikely that Europe would seek to launch a campaign of such scale without NATO (that is, U.S.) involvement.⁷  Thus, it seems that this gap will not be filled in the near future and Britain and the rest of Europe will continue to rely on U.S. capabilities in this regard.

All-weather precision bombing capability was also recognized as a necessary area for improvement prior to the launching of Operation Allied Force.  During the Kosovo campaign, only 24 percent of weapons used by the RAF were precision-guided, and their shortage forced a reliance on unguided bombs.  In July 2000, the Defense Ministry said that several measures would be taken to remedy deficiencies in the wake of Kosovo, which included the acquisition of AGM-65 Maverick anti-tank missiles for the Harrier fleet, and enhanced Paveway laser-guided bombs for the Tornado force.  The Storm Shadow air-launched GPS-guided missile, along with the Brimstone fire-and-forget anti-armor missile will both enter service this year, 2002.⁸  In total this will represent a great improvement from the weaponry used during Operation Allied Force.

Tactical communications were a problem during the Kosovo operations both in the air, where secure communications were sometimes not possible, and on the ground, where transmissions using the old ‘Clansman’ radio system could sometimes be overheard by the Serbs.  The Defense Ministry said in January 2001 that work on ensuring the security of aircraft communications should be completed ‘within the next few months,’ but remedying the ground radio communications gaps will take longer.⁹  The replacement ‘Bowman’ system suffered severe delays, including a slippage in in-service dates from 1995 to 2003-4, and the rejection of the first sole-source supplier’s solution in July 2000.  A new prime contractor, CDC Systems UK, was announced on July 19, 2001; the first component of the system, the Personal Role Radios, were also delivered starting in July 2001.

Intelligence and reconnaissance systems were also found wanting in Kosovo.  The Phoenix Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) performed well, gathering reconnaissance data and relaying it onward for use.  However, it did not have the ability to relay data directly to strike aircraft, though in January 2001 the Defense Ministry did say that that capability would soon be introduced. The Airborne Stand-Off Radar system, to be mounted in a converted Bombardier/Short Global Express aircraft, will provide wide-area ground surveillance radar coverage when it eventually enters service in 2005, more than two years after the originally planned date.  New reconnaissance pods for both the Jaguar and Tornado strike aircraft are planned, as well as a successor to the Phoenix UAV; the Sender and Spectator UAV systems will provide both tactical and formation level UAV support.¹⁰  However no in-service date has yet been fixed for their deployment.  Information systems across NATO were also found to be incompatible.

On the whole, the deficiencies revealed in Kosovo are being rectified.  Some, though, are European-wide deficiencies where capabilities cannot be raised to U.S. levels without spending far more than most Europeans are prepared to pay.  No program is being proposed to match the U.S. EA-6B Prowler’s tactical electronic warfare aircraft, for example.

Afghanistan and the War on Terror

Following Sept. 11, the United Kingdom was the first U.S. ally to contribute combat forces to the U.S. assault on the Taliban and al Qaeda.  British forces were involved in the first strikes of the campaign, on Oct. 7, 2001.  Three British attack submarines, HMS Superb, HMS Trafalgar and HMS Triumph were in the theatre of operations, and one or more of them fired Tomahawk cruise missiles at terrorist targets on the first night of the campaign.  Royal Air Force tankers, Tristars and VC-10s, and reconnaissance and early warning aircraft, Canberra PR.9s and Sentry AEW Mark 1s, have also been involved since the early days of October.

 Coincidentally, a significant British force had been deployed to Oman for Exercise Swift Sword II in early September 2001.  From this force, a small helicopter carrier group led by the Invincible-class carrier HMS Illustrious was retained in the Arabian Sea to support Operation Enduring Freedom.  It consisted of the carrier, reequipped for helicopter operations, the assault ship HMS Fearless, two escorts, seven support ships, and a 200 strong party of elite Royal Marine Commandos.  The helicopter carrier HMS Ocean relieved the other carrier and Fearless in February.  Operating with strong allied naval forces, the group was tasked to prevent any fugitive terrorists fleeing by sea.  The senior British naval commander on the scene, Rear Adm. Burnell-Nugent, was appointed deputy Coalition Joint Force Maritime Component commander, second-in-command of all coalition naval vessels in the region, working under U.S. Vice Adm. Timothy J. Keating, the U.S. Navy regional commander.

On the ground in Afghanistan, U.K. Special Forces, including the elite Special Air Service, have conducted reconnaissance and combat operations in conjunction with U.S. forces since before the formal onset of the campaign in early October.  It was also announced on March 18, 2002, that a 1,700 strong Royal Marine Commando Group, built around 45 Commando, will deploy to assist U.S. operations against remaining Taleban and al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan.¹¹  The force will consist of infantry supported by artillery, engineers, logistics personnel, and helicopters.  The force will operate in Afghanistan for at least three months.

The United Kingdom also played the leading role in establishing and deploying the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which was deployed to Afghanistan in December 2001 to assist the new Afghan Interim Authority to maintain security in Kabul and the surrounding areas.  The Force Headquarters was based upon the 3rd Division and commanded by British Maj. Gen. John McColl.  The subordinate Kabul Multinational Brigade headquarters was based on U.K. Headquarters 16th Air Assault Brigade, and a British infantry battalion is among the ISAF’s 5,000 personnel.

Finally, it seems that Britain may start to assist the United States in anti-terrorist operations in Yemen.  Diplomatic sources said on March 20, 2002, that three months of exercises would soon begin, but gave no indications of the nature or scale of the activities.¹²

A New Chapter: The Impact of Sept. 11 on British Defense Policy

Outside of direct involvement in the U.S. war efforts, Sept. 11 has had other effects on UK defense policy.  Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon announced Dec. 5, 2001, in a speech at King’s College in London that a ‘new chapter’ of the SDR was to be drafted to determine how UK policy should change to face the new challenges that have arisen in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States.

The new chapter will investigate whether the United Kingdom has the right concepts, the right forces and the right capabilities to address terrorism and asymmetric threats.  The government has released a discussion paper, inviting comments from the public.  One of the most important questions is that of assessing the balance between overseas operations to destroy terrorist bases and activities designed to protect the U.K. homeland.  The appropriate level of action to address the key underlying causes of international terrorism is also due for discussion.  Finally, the right role of international organizations (the European Union, United Nations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in the anti-terrorism campaign will be assessed.

Few indications of the new policy have emerged.  It is known that the Defense Ministry wants to make two more brigades mobile and light to support the two existing rapid reaction formations.  The two brigades, one in the South-East and one in Scotland, would be shorn of reserve Territorial Army units and have regular units added.  The Territorial Army as a whole would have an expanded role in supporting the police guarding key installations against terrorist attack.¹³  Britain’s forces, due to their historic global role, are relatively well-suited for the types of missions needed for Operation Enduring Freedom.  Britain’s Special Forces and light infantry are among the world’s best, and their precision strike capabilities are being improved.

Conclusions

The United Kingdom was slow to fundamentally reshape its forces after the Cold War.  After eight years of intermittent cuts to the old structure, a new shape and focus for the Armed Forces was outlined more fully in the 1998 SDR.  The SDR has served Britain well; fewer deficiencies were uncovered in Kosovo in British forces compared to other U.S. European allies.  Some deficiencies are still not remedied, but for Enduring Freedom, this will not matter too much as U.S. forces are fully engaged and can shoulder the necessary missions.  Looking forward in the ‘war on terror,’ British forces are well prepared for the task ahead.  Britain’s political outlook also makes it likely to be one of the United State’s closest allies in the continuing struggle.

 

Colin Robinson CDI Research Assistant crobinson@cdi.org

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