Afghanistan:
United Kingdom Deploys Commando Battlegroup

As the United Kingdom’s March 18 announcement that it is to deploy 1,700 combat troops to Afghanistan shows, the military campaign there remains far from over.  The British deployment comprises a battlegroup built around 45 Commando, Royal Marines.  This will join a U.S.-led brigade and participate in future operations against al Qaeda.  The U.K. force will eventually number 1,700, including personnel from all three British armed services.  As if to reinforce the oft-alleged British tendency toward understatement, the operation in which the battlegroup will participate has been codenamed Jacana, after an African bird noted to be shy and retiring.  Unlike the U.K. contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the battlegroup will engage in warfighting, and is the largest such British contingent since the Gulf war.  However, the force’s deployment did not began auspiciously, with Pakistan refusing to allow Karachi to be used as a staging post, a development which highlights the contradictory pressures inherent in maintaining a broad-based alliance that includes Muslim countries in the war against al Qaeda.

The request for the British battlegroup came from Gen. Tommy R. Franks who, as Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, is responsible for the campaign in Afghanistan.  Franks could have assigned the mission allocated to the Royal Marines to American troops.  For instance, the 10^th Mountain Division and 101^st Airborne division, both of whom fought in the recent Anaconda operation, have two brigades, or almost 7,000 personnel that have yet to be committed to battle.  Two U.S. Marine expeditionary units as well as the American 25^th Infantry and 82^nd Airborne divisions are also apparently eager to get into action.  However, as the London Times recently noted, “with international criticism of Bush’s threats against Baghdad mounting, Washington has appeared increasingly keen to demonstrate the solidarity of the anti-terrorism coalition.”¹  This does not mean, that the British deployment signifies widespread British support for military action against Iraq.  Indeed, Prime Minister Blair’s support for such a venture has caused such disquiet among his own party as to raise rumors of a leadership challenge.²  However, like other allied participation, such as during Operation Anaconda, the dispatching of the U.K. battlegroup does lend the war in Afghanistan a legitimacy that might otherwise be absent were the campaign to be undertaken solely by America.  As such, the desirability of a more multi-national force rather than any suggestion that American troops are not up to the job motivated the U.S. request for the British force.  This does not mean that Franks did not consider the significant military capability that the U.K. Commando battlegroup will bring to ongoing operations to hunt down al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan.

The British Commandos bring with them long experience in counter insurgency operations, ranging from the jungles of Malaya and Borneo in the 1950s to the streets and farmlands of Northern Ireland in more recent years.  This will prove invaluable as the Afghan war enters a phase that U.S. officials forecast will see a growth in guerrilla attacks by al Qaeda and Taliban forces.  In addition, the Royal Marines are well used to tough conditions.  In the 1982 Falklands war 45 Commando famously marched 80 miles at the height of the South Atlantic winter, with each man carrying some 100 lbs of equipment, before defeating a numerically superior enemy force.  As such feats indicate, Royal Marine Commandos are considered among the world’s best soldiers.  Their basic training alone lasts 26 weeks and is conducted in classes of 60, allowing extensive individual tutoring.  They then attend a six-week commando course before being “green-hatted,” as the act of earning the green Commando beret is known.  The marines are also trained in mountain and artic warfare, something that influenced the U.S. request for such troops.  Morale is high among the advance party of the Commando battlegroup, already at Bagram, with much expected of them.  However, there is also concern in some quarters about the mission facing the British marines.

For instance, worries have been expressed over these troops taking on a warfighting role, while other British personnel are involved elsewhere in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  Some fear that deploying British combat troops will cause British peacekeepers to be viewed as “legitimate targets” by enemy forces, something Ministry of Defense officials are said to be willing to accept.³  Indeed, such targeting is already happening, as the recent discovery of six cars rigged with explosives and intended for use against peacekeepers in Kabul shows.⁴  Given the nature of the September 11 attacks, al Qaeda’s concept of what constitutes a legitimate target is hardly in doubt.  Moreover, ISAF has a robust mandate that allows it to take whatever means are necessary to fulfill its mission, and should be prepared to defend itself regardless of whether the nationalities who comprise it also have combat troops on the ground in Afghanistan.  As such, the argument that it is not possible to have warfighters and peacekeepers involved in Afghanistan at the same time is debatable. 

Rather more serious are the concerns of John Barry, a former commander of the Mountain and Artic Warfare Cadre – the unit responsible for training 3 Commando Brigade, of which 45 Commando is part.  Barry has confidence in 45 Commando’s abilities.   He cautions, however, that while he would back the British Marines against virtually anyone in a fight, they have not seen action since the Falklands conflict.⁵  More ominous is his warning that it will take at least a month for the newly-deployed troops to acclimatize to the high altitudes in which they will operate, a fear that has been echoed by other mountain warfare experts.⁶  Barry also warns that the SA-80 assault rifles that the Royal Marines will carry into battle have yet to be tested in an environment such as they will meet in Afghanistan’s mountain ranges. Likewise, he questions the suitability of the British 105 mm howitzers that, while accurate, pack one-third the punch of their U.S. 155 mm counterparts, which are too heavy to be carried by the battlegroup’s helicopters.⁷

Alongside such concerns, the risk of committing the U.K. forces to too many operations has also tempered discussions over the decision to send more British troops to Afghanistan.  This new deployment will mean that out of a total of 205,000 personnel, the UK. armed forces will have 31,000 deployed either overseas or on internal security duties in Northern Ireland, with the same number either recovering from such operations or preparing for deployment.  British Chiefs of Staff are said to be concerned at the fast operational tempo this entails.⁸  This will lead to shorter periods between deployments, leaving troops less rested and less prepared for any new missions.  Such “overstretch” has particularly hit the Royal Marines as well as the Parachute Regiment, the two units that tend to be called upon first to respond to any overseas emergency operations. 

As well as over-committing Britain’s airborne and commando troops, this could cause morale problems among the line regiments who make up the bulk of the U.K. armed forces.  As noted British military historian John Keegan said recently, “The impression emerges, certainly strongly felt by the county regiments, that they are not judged competent enough to fulfill unexpected or spearhead roles.”⁹  This is a problem of which British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon appears to be aware, as is the need for more rapid reaction troops like those in the Royal Marines and the Parachute Regiment, something that constitutes a step-down from the 1998 strategic defense review.¹⁰   Commando and airborne troops are not cheap, however, something that will give Britain’s Ministry of Defense leverage in its request for an extra £1 billion in its annual budget.

When such factors are considered alongside the warnings of U.K. Military Chiefs that 45 Commando can be expected to suffer around 80 casualties and at least 20 deaths in the course of Operation Jacana, it is hardly surprising that news of the unit’s deployment has led to a full parliamentary debate among Britain’s politicians.¹¹  Such debates are to be welcomed, as they ensure that such high-risk commitments are not undertaken without due consideration of what these will involve.  Meanwhile, the Commandos’ advance party is preparing for the arrival of their main force.  This force will have preparations of its own to do before it can engage its al Qaeda and Taliban enemies to best effect -- like acclimatizing itself to the high altitudes at which it may soon be in combat.

 

Mark Burgess CDI Research Assistant mburgess@cdi.org

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