By Theresa Hitchens, CDI Senior Adviser
First Appeared in Defense News, Oct. 8-14, 2001

As the U.S. government scrambles to respond to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the main theme sounds disappointingly familiar: More money. The Defense Department alone is now expect ed to ask for an additional $40 billion in 2002 supplemental funds to aid in the newly prioritized fight against terrorism.

Other government agencies, from the FBI and CIA to the Transportation Department, are gearing up increased budget requests aimed at plugging holes in America’s woefully inadequate kit-bag of homeland defense and antiterrorism tools.

Congress is unlikely to let fiscal restraint stand in the way of making a political show of lawmakers’ support for the antiterrorism agenda - and loads of new money likely will appear. However, money alone cannot solve the systemic problems that underlie the lack of U.S. capabilities to track, prevent and defend against future terrorist activities. Nor is throwing money at the problem a sustainable strategy, given the nation’s growing economic slump.

What is needed is much more difficult: a serious rethinking of U.S. national security, defense and military priorities, especially at the Pentagon. The release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Oct. 1 highlights just how shallow current thinking on future needs remains.

Despite some last-minute verbiage to tout the Pentagon’s new focus on homeland defense, the QDR fails miserably to provide a blueprint for refashioning defense priorities on the likely threats of the future: terrorism, asymmetric warfare and the violent collapse of failing states. Indeed, most major decisions about strategic priorities, size and composition of the force, and weapon system requirements have been postponed until next year.

Force size and composition remains the same - 12 Navy carrier battle groups, 10 active-duty Army divisions and 12 active Air Force fighter wings - despite the Pentagon’s long-awaited move to jettison its two-war strategy. Cold War weapon programs, such as the F-22 stealthy air superiority fighter, the F-18E/F and the Army’s outsized Crusader, remain top budgetary priorities, as do high-technology approaches to intelligence and surveillance.

High-demand, low-density assets, such as airlifters, remain underfunded and are given low priority, as are Special Operations Forces, which must be the vanguard in the military’s role in fighting terrorism.

To be fair, the QDR was put together before Sept. 11. However, the shift in force structure requirements mandated by post-Cold War realities are not exactly a secret. There have been nearly 10 years of study and debate within and outside the Pentagon about the need for smaller, lighter more mobile forces; about asymmetric threats; and even about the need for stronger homeland defenses and better protection of critical infrastructure.

The January final report of the Hart-Rudman U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, concluded that the United States “will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attacks on the American homeland, and U.S. military superiority will not entirely protect us.”

For example, the Hart-Rudman Commission called for reductions of 10 percent to 15 percent in the size of the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military services and the regional commands. Along with that recommendation came another for a 20 percent to 25 percent cut in infrastructure, as part of a reform process to prioritize expeditionary capabilities.

The commission also talked at length about the need to integrate Department of Defense (DoD) and military functions with those of other federal agencies and departments, such as a beefed-up Coast Guard and better border control.

A study published in September by the Center for Defense Information, “Reforging the Sword: Forces for a 21st Century Security Strategy,” similarly calls for a new security strategy that includes measures to quicken military forces to face asymmetric challenges through improving mobility, agility and decision-making speed.

The study urges faster transformation efforts that focus on building and honing the medium-weight Army, the Marine Corps, special operations, littoral Navy, lift, close air support, interdiction Air Force, and defensive nuclear, biological and chemical forces. It also puts a top priority on ensuring better human intelligence capabilities across the national security spectrum.

Indeed, the administration of President George W. Bush, and most especially Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, came into office with a far-reaching agenda for change that encompassed some of the elements of a new military strategy mentioned above. Unfortunately, the Bush team, like President Bill Clinton’s administration before it, has been stymied by proponents of the political/bureaucratic status quo. Military leaders are loathe to give up turf, budget and platforms, and congressional leaders are loathe to give up jobs and influence.

This must change if the nation is ever going to be prepared for the future revealed on Sept. 11. U.S. government leaders seriously must weigh tradeoffs in today’s bloated, unwieldy military structure not only against new military priorities, but also against improvements in other national security tools for fighting terrorism.

At some point, someone has to balance the cost benefits of the F-22, for example, against equipping the FBI with modern computer capabilities. The answer is an in-depth, fearless look at national security priorities both short- and long-term, not more unnecessary, parochial spending.

Theresa Hitchens is a senior adviser with the Center for Defense Information, a non-partisan think tank in Washington.