U.S. Forces and Strategy Through
the Lens of Operation Enduring Freedom

Operation Enduring Freedom, the effort to find and capture or kill Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and to replace the Taliban with a government unwilling to host al Qaeda, is one example of the type of missions the military may be called upon to conduct in the future. Other missions will continue to require other types of forces, so one example should not be generalized into a prescription for overall U.S. capabilities. Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at an important and actual case to see what it might offer about relevance and adequacy of existing forces and strategy for such operations..

 
Forces

What are implications of Operation Enduring Freedom for some of the force tradeoffs often debated in defense reviews?

Issue: Heavy land forces vs. lighter and special operations forces
Special Operations Forces are playing a key role in the Afghanistan operation. If Osama bin Laden cannot be successfully attacked from the air, the alternative is to send in Special Forces units. Heavy divisions would be relevant mainly if large U.S. ground forces were used to join an offensive against the Taliban, a risky option. Medium or light forces would be better-suited to much of the mountainous Afghani terrain. Soviet armored forces proved unable to defeat broad Afghani opposition during the Soviet intervention.

Issue: Land forces vs. airpower
Ground-attack aircraft - U.S.-based, sea-based, and land-based - have played a prominent role in the operation, but it is recognized that airpower alone may not be able to kill Osama bin Laden, nor remove the Taliban. Lack of targets in Afghanistan and a cautious strategy regarding close air support for Northern Alliance opposition forces have sharply limited the scale of the bombing campaign. Continued bombing is beginning to have negative political repercussions within Afghanistan and internationally.

Issue: Long-range vs. carrier vs. land-based airpower
U.S.-based and sea-based bombers proved useful, while permissions for land-based aircraft operations were being worked out with host nations in the region.

Issue: Air superiority forces vs. ground-attack forces
Facing one of the world's weakest air forces, U.S. air superiority forces - air-to-air fighter units - were not in great demand. In contrast, heavy bombers and fighter-bombers have attacked a variety of targets. Again, this operation is just one of many the military faces, so the illustration does not imply there is no need at all for air superiority forces, but it serves as one contributing indicator of areas to prioritize.

Issue: Airlift capability
Airlift capability is particularly important for a scenario involving a landlocked country such as Afghanistan, quite far from bases the United States initially has access to. No reports of a shortage of airlift assets have surfaced to date. Relative to major theater wars, for which airlift capabilities are sized, these operations have involved smaller numbers of units and personnel. Airlift would be more taxed if the rapid deployment of sizeable U.S. units to Afghanistan or neighboring countries was undertaken.

Issue: Submarines
In this particular scenario, with the absence of an Afghani Navy or other hostile naval or maritime air threats, attack submarines have not been important. Although Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from attack submarines, surface vessels equipped with Tomahawks could have and did perform the same mission. In the unusual case of landlocked Afghanistan (many plausible countries for deployment of U.S. forces are littoral), the submarine mission of landing special operations forces has been moot.

Issue: Intelligence
For what is essentially a manhunt mission of capturing or killing Osama bin Laden, intelligence is the most important element of military capabilities. The military maintains multiple ways and types of forces to kill bin Laden, none of which will work without knowing where he is. Both technical intelligence (e.g. satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles) and human intelligence could be useful to locate bin Laden or elements of his organization. Human intelligence might be needed to confirm identities of people or targets located by certain types of technical intelligence. Human intelligence is also needed to understand changing political conditions in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region, which is likely to be key to the broader campaign.

Issue: Nuclear Weapons
It is possible that U.S. use of a tactical nuclear weapon would be considered if, hypothetically, bin Laden was located in a deep cave and the only way to get him was with a small nuclear weapon designed for attacking deep underground targets. Although some officials might see such a use as a proportional response to the "attack of mass destruction" against the United States on Sept. 11, it likely would have serious negative political ramifications for the overall mission in Afghanistan, for U.S. relations with the region, for possible future attacks against the United States, and for nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.

 
Strategy

Issue: Use of allies and partners
The administration has conducted an effort that so far has been highly successful at the grand strategic level of attracting allies to its cause and subtracting them from its opponent. NATO, other allies, partners, former adversaries such as Russia and Iran, and others have participated, cooperated, or at least not actively opposed the U.S. campaign. Interestingly, the administration has apparently chosen at various times not to use certain military forces offered by allies (possibly including France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Australia - the major exception has been Britain). Such decisions may have been based on a combination of equipment interoperability and training issues, as well as a concern over operational security. The existence of a variety of Special Operations and counter-terrorist units in these nations offers particular promise for future joint operations if operational procedures, training, and equipment can be developed ahead of time.

 
Personnel & Leadership

Issue: Does the officer selection system promote those officers with the agility to win new challenging and complex new forms of asymmetrical warfare?
The verdict is unknown since the campaign is still in the early stages. The operation will be a good test since the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, has more of a background in air and space operations than special operations; the vice chairman, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, is not often described as "visionary;" and the commander in chief of Central Command has more of an artillery background. If the system has selected flexible and agile leaders, their particular areas of expertise should not hinder their ability to adapt to asymmetrical warfare.

 
Weapons and Equipment

Issue: If choices have to be made, which of the largest programs in development or procurement might be used or particularly suited for this type of operation?
The following programs have been or would likely be prominent in this type of operation: C-17 and C-130 airlifters, V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport, B-2 Spirit bomber, F/A-18 Hornet, and Joint Strike Fighter fighter-bombers, AH-64 Apache and RAH-66 Comanche attack helicopters. Less used or relevant equipment categories would include: Crusader howitzer, NSSN Virginia-class attack submarine, F-22 Raptor fighter, Trident II nuclear missile, national missile defense, airborne laser. Uncertain at this point would be LPD-17 amphibious ship (will there be a deployment of forces into Afghanistan from the sea?), DD-21 destroyer (importance of sea-launched cruise missiles vs. bomb attacks unclear), and E-8C JSTARS reconnaissance aircraft.

 

By Marcus Corbin CDI Senior Analyst mcorbin@cdi.org

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