IN THE SPOTLIGHT:
The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment

The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR), designated by the U.S. Department of State as a terrorist organization Feb. 28, 2002 , is a Chechen terror group engaged in a bloody, ethno-nationalist struggle for the independence of the Republic of Chechnya and Ichkeria from almost 150 years of Russian subjugation.  While most of the citizens of Chechnya adhere to a mild form of Sufi Islam — mysticism based on certain indigenous pre-Islamic traditions — members of the SPIR are Sunni Islamic radicals, imbued with a passionate fundamentalism of the Wahhabi creed, who, along with two other Chechen groups recently added as terrorist organizations, have appropriated the tactics of international terrorism with Islamic connections as a means to advance their nationalist objectives.  The Oct. 23, 2002 , attack on Moscow ’s Poshipnikov Zavod Dubrovka Theater was a case in point — an al Qaeda-style attack that possibly could portend things to come.  This would especially be true if SPIR and other groups decide to sabotage the results of the March 23 referendum, where Chechens voted overwhelmingly for political autonomy while remaining a part of Russia .

But while the SPIR shares the desire for independence with the mainstream Chechen population, who are moderates and largely reject fundamentalist ideologies, their interests are not the same.  The SPIR, in addition to Chechen independence, seek the implementation of their fundamentalist ideology throughout the Caucasus region as well.  This would mean, ideally, areas from the North Caucasus republics in Russia , Abkhazia in Georgia , and parts of Azerbaijan would be under the rule of an Islamic caliphate.  SPIR has managed to muddy the mainstream Chechen struggle through violent acts of terrorism and promotion of its preferred version of Islam.  As Wahhabists, the SPIR and similar groups have transformed the Chechen struggle for national liberation into the appearances of a religiously-inspired rebellion, jihad, with direct links to the most notorious and pernicious terror group the world has ever seen.

Background

The SPIR, also known as the Islamic Special Purpose Regiment and the al-Jihad-Fisi-Sabililah Special Islamic Regiment, was loosely formed in 1996 as a criminal organization by Arbi Barayev and was regarded as one of the main hostage-taking, kidnapping, and oil-smuggling groups operating in Chechnya following the 1994-1996 war with Russia.  Barayev was a member of the mainstream Chechen resistance under President Aslan Maskhadov throughout the 1990s, and after a bitter falling out in 1998 with the Chechen president, was stripped of his rank within the republic’s armed forces and was put under an arrest warrant after he tried to usurp the city of Gudermes as a personal fiefdom.  Upset by his demotion, Barayev took his criminal faction and began to enlist the support of various Islamic militants, notably Chechen extremist Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Saudi-born commander Amir al-Khattab (a.k.a. Samir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailem), who in 1995 arrived in Chechnya from Saudi Arabia to fund separatism from Moscow and to champion Wahhabism. 

This was a departure from what was believed to be Arbi Barayev’s raison d’etre.  Known primarily as a brutal criminal, with a résumé replete with kidnapping, torturing, and executing of hostages, Arbi Barayev was never believed to be an ardent Islamist.  He was always more of a gangster, according to extensive reporting on his life.  Many analysts have concluded that his ingratiation with providers of foreign monetary support was done irrespective of the fundamentalist ideology, Wahhabism, he knew would be an accompanying factor.  His motives appeared to be a means to an end, a way to continue his fight with Moscow after the Russian withdrawal in 1996 until Russia ’s re-intervention in Chechnya in 1999.  This perhaps could explain his December1998 beheading of as many as six British and New Zealander telecom employees, according to some press reports.  Various reporting on the subject claim Barayev gladly performed the executions on the kidnapped group in return for $20 million — an offer made to him by al Qaeda.  Also, events such as his Dec. 9, 2000 , involvement in an attack on a Russian military convoy that killed 20 soldiers and injured 17, and the June 16, 2001 murders of a Moscow-appointed mayor in Gekhi, the mayor’s wife, and a Russian military officer serve as examples.  His fight with Moscow and his own criminal urges always appeared to be his primary motivation, according to various analyses.  As one Russian security source indicated, “We believe Barayev’s ideology was always Barayev.”

Arbi Barayev was killed by Russian troops in June 2001 during a six-day shootout near the Barayev family’s village in Alkhan-Kala, which precipitated the rise of his nephew Movsar Suleimanov to the leadership role of the SPIR.  Movsar, who changed his last name to Barayev to honor his uncle and “to strike horror in many hearts in Russia and to chill the people’s veins,” was one of the principal commanders of the deadly hostage crisis of the Moscow theater in October 2002.  However, before Movsar “took over the family business,” as one analyst referred to the SPIR, Movsar engaged in various disputes to retain control of the organization.  Following Arbi’s death, Movsar executed fellow compatriots, including fellow warlord Rivzan Akhmadov, who competed with him for control over the group and foreign funding connections.  Movsar believed it was his duty to follow in the footsteps of Arbi, and after a Russian mop-up operation resulted in the disappearance and eventual death of another uncle, his beloved Samsudin, Movsar was as determined as ever to bring the fight to Moscow as head of the SPIR.

What had distinguished Movsar from Arbi Barayev was an apparently stronger commitment to Islam, and particular, the Wahabbi creed that Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Amir al-Khattab imported to the region throughout the mid-1990’s.  Some reports have suggested that Movsar approached the Islamic aspect of his insurgency the same way his uncle Arbi did, conveniently using the money while feigning piety.  Other reports indicated his personal devotion to the puritanical strain of Islam was earnest.  Before Movsar’s Oct. 26, 2002 death, the last day of the Moscow hostage crisis, various interviews with the leader indicated his commitment to die a “martyr” and through his martyrdom the chance to “build the Islamic state of Chechnya —the nizam of Allah, God willing.”  Such comments suggest a true radicalization and commitment to the creed.  But despite the debate, it is nonetheless unmistakable that the Barayev group nourished connections with the fundamentalist strain of Islam endemic in Saudi Arabia and accepted by bin Laden and his al Qaeda network.  Through Amir al-Khattab, who had connections with bin Laden, Chechen extremists were able to receive extensive funding as well as volunteers to wage their jihad against Moscow .  Khattab also mobilized militants from Ingushetia, Ossetia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to help in the fight.  Khattab’s numerous Gulf and Middle Eastern financial connections proved invaluable in the proliferation of the radical Chechen movement.

The al Qaeda Connection

The introduction of Khattab into the Caucasus region can explain not only the rise of the SPIR, but also two other Chechen terror groups--the Islamic International Brigade (IIB) and Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs.  All three groups — loosely formed and interconnected — were intimately involved in the Moscow hostage crisis, sharing fighters, weapons, and tactics.  According to press reports, this was due to Khattab and bin Laden’s shared desire in 1995 to “create one Muslim nation on the Caucasus under fundamentalist rule.”  Subsequently, millions of dollars per month were funneled into the region to fund this initiative, and shortly there after, Chechens began receiving terror training in Afghanistan as well as indoctrination of the Wahabbi creed in various “learning centers” across Chechnya .  Some reports suggest as many as 1,000 recruits passed through these centers during this time.  It was these events that were the impetus for the radical Chechen movements of today, such as the SPIR, IIB, and Riyadus-Salikhin.

It was after the start of the second Chechen war in 1999 that Khattab allied himself even more closely with the more violent and radical Chechen elements than before, which included Arbi Barayev and Shamil Basayev, an extremely brutal figure believed to be the organizer of the Moscow hostage crisis.  This was the time when the majority of heavy funding and training from foreign terror sources was believed to have started.  In October 1999, for instance, it is believed representatives of Basayev and Khattab traveled to Kandahar province in Afghanistan to meet with bin Laden to secure military assistance, additional financial aid, and fighters to be sent to Chechnya and Dagestan to take on the Russians.  Khattab had originally met bin Laden in 1987 as mujahideen partners during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan , and from 1989 to 1994, was believed to have returned to the country to secure further contacts with elements of the radical Chechen resistance.  Shamil Basayev traveled personally to Afghanistan as well, visiting Khost province in 1994 to meet with Khattab and to tour various mujahadeen camps and to receive training and Islamic fighters to return to Chechnya with.  Throughout the 1990s, some reports have indicated that as many as several hundred Chechens trained in al Qaeda terror camps in Afghanistan .  Khattab became so successful in funding, training, and arming the necessary radicals into the Caucasus region to fight Moscow that even Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s top lieutenant, began eyeing Chechnya as a possible base during the 1990s as well.

It was this very nexus between radical Chechen fighters and Islamic terrorists that in the eyes of some, has transformed the mainstream Chechen cause from a movement of national liberation into the appearance of an anti-Western jihad similar to al Qaeda.  The Oct. 23-26 hostage crisis in Moscow ’s Dubrovka Theater had all the trappings of an al Qaeda-style attack.  Movsar Barayev and his SPIR picked specifically the event, the “Nord-Ost” musical, because it was a pointedly patriotic and nationalistic Russian production.  SPIR aimed at striking fear in all of Russia , by attacking non-combatants in the heart of Moscow against a target of symbolic import.  Many of Barayev’s fighters, widows whose husbands died at the hands of Russian soldiers, were even wired with suicide-bomber-type explosives.  All of them spoke affectionately about martyrdom and jihad. 

While the SPIR and all participating groups in the hostage crisis were successful in bringing the war to Moscow , it is clear their al Qaeda-style attack and ideology has harmed the perception of the mainstream Chechen population.  Movsar Barayev and Khattab are both dead now, but the SPIR continues on under the leadership of a rebel leader, Amir Khamzat.  Though it remains uncertain how the organization has been affected by Movsar’s death, a possibility that large-scale attacks directed against Moscow could continue.  The March 23 referendum in which the majority of Chechens accepted political autonomy under continued Russian rule falls short of the desires of the SPIR.  It also falls short of what the Chechen Foreign Minister, Ilyas Akhmadov, has insisted, calling any Russian referendum “illegal” while not offering a “constructive, long-term solution.”  Perhaps all one can do is wait and see.

Patrick Armstrong, “Conflict in Chechnya : A Background Perspective,” The Journal of Conflict Studies, November 1999

Mark Galeotti, “Chechen Militants Bring Their War to Moscow,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Volume 14, Number 12, December 2002

Unattributed, “Young and Cruel Chechen Warlord Directing Siege,” British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Oct. 24, 2002

Sharon LaFraniere, “A Young Gang Leader Sheds His Obscurity,” The Washington Post, Oct. 25, 2002

Patrick Smyth, “Leader of Militant Chechens is Familiar with Terror Campaigns,” The Irish Times, Oct. 25, 2002

David Holley and Alexei V. Kuznetsov, “Chechen Rebel’s Rise and Fall,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 26, 2002

Julius Strauss, “The Leader: The Unknown Soldier,” The Telegraph, Oct. 26, 2002

Anne Penketh, “Rebel Leader From a Family of Notorious Chechen Killers,” The Independent ( London ), Oct. 26, 2002

Unattributed, “A Chechen Warrior’s Life of Brutality,” Newsday, Oct. 27, 2002

Nabi Abdullaev, “Barayev Points Finger at Basayev,” The Moscow Times, Oct. 28, 2002

Marc Erikson, “Bin Laden’s Terror Wave 2,” Asia Times Online, Oct. 29, 2002

Leela Jacinto, “Black Widows: Hell Hath No Fury Like Chechnya’s Ruthless Widows of War,” ABC News.com, Oct. 29, 2002

Johanna McGeary and Paul Quinn-Judge, “Theater of War:  The Chechens Who Dared Seize a Theater in Russia’s Capital Are Put Down, But Their Cause is on Center Stage,” Time Europe, Vol. 160 No. 19, Nov. 4, 2002

Unattributed, “Chechen Rebels Confirm Downing Helicopter Over Grozny ,” Financial Times Information, Nov. 4, 2002

Mark Franchetti, “Siege Leader’s Mother On Run From Russians,” Sunday Times ( London ), Nov. 10, 2002

Christopher Swift and Edward Marshall, “The War in Chechnya: Moral and Strategic Dimensions,” The American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, Washington, D.C.

Ilyas Akhmadov, “Chechnya: The Way to Peace and Democracy,” Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2003

By Armond Caglar CDI Research Assistant acaglar@cdi.org

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