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Somalia: A Litmus Test for U.S. Terrorism Policy
While operations in Afghanistan focus more on base defense, reconstruction, and intelligence gathering in pursuit of key al Qaeda personnel, the war on terrorism writ large is beginning to widen. Countries known to support terrorism — the “axis of evil” — top the list of potential threats, yet the big three, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, carry with them an inherent commitment to a major undertaking and likely reorganization of an entire regional political balance. Faced with this certainty and its staggering consequences, in order to retain the strategic momentum of the war on terrorism, Somalia may be one of the places Americans go to interrupt a terrorist network. Somalia no doubt has some legitimate targets that, if eliminated, would help interrupt operations against the United States and its interests. However, it is also an illustration of what conditions make a country susceptible to extremism and what might be done to mitigate the social and political climate in which terrorists find support. The direction of U.S. policy in Somalia will be an example of how the United States is willing to both conceptualize and fight the global war on terrorism.
Somalia has lacked a legitimate central government since the overthrow of Siad Barré in 1991. The resultant environment of lawlessness and clan warfare is ideal for hiding fugitives. It also makes Somalia vulnerable to external manipulation — the first seeds of which were planted when Osama bin Laden sent al Qaeda personnel to assist in the guerrilla war against UN and U.S. peacekeepers whose presence marginalized important clan leaders. Warlord rule and Somalia’s crippled government make it, in the words of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “ripe for misuse by those who would take that chaos and thrive on that chaos.” There are reasons to suspect that foreign governments may indeed be taking advantage of Somalia’s state of affairs. The extremely weak Transitional National Government (TNG) is the recipient of financial aid and support from the Arab League — a situation that has led to allegations that the TNG supports al Ittihad, Somalia’s resident radical organization with links to al Qaeda. Al Ittihad al Islamia was placed on the State Department’s list of terrorists in fall of 2001, after the Sept. 11 attacks. Al Ittihad, a small, relatively weak organization with a predominantly domestic agenda, was largely eliminated as a military presence by the Ethiopian government after encroaching upon the turf of powerful warlords. In the early 1990s, the group seized ports of Merka and Kismayo and the town of Luuq in the southern Gedo region. They managed to set up training camps in Bossasso, Las Quoray, and Los Anood in the north, and Ras Kiamboni and El Waq in the south. However, al Ittihad’s land seizure incensed other clan leaders, who responded to incursions in their sphere of influence by driving the fighters out. Because al Ittihad was associated with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (a group fighting against the Ethiopian government), the Ethiopian Army launched operations against them, further diffusing the organization. Rather than centered at bases or organized training camps, they are dispersed throughout the country; they have melted into Somalia’s social framework in civic professions, preparing the country for Islamic revolution. The group has thus lost much of its formal structure and associates with Somalis that are not always strict fundamentalists. They have gone underground as an organization but have blended their message into society, making them more difficult to track. However, because their message is intended for broad consumption and incorporates fewer hardliners, they may be easier to infiltrate.
Military operations in Somalia may not be the best extension of the war on terrorism — largely because Ethiopian success in subduing terrorist activity eliminated hard targets such as bases and compounds. The removal of suspected terrorists in snatch and grab operations is convenient because it is not largely disruptive; however, the historic inability of the United States to find reliable intelligence assets in Somalia has further regressed during a seven-year absence. Identifying and capturing key individuals would require a significant commitment to good intelligence — partially indicated by a marked recent increase in surveillance flights. While there is speculation that an Enduring Freedom-style operation, in which indigenous forces are used as a kind of proxy army, could apply as a model in Somalia, this counter-terrorism strategy would be extremely vulnerable to hijacking by regional interests. Somali clan leaders and warlords are opportunists, attempting to exploit the current international atmosphere to play an important political role and leverage their own power. Further complicating the situation is the belief by Somalia-watchers that while there is not currently a credible terrorist threat, it may be fecund ground for a later presence. Ethiopia continues frequent incursions into Somali territory to train paramilitary groups that are part of the anti-government Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), and has volunteered to act as a proxy army. The Republic of Somaliland, a self-declared autonomous province in the northwest, may have offered U.S. or allied forces the use of Berbera as a base for military operations. Puntland, an autonomous region in the northeast, also wants to gain political leverage and international recognition, and might also be receptive to basing troops or staging operations from its territory. Warlord Hussein Mohammed Aideed, anxious for any excuse to fight the government, has volunteered his army for use against the TNG. As in Afghanistan, a domestic or personal agenda is never absent. Support of one group at the expense of another might cause a tremendous backlash in a country where warlords and clans are the driving political force.
Since Somalia’s terrorist threat is part
and parcel of deficiencies in functioning civil institutions, it will define
whether or not the United States is willing to embark on a long-term strategy of
constructive engagement, even if it means fighting what seems to be a low-grade
war on terrorism. There is a need to develop an alternative to al
Ittihad’s social programs and to build up
infrastructure so that Somalis have an alternative to the services now provided
by some Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The
potable water system must be rehabilitated, health care facilities need to be
rebuilt, and cargo ports and airports need improvement. All these opportunities
are underscored by the unique political situation in Somalia — lack of an
underlying terrorist agenda there means that incorporation of soft power will
not be seen as a concession to terrorist demands.
The administration will either choose a broad-based counter-terrorism
strategy in Somalia or a short-term military option that — while serving
as a powerful deterrent — does not mitigate the underlying reasons for
chaos that enables hiding places and extremism.
By Emily Clark
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