CDI Terrorism Project Factsheet:
The Sky Marshal Program

The Federal Air Marshal program is supposed to defend against hijackings and catastrophic terrorist attacks such as those that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001. However, despite the high hopes held for the scheme, its breakneck pace of expansion continues to expose some worrying flaws. The total budget for the program increased from $1 million to $481 million in the first year and may reach $1 billion by the end of 2003, while the number of officers has grown from 32 in 2001 to nearly 4,000 today. However, while high base pay of $52,000 and promises of speedy advancement lured many candidates to apply, management problems, exhaustive work schedules, and unhonored promises for relocation left many officers feeling stranded hundreds or thousands of miles from their families and angry enough to quit.

In the first year after the program's expansion, more than 250 officers resigned. American Airlines, in one highly publicized incident, allegedly refused to seat marshals where they had requested, in order to save higher-priced seats for paying passengers. While supposedly covert or discreet, marshals' identities have been exposed by "nosey passengers" 294 times since Sept. 11. Most seriously, the speed of recruitment, which at its peak reached 800 officers a month, has led to a reduction in training from 12 weeks down to six and a half weeks. Such incidents may indicate serious flaws in the new system.

Approximately 25,000 flights arrive or depart the United States each day. At any given time, there are more than 6,000 commercial planes in the air. A year ago, air marshals were only able to cover approximately 15 percent of the highest priority flights — determined by a complex computer profiling system covering such factors as passenger history, flight location, times of day, and the occurrence of special events, such as the World Series or the Superbowl. Due to their increased ranks, marshals are now able to supervise approximately 50 percent of flights, and concentrate on a daily-updated list of the nation's 25 most at risk airports.

While the program's reach and scope has snowballed massively in the last year and a half, it has not been without its detractors. Supporters of the program assert that the host of recent complaints and concerns are merely a result of normal "growing pains" in a scheme that has seen its staff and budget grow by a factor of 100 in the space of 16 months. Dissenting voices include the marshals who have resigned in that span of time, asserting that they have been "lied to and betrayed" by the program's administration, and that the scheme's defects could very well "endanger public safety." Indeed, it has been hard to get a straight number from either side on the attrition rate of the program — estimated by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at "less than one percent". However, when compared to current staff levels, resignation rates are in the 6 percent to 7 percent range.

The reasons for air marshal resignations are numerous. While marshals are supposed to fly in pairs, they are being required to fly solo in certain situations (such as when their partner calls in sick). This is potentially more dangerous than if the marshal was not aboard, because it significantly increases the chances of him or her being overpowered and disarmed. New marshals, as they are told at training, must take whatever seats the airline provides, even if it turns out to be "tactically unsound". This is policy in spite of the fact that marshals are trained to sit up front to guard the cockpit. A year ago, American Airlines employees at Palm Springs allegedly notified marshals that the airline was "growing tired of air marshals taking high-revenue seats" and refused to reposition them from the two coach seats that were incorrectly booked through the Federal Aviation Administration near the rear of the plane. Contradicting regulations, the TSA required the marshals to sit in the seats provided. Even worse, the gate agent, insisting on an "on-time departure" refused to let marshals aboard first to perform their routine inspection of the aircraft.

Remarkably, during the same incident, an American Airlines employee managed to blow the marshals' cover by stating "These marshals have been a nuisance all week," within earshot of passengers. Again, contrary to their training, marshals were required by the TSA to continue with their mission even though their identities had been exposed. According to TSA policy, "The actual or perceived compromise of your identity is never a sufficient reason to abort your assigned flight." This policy has become a definite problem for new marshals, who aren't entirely clear as to exactly what their role should be. As a result of this, marshals have been exposed, or identified themselves, nearly 300 times since Sept. 11, 2001. The problem goes deeper, however, than just emergency situations. Marshals are prohibited by regulations from dressing casually; a practice some allege makes them stand out. Ironically, the Washington Post, in response to a major article on the subject printed Jan. 2, 2003, posted responses from several readers who claim to have spotted marshals several times in the course of boarding and flights, under the headline An Undercover Bust.

Another major issue for the program is fatigue from long and grueling work schedules. Due to lack of organization in the program, many marshals have had difficulty even requesting a day off less than two months in advance. USA Today reported that frustration last fall peaked when 1,250 marshals called in sick over a span of 18 days.

It must be emphasized that a marshal is required to be in a constant state of readiness at all times in order to thwart a potential hijacking. It has been suggested, however, that the long hours and high pressure work schedule is compromising this state of readiness, leaving marshals fighting to stay awake. While originally promised a four-day work week with one of the four days devoted solely to training, that promise has gone unkept. Marshals who regularly fly 50 hours in a five day week (some missions extend up to 10 days for 12 to 16 hours a day) report that, "On the fourth or fifth day, you start feeling nauseous". Some marshals have had to resort to over-the-counter stimulants such as No-Doz just to stay awake and alert during flights. The 10 day schedules have since been scrapped, and marshals have started getting their schedules a month in advance, enabling them to request time off. Program director Tom Quinn also plans to equip marshals with laptop computers so they can communicate more effectively with their partners and management.

There is not a wide amount of data readily available on the Air Marshal Program due to national security considerations and the need for marshals to maintain a security clearance. This has a separate impact, however, of isolating marshals from management and lowering morale. Those frustrated with the policy decisions of the administration feel unable to voice their concerns. Those that were frustrated enough to come forward have been rebuked by Quinn, who says that they represent"a small number of disgruntled individuals who are total amateurs."

There are reasons for concern, however, when marshals are under investigation by federal authorities after turning up for work smelling of alcohol, accidentally firing off their weapons in hotel rooms, and leaving guns in airplane lavatories. Initially insisted upon, stringent marksmanship requirements have since been eliminated as a means of qualification, along with the one day of training a week originally promised new recruits. Incredibly, ammunition was not available on occasion, with management recommending in a memo that marshals buy bullets with their own money and train on their own time until such problems are rectified. Most shocking is the fact that some new recruits are hired and put on planes without first completing the rigorous background checks.

At the request of Congressman Peter DeFazio, the General Accounting Office and Department of Transport Inspector General have begun an investigation into the effectiveness of the Federal Air Marshal Program.

Sources:

Marco R. della Cava, "Training sky marshals is deadly serious business," USA Today, Jan. 9, 2002

"Fact Sheet: FAA Federal Air Marshal Program (September 2001)," FAA NEWS, Sept. 2001

Brock N. Meeks, "Air marshals program hits turbulence," MSNBC News, Jan 23, 2003

Blake Morrison, "Airline allegedly hindered marshals," USA Today, Mar. 6, 2002

Blake Morrison, "Air marshals' resignations flood TSA, managers say," USA Today, Aug. 29, 2002

Blake Morrison, "Air marshals charge new policies could endanger passengers Anti-hijacking program mismanaged, many say," USA Today, Dec. 19, 2002

Blake Morrison, "Air marshal program in disarray, insiders say," USA Today, Aug. 14, 2002

Tom Ramstack, "Air marshals sap other agencies," Washington Times, Aug. 29, 2002

Greg Schneider, Sara Kehaulani Goo, "For air marshals, a steep takeoff," MSNBC News, Jan 2, 2003

"Securing the Skies," Online NewsHour, Oct. 2, 2001

"Volunteers lining up to be federal air marshals," CNN.com/TRAVEL, Sept. 26, 2001

By David Savino CDI Research Assistant dsavino@cdi.org

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