Prior to Sept. 11, acts of
terrorism in Southeast Asia, though rampant, were largely seen as local or
regional in scope. Though provoking
international concern through widespread violence, domestic terrorists and their
vision of establishing independent states appeared to pose little threat to
global order and security. The
events of Sept. 11 were thus as much a wake-up call to Southeast Asia as they
were to the United States and its traditional allies. Authorities are now unearthing and piecing together evidence
that, far from being locally-contained separatist groups, many terrorist
organizations in the region in fact have close and long-running connections not
only with each other, but to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda as well.
The focus here will be on four
Southeast Asian nations where international terrorists are now known to thrive:
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Detailed below are terrorist activities and their al
Qaeda connections in each country, various governments’ responses and
actions, American involvement in the countries’ crackdown efforts, if any, and
the political risks that are at stake as these countries participate in the
global campaign against terrorism.
INDONESIA
Terrorist
evidence and activities
Indonesia has long been marred by acts of terrorism by
domestic separatist and radical Islamic groups. Since Sept. 11, however, focus has shifted to ample but murky
evidence of al Qaeda connections in
the country. In particular,
authorities are scrutinizing two Indonesian Muslim clerics as leading expansive
terrorist networks that are regional in focus but global in association.
Abu Bakar Baasyir is believed to be leading Jemaah Islamiah (Islamic
Group), a terrorist group believed to be responsible for unsolved bombings in
Indonesia and the Philippines over the past few years, including explosions in
Jakarta and Manila in December 2000 that killed 35 people.
Authorities believe his former student, Nurjaman Riduan
Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, is leader of another organization, the
Kumpulan Militan/Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM).
Both Jemaah Islamiah and KMM have cells throughout Southeast Asia, and
their Afghan-trained members are believed to have served major roles in
expanding the al Qaeda network in the
region.
Also of concern is a militant Muslim group called Lashkar
Jihad, which was founded in 2000 with the goal of establishing an Islamic state,
and has become known for its violence against Christians in the Moluccas and
central Sulawesi. The group’s
leader, Jaffar Umar Thalib, is known to have met bin Laden in the 1980s, though
he claims to have rejected the offer of money from al Qaeda.
Another al Qaeda-linked
group is the Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front (IILF).
According to intelligence reports, IILF members received training not
only from al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but
also from al Qaeda members in Mindanao
in the Philippines.
In addition, Indonesian authorities recently announced that
last July, five al Qaeda associates
entered the country with the plan to attack the U.S. Embassy.
The Bush administration promptly sent a secret Delta Force team to
Jakarta to bolster security. However,
the suspects slipped away from Indonesia ‑ or, many U.S. officials
speculate, Indonesian authorities allowed them to escape, fearful of embroiling
the country in a terrorist crackdown.
Government
action
The government, after months of insistence that al
Qaeda did not operate in Indonesia, finally endorsed a public statement in
December in which the intelligence agency acknowledged the presence of al
Qaeda training camps in the country. Even
such a statement proved shaky, however ‑ in January, Foreign Minister
Hassan Wirajuda denied having any evidence that local Muslim organizations had
any ties to international terrorist networks.
The government has ordered the central bank to freeze
assets of 28 companies and groups suspected of links to terrorist activities;
however, it still has not investigated the bank accounts of many of the entities
on the terrorist list issued by Bush.
Authorities interrogated Abu Bakar in January, but
released him after claiming that there was not enough substantial evidence for
detention, despite strong allegations by Singapore and Malaysia and calls by
their leadership urging his arrest. Critics
claim that Indonesia’s reluctance to capture him stems from fear of Muslim
backlash.
In February, Indonesia signed a pact with Australia
to fight international terrorism.
U.S. involvement
Washington
upholds a congressional ban ‑ a product of Indonesia’s 1999 army-led
violence in East Timor ‑ on U.S. training of Indonesian military
officials, which Indonesian security officials say impedes more effective
security programs in the country. To
partially evade the ban’s restrictions, Congress passed a bill in December
allowing Indonesian officers to attend a counter-terrorism training program.
The Bush administration has also resorted to a range of non-military
assistance to Indonesia, including $10 million to train Indonesian police,
customs officers, and the banking sector, as well as an offer to enhance
intelligence sharing with the United States.
Bush also invited Indonesia to submit a wish list of equipment it will
need for counter-terrorism, but the government has yet to respond.
Risk
assessment
Indonesia’s support for anti-terrorism since Sept. 11
essentially amounts to laudable rhetoric and no implementation.
Neighboring countries have been critical of Indonesia’s slow response,
and pressure for action is mounting. At
the heart of President Megawati
Sukarnoputri’s predicament is the reaction of Indonesia’s 176 million
Muslims to any anti-terrorism ‑ and thus pro-Western ‑ policy. While Megawati was one of the first heads of state to visit
President George W. Bush and offer condolence and support in the days following
Sept. 11, Indonesia also saw some of the largest protests denouncing imminent
U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan.
Megawati
must thus strike a balance between her crucial status as a U.S. supporter in the
campaign, and as the president of the world’s largest Muslim country whose
populace might easily interpret crackdowns on terrorist groups as an attack on
Islam. Thus far, lack of decisive
action has convinced neither the United States nor Indonesian Muslims that her
commitment to their causes goes beyond mere rhetoric. And the new “war” on terrorism is just another agenda on
her long list of problems ‑ from secessionist movements in Aceh to
recurrent violence between Muslims and Christians ‑ that have continually
beleaguered her six-month-old presidency. In
many ways, Megawati stands at a crossroads.
Like Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf, she boldly chose to side
with the United States. Unlike
Musharraf, she has yet to back her words with action.
MALAYSIA
Terrorist evidence and activities
Malaysia
was the staging ground for two abduction cases by the Abu Sayaaf terrorist group
in the past two years, but was not a focus of attention for either domestic or
international terrorism investigations. In a recent report, however, FBI officials stated that
Malaysia was in fact a “primary operational launch pad for the Sept. 11
attacks.” While Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad strongly criticized the
report, he also admitted that police have identified about 50 Malaysians with al Qaeda connections.
Mounting
clues reveal that numerous suspected terrorists with links to al
Qaeda have been filtering in and out of the country in recent years.
Particularly suspect is Yazid Sufaat, who Malaysian authorities recently
detained under the controversial Internal Security Act on charges of having ties
to al Qaeda.
Sufaat, a Malaysian chemist and a member of Jemaah Islamiah, is a close
associate of Hambali’s and was reportedly a key figure in helping bin Laden
expand his network in Southeast Asia. U.S.
officials say there is evidence that Sufaat met with two of the hijackers
onboard the planes on Sept. 11, and that in Kuala Lumpur he provided $35,000 to
Zacarias Moussaoui, another figure implicated in the Sept. 11 attacks, in
January 2000. Malaysian authorities are currently on the lookout for the
four tons of ammonium nitrate ‑ used to make truck bombs ‑ that
Sufaat ordered in late 2000, and which has since gone missing (consider that
only one ton of the substance was needed for the Oklahoma bombing).
Along
with Sufaat, Malaysian authorities have arrested dozens of suspected Jemaah
Islamiah members in recent weeks. In
addition, they have also arrested 50 members of KMM since last August, and are
searching for about 200 more they believe are present in the region.
KMM seeks to establish an Islamic state composed of Malaysia,
Indonesia and the southern Philippines, and have a history of bombings,
robberies and murder.
Government action
Though
staunchly opposed to the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan, Mahathir has
been resolute about counterterrorism on the regional front.
Defense Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak recently agreed to work more
closely with Indonesia to combat terrorism and bolster the exchange of military
intelligence. The government has
also been urging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to play a
more prominent role in regional crackdowns rather than rely on U.S. leadership.
Demonstrating
his commitment to anti-terrorism, Mahathir also stepped up measures against the
al Maunah, a Malaysian Islamist sect with a history of attacks on domestic
targets. On Dec. 28 he sentenced
three of the group’s leaders to death by hanging and 16 members to life
imprisonment for treason.
U.S. involvement
With
Prime Minister Mahathir sending strong messages through these measures that
Malaysia can act on its own in coordinating the region’s counter-terrorism
campaign, the United States has not given any indication of direct assistance.
In fact, the vocal figure in the U.S.-Malaysian dialogue since Sept. 11
has been Mahathir, who has persistently called on the U.S.-led coalition to
avoid creating “more terror” through the military campaign.
He also told the world’s leaders at the World Economic Forum in early
February that the United States and its allies need to have better understanding
of Muslim grievances and “listen to the views of others.” He said Bush understands his position and the feelings of the
Malaysian people, and “that is why he doesn’t press me to support him.”
Risk assessment
As in
Indonesia, thousands of Muslims gathered in Kuala Lumpur last October to chant
anti-U.S. slogans and oppose the military campaign in Afghanistan.
However, in contrast to Indonesia where Megawati could face a major
fallout with her Muslim supporters, Mahathir is likely to benefit politically by
stepping up his counter-terrorism efforts.
Many of his critics, in fact, are accusing his government of using
counter-terrorism to discredit the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS),
Mahathir’s biggest opposition group. With
strong ties to Muslim extremists, PAS has already begun to see deterioration in
its coalition since Malaysia strengthened its counterterrorism measures ‑
thus resulting in Mahathir’s firmer grip on power.
Malaysia
will be crucial in providing further aid to authorities tracing terrorist
footsteps. Serious about rooting
out terrorists from his country, Mahathir is likely to remain a cooperative
regional partner so long as his adamant request for noninterference from the
West is respected.
SINGAPORE
Terrorist evidence and activities
Unlike
many of its Southeast Asian neighbors, Singapore has been virtually free of
domestic terrorist organizations. Thus,
increasing evidence of the presence of regional, as well as al
Qaeda, terrorist operatives in this rigidly controlled city-state has
triggered alarm bells in the region as a whole.
In December, the government arrested 13 members of Jemaah Islamiyah who
were accused of plotting to bomb the American Embassy and other foreign targets
in Singapore. Authorities also
recently obtained tapes from Afghanistan that show a direct connection between al Qaeda and the arrested militants. The government blames Abu Bakar for masterminding the plot.
Government action
Singapore’s
government fully backs all U.S.-led anti-terrorism initiatives and, along with
the Philippines, blocked a move to issue a joint statement calling an end to the
bombing in Afghanistan. Since Sept.
11 the government has set up a new national security secretariat within its
defense ministry to oversee counterterrorism measures.
It also tightened border security last October by making it a requirement
for citizens of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan Egypt and Pakistan to obtain visas to
enter the country.
U.S. involvement
There
is no indication of imminent U.S. involvement in the country’s
counter-terrorism activities. Since
Singapore and the Straits of Malacca are strategically important to the movement
of U.S. warships and logistic operations from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean,
the two countries may call for dialogue to coordinate such movements.
Risk assessment
The
Singaporean government has much to gain and little to lose through its all-out
support of the anti-terrorism campaign, in contrast to the political stakes
other Southeast Asian governments must risk.
The country, known for its autocratic government whose reach is reflected
in social order, is seeking to protect its reputation from being tainted with
evidences of terrorists’ presence within its boundaries.
Active counter-terrorism measures are in line with existing policy and
with the government’s efforts to continue to attract foreign investors and
tourists despite recent events.
PHILIPPINES
Terrorist evidence/activities
The
series of kidnappings of foreigners and subsequent demands of huge ransoms by
the Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines is now well known.
The group, designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United
States, was founded by one of bin Laden’s top associates, Jamal Khalifa, and
initially led by Abdurajak Janjalani, a Filipino Muslim who fought alongside the
mujahidin in Afghanistan. Abu
Sayyaf continues to hold two Americans and a Filipino hostage.
Receiving
less media attention but perhaps possessing far greater potential for
international terrorism is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), another
separatist group in the southern Philippines island of Mindanao.
As with Abu Sayaaf members, many MILF members are known to have trained
in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.
Philippine authorities recently arrested Fathur Rohman al Ghozi, an
Indonesian explosives expert who has been singled out as the critical link
between Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiah and the MILF ‑ a link that has
caused grave concern among Philippines officials who have long suspected that
the MILF is more than just a domestic guerilla group.
Al Ghozi’s arrest came after police found a cache of weapons and
explosives in Mindanao, which were reportedly to be used to attack U.S.,
Australian, Israeli and British targets in Singapore.
Al Ghozi is also known to be a close associate of KMM and Jemaah Islamiah
leader Hambali.
Since
the U.S. decision to send its troops to Basilan, the MILF has threatened to
attack any joint Philippine-U.S. forces that steps into its territory.
In response, President Gloria Arroyo indicated the military will be ready
for retaliation if the MILF intervened in the joint exercises.
Government action
President
Arroyo has demonstrated
total support for the U.S.-led campaign, offering intelligence, logical support,
and the use of Philippine air space, and opening two former American military
bases, Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay. Most recently, she has agreed to receive U.S. troops’
advice and logistical support in the country’s fight against the Abu Sayyaf.
Manila also called for a tri-nation anti-terrorist coalition with
Malaysia and Indonesia to boost border security and share intelligence.
Late last year, the government also passed an anti-money-laundering
legislation to block the flow of terrorist money.
U.S. involvement
By
sending American troops to aid Filipino forces in defeating the Abu Sayyaf, the
Philippines has become the only country besides Afghanistan to receive direct
involvement of U.S. troops in the fight against terrorism.
The full contingent of about 660 American soldiers consists of 160
special operations forces ‑ including Navy SEALs, the Army’s Green
Berets, Marines with special operations capabilities, and Air Force Special
Forces ‑ as well as about 500 support and technical personnel.
Joint training exercises for the “balikatan,” or
“shoulder-to-shoulder” operation, began formally on Jan. 31 on the island of
Basilan off of Mindanao, and will last six months under the current agreement.
Though their precise role remains unspecified, U.S. troops will
officially only provide technical support, advice and training, and will not
participate in combat. However,
they will accompany Philippine troops into combat zones ‑ two Special
Forces soldiers for each Philippine company of 70 to 100 soldiers ‑ and
will be armed and are authorized to fire in self-defense.
Arroyo has given repeated reminders that “balikatan” remains a
Philippine operation and that “we will do the fighting.”
Risk
assessment
Arroyo’s decision to accept U.S. troops is an enormous
political gamble for the president.
The Philippine Constitution bans foreign combat troops unless a formal
treaty has been signed. Thus, even
with the U.S. troops already having commenced joint training exercises with
their Filipino counterparts, Arroyo’s critics continue to challenge the
constitutionality of the deployment of American troops.
The issue is so sensitive that the “terms of reference” that specify
the role of American troops and their chain of command still remain at the
development stage.
COLLABORATIVE REGIONAL EFFORTS
The
intricacy of Southeast Asia’s terrorist network, various groups’ elaborate
and established links to each other and to al
Qaeda, and the elusive and itinerant nature of their members all confirm
that governmental cooperation is a fundamental prerequisite for a successful
campaign against terrorism. Every
head of state in Southeast Asia has acknowledged this immediate need, and has
vowed to enhance security, intelligence and legal cooperation.
Recently, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines also agreed to draft an
accord to combat terrorism and border crime, and may create a joint rapid
response force. For the large part, however, words have come more easily than
action.
Southeast
Asian nations need to take advantage of the forum that already exists to
facilitate cooperation. ASEAN can
serve as the focal vehicle through which the countries can coordinate and act on
their promises. All ASEAN members
already adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism at
the Brunei summit in November, and are in the initial stages of establishing
collaborative procedures. A solid
ASEAN initiative, furthermore, has high credibility in the international arena,
and will pave the way for broader frameworks of international anti-terrorism
cooperation through such meetings as the ASEAN-Plus-Three (with Japan and South
Korea) and ASEAN-China summits, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the U.S.-ASEAN
Dialogue. The seriousness and
swiftness with which Southeast Asian nations responded to the Sept. 11 attacks
augurs well for the progression of the global fight against terrorism, but the
region faces difficult tasks ahead.
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