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Today, Saudi Arabia is stable. But as of Sept. 11, this stability can no longer be taken for granted. Osama bin Laden's actions, and the American response to them, will help to coalesce opposition to the royal family, the Al Saud, and their monopoly on power. It is difficult to measure the level of support bin Laden enjoys within Saudi Arabia. But he represents the conflict, albeit in its most extreme dimension, that has altered political dynamics in Saudi Arabia, perhaps permanently.
Sources of Stability
The Al Saud's political authority exists by virtue of its intimate alliance with the Al ash Shaykh, as Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and his descendants are known. This 250-year-old relationship lies at the heart of the royal family's political and ideological legitimacy.
The Wahhabi movement arose out of the political and religious conflict of 18th century Saudi Arabia.
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, a scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, preached a message of Islamic reform, emphasizing a strict and literal interpretation of the Koran and the institutionalization of Islamic law. In 1744, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab came under the protection of a Najd tribal leader named Muhammad inb Saud. The association flourished, and provided the Al Saud with a fundamentalist and proselytizing fervor. By the early 19th century, Al Saud's dominion, and with it the influence of the Wahhabi movement, extended to much of the Arabian peninsula.
The Koran is strictly monotheistic. In contrast to the Christian West, there is no justification for the separation of church and state. God is the supreme power; the state is God's to govern. This idea was hardly new to classical Islam. But Wahhabi doctrine linked political loyalty with religious devotion. A ruler's job is to ensure that both the state and society live in accordance with God's law. A legitimate ruler thus ensures that society is a living reflection of God's law. Such a ruler can expect the unquestioning allegiance of his people.
Today, the relationship between Al Saud and the religious community remains the principle pillar upon which Saudi stability rests. The clearly defined religious puritanism of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab provides a basis both for the royal family's political authority and its legitimacy. Despite the considerable power that is vested in the king, his legitimacy remains dependent of the consensus of the religious leadership (ulema). While the ulema should not be considered king-makers in Saudi Arabia, their support is essential. In 1964, members of the royal family deposed King Saud only after obtaining a religious opinion (fatwa) justifying their actions.
Internal Security
Security policy, both national and international, remains the purview of a select group within the royal family. The central figure from the standpoint of internal security is Crown Prince Abdallah who commands the National Guard. Outnumbering the regular army by 25,000, the 100,000 strong National Guard is designed to counter a challenge to the throne by either the military or a popular uprising. The regular army is consigned to the periphery of the kingdom, and combined movement of forces is regulated. In contrast, the National Guard is stationed at key locations and facilities throughout the country. Moreover, the National Guard is raised through tribal levies. In theory, this simultaneously ensures the loyalty of the tribes, and insulates the Guard from the undercurrents of dissent that may influence other segments of society.
The Opposition
Though there were rare instances of opposition prior to 1991, Islamist criticism of the monarchy grew dramatically following the Gulf War. The presence of thousands of Western, non-Muslim troops in close proximity to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina was seen as heretical. Moreover, reliance on foreign troops for defense highlighted the vulnerability of the monarchy and seemed to insinuate that the defense of the Holy Land had been mismanaged in view of the billions spent on defense. Thus, in the eyes of the religious opposition, the Islamic credentials of the monarchy had been called into question. When, following the Gulf War, some Western troops remained in Saudi Arabia, the radical opposition viewed them as a prop for what had become an illegitimate government.
In the meantime, increasingly dire economic conditions have curbed prosperity, highlighted fissures within Saudi society, and exposed the royal family to charges of waste and corruption. In the last decade, the standard of living has fallen precipitously. Critics charge that the government has done nothing to diversify an economy that is overwhelmingly dependent on oil revenues. Population growth is robust, but the economy is stagnating, further stressing the social welfare net.
The religious opposition to Al Saud, by no means united, reflects this myriad of problems. A cross section of prominent opposition personalities demonstrates a strong mix of academic backgrounds and religious training. By and large, they are the well-educated children of an affluent generation. Perhaps more importantly, they are largely drawn from the urban middle class, a segment of society that has been excluded from the decision-making process.
Among the opposition movements and figures, Osama bin Laden is the most radical and activist. With the exception of Saad al Faqih, currently exiled in London, few other opponents of the regime are calling for its downfall. These more moderate groups stress reform, rejecting Westernization rather than modernization. They understand that Islamic society will have to accommodate the modern world in some respects. They wish to mitigate the more problematic influences of modernity through a revival of traditional Islamic values. Consequently, they accept the royal family as a political institution, but object to the indulgence and corruption its more free-wheeling members. The Sudayri seven, as the king and his six brothers are known, seem to be the focus of frustration in this regard.
For Osama bin Laden and the radical opposition, the king is an apostate. Little more proof is required than the "occupation" of the Holy Land by infidel armies. Classical Islam prescribes one penalty only for apostasy, death. But the myth surrounding bin Laden in Saudi Arabia may be more pervasive than his influence. Though bin Laden's message resonates among the alienated in the Kingdom, it also arouses more curiosity than adherence. Ironically, bin Laden's revolutionary appeal is strongest among those who, like himself, have benefited from the encroachment of the Western world.
Thinking the Unthinkable?
The Al Saud record of governance is mixed, and their response to these challenges has often been contradictory. The rules of the game were set two and a half centuries ago, but the game has changed much in the intervening years. The reliance on puritanical Islamic values and idiom provided the Al Saud with the credible ideology and identity through which to rule. But these qualities have proven less adept as a means for coping with many of the concessions Saudi Arabia has made to modernity. In the past, the government has sought to co-opt Islamists through the support of groups both home and abroad. Elements of the opposition that have proven less susceptible to this strategy have been ruthlessly suppressed. The success of this course remains an open question. The government has found that support for these groups, once conferred, is not easily eliminated.
Credibility is a double-edged sword. It is a burden shared both by the regime and its critics. Few of the latter, with the exception of Osama bin Laden and Saad al Faqih, have presented a coherent program or alternative to the monarchy. A theocratic state modeled after the (Shia/Persian) Iranian example finds little appeal among a Sunni/Arab population. Moreover, pedigree is an important obstacle for the radical opposition. Not only does Osama bin Laden lack religious credentials, his family is of Yemeni origin. Likewise, Saad al Faqih was born in Iraq. The lack of prominent tribal affiliations will do much to blunt their appeal.
Many of the circumstances that made Iran ripe for Islamic revolution exist today in Saudi Arabia: an authoritarian government, an unbalanced economy heavily dependent on oil revenue, problematic demographic growth, income distribution gaps, political persecution. But there, similarities begin to weaken.
The utility of religion as a revolutionary force is difficult to assess. During the industrial revolution, the influence of evangelical Anglicans and Methodists softened dissent in England. In modern Iran, Shia Islam provided the vehicle for revolution. The evolution of Shi'ite institutions in Iran allowed for a hierarchy of religious leadership, a separation of clergy and state control, and consequently, the basis for independent claims for a clerical state. Islam, in the aggregate, is in many ways a revolutionary movement. But Sunni Islam, reliant as it is on consensus, may lend itself less readily as a vehicle than its Shia counterpart.
Al Saud rule is, for the time being, intact. But the quest for stability in Saudi Arabia is ongoing. History may not be on their side any longer. The Islamic values upon which they based their authority for so long are now, seemingly, in conflict with forces they could not control even if they chose to do so. The process of globalization will challenge Saudi society long after Osama bin Laden exits the stage.
Sources:
R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Rise of Political Islam In Saudi Arabia," Middle East Journal 48, No. 4 (Autumn 1994).
Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
Nikki E. Keddie, Debating Revolutions (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revolution," The New York Review of Books, January 21, 1988.
David E. Long, The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1997).
Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle Of The Prophet: Religion And Politics In Iran (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).
The Military Balance, 2000-2001, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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