Russia’s Souring Strategic Perspectives in Afghanistan

The U.S. military campaign against the Taliban (Operation Enduring Freedom) was a blessing in disguise for Russia for two reasons.  First, given the heightened American concern regarding transnational terrorism, Russia concluded that it could solve its own “Chechen problem” in the name of fighting “terrorism,” and, in the process, might get away with using whatever level of force it deemed necessary.  Second, it was the U.S. military action — in which the American Special Forces pinpointed the position of the Taliban forces from the ground positions of the Northern Alliance, and the American air force pounded those Taliban targets, thereby collapsing the resilience of the Taliban fighters.  Russia was indeed surprised with the pace of dismantlement of the Taliban rule.  The awesome power of the American military was once again unambiguously proven.

 As the interim government of Prime Minister Hamid Karzai started to take political control of various regions of Afghanistan, Russia decided to send its own medical force.  As benign the presence of the Russian medical forces in Afghanistan might have been from the Russian viewpoint, it raised a lot of eyebrows, and it also brought back painful memories of the brutalities related to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  But Moscow did not show any sensitivity about those sentiments.

The Pashtuns siding with Hamid Karzai (himself a Pashtun) did not forget that the Russians fought with the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated Northern Alliance, which was largely equipped by Russian military wherewithal.  A potentially contentious aspect of that reality is that the Afghan “national military” is not at all “national” in its ethnic makeup.  There are also reports that the Russians are essentially “running the small Afghan Tajik Air Force, serving as pilots or mechanics.”  From the Russian point of view, the military dominance of the Northern Alliance would guarantee against any sudden buildup of the Pashtun forces.

Russia will not forget that the Taliban were primarily Pashtun in ethnicity; thus they do not trust the Pashtun even under the leadership of Karzai, especially when one considers that a large number of them are merely turncoat Taliban.  Karzai has shown his own ill will toward Russia by pointedly keeping Moscow off the itinerary of his recent worldwide travel.  It is also likely that Karzai remains wary of the Russian’s potential divisive role in his country.

 In the meantime, the defense minister of the new Afghan government, Gen. Mohammad Fahim — an ethnic Tajik — not only visited Russia, but was granted a lengthy meeting with President Vladimir Putin, and was also promised additional Russian military and technical assistance.

It is possible that Hamid Karzai’s request for additional Western peacekeeping troops in his country might be related to the predominantly non-Pashtun ethnic makeup of the Afghan “national military.”  Undoubtedly, the presence of such forces would enhance the political clout and maneuverability of the Karzai government.  Interestingly enough, Fahim has been on the record for his opposition to the enhanced presence of Western peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan.

If the ethnic tensions within the ranks of the interim government were somewhat submerged up until now, the assassination of the interim minister for air transport and tourism, Abdul Rahman, on Feb. 14, surfaced them with a vengeance.  Karzai accused five men for that act, two of which were generals and members of the intelligence service of the intelligence ministry.  What was most troubling was that all five of the alleged attackers belonged to a faction of the Northern Alliance.

As the ethnic rivalry within the interim government begins to intensify, the United States and Russia are also manifesting their own growing differences.  The very fact that the Bush administration has decided to have a long-term, if not a permanent military presence in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will lead to increased tensions between the two great powers.  The Putin government considers Central Asia as its own backyard; any long-term American presence is seen as intrusive and hegemonic in orientation.  In addition, the U.S. government is also busy stating its preferences for the Caspian Sea oil and gas routes, which are likely to go through Afghanistan, but would avoid the Tajik controlled areas of that country.  Given the large revenues that such pipeline plans promise, Russia and its Tajik and Uzbek allies of the Northern Alliance would not like such arrangements.

Another source of Russia’s concern in the Afghan evolving power game is the exchange of shrill rhetorical barrages between the Bush administration and Iran.  After all, both Russia and Iran were long supporters of the Northern Alliance’s fight against the Taliban.  As Iran watches the rising ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, it has escalated its own behind-the-scenes maneuvering.  As a country that watched in frustration the complete dissipation of its political clout from Afghanistan during the Taliban rule, Iran is in no mood to experience similar frustrations in the post-Taliban era.  Russia continues to value Iran’s increased strategic influence in Afghanistan, since it is not likely to compete with its own interests.

The United States, on its part, interprets the Iranian maneuvering as a manifestation of its predilection for the return of “warlordism” in Afghanistan, and aimed at weakening the interim government.  The unfortunate aspect of the U.S. interpretation (or misinterpretation) of Iranian activism, inter alia, contributed to Bush’s lumping of Iran (along with Iraq and North Korea) as the so-called “axis of evil.”  However, given that it assigns high significance to having its own influence not completely wiped out from the areas contiguous to Afghanistan, Iran is not likely to cease its activities in Afghanistan, America’s seeming misinterpretation of its activism and ensuing warnings, notwithstanding.

Thus emerges a portrait of Afghanistan that is still very unstable, divided and weak, and, consequently, very prone to be exploited by regional and great power rivalry.  Moscow’s chief concern is that “wrong” groups might capture power in that country in the coming months, especially if the U.S. diverts its attention to other parts of the world and pursues other strategic issues.  Even with a powerful presence of United States in Afghanistan and other neighboring states, Russia sees a definite uphill struggle in its own attempts to reestablish its hegemony in Central Asia or influence the power politics of Afghanistan.

By Ehsan Ahrari Independent Security Analyst shahr@livenet.net

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