U.S. Deployment to the Philippines:
A Sensible and Timely Quid Pro Quo

The deployment of U.S. troops to the Philippines to fight the war on terrorism is not an entirely new development, but may herald a new phase in relations between Washington and Manila. However, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo must first weather the criticism that her decision to accept U.S. assistance in the ongoing campaign against Abu Sayyaf has provoked among many Filipinos, including her vice president and foreign affairs secretary, Teofisto Guingona. Guingona came close to resigning over the issue, and dissent still lingers despite Arroyo's ability to win much-needed support for the controversial initiative at a Jan. 23 meeting of her National Security Council.

The roots of this controversy run deep in the Philippines, a side effect of the long American military presence that ended at the start of the 1990s. A decade after America's departure, the issue still is near the surface for many Filipinos. However, while some, such as Guingona, may fear the specter of colonialism, others, like Arroyo, grasped quickly the heightened convergence of American and Filipino interests that followed Sept. 11. While reportedly turning down an offer by the United States last November to contribute combat troops to her country's continuing fight against Muslim insurgents (something forbidden under the Philippine Constitution), Arroyo did accept an offer of some $100 million in military aid to assist in this struggle, including a C-130 military transport aircraft, eight helicopters, 30,000 M-16 assault rifles, and several coastal patrol vessels. She also took the opportunity to press for greater access to U.S. markets for Filipino goods.

The renewed military relationship between Manila and Washington includes the recent deployment of U.S. troops to the southern Philippines. The number of American troops in the country is projected to grow to around 660, some 160 of whom will be Special Forces personnel. These field exercises, scheduled to last six months, represent a quantitative and qualitative increase over existing annual joint U.S.-Filipino military cooperation. The deployed U.S. troops — who, under the Philippines constitution, cannot directly engage in combat but are authorized to defend themselves under rules of engagement currently being developed — will serve as advisers to the Filipino military.

Meanwhile, no doubt mindful of the need to assuage fears among some Filipinos that the return of U.S. troops to their country represents a return of the colonial 'bogey-man,' Philippine Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes has repeatedly emphasized that the American role is as non-combatants, even if it is possible they could be involved in defensive fighting. Abu Sayyaf, the terrorist group upon which the U.S.-Filipino effort will be focused, currently holds two American hostages — missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham from Wichita, Kansas — as well as Deborah Yap, a Filipino nurse. Guillermo Sobero from Corona, Calif., was beheaded by his Abu Sayyaf captors in June 2001. As U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said, such factors add a further dimension to American interest in the campaign against Abu Sayyaf.

However, the main motivation for such interest appears to be the purported links between Abu Sayyaf and al Qaeda. According to Rumsfeld, there is no doubt that such a link exists. The United States has three pieces of "evidence" to back up this stance. First, Abu Sayyaf founder Abdurajak Janjalini met with Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, in the early 1990s. Second, the group received training from Ramzi Yousef, convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center attack, who also has been linked to bin Laden. Finally, members of Abu Sayyaf trained in Afghanistan with al Qaeda leaders. Despite this, there is little substantive evidence currently linking Abu Sayyaf with bin Laden's organization, and the main business of the Filipino group (whose name means "Bearer of the Sword" in Arabic) is viewed not as pursing its self-professed goal of establishing an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu islands as much as seizing hostages for money. Arroyo has herself described the group as "a money-crazed gang of criminals without any ideology."

However, whether the link with al Qaeda is as clear-cut as Rumsfeld claims is ultimately irrelevant. For, as he himself admits, the United States is "interested in a lot more than al Qaeda." Even if the connection between Abu Sayyaf was completely non-existent, the Filipino terrorist group's activities warrant U.S. interest — not least over the matter of the U.S. citizens it holds captive. Likewise, if any link al Qaeda exists, however tenuous, the message being sent to others who might consider such a relationship is an unequivocal one. Empty threats frighten no one. U.S. action to help put the Al Sayaffs of the world out of business will demonstrate to other such groups that the strategic environment after Sept. 11 is not one that favors them.

As such, sending U.S. troops to the Philippines is a viable strategy that allows the United States to retain the initiative while keeping open other more difficult or time-consuming options, including covert ones. It does so by the relatively simple expedient of expanding the sort of training that U.S. Special Forces already conduct with foreign militaries worldwide. True, the situation in the Philippines carries more risks than are usually faced in such programs, but it also presents less danger than another Afghanistan-type operation. Indeed, it is possible that the Philippines, rather than Afghanistan, will provide the dominant model for future overt U.S. actions in the war against terrorism.

 

By Mark Burgess CDI Research Analyst mburgess@cdi.org

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