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Afghans are pleading for a broadening of the peacekeeping
mission, but the United States and its allies are not responding.
What we have learned from past peacekeeping missions is that success
depends on the ability of the international community to respect the calls of
the local people.
Initial uncertainties
The Bonn
Agreement of December 2001, which included the decision to send an
international peacekeeping force to Kabul, was heralded as the opening of a new
era for Afghanistan. However, it
was not euphoria, but uncertainty, skepticism, and even reluctance, that
characterized the actual deployment of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan capital starting in
January. At its drafting stage,
there had been little dispute in the international community that the ISAF
needed to be predominantly Muslim, with Turkey possibly leading the force.
The actual composition: the ISAF is British-led and predominantly Western
European, with Turkey being the only
Muslim nation to participate. The
inclusion of countries such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and Jordan turned out to be
mere speculation.
Furthermore, the decision to send a peacekeeping force with
a European face seemed only to exacerbate Afghans’ deep-seated distrust and
resentment of foreigners. The
Northern Alliance envoy in Washington argued that international peacekeepers
were not needed because Afghans could ensure their own security.
In November last year, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz
said, “One of the lessons of Afghanistan’s history…is if you’re a
foreigner, try not to go in. If you go in, don’t stay too long, because they don’t
tend to like any foreigners who stay too long” (NYT
Nov. 19, 2001). Yet thousands
of foreigners — armed, and mostly non-Muslim at that — were given
the green light by the UN Security Council one month later.
And even as ISAF troops arrived in Kabul, many questioned whether they
would create order and security, or further violence and bloodshed.
Afghanistan’s requests
Unexpectedly, one month into the ISAF’s deployment there
exists an enormous contrast between these preliminary doubts and the issues at
hand today. Far from questioning
the very existence of the ISAF, leaders are now considering the sufficiency
of the mission under current guidelines. The
presence of the British-led force has not only been largely accepted by the
Afghans, but Afghans themselves are now asking for a more visible presence of
foreign troops, be they Muslims or not. The
representative voice for this request has been none other than Afghanistan’s
interim Prime Minister Hamid Karzai. He
has personally appealed to both U.S. President George W. Bush and the UN
Security Council that he would like to see a greater number of peacekeepers in
Kabul and throughout the country. During
his visit to Washington in January, Karzai even requested the participation of
American troops — the epitome of “foreigners” in the eyes of the
1980s’ Afghanistan War generation — in the ISAF. The chief UN envoy to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, also said
local Afghan people, and even competing warlords, are pleading for more
peacekeepers (LA Times Feb. 7, 2002).
The United States and its anti-terrorism allies in the
United Nations have so far given the calls a cold shoulder.
Bush ruled out involvement of U.S. troops in the security force, and made
no public comment about any imminent broadening of the ISAF.
Clearly, players have switched their roles:
Afghans are asking for more foreigners, but the foreigners are not
rushing to go in.
Assessing the mandate
But it may only be a matter of time before the ISAF is
authorized a greater role. One of
the greatest security concerns in Afghanistan now is the sporadic fighting
between regional warlords who have held on to their various factional
motivations. Afghan officials fear
that these clashes will eventually undermine the new government.
Rural residents are pleading the government to disarm local fighters and
bolster security in their areas. Unsurprisingly,
Kabul has been largely spared of the warlords’ infighting.
In fact, the problem for Kabul now is overcrowding caused by returning
refugees who are heading en masse to the capital, where it is safer, rather than
back to their hometowns. Local
police also report that crime rates in the city have dropped markedly since the
ISAF’s arrival. Far from
resenting foreign peacekeepers, ordinary Afghans are counting on the security
the ISAF promises to provide.
While the Pentagon has not articulated reasons for its
unwillingness to advocate the ISAF’s expansion, it continues to stress that
the United States is committed to the building of an Afghan national army.
Rather than fostering dependency on foreign troops, “the best option
for Afghanistan is really to have their own Afghan forces keeping the peace in
their own country,” said Douglas Feith, U.S. undersecretary of defense for
policy (Reuters Feb. 20, 2002). But
considering the urgent security needs in Afghanistan, a national army and the
ISAF do not appear to be viable alternatives for one another; instead, greater
security will be attained if they work hand in hand.
The first recruits for the new army began training only last week, and
U.S. military officials admit that it may take up to two years to build a
full-scale Afghan defense force. In
the meantime, the poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly paid Afghan police
can do little by itself to ensure security.
The Bush administration struggles with an internal rift over this issue.
While the Department of Defense remains adamantly opposed to the ISAF’s
expansion, State Department officials have indicated that they believe the
broadening of the peacekeeping mission is forthcoming.
Furthermore, it is of great significance that Afghans
themselves, and not an outside authority, initiated the current appeal for an
expanded ISAF mandate. To respond
promptly to the request for further assistance is to reassure Afghans that the
international community is serious about the country’s reconstruction, and
that there will not be a repeat of the abandonment it experienced in the early
1990s. Karzai stated that a
revision of the current mandate would “signal the ongoing commitment of the
international community to peace and security in Afghanistan.” Conversely, to discard the request is to rebuff inputs from
the new Afghan government, slight its credibility, and to suggest to the Afghans
that reconstruction is a foreign-imposed project in which aid is given when and
to the extent that “foreigners” are willing to do so.
Details of the Afghan request
Any amendment to the existing ISAF mandate requires the
passage of another UN Security Council resolution drafted in consultation with
the international community and the Afghan government.
While a resolution is not yet in sight, many Afghan and UN officials have
made their proposals clear: 1) expand the ISAF to a force of 25,000 to 30,000;
2) deploy the peacekeepers throughout Afghanistan — Karzai highlighted
particular needs in the cities of Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Jalalabad;
and 3) extend its mission beyond the current six-month limit.
An enlargement to six times its current 4,500-strong force
is not an implausible request when put into perspective with the history of UN
peacekeeping missions. More than
60,000 peacekeepers were initially deployed in Bosnia in 1995.
The UN Mission in Sierra Leone that began in 1999 has grown to a force of
13,000 troops, and may expand to about 20,000 with yet another mandate revision.
UN peacekeepers on the small island of East Timor (with a population of
under 1 million) numbered over 9,000 in 1999-2000.
While success hinges on the quality, not quantity, of the international
troops, Afghanistan’s history of warring factions and its utter devastation
seems to warrant a greater security force for its 26 million people, at least
until the establishment of a capable national police force and army.
East Timor may in fact be a model in many ways for the ISAF.
Like Afghanistan, in 1999 the country was in need of everything from a
functioning army, police, central bank, accounting system and a national
currency to basic infrastructure, an official language, a legal system and a
civil service. Local militias
initially resented the Australian-led peacekeepers’ predominantly Western
presence, and a regional UN official warned that “In Asia, you offer, but you
don’t push” (Time Asia Sept. 29,
1999) — a caution similar to those heard for Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, peacekeepers adopted robust rules of engagement and have
been rigorously training locals to run their own country.
Two years later, the talk is now of peaceful and democratic transition to
independence and of a promising revival of the private sector, foreign
investment, and tourism. Yet, about 5,000 peacekeepers will remain even after
independence in May, until the Timorese are ready to adopt all administrative
and security responsibilities.
The 4,500-strong peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan
working to secure peace in just six months seems miniscule and fleeting in
comparison. In the Afghan case, the
international community is not offering, and the Afghans are begging.
A common lesson learned from successful peacekeeping missions is that the
peacekeeping authorities recognize the requests of local representatives and
include them in all major decisions. By
turning down the call for the ISAF’s expansion without providing adequate
reasons, the Afghan mission is already neglecting this fundamental lesson.
What is urgently needed is a reassessment of ISAF’s mandate in view of
Afghanistan’s immediate security concerns.
Countries also need to maintain their financial pledges to Afghanistan
and ensure that bureaucratic walls do not obstruct money flows toward Afghan
security and reconstruction. A more
decisive international commitment to the country will reassure Afghans that this
time they will not be left to themselves.
Sources:
Associated Press (Oct. 31, 1999 – Dec. 17, 2001); BBC
News (Sept. 24 – Oct. 29, 1999); Far
Eastern Economic Review (Jan. 31 - Feb. 28, 2002); LA Times (Feb. 7 - Feb. 21, 2002); OneWorld.net
(Jan. 31, 2002); Paknews.com (Feb. 18,
2002); Reuters (Dec. 12, 2001 - Feb. 20, 2002); South China Morning Post (Nov. 7, 1999); The New York Times (Nov. 19, 2001 - Feb. 26, 2002); The
Washington Post (Feb. 8 - 26, 2002), http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/
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