Post-Taliban Afghanistan: What's Next for Pakistan

The Taliban regime has been dismantled in Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden may be captured or killed, but the post-Taliban phase of America's 'war' on terrorism holds a mixed bag of opportunities and challenges for Pakistan. In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, the newest theme of U.S. foreign policy is that any violent movement that aims to alter the political status quo faces the danger of being branded as 'terrorist,' and its brutal suppression by the pro-status quo power is a perfectly legitimate response.

The Kashmir dispute — in which Pakistan has frequently and fervently used Islamist forces as a tool to secure international attention — will get the focused attention of the United States before too long. But such attention, in all likelihood, will be aimed at preserving the status quo, which India favors, and not its potential alteration, which Pakistan desires. In the wake of the terrorist attack on India's parliament on Dec. 13, the Bush administration demanded that Pakistan clamp down hard on the Islamist groups. The Indian government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee accused the Kashmir-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) of being involved in that attack. As an additional measure, Bush on Dec. 21 froze the financial assets of LeT and another Pakistan-based organization, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN). The last mentioned entity was suspected of having contacts with an al Qaeda terrorist group, a charge UTN vehemently denies.

However, such U.S. insistence, especially after Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's risky maneuver to side with the American dismantlement of the Taliban regime, will only strengthen the position of the Islamists — both within and outside the Pakistani armed forces — who have been arguing all along that the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, in reality, is aimed against Islam. The Bush administration must clearly understand that the flip side of its decision to remain engaged in Afghanistan is remaining involved in Pakistan.

Staying engaged in Pakistan means, first and foremost, an active participation by the United States in resolving the Kashmir conflict. The hope of becoming a beneficiary of the Pax Americana that has emerged in South and West Asia might have been one of the primary reasons that Pakistan unhesitatingly abandoned the Taliban. Pakistan for some time has hoped for U.S. involvement in spurring dialogue with India, and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell discussed the Kashmir issue with Musharraf at their meeting in October. In fact, Powell, in an Oct. 16 press conference, echoed Islamabad's long-time push for talks with India on the issue.

Pakistan, however, realizes that by insisting on a political solution for the Kashmir dispute, it remains an anti-status quo power, and, is thereby in a disadvantageous position. India, on the other hand, will have no problem accepting the status quo as the 'final' solution, and is thus likely to gain American sympathies — especially in view of the post-Sept. 11 near 'zero tolerance' of the Bush administration for any significant alteration in the political status quo anywhere. However, Pakistan hopes that one of its major rewards for its participation in the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan will emerge in the form of active American involvement in resolving the Kashmir conflict.

As Pakistan calculates, India — despite all its bravado about having an independent foreign policy and not accepting a third party involvement in the Kashmir dispute — will be persuaded to accept an active U.S. role in resolving that conflict. As Pakistan studies a steady acceptance of America's growing dominant role in Asia on the part of India's major interlocutor, Russia, Pakistani leaders feel that India's maneuverability has been severely constrained. Under these circumstances, Pakistan anxiously awaits America's proactivism in the political resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

The other crucial implications of America's continued engagement with Pakistan include generous economic assistance on bilateral and multilateral bases (perhaps even forgiveness of a portion of Pakistan's debt), and, equally important, systematic assistance in rebuilding civilian infrastructures. The enhanced role of the Pakistani madrassas (religious schools) in creating a jihadi subculture in that country, as well as in Afghanistan in the 1990s, was an unadulterated indication that modern educational institutions in Pakistan have been significantly weakened. That weakening came as a result of the systematically misplaced priorities of Pakistan's kleptocratic civilian leadership and the determination of its military to waste public funds in purchasing expensive weapon systems to sustain at least a semblance of strategic parity with India. Until it became an overt nuclear state in 1998, Pakistan had failed to achieve such parity in conventional weaponry, while at the same time its civilian infrastructures continued to deteriorate at an alarming pace, largely due to a sustained absence of capital investment.

If the United States wishes to see a stable South and West Asia, it must also emphasize the nurturing of democracy in those regions. Thus, the Bush administration must discreetly — or even not so discreetly — nudge the military leadership of Pakistan to bring back democracy. Even when the jihadi subculture was becoming increasingly voluble in the mid-to-late 1990s, a majority of Pakistanis manifested an unambiguous preference for political moderation and civilian rule, and eschewed voting for the Islamic obscurantist and radical Islamist parties. Given that democracy is being given a chance in neighboring Iran — rocky though its chances have been under the continued shenanigans of the Islamic hardliners — the military rulers of Pakistan ought to be persuaded to restart their country's arduous journey on the road to democracy. No one is suggesting that democratic India and Pakistan will overcome their traditional rivalry and become friends; however, as democratic nations, both of them are likely to rely heavily on peaceful means for resolving even the most obdurate aspects of their political disputes.

The decisions by Pakistan and India to become declared nuclear powers were a shock to the United States. It took a while for Washington to accept the reality that the nuclear programs in these countries will not unravel. Now, the United States must work assiduously to help them establish safeguards to prevent nuclear accidents, or, worse yet, unauthorized or accidental nuclear attack. The United States also is uniquely qualified to persuade both India and Pakistan to negotiate institutionalized transparencies in their nuclear weapons and missile programs, and, most importantly, in the modalities of their respective nuclear thresholds. Even though both sides subscribe to the notion of minimal credible deterrence, there is little doubt that nuclear deterrence has remained highly dynamic and unstable in both South Asian countries. The chief reason is that, while India's nuclear weapon and missile programs are driven by the pace of Chinese nuclear and missile modernization, Pakistan's own nuclear modernization is focused entirely on Indian nuclear and missile upgrading.

The U.S. capability to win the military part of its campaign against terrorism has been proven. But the most challenging part of winning the larger 'war' on terrorism is winning the politico-economic aspects. And the evolution of an economically productive and prosperous — and democratic — Pakistan, indeed, will be a great stride in that direction. The litmus test of America's success will be the arrival of an era when even the madrassas in Pakistan will educate their young students, along with modern education, in the religious tolerance that the Prophet of Islam himself practiced and preached.

By Ehsan Ahrari Independent Security Analyst shahr@livenet.net

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