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On Terror and Terrorism
 
Dec. 3, 2001 Printer-Friendly Version

Terror is a condition or state of mind induced by the power of the unknown, unknowable, or unpredictable acts (or omissions) of nature or of man.

The origin of the word can be traced to the Sanskrit "trasati," meaning "he trembles, is afraid" and to the Greek "trein," to flee from fear, be afraid."1

As millions around the world know, especially Americans since Sept. 11, terror most often is the product of highly destructive acts. Natural forces - volcanoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, disease - while remaining untamed and powerful, are no longer quite as unpredictable or untreatable as in the past. And science promises additional progress in at least predicting these natural occurrences.

Less predictable are the acts of terror instigated by humans. These we call terrorism, "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."2

Terror or terrorism seems to be a staple of human relations. It can be inflicted either on its own terms or be associated with more general warfare. From World War I through the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the use of gas induced added terror among soldiers and civilians. Air raids on cities during World War II using incendiary munitions were another instance of terror within the larger war, as were the V-1 and V-2 rockets aimed at cities by the Nazis. In the nuclear era, the term "balance of terror" became a common alternative to MAD - mutual assured destruction.

 
International Conventions on Terrorism

Terrorism as a subject of concern for the international community as a whole is relatively recent. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter addresses the existence of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and the "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member" state. But the intent of the charter was to preclude state-to-state violence, not violence by sub-national organizations.

On Sept. 14, 1963, in Tokyo, the U.N. sponsored the initial international agreement on terrorism connected with aircraft: the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft was opened for signature. The convention entered into force on Dec. 4, 1969, and currently has 41 signatories and 172 contracting states. Charter IV deals with unlawful seizure of an aircraft. Two other conventions concerned with aircraft terrorism were signed in the early 1970s.3

Other anti-terrorism conventions of the 1980s and early 1990s dealt with hostage-taking, oil platforms, ships, nuclear materials, and plastic explosives. But the word "terrorist" did not specifically appear in the titles of agreements until the mid-1990s. In 1994, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, supplementing it in1996. On Dec. 15, 1997, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which went into force May 23, 2001 (now with 58 signatories and 29 ratifications/accessions4). And on Dec. 9, 1999 the Assembly adopted the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. With 54 signatories and 4 contracting states, the 1999 convention is not yet in force - it needs 22 ratifications/accessions.5

Also in 1999, the U.N. Security Council passed two resolutions - 1267 and 1269 concerning terrorism. While 1269 "unequivocally condemned all acts of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable," 1267 was more directly focused, demanding Afghanistan surrender Osama bin Laden "to appropriate authorities so that he can be brought to justice." Resolution 1333, passed in 2000, called on the "Taliban to close" terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

In an accident of timing, the 56th session of the U.N. General Assembly opened Sept. 12, 2001. In one of its first actions, the assembly condemned the attacks of the previous day. Between Sept. 11 and the end of that month, seven of 16 press announcements concerning the General Assembly dealt with terrorism. On Sept. 12, the Security Council passed resolution 1368 (2001), which "condemned in the strongest terms the terrorist attack against the United States and called on all states to work together urgently to bring the perpetrators to justice." And on Sept. 28, the Security Council passed resolution 13773 (2001) which called for suppressing terrorist financing and improving international cooperation on stopping the movement of funds for terrorists.

Finally, there are seven anti-terrorist conventions that are regionally based: the Organization of American States (1971), the Council of Europe (1977), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (1987), the Arab League (1998), the Islamic Conference (1999), the Commonwealth of Independent States (1999), and the Organization of African Unity (1999).

With post-Cold War globalization supposedly breaking down barriers and uniting peoples, why does terrorism seem to be flourishing and becoming more virulent despite the numerous recent conventions and resolutions calling on nations to act against terror?

 
Terrorist Motives

Terrorism, by definition, is highly political. Contrary to popular opinion, it is not always irrational behavior. Research has shown that it has been particularly effective in struggles for independence, although far less so in international wars, revolution, and in changing hated government policies (although political assassinations, such as those of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and President John F. Kennedy, have had profound policy ramifications). Terrorist leaders always profess that they seek to redress some injustice, and they use propaganda about eradicating injustice to recruit followers. These recruits include both true believers in the cause and what researchers call opportunists, those who like the action and feelings of belonging.

Research has also revealed that removing the perceived injustice, or taking steps to do so, does not immediately eradicate terrorism. Another motive comes into play. In a sense, terrorism becomes habit forming. It is what terrorists are good at, what gives them a sense of purpose, and what is necessary to keep the group united and preserved. Often there remains a price on their heads, although amnesties can mitigate this factor.

In other cases, terrorism is used to support movements seeking their own self-aggrandizement. Criminal organizations engage in terror when they demand "protection" money - and enforce their demands on the few who might resist. In Colombia, terror is being employed by both the guerrillas and the right-wing paramilitaries in their attempts to control the drug trade that finances operations.

Finally, what is often termed anti-globalization is being co-opted by terrorist organizations that go far beyond the violent protestors who attack police and property during meetings of international financial meetings and political summits. This hi-jacking of legitimate concerns about the impact of globalization on the environment, health, and equitable distribution of economic and other resources seeks to exploit unease among millions of people that their traditions and values - familial, cultural, religious - are being overwhelmed by outside, uncontrollable forces. These people are suffering the most fundamental forms of terror; they are losing the pillars of experience that provide a sense of orientation in life. They are losing their sense of purpose. They are losing their identity. Their options seem reduced to fighting back or being swallowed by the monster of change.

 
Political Terrorism: "State-fueled" Movements

As could be expected, groups branded Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the U.S. Department of State represent a garden variety of motives and objectives, thus attesting to the difficulties of defining "terrorism" as a concept. A recent addition to the list, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), serves as an interesting example of a relatively new sub-category, what might be termed "state-fueled" terrorism. As opposed to state-sponsored terrorism, "state-fueled" denotes a group wholly opposed to the government of the state where it operates, but whose success has been strengthened by adverse popular reaction to the actions of the state's security apparatus.

The movement may be religious in its name and nature, but its popularity is a direct result of political, economic and social chaos in Uzbekistan. The IMU's political goal is the overthrow of the government of Islam Karimov, the country's authoritarian ruler and the only president independent Uzbekistan has ever known. Under Karimov, the country descended into poverty unseen in the Soviet times. The president's firm grip on power came at the expense of outlawing or intimidating leading opposition parties and figures.

More importantly, Karimov - officially a devout Muslim - has banned a number of Islamic groups whose preaching strayed from the government-approved line. In a poor country that is over 90 percent Muslim, religion is certain to serve as an outlet for popular dissatisfaction and social tensions. But by outlawing "unofficial" religious expression, Karimov left thousands of people no choice between complete loyalty to an unpopular regime or illegal - and often militant - religious groups such as the IMU.

The government's persecution of Islamic opposition forced thousands to flee to Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Many of the refugees received training in Afghanistan and - forming the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
returned to their country of origin to fight. Although IMU's goals are vastly different from those of al Qaeda and the Taliban, the latter's support at a time of crisis has forged closer links between them and the IMU than their differing political and religious goals would otherwise dictate.

Uzbekistan's example holds a lesson for future development of the Middle East and Central Asia. Terrorism is inextricably tied to the social conditions in the region and opportunities for expression of religious preferences. The oft-repeated refrain "Islam is not the enemy" is not a mere public relations ploy. Islam is an intricate part of the region's culture, and a regime's heavy-handed approach to religion is just as likely - if not more so - to fuel terrorist activities than it is to suppress them.

 
Religion in the Arabian Peninsula

At the heart of Osama bin Laden's terrorism is a duel hatred: that of the present rulers of his native Saudi Arabia, whom he considers apostates to Islam (secularists) and therefore unworthy to rule; and of the United States whose presence (approximately 5,000 military plus hundreds of civilians) defiles the holy land of Mecca and Medina.

So deep is this hatred that it knows no bounds, not even those of the Koran proscribing the killing of women and children. Those who follow bin Laden and al Qaeda seem to believe that unlimited violence unencumbered by pity or compassion is justified in the name of religious rage. (Thus U.S. President George W. Bush has called the al Qaeda terrorists involved in the attacks in New York and Washington "pure evil.")

Some commentators have suggested that the basis for such unremitting "religious-based" rage can be found in the strain of Islam called Wahhabism, which emerged less than two centuries ago in Arabia and is the official theology of the Arab Gulf states. They see Wahhabism as violent, intolerant, and fanatical - an extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism. It is puritanical, demanding punishment for those who enjoy any music except the drum, and severe punishment up to death for drinking or sexual transgressions. It condemns as unbelievers those who do not pray, a view that never previously existed in mainstream Islam.6

Osama bin Laden is a Wahhabi. He and his cohorts are driven by racial, ethnic, political, and religious hatred. For those who glorify hatred, as terrorists do, the end justifies all means, including the most despicable ones. If they could, fanatics of hatred would slaughter all those who do not adhere to their particular ideological or religious principles. Because they cannot achieve this level of violence, they resort simply to creating as much fear and chaos as possible whenever possible - as has been the goal of terrorists since they emerged in history. (They could, for example, without hesitation commit an act of mass destruction in the United States on Christmas Eve.)

While not Wahhabi, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is as fanatically religious as bin Laden, who believes that Islam is under attack by Christians and Jews.7 Thus at root their actions are not directly motivated by "lesser" considerations such as procedural matters or territorial ambitions other than to have a base from which to spread their "pure" form of Islam. Theirs is a religious war against "unbelief and unbelievers."

For the past two decades, this form of Islamic fundamentalism has racked the Middle East. It has targeted almost every regime in the region and, as it failed to make progress, has extended its hostility to the West whose support of current regimes has been a factor frustrating the terrorists.

From the assassination of Anwar Sadat to the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, from the decade long campaign of bin Laden to the destruction of ancient Buddhist statues, from the hideous persecution of women and homosexuals by the Taliban to the World Trade Center massacre, Robert Wright sees a single line. That line is a fundamentalist, religious one; it is a corrupt Islamic one.8

By their deeds, the al Qaeda terrorists reveal a belief that all is permitted them in acting out their "religious rage" and hatred. At its core, such unbridled, unrestrained extremism may lie at the root of evil. Certainly it is not religion, for at the heart of all religion is the most basic, most redeeming human impulse - compassion.

 
End Notes

1  Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 2361.
2   Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 12, 2001, p. 435.
3  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed Dec. 16, 1970 at the Hague, entered into force Oct. 14, 1971 (now with 77 signatories and 174 ratifications/accessions); and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed Sept. 23, 1971 at Montreal, entered into force Jan. 26, 1973 (now with 60 signatories and 175 ratifications/accessions). A supplementary convention to the latter was signed in Montreal on Feb. 24, 1988.
4  Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, China, and Saudi Arabia are not party to the treaty. Russia and all NATO countries are all signatories.
5  Among NATO counties, Poland and Hungary have yet to sign. Otherwise, the status of participation and non-participation noted in Note 4 above applies.
6  Stephen Schwartz, author of Intellectuals and Assassins (Anthem Press). Written Sept. 23, 2001, his article appears in the current edition of "The Spectator," London, England.
7  Andrew Sullivan, "This is a Religious War," New York Times Magazine, Oct. 7, 2001.
8  Robert Wright, "Muslims and Modernity," Slate, Oct. 27, 2001.

 

By Col. (Ret.) Dan Smith, USA
CDI Chief of Research
dsmith@cdi.org

Dr. Nicholas Berry

Tomas Valasek, CDI Senior Analyst

tvalasek@cdi.org


Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker, USN
CDI Senior Fellow
sbaker@cdi.org

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