One of the benefits of the recent arrest of Jose Padilla, the U.S. citizen
accused of planning to construct a radiological device, i.e., “dirty nuke,”
is that it helped publicize a woefully under-appreciated threat, namely, the
trafficking in and loose control over nuclear materials.
Although concern about nuclear terrorism is not new, the proliferation of nuclear
materials and nuclear know-how since the end of the Cold War has made at least
the likelihood of a nuclear incident more feasible. According to various reports,
nuclear fuels – such as highly enriched uranium – are highly available in research
reactors. In addition, nuclear material control is lax in Russia and in other
countries, as physical security is insufficient. Access control, inventory
control, and transportation security are all defective.
Earlier this week the International Atomic Energy Agency warned that all countries,
including the United States, need to increase safeguard of radioactive materials.
It believes that more than 100 countries may have inadequate controls to monitor
their radioactive materials. It also admits that before Sept. 11, the agency
had concentrated on safe use of those materials, not on protecting them from
terrorists.
Consider some basic facts on the supply side: The worldwide stockpiles of
separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are estimated to include
some 450 tons of military and civilian separated plutonium and over 1,700 tons
of HEU. A key problem in this arena is the large stocks of weapons-grade plutonium
and uranium that are produced by power reactors. Russia now holds about 150
tons of plutonium and 1,000 tons of highly enriched uranium.
A recently published report by the National Research Council found that “theft
or diversion of excess Russian HEU for terrorist use represents a significant
near-term threat to the United States.” A complete inventory of Russian
materials is not available, so it is impossible to confirm that diversions of
materials have not already occurred. Additionally, there have been more than
a dozen seizures of special nuclear material from Russia and surrounding countries
since the early 1990s.
About 40 kilograms of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium have been stolen
from poorly protected nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union during the
last decade. While most of that material was retrieved, 2 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium filched from a research reactor in the former Soviet Republic
of Georgia are still missing. And, Western countries have been searching in
Georgia for potential “dirty bomb” materials – highly radioactive and mobile
nuclear batteries containing strontium-90.
Publicly available databases, like the Newly Independent States Nuclear Trafficking
Abstracts database, run by the Monterrey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, reveal the theft of radioactive isotopes with depressing regularity.
The U.S. Energy Department cannot fully account for small amounts of potentially
dangerous plutonium provided under a 1954 Atoms for Peace program to 33 countries,
including Iran, Pakistan and India.
Unfortunately, this material is not under tight control. A bipartisan Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was established in 1991, which among other
things aims at improving the security of Russian control over fissionable materials,
and at making Russian plutonium and uranium unusable as nuclear explosives.
The program is inadequately funded. A past U.S. blue-ribbon advisory panel
called for spending an average level of about $3 billion a year over the next
decade for securing, monitoring and reducing Russian nuclear weapons, materials,
and expertise. The amount in the FY 2002 budget for these activities was only
about $750 million, even after substantial increases by Congress. And the proposed
FY 2003 budget reverses past Bush administration’s attempts to cut back these
programs, but still represents a cut compared to what was appropriated in FY
2002.
In January 2001, a U.S. bipartisan commission chaired by Howard Baker, former
Senate Republican majority leader, and Lloyd Cutler, former Clinton White House
counsel, found that “[t]he most urgent unmet national security threat to the
United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable
material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation
states and used against American troops abroad and citizens at home.”
A recently released report by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that
U.S. efforts to control the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive material in
foreign countries are poorly coordinated and haphazardly administered, resulting
in foul-ups that have left needed equipment idled in packing crates, sometimes
for years. The report examined programs administered by six federal agencies
that spent $86 million in about 30 countries between 1992 and 2001 to help them
monitor and control the movement of radioactive materials that could be used
in nuclear weapons or radiological bombs, known as "dirty bombs."
The assistance, mostly to Russia, former Soviet republics, and Central and
Eastern European countries, is used to buy detection devices and other equipment,
technical assistance and training.
The investigators found that no agency coordinated the programs, resulting
in the absence of an overall strategy, duplicate bureaucracies and marked differences
in the quality of equipment given to different countries.
Nor are foreign countries the only problem. In the United States, it is estimated
that of roughly 2 million small-but-valuable radioactive contraptions used annually
– in everything from construction to healthcare to scientific research. Hundreds
of these devices have been lost, stolen, or even abandoned, most of which are
never retrieved, and 30,000 are unaccounted for.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission fined the owners of the Dominion Nuclear
Connecticut nuclear power plant $288,000 this week for failing to account for
two missing fuel rods. The NRC has also reported that companies have lost about
1,500 radioactive sources since 1996 and more than half were never recovered.
In late March 2002, the Energy Department warned officials in the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that it lacked the funds to adequately
protect the nation’s nuclear weapons research facilities – a warning that came
shortly after the Bush administration had offered public assurances that security
was more than adequate. Terrorists could also target the storage facilities
for spent nuclear fuel, which is kept in special pools on site at most plants.
Permanent storage, probably at a Nevada underground facility, remains years
away. The spent fuel rods typically are stored in barrels beneath 30 feet of
water. The water absorbs radiation and keeps the fuel from overheating. A
large plane crashing into the pool could displace or evaporate enough water
to leave the rods exposed, and the resulting buildup of heat would trigger a
large release of radiation. The storage pools do not have hardened roofs.
There are about 40,000 tons of such spent fuel, including hundreds of tons of
plutonium, stored at operating and closed plants around the country, usually
in concrete-reinforced cooling pools that were supposed to be temporary but
now hold more radioactive material than the reactors themselves.
On average, spent fuel ponds hold 5 to 10 times more long-lived radioactivity
than a reactor core. Particularly worrisome is the large amount of cesium 137
in fuel ponds, which contain anywhere from 20 to 50 million curies of this dangerous
isotope. With a half-life of 30 years, cesium 137 gives off highly penetrating
radiation and is absorbed in the food chain.
Most of the spent fuel pools are housed in fairly standard concrete or corrugated
buildings; the Union of Concerned Scientists describes them as “Kmarts without
neon.”
Despite legislation requiring that it does so, the Energy Department has not
uniformly secured the nation’s nuclear waste, which could be used by terrorists
to build radiological weapons. According to the department, it already is running
12 years behind schedule.
Consequently, U.S. lawmakers want to expand the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
authority to include monitoring radioactive materials used in a variety of commercial
and medical activities, and are now considering legislation to require the agency
to regulate materials that could become the source of a terrorist radiological
weapon.
Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y., and Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., have proposed
the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act of 2002 in both houses. The Act would require
the commission to recover lost or stolen radioactive materials and to reinstitute
a nationwide tracking system that was discontinued in 1984. In addition, it
would tighten export controls and levy fines for industrial facilities, hospitals
or food irradiation plants that do not properly handle or dispose of such materials.
Sources:
June 25, 2002 IAEA Press Release, “Inadequate Control of World's Radioactive
Sources,” http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2002/prn0209.shtml
National Research Council, “Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism,” http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10415.html?onpi_topnews_062402
U.S. General Accounting Office, May 2002, “U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries
Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning,”
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02426.pdf
NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/index.html
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