Keeping Nuclear Power Plants Safe from Terrorists  

Oct. 1, 2001

The vulnerability of nuclear power plants to an aerial attack — whether from powerful munitions or a suicide airplane — has been known for some time.¹  

A direct hit by a penetrating 1,000-pound explosive (or equivalent) would likely inflict damage that would disperse tons of radioactive material. "Destruction of the main feed pump or steam lines," says David Rossin, a nuclear expert at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, "could create problems of decay heat and produce the release of fission products." Perhaps the most vulnerable nuclear material is in the spent fuel storage pool, according to Rossin, where unloaded core material does not have the same degree of protection as does the reactor core.²  

After the Sept. 11 terrorist airliner assault, concern about the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to aerial attack has resurfaced — or for some, surfaced for the first time. David Kyd, a spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), confirmed the risk factor. "Reactors have the most robust engineering of any buildings in the civil sector — only missile silos and nuclear bunkers are built to be tougher," Kyd said. "They are designed to be earthquake-proof, and our experiences in California and Japan have shown them to be so. They are also built to withstand impacts, but not that of a wide-bodied passenger jet full of fuel. A deliberate hit of that sort is something that was never in any scenario at the design stage. These are vulnerable targets and the consequences of a direct hit could be catastrophic."

In fact, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had not before Sept. 11 even considered the danger of an aerial attack on nuclear reactors. Its still-current fact sheet, "Nuclear Plant Security," reports that the NRC "decided in 1997 that, although there was no known threat directed against nuclear power reactors, it would be prudent to have security programs in place. Since then, the programs have matured, technology has improved, and licensees have become more proficient in achieving security program goals."

The NRC fact sheet describes how the 1993 World Trade Center bombing provoked measures to protect reactors from land vehicles. All such measures were in place by 1996. Enhanced security storage for spent fuel rods was completed in 1998. In addition, security personnel received advanced training, anti-sabotage procedures were implemented, and new plant-monitoring devices installed. Tests of these security systems by penetration teams have produced mixed results, although the NRC believes overall plant protection has steadily improved.

Sept. 11 has undoubtedly provoked the NRC to look upward.

Kyd recommends "that it would be prudent to consider installing anti-aircraft positions around plants, particularly those in urban areas, as has already been done in the Czech Republic." Others, undoubtedly, would favor jet fighters patrolling America's 103 nuclear reactors.

A far less intrusive and expensive measure — and one far more effective — would involve the erection of steel poles about 100 feet apart laced with steel cable approximately 300 feet from and surrounding the reactor building. Any cruise missile, warplane, or airliner would be shredded, its fuel ignited, and any explosive on board either detonated early or dispersed.

In addition, threats could emerge from adjacent bodies of water (since virtually all reactors and many other assets are located next to rivers, lakes, and harbors). Producing crude, ship-launched cruise missiles requires relatively elementary technological capabilities.

It is now urgent that the NRC take actions to protect reactors and other assets from threats from above and afloat.

¹  See Nicholas Berry, "Nuclear Power Plants — Double-Edged Swords," The Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, 2000 (available in PDF).

²  The author interviewed Rossin in December 1999.
 

By Dr. Nicholas Berry


 

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