Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the current counter-terrorist
operations is that the world's strongest military alliance, NATO, is nowhere in
sight.
The formerly 16, now 19, allies spent decades planning for jointly defending
one another from an attack. Yet when the military operations in Afghanistan
began, the White House essentially asked NATO to stay out of the conflict,
despite its offers of help and the gallant gesture of evoking the mutual defense
clause in the Washington Treaty. NATO's formal participation is limited to the
deployment of a handful of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft
in the United States, and the alliance's modest naval assets in the Middle East.
Some individual alliance members, such as Britain, are fighting alongside
U.S. troops but their assistance is bilateral, not through NATO.
Some observers say that NATO's role as a fighting alliance is over, or will
at best be limited in future to peacekeeping. The Russian government would like
NATO to become a political forum that could easier incorporate its former Cold
War foe. U.S. officials have yet to specify NATO's relevance to their
anti-terrorism campaign, and the form and extent of future military
participation by NATO allies.
But what lessons is NATO itself drawing from the experience? Alliance
Secretary-General Lord Robertson, speaking to reporters at the National Press
Club in Washington, last week, presented six areas that NATO needs to target to
better adjust to the terrorist threat. But will this help make the alliance more
relevant to the new war against terrorism? Find below an analysis of each of
Lord Robertson's six points.
Lord Robertson:
"We should make better use of the political tools that we have available
in NATO to cope with terrorism…. We have the habit and the mechanisms for
co-operation, and strong experience in working together in Brussels and on the
ground. The 46 nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [19 NATO allies plus all
Partnership for Peace countries]…enables us to mobilize a coalition for the
long haul."
Analysis:
NATO historically has worked as both a forum for political consultation in
times of crisis, and as a command center for coalition war fighting. The
alliance is already serving as a forum to keep the allies appraised of the
current operations and to solicit their involvement. But the United States is
unlikely to use NATO for command of the current operation or any other campaign
conducted in defense of the United States itself. The Pentagon brass resent the
lengthy consensus-building process inherent in NATO's decision-making, which,
they say, compromises the mission and safety of U.S. forces. The U.S. General
Accounting Office agreed with them in a July 2001 study, which concluded that
the need to maintain NATO cohesion during the 1999 air war against Yugoslavia
forced the Pentagon to depart from its war fighting doctrine, possibly
prolonging the war and increasing risks to U.S. forces. NATO will remain the
focal point of military operations that do not involve direct threats to the
United States, such as peacekeeping and peacemaking. In these kinds of
operations, NATO involvement adds legitimacy to the mission. Allied involvement
also allows the United States to conserve part of its military resources for
conflicts elsewhere.
Lord Robertson:
"We need to move forward the NATO-Russia relationship…. We should be
able to transform a nervous partnership of former enemies into a practical
friendship that benefits both sides."
Analysis:
NATO's past attempts to bring Russia into Western security structures ended
with mixed results; even alliance officials admit that joint consultative bodies
are not working fully. Moscow has historically tended to view NATO's activities
(especially enlargement) as irritating or even threatening, rather than
engaging. The terrorist events are now serving as a catalyst for renewed
cooperation. A constructive NATO-Russia relationship would, by its very
existence, open door to more fruitful cooperation on counter-terrorism between
Russia and the United States. As for the impact of such cooperation on NATO
itself, if the alliance becomes the center stage for counter-terrorism and
related activities (such as non-proliferation, see below), Russia's full
involvement in these efforts would make NATO dramatically more likely to
succeed. The military campaign against Afghanistan has already benefited from
Russian intelligence on this country. Given Russia's vast WMD arsenal (and its
business contacts with some of the countries suspected of harboring or aiding
terrorists), a NATO non-proliferation effort excluding Russia would be unlikely
to succeed.
Lord Robertson:
"We need to focus even more strongly on non-proliferation and missile
defense…we can never be certain of 100% success [of non-proliferation
efforts]. That is why defense against ballistic missiles is here to stay.
Analysis:
Non-proliferation is not only the first line of defense against ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction; preventing the migration of deadly
technology to the wrong hands is also the most effective kind of defense. NATO
can play a useful role on several levels. Allies themselves will need to tighten
control over exports of their military technologies, among the most advanced and
lethal in the world, to countries outside the alliance. NATO could also use its
extensive contacts with, and powerful influence over the Partnership of Peace
countries to incorporate them into allied non-proliferation measures. However, a
lot of missile and WMD technology may already be in the hands of terrorist
groups and potential or actual state sponsors of terrorism. The alliance could
play an essential role in leading non-military as well as military operations
against WMD capabilities of terrorist groups and their sponsors. These
activities might include intelligence-sharing and actual military strikes, where
necessary.
Lord Robertson:
"We need much closer interaction and intelligence-sharing between our
military and civilian security agencies… we can, and must, do better to break
down the artificial barriers between agencies and 'join up' or overall
response."
Analysis:
Just as the appointment of Gov. Tom Ridge to streamline the work of U.S.
intelligence and security agencies highlights need for better teamwork within
the United States, allies also need to do improve cooperation across borders.
NATO countries do currently share intelligence but on a limited, selective basis
and mostly processed intelligence, rather than raw data. Encouraging greater
information exchange would require several changes. First, allies would need to
tighten rules and procedures for handling sensitive information in each
individual NATO country. The Bosnia operation, for example, was plagued by
leaks from NATO nations to the Bosnian Serbs. Second, allies (including the
United States) must improve their intelligence gathering capabilities, both in
the field of human and electronic intelligence. Lastly, the allied countries
would need to change the culture of secrecy and turf wars that permeates the
intelligence field.
Intelligence sharing is one area in which NATO can arguably make the most
difference. Combating terrorism cannot be accomplished without effective
cross-border cooperation. NATO already has many of the necessary mechanisms in
place, such as procedures for handling sensitive information. Much of the
intelligence gathered by NATO countries is of importance not just to military
planners but also to civilian agencies prosecuting terrorists or trying to
prevent future attacks. The allied tradition of intelligence sharing in support
of military operations should be extended so that law-enforcement agencies
benefit as well.
Lord Robertson:
"We need to move ahead with a European Security and Defense Policy….
Europeans can expect a tougher U.S. stance on transatlantic burden sharing….
The United States needs capable and effective European forces with which to
co-operate, or on which to rely in peace support mission where the Alliance as a
whole is not engaged."
Analysis:
Better equipped and more powerful allies will be better able to serve as
partners in the war against terrorism. But Lord Roberston's emphasis on the
European Security and Defense Policy is also an acknowledgment that NATO will
continue to perform its other duties, such as peacekeeping, and that the
European allies will have to take on a gradually bigger portion of those
responsibilities. The United States will not be there in as substantive a way as
it used to. In 1995, U.S. forces represented a full one third of NATO's mission
in Bosnia. In 1999, U.S. supplied only 15 percent of troops for the Kosovo
operation. And in 2001, the Pentagon sent no forces to help NATO in Macedonia
besides those already deployed there in support of the Kosovo mission. When
asked if America's war against terrorism means even less U.S. support to NATO's
Balkan missions, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld answered essentially yes,
saying that the United States will have deploy some of its troops and equipment
out of the Balkans and into the Middle East.
A stronger European military force may make NATO allies somewhat more
important to the fight against terrorism but, more importantly, it will make
them better allies, from the U.S. point of view, by assuming military
responsibilities previously borne by the United States.
Lord Robertson:
"We must look at the financial implications which arise from these new
challenges and tasks. If we want to do a proper job in the fight against
terrorism, we need the right tools."
Analysis:
Money is just one component of security; most European allies suffer not from
"too little military" but from too much of the wrong type. The good
news is that most Europeans are already moving away from fielding large standing
armies towards building lighter forces, ones that can be deploy faster, farther,
and with less logistical support — in other words, the types of armed forces
that are more suitable for fight against terrorism, among other things. But Lord
Robertson is right in suggesting that many of the transformation processes are
based on overly optimistic assumptions about the underlying costs. Germany, for
example, plans to fund most of its reforms through savings achieved by force
cuts, disregarding the high initial costs and the fact that most savings
materialize only years after the cuts are made. Higher defense spending would
help boost Europe's — and by extension NATO's — ability to assist in the war
against terrorism and other NATO activities (see above).
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