Terrorism in Colombia:
More than A Military Solution Required

Today, the U.S. war on terrorism is currently focused on Afghanistan, but other countries may soon feel the full force of the U.S. commitment to stamp out the world terror networks. U.S. officials have hinted that Colombia may fit within the anti-terrorist embrace. Asked which terrorist groups have "global reach" and require U.S. action, Secretary of State Colin Powell told ABC News "we have to treat all of them as potentially having the capacity to affect us in a global way." Powell cited Colombia as an example of a country where such groups are thriving.

A few days later, Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., told CNN, "Look at what just happened in Colombia: the wife of the Colombian attorney general being abducted and killed. That's terrorism." Interviewed in Miami's El Nuevo Herald, Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, compared the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network.

On Oct. 15, Francis X. Taylor, State Department coordinator for counter-terrorism with the rank of ambassador at large, affirmed the suspicions surrounding U.S. plans to demolish the terrorist network in Colombia. He announced that the United States would treat the guerilla groups in Colombia the same as all other terrorist groups "in terms of our interest in going after them and ceasing their terrorist activities."

To that end, Washington is now proposing a new anti-terrorism plan for Colombia and its neighbors. While the horrific acts conducted by the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are of a terrorist nature, the international approach to solving Colombia's problems must be much different than the current approach to fighting terrorism in the Middle East.

Including Colombia in a global war on terrorism appeals to many, but a counter-terrorist strategy similar to that in Afghanistan may make little sense in the Colombian context. Colombia's three terrorist groups have thousands of members: the FARC 18,000, the paramilitaries (AUC) 11,000, and the ELN 4,000. They have access to millions in ill-gotten funds, and control significant amounts of territory. Air strikes and Special Forces raids are unlikely to make a much of a dent in the sophisticated capabilities of these well-organized and well-armed groups.

Instead, the issue at hand is finding a multi-faceted strategy that includes a plan for bringing the guerrilla conflict to a negotiated solution. President Andres Pastrana has been trying to negotiate peace with these groups, predominantly the FARC, from the moment he took office. The peace process, however, has moved slowly, yielding few encouraging results.

Colombia's internal policies are doing little to stem the activities of terrorist groups. The controversial demilitarized zone in southeast Colombia, which has acted as a guerilla safe haven for conducting covert drug operations, staging kidnappings and plotting military attacks, was scheduled to expire on Oct. 9, 2001. The zone has been previously extended eight times and FARC threatened to walk away from peace negotiations if the government did not extend the timeline. However, the 3,700 abductions in Colombia last year, and a series of recent high-profile kidnappings, have put pressure on Pastrana to take back control of this Switzerland-sized area. On Oct. 5, the FARC announced it would halt random roadside kidnappings, a "commitment" that swayed Pastrana to extend the zone once again. Four days later, after negotiations were concluded, six people were kidnapped in Southern Colombia, an act police have attributed to the FARC. In Alaska, Colombia, on Oct. 11, the AUC paramilitaries conducted what is thought to be the largest mass killing in Colombia this year, when 24 people were killed arbitrarily.

While Pastrana publicly condemns these atrocities, diplomatic measures need to be more concrete. A simple promise from these terrorist groups is not enough — a new path for peace must be paved. Those who support foreign aid programs, such as the U.S.-backed "Plan Colombia", believe a better armed Colombian military can solve the Colombian crisis, others see the problem as much more complex. While little can be achieved without security, more emphasis needs to be put on the economic and social issues plaguing Colombia. Although "Plan Colombia" does include an economic aid component, it is only 20 percent of the total aid package. While U.S. military equipment has arrived in Colombia rather promptly, the economic assistance has been extremely slow in arriving. Critics also assert that counter-narcotics military operations in Colombia will not solve the lack of education and economic opportunity facing rural Colombians, as eliminating corruption or strengthening democratic institutions would.

Vietnam taught the United States that counter-insurgency will fail if the local leadership does not share a commitment to the fight. Colombia's governing elite has shown it is not willing to sacrifice for its war effort. The internal situation in Colombia has made the status quo an attractive option to many. Corruption is rampant, and the World Bank reports that Colombia only pays 10.1 percent of GDP in taxes, less than nearly all of its Latin American neighbors. Rather than pay for a professional military, too many wealthy Colombians prefer a cheaper option - paramilitary vigilantes that kill civilians far more than they fight guerrillas. Meanwhile, Colombian law excludes high school graduates from service in combat units. Only the poor must fight.

Many rural Colombians who participate in the drug trade may resort to violence because of a lack of economic opportunity. Rural Colombia needs schools, banks, roads, and the presence of a state capable of creating a stable and economic infrastructure. Without all of these, most rural Colombians will not be able to make a living legally. To a great degree, armed groups serve as a jobs program. So does the drug trade. Yet rather than focusing on help for Colombia's government to institute real jobs programs, U.S. counter-drug strategy so far has relied on fumigating smallholders' crops, undoubtedly winning the armed groups many fresh recruits.

Washington has repeatedly insisted that there is a difference between fighting drugs in Colombia and fighting the guerillas, but unfortunately the two are inextricably linked. The military defeat of Colombia's terrorist groups would require an enormous U.S.-backed counter-insurgency effort, an idea that was already gaining adherents before the tragedy of Sept. 11. "The U.S. program of military assistance to El Salvador during the Reagan administration could be a relevant model," an influential Air Force-funded Rand Corp. study suggested in June.

Yet rushing (or creeping) into counter-insurgency may have many negative repercussions. The cost in Colombian lives could be very high. El Salvador's civil war didn't end until 11 years after the United States began pouring in counter-insurgent military aid. During those 11 years, fighting killed 70,000 people and made refugees of more than a million. Imagine this on the scale of Colombia, which is 53 times larger and has eight times as many people.

The United States has an obligation to help Colombia, but to do so, any strategy must include methods of attacking the reasons why, for so many thousands of rural Colombians, it somehow seems rational to risk their lives by taking up arms and joining illegal groups of the right and left.

Politically, Colombia's guerrilla and paramilitary groups are not as strong as they might seem; their violations of international humanitarian law have left them as isolated as the Taliban. But military action alone may be hard pressed to deal them a knockout blow, since they remain well funded and well armed and thrive on rural Colombians' desperation. A better way to further weaken them may be to help Bogotá find ways to increase economic opportunity for Colombia's excluded majority.

By Victoria Garcia CDI Research Assistant vgarcia@cdi.org and Adam Isacson Center for International Policy, Senior Associate isacson@ciponline.org

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