In the Spotlight: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Unlike
the organizations that have recently come under intense U.S. scrutiny for their
terrorist activities, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka,
long known as one of the world's most deadly rebel groups, has come in the spotlight
for their declaration to work toward peace.
On April 10, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran held his first press conference in 12 years and spoke of his serious commitment to resolving the 18-year old war against the Sri Lankan government. A sign of hope first emerged in late December last year, when the Sri Lankan government asked its Norwegian counterpart to facilitate in bringing the two parties together for peace talks. Accepting the role, Norway successfully brokered a ceasefire deal in February. And, in May or June, the majority Sinhalese Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers are scheduled to hold their first direct peace talk in eight years.
While the government sees Prabhakaran's rare public appearance as a positive sign, many observers remain highly skeptical of the LTTE's motives. This is largely due to the movement's history of violence, including fatal attacks on prominent government figures, and the failure of two major peace talks with the government in the 1990s.
Ethnic Tamils, who are largely Hindu and make up 18 percent of Sri Lanka's population of 20 million, began a largely nonviolent movement in the 1960s to champion more government recognition. But it was not until the early 1970s that the Tamils began forming several rebel groups. In 1976, Tamils gathered as the LTTE and for the first time called for the formation of a separate state of Tamil Ealam covering the northern and eastern provinces, where they are in the majority. The LTTE established itself as a major guerilla group in 1983, when a Tamil attack on an army patrol inflamed a series of violent clashes between Sinhalese mobs and Tamils that left thousands dead and produced several hundred thousand refugees.
Violence has since escalated. In the late 1980s, India stepped in as mediator to the conflict, bringing in Indian peacekeeping forces (IPKF) to Jaffna in the Tamil heartland in the north. The warring parties signed an accord, but it collapsed in 1987 and the LTTE mounted attacks on both government forces and the IPKF. When attempts at a ceasefire failed in 1990, the government declared Ealam War II and began an offensive against the Tigers in the north. The war ended with a round of peace talks in 1994, which broke down and only ignited another army offensive, Ealam War III, in 1995. To date, at least 64,000 people have been killed in the conflict since 1983. This number includes an alarming list of political assassinations, including five Cabinet ministers, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The LTTE has also carried out a number of attacks on urban targets, including two large-scale terrorist attacks, one on the Sri Lanka Central Bank in 1996, and the other on the Colombo World Trade Center in 1997.
The organization has about 10,000 armed combatants, including an elite cadre called Black Tigers who have carried out at least 150 suicide bombings. Members are notorious for carrying cyanide capsules to kill themselves rather than surrender to the enemy. Many suspect that the group is continuing to procure weapons from its extensive overseas contacts despite the peace talks.
The U.S. government has designated the LTTE a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since 1997. Britain, Canada and Australia also gave the group the designation last year, joining the United States, India and Sri Lanka. As a result, greater global enforcement and monitoring of anti-terrorism measures since Sept. 11 are believed to have hurt the Tigers' ability to raise funds from its large Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe and Asia, and to maintain its well-documented links to terrorist groups in the Middle East. The effects of the global campaign against terror are therefore providing the Sri Lankan government some hope that the new round of peace talks would succeed.
The government has its own incentives to reach peace agreements. The war has cost $40 billion to date. The virtual destruction of the tourism industry has exacerbated the sagging economy. So far, both sides have given promising signs of cooperation by strictly observing the ceasefire. In addition, in March Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe became the first top government official to visit Jaffna in two decades. But it remains unclear whether the Tigers will drop its decade-old demand for a separate Tamil state, which the government has continually rejected.
Recently, there have been reports that the United States may be preparing to deploy U.S. troops to Sri Lanka as part of the global campaign against terrorism. Such speculation began circulating last month, when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca and U.S. Marine Gen. Timothy Ghormley visited Sri Lanka and met with the prime minister to discuss possibilities for military cooperation. While Washington has not indicated any imminent deployment of forces to Sri Lanka, it has issued numerous statements supporting peace talks and urging the Tamil Tigers to abide by agreements. Whether the United States is eyeing Sri Lankan territory if it in fact is doing so to take advantage of Sri Lanka's strategically valuable locale or to back the government against the LTTE remains unclear. What is clear is the implication of such a move for the rebel Tigers: if the peace talks do not succeed this time, the LTTE can expect greater and graver consequences than in the past.
Sources:
"Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism.
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, April 2001.
"U.S. Exploring Military Presence in Sri Lanka," Stratfor.com, March 25, 2002.
The Economist, The New York Times, Time, Washington Post.
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