The Moment of Truth for the Kremlin

After Japan attacked the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the United States joined the military alliance in which the Soviet Union played a leading role. The flagships of capitalism and socialism were suddenly thrown together by a common problem: Axis aggression. Political, ideological, economic and various other differences of opinion, differences that seemed so fundamental and insurmountable just days earlier, were immediately thrown aside. With time, however, it became clear, that they were thrown aside only for the duration of the struggle against this enemy.

On the tragic day of Sept. 11, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first world leader to get in touch with U.S. President George W. Bush. The Russian President expressed resolute support for America in the fight against a common enemy: international terrorism. On that day, here in Washington, we received dozens of phone calls and e-mails from friends and colleagues in Russia who wanted to express their condolences and their desire to help. It became clearer than ever that Russia and the United States, the Russians and the Americans, have so much in common that they can become members of the same international system. Just like 60 years ago, that which unites us is stronger than all of the discords that draw us apart.

Vladimir Putin's address to the people of Russia demonstrated that he had made his choice. However, as often happens in Russia, some of the high-level presidential advisors immediately began to "explain" and "elucidate" his propositions of Russian support for the counter-terrorist operation. Influential military and political experts recommended a return to old Soviet traditions: in particular, they immediately began to fret about NATO forces in Central Asia and about the fate of their old Soviet allies — Iran and Iraq.

To give Putin his due — he made the most important decision of his presidential career. The terrorist attack on the United States gave Russia an opportunity to finally become a part of the West. The disagreements that divided the United States and Russia throughout the second half of the 1990s seemed insignificant in comparison with the new common interests. Yet even for the president of Russia, it was easier to announce his decision than to realize it in practice.

Putin's address showed that, in his desire to join forces with America, he was very far from the majority of the Russian political elite. Part of the Russian elite was entangled by political and economic contracts with various forces in the Islamic world, including those that would become the focus of American retribution. Many representatives of that elite are still guided by anti-American sentiments, still maintain nostalgic hopes for the restoration of lost superpower status. Without a doubt, they will attempt to tie Putin's hands. If the Russian president falls under the influence of those who still fit the molds of Soviet geopolitical thinking, Russia could — again, and for a long time — lose the chance to integrate itself into the contemporary Western civilization.

The commencing war against terrorism will not be quick and easy. It will not be a "cold" war, nor a "hot" war, but a "warm" war of sorts. Many of the method to be used, have been used until today strictly as domestic means of guaranteeing national security and sovereignty: gathering intelligence, providing weapons to political allies abroad, secret diplomacy and etc. Russia and the United States recognize their common interests, which means they should combine their efforts. In a war against terrorism, just as in any other war, the success of an ally becomes your success, and his defeat becomes your defeat.

This is a unique chance to eliminate the lack of trust between our nations. If that is accomplished, the prolonged process of abolishing the political and ideological baggage of the Cold War can be completed fairly quickly. In a situation like this, Bush could help his Russian colleague to make another right choice. He could remind the Russian president of an obvious fact — that Russia cannot become a full-fledged member of the Western society until it creates a stable democratic system at home.

As the U.S. administration gets caught up in a drawn-out conflict with a new enemy, it will be tempted to set aside questions that are critical to nations that support it. There should be no mistake here. For example, Washington's reliance on local leaders in Asia will have a temporary and limited character and will not make their regimes more attractive to the democratic society.

In other words, regardless of the support Moscow shows for America, Russia will not become an equal partner in the West until internal democratic processes gather strength. It is not simply a coincidence that all of the democratic nations — whether rich or poor — have good relations with the United States, while America's enemies are — without exception — dictatorial regimes. The strengthening of democracy is a key deterrent in a civilized world.

America currently needs Russian assistance, and will be grateful for it. Washington has already placed a high value on Moscow's decision to cooperate in the struggle against terrorism and on the Russian "ok" of the cooperation of its Central Asian allies. Vladimir Putin is probably the only world leader who — by virtue of his education, experience and mentality — is prepared for action in these circumstances. Russia has invaluable experience with conflicts in the region of impending military action. As it takes a correct step at the beginning of a long journey, Russia should not detract from its value. By stumbling around, confronting Washington with endless political or economic conditions and other such unimpressive actions, it would risk strangling the emergent union in its infancy.

America would not stand for Russia's attempts to, once again, contest the necessity of NATO, or drive a wedge between the United States and the European Union. Over the last three weeks, both NATO and the European-American friendship have demonstrated their importance and strength. At the same time, Washington also needs to openly recognize Russia's interests in Central Asia, in the Caspian, in Chechnya. The situation will be aggravated if the two nations have different visions for the future of Afghanistan or Iraq, or if Russia and the United States conduct their political games there in secrecy.

A democratic Russia is interested in establishing democracies in Asian nations. America is interested in this as well. It is clear that attempts to make political changes — in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, for example - are complex and dangerous; they are tasks of the distant future. It is pointless to talk about democracy in Afghanistan, where only 30 percent of the men and 15 percent of the women can read, where the percentage of widows and orphans is the highest in the world, where life expectancy is below 44 years and yearly income less than $100 per capita. The people who planned, financed, and carried out the terrorist attacks in the United States are not poor, not illiterate, not Afghans. Nonetheless, at the root of the strategy for the fight against Islamic fundamentalism must be support for new ideas and new leaders in this region. Fundamentalism of any sort is a monopoly. And the deadly enemies of monopoly are pluralism, freedom, choice, openness and democracy.

Bush has to show Russia that new opportunities for cooperation exist. The United States must set democratic development in Russia as a prerequisite. At the same time, Bush can convince other Western leaders that Russian integration into the European-American civilization is a real and achievable goal. He can begin by supporting Russian entry into the WTO, lowering trade barriers for Russian imports and rejecting the majority of visa limitations. Bush can promise to support Russia in strengthening its position in Central Asia and to help it sell energy to NATO nations. He can facilitate the growth of American investment in the Russian economy. Furthermore, the U.S. president can designate the concrete steps that should be taken to prepare Russia for entry into NATO.

On Sept. 11, many of our stereotypes faced a "reality check" — and they could not stand up to it. The terrorist attacks clearly demonstrated the threats America faces. Russia should not be one of these threats. On the contrary, these days have shown us how much closer our countries have gotten over the past decade. A united effort can destroy international terrorism. The most important thing is that, at the end of the battle, the winners are not — as before — on the opposite sides of the barricades.

 

Dr. Michael McFaul Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Professor at Stanford University and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution Dr. Nikolai Zlobin CDI Senior Fellow Executive Editor of Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization nzlobin@cdi.org

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A version of this article first appeared in Obshaya Gazeta , Oct. 11-18, 2001 # 41

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