Investigating the terrorist network in Southeast Asia reveals why the global war on terrorism may have yet to see its most difficult phases. Here one finds scattered but substantial pieces of evidence that several radical Islamic groups, overcoming national and geographical barriers, have maintained deep and long-running ties with one another toward a shared fundamentalist goal. Their clandestine, elusive "cells" are dispersed throughout everyday-life places, functions, and businesses, rendering Afghanistan-style military campaigns impractical. Furthermore, many of these organizations forged partnerships with al Qaeda long before authorities began unearthing the scale of their transnational reach. JI is at the core of this extensive, complex, and resilient terrorist labyrinth in Southeast Asia.

With the recent surge of violence in the Southeast Pacific region, the United States will expect more cooperation than it had previously been receiving from the Indonesian government, which, until recently, had gone to great efforts to dismiss charges that international terrorism was a problem within their borders. Revelation of the fact that warnings preceded the Oct. 12 attacks have brought Indonesian authorities under intense scrutiny, particularly in comparison to their neighbors, Malaysia and Singapore, who have jailed several suspected al Qaeda members. Given the addition of new warnings, based in part on the interrogation of Omar al-Faruq, a Kuwaiti-born al Qaeda operative currently detained by U.S. authorities, the world will be watching closely to see what steps Indonesian authorities take to prevent future attacks.

To sustain its formidable vision and conduct operations in at least four countries, JI collaborated extensively with other radical Islamic groups. In particular, it is closely affiliated with Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), sharing its founders and top leaders, namely, Abubakar Baasyir and Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali. KMM, for its part, has been linked to Indonesia's militant group Laskar Jihad and to the Philippines' Abu Sayyaf. Asian and U.S. officials now have clear evidence that both Jemaah Islamiah and KMM are also linked to Osama bin Laden's global terrorist network through these individuals and their subordinates. For instance, Yazid Sufaat, under Hambali's orders, is believed to have met and provided logistical and financial help to at least three individuals implicated in the Sept. 11 attacks. FBI chief Robert Mueller recently singled out JI as al Qaeda's foremost Southeast Asian collaborator. Singaporean sources report that scores of JI members received military training in Afghanistan, and that JI received over 1.35 billion rupiah ($140,000) over three years from al Qaeda. ³ 

In the Philippines, evidence links JI to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an Islamic separatist group surpassing Abu Sayyaf in number and perhaps in threat. According to regional sources, dozens of recently detained JI members trained in MILF camps in Mindanao in the 1990s. Most prominent among them is the bomb expert al Ghozi, who authorities say passed on his knowledge and skill in explosives to MILF operatives. The MILF, in turn, is believed to have ties with al Qaeda through the hundreds of its members that trained in Afghanistan and secured the Afghan fighters' support.

Taken together, what one finds in Southeast Asia is an international terrorist network as well-grounded, well-supported, far-reaching and threatening as al Qaeda, but without the option of using U.S. military power to quell the network, as we saw in the anti-Taliban campaign. What, then, are U.S. options in extending its fight to this regional terrorist hotbed? The first obstacle in the anti-terrorism campaign in this region is that the terrorist suspects operate like criminals, infiltrating discreetly throughout the nooks and corners of ordinary life. The police and law enforcement officials, rather than the military, will assume much of the responsibility in this vein.

Second, the region is home to two Islamic governments and their peoples that condemned the war in Afghanistan more vociferously than any other. Soon after Sept. 11, leaders of both Indonesia and Malaysia warned against an attack on Islam while thousands of Malaysian and Indonesian Muslims gathered on the streets to chant anti-U.S. slogans and denounce bombings in Afghanistan. Months into the campaign, Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir remains staunchly opposed the U.S.-led military strikes, and Indonesian President Megawati has yet to take any definitive action in counter-terrorism. If U.S. action against terrorists overseas brought angry citizens to the streets, any U.S. action at home in Southeast Asia is sure to lead to even greater social unrest. U.S. consideration of the sensitivities of the region's Muslims remains key to keeping its global coalition intact.

Third, these cultural-religious barriers aside, the United States confronts a political hurdle in planning a counter-terrorism strategy in Southeast Asia. Take, for example, the dispute over interpretations of the constitution in the Philippines prior to the deployment of American troops there. That controversy, now more or less settled, will pale in comparison to what lies ahead for the United States as it tries to bypass or overcome U.S. congressional ban on training the Indonesian military. Yet arguably, it is in Indonesia that counter-terrorism measures currently need the greatest advancement and the most stringent enforcement. As for Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir openly said, "Suppose I said that we must support the U.S., I will lose support from my people." ⁴  Mahathir's need for political support thus leaves little room for overt U.S. involvement in the country's fight against terrorism.

The region's own initiatives remain the single most crucial factor in controlling terrorism in Southeast Asia. Indeed, with the exception of Indonesia, which has been criticized from abroad for its irresolute participation in the global effort, the region's countries have generally acted rapidly and effectively in response to the needs of the new security environment. With JI connected in known and yet undiscovered ways to the region's major suspect organizations, regional cooperation — particularly through information sharing — is also essential in disabling the international network. And it is perhaps here that Washington can play a critical role-by strengthening diplomatic relations and providing economic and political incentives bilaterally and through regional organizations such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Regardless of their level of support for the United States, countries will seek apt quid pro quos for their efforts against terrorists. U.S. participation, to the extent allowable and appropriate, will therefore demonstrate Washington's commitment to fighting terrorism globally, as well as the seriousness with which countries need to fight their own fights against terror.

With the recent surge of violence in the Southeast Pacific region, the United States will expect more cooperation than it had previously been receiving from the Indonesian government, which, until recently, had gone to great efforts to dismiss charges that international terrorism was a problem within their borders. Revelation of the fact that warnings preceded the Oct. 12 attacks have brought Indonesian authorities under intense scrutiny, particularly in comparison to their neighbors, Malaysia and Singapore, who have jailed several suspected al Qaeda members. Given the addition of new warnings, based in part on the interrogation of Omar al-Faruq, a Kuwaiti-born al Qaeda operative currently detained by U.S. authorities, the world will be watching closely to see what steps Indonesian authorities take to prevent future attacks.