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and Konstantin Makiyenko
The following is a transcript of an Oct. 1, 2001 program by Ekho Moskvy Radio on Iran, Russia and the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign, featuring Ivan Safranchuk, director of CDI's Moscow office, and Konstatin Makiyenko, deputy director of the Center for Strategic and Technological Analysis in Moscow. The transcript was provided by Federal News Service Moderator: Our guests are Konstantin Makiyenko, deputy director of the Center for Strategic and Technological Analysis, and Ivan Safranchuk, chief of the Moscow representative office of the U.S.[-based] Center for Defense Information. Today we face a totally new situation because, how would the Americans feel about a visit to Moscow by the Iranian Defense Minister just two months ago or even a month ago? About the possibility of Russia and Iran being on the same side and, miraculously, even the United States finding itself on the same side in a world confrontation. I would like to consider some aspects of this situation with you, and our listeners have an opportunity to comment and to put questions for Ekho Moskvy at 974-22-22. Let us start in. What could be the implications of the visit by the Iranian Defense Minister in the new context. Who will be the first to start? Ivan? Safranchuk: I think it is a very important visit and it's important that it is taking place at this point in time. Because the world, experts and politicians are wondering which side Iran is on and will the United States be more critical or less critical of Russian-Iranian relations? I think that both Russia and Iran are trying to demonstrate in the court of that visit that Russian-Iranian relations are exclusively peaceful, including the battle against terrorism, and that Russian-Iranian relations should develop, in particular, after what happened in the United States. And it would be very interesting to see the reaction to all this on the part of the United States, which has traditionally criticized Russia for close ties with Iran, and which will probably now have to tone down its criticism. Because Iran, like many other countries, has condemned the terrorist acts in the U.S. And, in general, Russia and Iran take very similar stands on the terrorist acts in the U.S. Perhaps, we will discuss it a little later. Moderator: Yes, I think we will discuss it. But right off, I have a question for you, Ivan. Doesn't the Western world, including the United States, overestimate the secular character of Iran, its movement towards democracy and its engagement with Western civilization? Because there have been serious protests on the part of spiritual leaders of Iran. Safranchuk: That is true, and yet not only the secular authorities led by President Khatami condemned the terrorist attacks in the United States, but also the religious authorities of Iran, and the spiritual leader of Iran, Khomenei. He and the supreme bodies of power of Iran have condemned the terrorist acts. As for the first part of your question, namely, whether the West is reading too much into Iran's movement toward civilization and modernization, it should be noted that in the 1990s many experts expected a reconciliation between Iran and the United States, between Iran and the West. And there were some signs of it. For example, in the mid-1990s, there was a very unusual situation when the authorities of Iran sent New Year greetings to the American people. You probably remember that situation. And such little steps, cultural and religious, took place constantly. The current situation can either dramatically stimulate Iran's rapprochement to the civilized world, which would be very important considering that many try to present Islam as a militant religion, or, this situation may block for a long time the reconciliation of Iran and the civilized world. And Russia will have a chance to play the role of catalyst in bringing Iran closer to the civilized world, and the civilized world to Iran. Moderator: And especially since Russia is itself in a similar choice situation, whose side is it on after Sept. 11? Iran, in spite of peaceful cooperation, is also a large market, a technological market and American disapproval, to put it mildly, has been slowing down these processes. Makiyenko: Yes, that is so. Iran is a major potential [market]. Moderator: Potential, yes. Makiyenko: But it is important to know that it is a potential market for the Russian high technology, including [military] technology. Rosoboronexport reckons that Iran theoretically can become the third biggest consumer of Russian weapons after China and India, with purchases of about 300 million dollars a year. Actually, the potential of Russian-Iranian cooperation is by no means limited to military-technical cooperation because we have interesting projects with Iran in the field of civil aviation and space exploration. And there are serious military-political partnerships, notably in the field of containing the Taliban movement, and military-political containment of Turkey. There are some interesting projects to develop transport corridors between North and South, from the Baltics via the Volga and canals and the Caspian Sea to the Iranian ports and further to Southeast Asia. So, Iran is a very interesting potential market and a military-political partner. Moderator: Our listener Oleg has sent a question to our pager: "The words of Islamists are worth nothing and will never be worth anything. Russia should not supply arms to Iran. Iran is closer to Russia and the United States is far, says Oleg. Isn't it dangerous to arm a neighbor, especially such an unstable neighbor?" Safranchuk: I don't think so. I don't understand why Iran is an unstable neighbor. [And] the workers of the enterprises that will get the 300 million dollars will probably be of a different opinion. Moderator: Yes, we will shortly consider several aspects of the situation, partly in connection with Afghanistan. Let us look a step and a half ahead to the situation that may emerge if the anti-terrorist operation, its "hot" phase, is quickly and successfully carried out, something that nobody seriously counts on, not even President Bush. We will continue our talk after a brief news bulletin. (News). We continue our talk with Konstantin Makiyenko, deputy director of the Center for Strategic and Technological Analysis, and Ivan Safranchuk, chief of the Moscow representative office of the U.S. Center for Defense Information. The number of questions on the same topic is such that they are impossible to ignore. So, I would like to put this question to Ivan. Several listeners for example, Natalya, Alexander, Vasilyevich, Oleg, Sergei speak about Iran's support for such organizations as Hezbollah; Iran raises money for Chechnya, Sergei claims. Well, I don't know where money is not being raised for Chechnya, and how one should interpret it. But the important thing is support for such organizations as Hezbollah and the attitude to Israel, which is not conducive to stability in the Middle East. Safranchuk: Yes, money is raised for Chechnya in many places, including Great Britain, which, according to press reports, sometimes issues visas to, and shelters, not only peaceful citizens. But the situation in Central Asia and in the Middle East, in the area from the Middle East to Southern Asia, is very complicated. Not a single big country has permanent allies and permanent partners there. The situation on much of the globe, in the south of Eurasia, is unstable. It's everyone for himself and everyone tries to go it alone in this complex world. It is true that some data prove that Iran backs some organizations, including Hezbollah, that are waging war on Israel. At the same time, very little is said about who supports other organizations. For example, Saudi Arabia, at least some influential families in that country, also support certain groups. As for Chechnya specifically, Iran's position on Chechnya is more considerate and restrained. Iran, of course, cannot back the Russian authorities in the so-called counter-terrorist operations. Moderator: Its forms? Safranchuk: Its forms and probably substance. And yet compared with Pakistan or Saudi Arabia or Turkey for that matter, Iran is behaving in a much more moderate, restrained, careful manner, which is much more pro-Russian in its own relations with Russia and in its relations with the Chechen emissaries. And in general, on questions of major importance to Russia such as the question of Chechnya, Afghanistan, [and] the Caspian oil, Iran's position and the position of Russia are surprisingly similar. And one can even point out the following feature here. Russia as a rule agrees much more quickly to soften its position on all these issues than does Iran itself. And the last point which is also very brief. It is the following: as I already said, in its specifics, the attitudes of Russia and Iran to the explosions in the United States are very similar. As to the international operation on the Afghan territory, Russia and Iran take a largely similar attitude to it, say on such items as that the operation must be carried out under the UN aegis on a Security Council decision, with the least losses of innocent lives and only if there is clear evidence, submitted by the United States, that those attacks were carried out by Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. On these questions the positions of Russia and Iran coincide, but it is only Russia that, in recognition of this position, has become a friend of the West, unexpectedly and as to Iran, on the contrary, it is talked about with suspicion when they say that Iran does not quite clearly express its position. Moderator: But it ceased to be an enemy. Safranchuk: But in the specifics, in the substance, the Russian and Iranian positions are very similar. They differ only in form, in the way that they express it, like President Putin and President Khatami. But as to the difference in form, it turns out to be enough to perceive two similar positions as diametrically opposite. Makiyenko: Literally one addition. Incidentally, one year ago there was a project which, I take it, was not implemented, when Iran was allegedly ready to participate in financing the rehabilitation of Chechnya, to finance the federal programs of Chechnya's restoration and as far as I know, there was the figure of around 25 million and allegedly the Iranian government approved this figure. Moderator: Why did this not materialize? Makiyenko: I don't know. As regards support of terrorism, indeed Iran supports Hezbollah and I take it that this is the only organization that is now supported by Iran. It also supported some groups in Bosnia but then the pro-Iran groups in Bosnia were destroyed by the NATO forces. We must remember that Saudi Arabia, for instance, or the United Arab Emirates are the principal sponsors or rather were principal sponsors of the Taliban movement, which is now considered to be the main enemy of the civilized world. In this sense it seems to me Ivan uttered the key word, the word is "perception." It seems to me that now, in the new context, the political and military-political context, we have to break the perception of Iran as a "devil." Because this perception was largely molded by the United States based on internal political considerations and I think that now we have to get away from this perception. Iran is a sufficiently normal state for the region. Moderator: You know that if, say, it were not for the explosions, if everything turned out to be well a similar dynamic might have been observed with regard to the Taliban movement, quite possibly in Afghanistan, i.e. first there is the "demonization" and then a certain restoration of an image, a certain civilization and perception of the Taliban as a normal state with an internal evolution. Makiyenko: But this would have taken 10-15 years. Moderator: 10-15 years, and for how long did the revolution in Iran last, when it began in 1979? Makiyenko: Yes, about that time. After 10 years the "termidorization" sets in and then a normalization. So, with regard to the Taliban this might have been indeed so. Moderator: But now the situation has drastically changed, and Russia quite unambiguously came out in support of the Northern Alliance, including with arms shipments. As Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said, people there like simple arms and so all Soviet-time weapons could have been sold down there. What do you think, Konstantin? Makiyenko: I am not sure about "all weapons." Yes, indeed, the Defense Ministry has significant surplus arms which, generally, consume resources for their normal functioning, and this requires money. So, indeed, now it is possible to dump a certain quantity of the extra, absolutely old arms to the Northern Alliance. Actually, this should have been done a long time ago. Incidentally, talking about the relations between Iran and the Northern Alliance, I think that between 1996 and 2000, that is to say from the moment of the capture of Kabul by the Taliban and up until recently Iran was the principal sponsor, financial, military and technical sponsor of the Northern Alliance, because Iran has two allied enclaves in Afghanistan. On the one hand, these are the Shiites, the Khazarians who control the central regions and, on the other, these are the "Persian speakers" like Tajiks, like Massood and, of course, Rabani. Moderator: Now tell me please, and I address both Ivan Safranchuk and Konstantin Makiyenko, tell me please, the following: now the situation in the country has been exploded by those blasts in America. Beginning now is the destruction, where there is bin Laden or there is no bin Laden, but the destruction of the regime of the Talibs is one of the objectives. Judging by everything, this will, if it comes about, change the situation in the region and a new circle of problems will begin arising around Afghanistan because everything will end the way it is now assumed: the regime will be destroyed, a certain Mohammed Zakhir Shah will install himself in Kabul and, on his behalf, a coalition and quite pro-Western government will rule. Then these problems, that are related with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and then other neighbors - the CIS countries and Russia ? will arise again. What do you say about such a perspective? Safranchuk: In answering this question, one has, willy-nilly to talk from the angle of the United States because the U.S. is the leader in this situation and it is actually the leader of this anti-Osama-bin-Laden, possibly anti-Taliban coalition. So, the question now is, what is the substance of the interests of the Unite States? In my opinion, the U.S. policy in 1990s, both in the Middle East and in the Near East, was not a happy choice, as a result of which we now have this crisis. One can say that the policy of Russia, backed up by very few resources and by a small budget, was much more successful because we had at least a quasi ally represented by the Northern Alliance. Moderator: You mean to say that it was during 10 or 13 years? Safranchuk: Yes, during 10 years. During the 1990s. We witnessed the fall of the Nadzhibullah regime. There was a civil war in Tajikistan which Russia was actually forced to end and to close the Tajik border. Nevertheless, we have a certain stabilizer in the region as represented by Rakhmonov and the Northern Alliance. The United States relied on the Pakistani regime and even on an option of carrying out a coup d'etat there, but all this failed and there is complete instability there for the Americans. But as it seems to me the United States cannot change this situation in principle, and they need to preserve a certain status quo. The Taliban for the United States is the guarantor of the status quo in the region. That is why I don't believe that the Taliban regime will be completely routed and that the regime will fall and that something new will emerge in its place. Primarily for internal political reasons, the United States will be forced to carry out a certain action. It will probably be conducted, but I doubt where it will be of a sufficient scale and turn into a war against the Taliban regime. I believe, and this is my forecast: the regime will survive. So there will be no global changes, as you say. But there will occur lesser global changes, namely, influence in the region from Pakistan to Iran will be redistributed. The Arab regimes - U.S. allies will be extremely unhappy at this, most probably. Traditionally Iran has been counter-balanced by Iraq in Middle Eastern politics. But we understand Israel's desire, on the other hand, when there is noise around, to punish Iraq as strongly as possible. And it turns out that, on the one hand, Iran is getting stronger, and it is a chance to establish relations with it, and on the other, as we know, Iraq is an intended target for bombing by the United States to turn Iraq into a continuation of the anti-Osama-bin-Laden operation. That is why I think that the principal task for the U.S. will be to give a worthy response but to minimize its actions. Makiyenko: I would agree with Ivan. In my opinion, we are burying the Taliban regime a little too early. It seems to me that the regime enjoys quite a strong support inside Afghanistan and not only Afghanistan but also the support of North-Western territories of Pakistan. And if one looks at the first reports that started coming in after, it became clear that the U.S. would wish to support the Northern Alliance, the reports said that the Northern Alliance increased within two or three days its control from 5 percent to 20 percent and to 25 percent of the territory, when it was said that the Northern Alliance and General Dustum would capture the city of Mazari-Sharif very soon, but one deadline succeeds another and we do not see any serious successes in the military area on the part of the Northern Alliance. In my opinion, all this indicates that, militarily and politically, the Taliban regime is a very serious force, which cannot be overturned by the forces of the Northern Alliance. But neither do I see any great military and technical means at the disposal of the U.S. and Great Britain, of all this Western coalition, in order to rapidly and bloodlessly overturn and destroy the Taliban regime. Moderator: Two brief questions: will this coalition be able to at least disrupt the world terrorist networks? Yes or no, very briefly. Makiyenko: I think not. Safranchuk: I think not, but this will have a positive psychological effect. Makiyenko: The source of the funds for the international terrorist networks must be sought not in Afghanistan but in other regions. Moderator: In other regions? Can you name them? Makiyenko: On the Arabian Peninsula, in my opinion. Moderator: The Arabian Peninsula ? I hope this is not a new target but simply a place where one must look for sources. Makiyenko: But for the U.S. this is not a new target, this is no target at all. Moderator: I thank you Konstantin Makiyenko and Ivan Safranchuk. Makiyenko is deputy director of the Center for Analysis, Strategy and Technology, and Ivan Safranchuk is head of the Moscow office of the U.S. Center for Defense Information. I would very much like our listeners to be able to consult with you at subsequent stages of the operation and in the developing situation in that region. Thank you.
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